Pakistan’s Navy confirmed plans to expand its fleet to 50 ships during a 2021 address by then–Naval Chief Admiral Zafar Mahmood Abbasi, formally outlining one of the country’s largest long-term naval force development programs, according to defense analyst Zarvan Ali. Abbasi stated that the Pakistan Navy intends to induct 20 major surface combatants, including corvettes, […]Pakistan’s federal government has signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with SC Financial Technologies LLC, an affiliated entity of World Liberty Financial, to explore using World Liberty’s stablecoin for cross-border payments.
The announcement was made by the Pakistan Virtual Asset Regulatory Authority (PVARA), which described the agreement as enabling “dialogue and technical understanding around emerging digital payment architectures.”
The MoU comes amid a visit to Pakistan by Zach Witkoff, co-founder and chief executive of World Liberty and son of US special envoy Steve Witkoff.
During his visit, Witkoff met senior Pakistani stakeholders to discuss how countries are approaching secure, compliant, and transparent digital payment infrastructure, including innovations in cross-border settlement and foreign exchange processes.
“Our focus is to stay ahead of the curve by engaging with credible global players, understanding new financial models, and ensuring that innovation, where explored, is aligned with regulation, stability, and national interest,” said Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb.
Industry observers note that this marks World Liberty Financial’s second engagement with Pakistan, reinforcing the country’s positioning as a potential early-stage partner for exploring new digital payment models, including the USD1 stablecoin.
The MoU builds on earlier efforts, including a Letter of Intent signed in April with the Pakistan Crypto Council, which laid the groundwork for knowledge-sharing and ecosystem-level dialogue around emerging financial technologies.
Under the agreement, SC Financial Technologies will work with Pakistan’s central bank to integrate the USD1 stablecoin into a regulated digital payments structure.
This would allow the token to operate alongside Pakistan’s own digital currency infrastructure, potentially providing a new framework for cross-border settlement.
Stablecoins—digital tokens typically pegged to the US dollar—have expanded rapidly in global markets.
Under President Donald Trump, federal regulations in the United States have been widely viewed as supportive of the sector.
Countries worldwide are increasingly examining how stablecoins can complement existing payment systems, with regulatory compliance becoming a key consideration for global adoption.
World Liberty’s engagement with sovereign states has already demonstrated impact in other markets.
Reuters previously reported that in May, the state-controlled Abu Dhabi investment company MGX used World Liberty’s stablecoin to acquire a $2 billion equity stake in Binance, the world’s largest cryptocurrency exchange.
Pakistan has actively pursued initiatives to strengthen its digital finance ecosystem.
The PVARA highlighted that the country is emerging as a compelling frontier market for digital payments, supported by over $38 billion in annual remittance inflows, a rapidly growing digital economy, an estimated 40 million crypto users, and an annual trading volume of up to $300 billion in digital assets.
Recent regulatory steps include the issuance of No Objection Certificates (NOCs) to Binance and HTX, allowing both platforms to initiate local incorporation in under five months—a faster timeline than in many other jurisdictions.
The visits of Changpeng Zhao, founder of Binance, and Justin Sun, founder of TRON, reflect ongoing international interest in Pakistan’s regulatory framework and growing digital finance market.
PVARA stated that with sustained global engagement and a structured, regulation-first approach, Pakistan is increasingly viewed as a market to watch in the evolution of digital finance, particularly as the country explores new models for cross-border payments and stablecoin integration.
Pakistan has been exploring digital currency initiatives as it looks to reduce cash usage and improve cross-border payments such as remittances, which are a key source of foreign exchange for the country.
In July, Pakistan’s central bank governor said the institution was preparing to launch a pilot for a digital currency, and that it was finalising legislation to regulate virtual assets.
The post Pakistan signs deal to explore WLFI-linked stablecoin for payments appeared first on CoinJournal.
China’s State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense confirmed on Jan. 12 that the export-oriented J-10CE fighter jet achieved its first combat victory last May, stating that the aircraft downed several adversary aircraft in an aerial engagement without suffering losses. The agency described the operation as the J-10CE’s first confirmed combat result. […]Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have begun formal discussions to convert a $2 billion Saudi loan into a transaction for JF-17 fighter jets, Reuters reported. The talks center on a broader package valued at $4 billion, including an additional $2 billion allocated for related equipment. Reuters, citing sources familiar with the negotiations, reported that “the total […]The Pakistan Air Force on January 3 conducted a successful flight test of the indigenously developed Taimoor Weapon System, confirming the missile’s performance during an air-launched trial, according to an official statement. The service said the Taimoor Air-Launched Cruise Missile is designed to engage land and sea targets with precision at a range of up […]Bitcoin Magazine
Pakistan Begins Crypto Overhaul With Preliminary Exchange Approvals
Pakistan is moving to formalize its place in the global digital-asset economy, signing a memorandum of understanding with Binance to explore the tokenization of up to $2 billion in state-owned assets while granting early regulatory clearances to both Binance and HTX.
Together, the initiatives reflect one of the country’s most ambitious pushes yet to merge sovereign finance with blockchain-based infrastructure.
According to Pakistan’s finance ministry, the MoU with Binance will allow the government to assess tokenising sovereign bonds, treasury bills, and commodity reserves — including oil, gas, and metals — as it seeks new tools to boost liquidity and expand market reach.
Tokenization would create digital representations of real-world assets on blockchain networks, potentially widening investor access and supporting secondary-market efficiency.
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Asia is coming
Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb described the agreement as a signal of Pakistan’s reform trajectory and a step toward a “long-term partnership” aimed at drawing global participation into the country’s debt and commodity markets, according to Reuters.
Binance founder Changpeng “CZ” Zhao called the MoU an important marker for both Pakistan and the broader blockchain sector, suggesting it clears the way for deeper experimentation with digital asset rails at the sovereign level.
The tokenisation initiative comes in parallel with a regulatory milestone. Pakistan’s newly formed Virtual Assets Regulatory Authority (PVARA) has issued No Objection Certificates (NOCs) to Binance and HTX after a multi-agency review of each exchange’s governance, compliance, and risk-management systems.
The NOCs allow both firms to register with the Financial Monitoring Unit’s goAML platform, begin local incorporation, and prepare full license applications once the country finalizes its virtual-asset framework.
PVARA emphasized that the early clearances are not operating licenses but the first step in a phased, FATF-aligned path toward full authorization.
“Strong governance, AML and CFT compliance remain central as Pakistan builds a trusted digital-asset ecosystem,” the regulator said. Chair Bilal bin Saqib added that compliance rigor—not size—will determine which exchanges advance through the licensing process.
The developments are part of a broader digital-finance overhaul that the country has compressed into a few months.
That includes establishing PVARA, forming the Pakistan Crypto Council (PCC), drafting licensing and taxation rules, and laying groundwork for a central bank digital currency pilot in 2025.
The country has also signed a letter of intent with U.S.-based World Liberty Financial to explore stablecoin infrastructure and tokenised financial rails.
Saqib, who serves as minister of state for digital assets, has repeatedly argued that Pakistan must treat Bitcoin, tokenization, and blockchain as foundational elements of future financial architecture.
At the Bitcoin MENA conference, Saqib argued that bitcoin serves as a practical tool for millions of Pakistanis rather than a speculative bet.
His case was grounded in everyday economic realities. With the Pakistani rupee losing more than half its value in five years, he said people aren’t seeking lessons in monetary theory — they’re looking for protection.
For many, “bitcoin is not theory, it’s a relief,” offering a hedge against inflation driven by political decisions and chronic currency mismanagement.
Access is the other major issue. Pakistan has a population of about 240 million, yet more than 100 million people remain unbanked. In that context, Bin Saqib said bitcoin provides a pathway to basic financial services that the traditional system has failed to deliver.
At a fireside chat, Saqib tied these grassroots use cases to a broader national strategy. Pakistan, he said, is not trying to “chase the future” but to build a new one. With roughly 70% of the population under the age of 30, the country cannot rely on outdated economic models.
Saqib said Bitcoin and blockchain-based payment rails enable Pakistani workers to get paid globally without friction, delays or excessive fees. Digital assets, and bitcoin in particular, are being viewed as infrastructure rather than speculation — new financial rails for the Global South.
This post Pakistan Begins Crypto Overhaul With Preliminary Exchange Approvals first appeared on Bitcoin Magazine and is written by Micah Zimmerman.
Bitcoin Magazine
Bitcoin Is a Relief, Not a Theory: Pakistan’s Case for Crypto Adoption
At the Bitcoin MENA conference, Bilal Bin Saqib, chairman of the Pakistan Virtual Assets Regulatory Authority, delivered a message that framed bitcoin not as a speculative asset, but as a practical solution to structural economic problems facing millions of people in Pakistan.
One of Bin Saqib’s most striking takeaways was how grounded his argument in lived reality. In Pakistan, bitcoin is less about ideology and more about necessity.
As Bin Saqib put it, for many Pakistanis “bitcoin is not theory, it’s a relief,” a response to problems traditional financial systems have failed to solve for decades.
He pointed first to savings. Pakistan’s currency has lost more than half its value over the past five years, eroding purchasing power for ordinary citizens. In that environment, Bin Saqib argued, people are not looking for explanations of monetary theory. They are looking for protection.
Bitcoin, he said, provides a way to store value outside inflation driven by political decisions, money printing and currency mismanagement. “You don’t need a lecture,” he noted. “You need a hedge.”
Access was the second pillar of his case. Despite Pakistan being home to roughly 240 million people, more than 100 million remain unbanked.
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Pakistan is coming
For this population, traditional finance has simply never arrived. Bitcoin, according to Bin Saqib, offers a financial identity without the need for permission, paperwork or intermediaries that may never open the door.
That permissionless access, he argued, is especially powerful for young people encountering true financial ownership for the first time.
The third pillar was cross-border earnings. Pakistan has one of the largest freelance workforces in the world, yet freelancers often struggle to receive international payments quickly, cheaply and transparently.
Bitcoin and blockchain-based payment rails enable Pakistani workers to get paid globally without friction, delays or excessive fees. For many, this has meant a direct connection to the global economy for the first time.
Bin Saqib tied these grassroots use cases to a broader national strategy. Pakistan, he said, is not trying to “chase the future” but to build a new one. With roughly 70% of the population under the age of 30, the country cannot rely on outdated economic models.
Digital assets, and bitcoin in particular, are being viewed as infrastructure rather than speculation—new financial rails for the Global South.
He outlined his mandate since being appointed seven months ago: to transform one of the world’s largest unregulated crypto markets into a compliant, investment-friendly ecosystem.
Pakistan has already moved to establish a virtual asset regulatory framework, issue provisional licenses for exchanges, and develop regulatory sandboxes for mining, tokenization and fintech.
The goal, Bin Saqib said, is to bring activity onshore rather than push it underground, protecting users without suffocating builders.
Energy played a central role in the discussion. Pakistan paradoxically suffers from both power shortages and massive excess capacity, paying for electricity that goes unused.
Bin Saqib described bitcoin mining and artificial intelligence as tools to convert that “wasted economic oxygen” into productive output.
Every unused megawatt, he argued, could be turned into bitcoin mining or AI compute, effectively transforming stranded energy into digital exports.
In that framework, bitcoin mining becomes less about consumption and more about industrial renewal.
Rather than exporting only commodities or labor, Pakistan could export compute—what Bin Saqib called one of the most valuable resources of the 21st century. He framed this not as a narrow energy policy, but as part of a broader industrial rebirth.
Looking ahead, Bin Saqib predicted that the next wave of bitcoin adoption will not be led by Wall Street, but by emerging markets where economic pain is real and the upside is massive.
This post Bitcoin Is a Relief, Not a Theory: Pakistan’s Case for Crypto Adoption first appeared on Bitcoin Magazine and is written by Micah Zimmerman.
OPINION — South Asia has once again returned to the global spotlight after a suicide bombing struck the heart of India’s capital on November 10. The bomber detonated explosives in a car near Delhi’s historic Red Fort, killing 13 and injuring 25 others. This attack—the first major attack in the Indian capital in over a decade—points to the threat of Pakistan-based terrorism beyond the border regions.
According to Indian authorities, the Delhi bombing was part of a broader plot that security agencies disrupted in the days leading up to the attack. The suicide bomber, allegedly recruited by the Pakistan-based group Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), reveals how Pakistan-backed outfits are upgrading their recruitment methods and fundraising tactics following Indian airstrikes in May that destroyed several of their operational centers. These developments highlight the fragility of regional security as both India and Pakistan edge closer to another military confrontation. With this backdrop, the United States must reassess its growing ties with Pakistan’s military establishment, which remains the epicenter of South Asia’s instability.
The Rise of a “White-Collar” Terror Network
Prior to the Delhi attack, Indian authorities uncovered a terror network across three provinces in India, including Jammu and Kashmir. Authorities seized nearly 2,900 kilograms of explosive materials near Delhi, including 360 kilograms of ammonium nitrate, confiscated assault rifles, and arrested at least ten doctors linked to the operation.
The scope of the seizure suggests that the “white collar” terrorist cell planned multiple coordinated attacks capable of mass casualties far exceeding the Delhi bombing. A hypothesis remains that the Delhi suicide bomber, Dr. Umar Nabi, acted independently after authorities preempted the larger plot and detained his associates. Nabi and another doctor from Kashmir were allegedly connected with JeM recruiters via Telegram and met their handlers in Turkey. It can be assessed with high confidence that the duo’s alleged meeting with their handlers overseas likely facilitated access to explosives, funding, and logistical support.
The revelation of the white-collar terrorist network in India marks a shift in Pakistan-based terrorist groups’ recruitment strategies—from radicalizing uneducated youth to mobilizing educated professionals with specialized skills. At the same time, JeM and other groups have shifted their financing from traditional banking channels to fintech platforms, mobile wallets, and decentralized digital payment systems. Together, these trends illustrate a strategic recalibration: a move toward more sophisticated, less detectable forms of proxy warfare aimed at destabilizing India’s internal security and social cohesion.
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The Pakistan Angle
A day after the Delhi bombing, another suicide attack outside Islamabad’s District Court killed 12 people. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Defense Minister Khawaja Asif immediately blamed India, claiming the attacks were “orchestrated from Afghanistan at India’s behest.” However, the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) offshoot Jamaat ul Ahrar (JuA) claimed responsibility, contradicting the government’s narrative. Although no direct link has been established between the Delhi and Islamabad attacks, the latter exposes Pakistan’s deteriorating counterterrorism capacity and its flawed internal security policies. Official data from October indicates more than 4,700 terrorist incidents occurred in Pakistan this year alone, killing over 1,000 people despite 62,000 reported counterterrorism operations carried out by security forces. This paradox points to a chronic failure of strategy rather than a lack of effort.
Instead of reinforcing counterinsurgency grids in its northwest, Pakistan has relied on punitive airstrikes and heavy-handed tactics—often targeting civilian areas in Afghanistan. In early October, Pakistani jets carried out an airstrike in Kabul intended to kill TTP leader Noor Wali Mehsud. The botched operation, however, damaged civilian infrastructure and provoked international condemnation. Mehsud later released a video clip confirming he remains active within Pakistan, further embarrassing Islamabad. Additional airstrikes in Afghanistan’s Paktia Province killed three athletes, inflaming tensions along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and triggering sporadic cross-border shelling. These misdirected operations have played directly into the TTP’s hands, enabling its expansion and emboldening more radical offshoots like JuA, which has increasingly targeted civilians in major Pakistani cities.
Pakistan’s motivations appear less about counterterrorism and more about geopolitical signaling. Its October 9 airstrike in Kabul coincided with Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s visit to India—the first such diplomatic outreach since the Taliban takeover of Kabul. The timing suggests Pakistan’s strikes were designed to warn Kabul against strengthening ties with New Delhi. Yet, Afghanistan has refused to yield and continues to deepen cooperation with India in healthcare and infrastructure development.
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Another Conflict Remains Imminent
As domestic terrorism surges, Pakistan’s civil-military leadership has diverted its focus to countering India’s strategic positioning in the region by inflicting punitive strikes on Afghanistan and increasing military cooperation with the interim government of Bangladesh, which is hostile to New Delhi. Simultaneously, Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, recently consolidated power after parliament passed the 27th constitutional amendment, granting him sweeping authority and lifetime immunity from prosecution. This move has sparked widespread criticism within Pakistan. Three senior judges have resigned in protest, and prominent civil society figures warn that the country has entered a new phase of authoritarian rule. Munir’s expanding authority mirrors the military’s long-standing playbook: when legitimacy wanes, external crises—particularly with India—serve as instruments of political survival.
The conditions for another India-Pakistan confrontation are steadily aligning. Pakistan’s military, under domestic pressure, could once again resort to conflict with India to restore its standing. Meanwhile, Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi has warned that any future operation would be far more severe than Operation Sindoor—the codename for India’s May 2025 strikes on Pakistani terrorist and military infrastructure. General Dwivedi’s statement that territory remains the “currency of victory” signals India’s willingness to pursue limited territorial gains in Pakistan-occupied areas of Jammu and Kashmir in the event of renewed hostilities.
The May India-Pakistan conflict has set a precedent that Pakistan will use nuclear saber-rattling to secure a ceasefire with India. Yet, Indian strategists increasingly regard Pakistan’s nuclear threats as coercive posturing designed to provoke U.S. intervention rather than as credible deterrence. If another conflict erupts, India may not be deterred by Pakistan’s nuclear signaling. The Indian calculus appears to favor limited conventional offensives aimed at degrading Pakistan’s militant infrastructure and securing limited territorial gains while testing Islamabad’s actual nuclear resolve. Such a confrontation would dramatically alter South Asia’s deterrence dynamics and expose the fragility of Pakistan’s “bleeding India with a thousand cuts” doctrine.
Conclusion
For the United States, these developments present a dilemma. As I warned in The Cipher Brief in September, America’s national security priorities cannot align with Pakistan’s objectives in the region. Washington’s growing diplomatic and economic engagement with Pakistan risks undermining long-term regional stability if it fails to address Islamabad’s dual game—presenting itself as a counterterror ally while nurturing militant proxies.
Washington must reexamine the foundations of its Pakistan strategy. The United States should leverage its political influence and aid frameworks to condition engagement on measurable counterterror reforms: dismantling militant networks, enforcing digital financial oversight, and halting cross-border militant activity. Without such conditionality, the United States risks legitimizing a regime that fuels the very instability it claims to combat.
The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.
Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.
Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.
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OPINION — One of the most enduring security issues in South Asia has been rekindled by the recent border conflicts between the Taliban-led Afghanistan and Pakistan military regimes. Diplomatic efforts by Qatar and Turkey have resulted in a tenuous ceasefire after days of fierce fighting that claimed scores of lives on both sides, offering a little respite from the rising violence. However, talks for a lasting peace have since collapsed. The crisis reveals long-standing structural tensions along one of the most volatile frontiers in the world that have their roots in militant activity, historical enmity, and disputed sovereignty.
Escalation and Triggers of Conflict
Intense fighting broke out along several stretches of the 2,600-kilometer Afghanistan-Pakistan Durand line in early October 2025, especially close to Spin Boldak–Chaman and the Kurram tribal areas. Each side accused the other of starting the conflict. The Taliban-led government denounced Pakistan's retaliatory bombings as a violation of national sovereignty, while Pakistan asserted that militants connected to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) were conducting cross-Durand line attacks from Afghan territory. According to reports, Pakistani air raids in the provinces of Kandahar and Paktika killed dozens of civilians. Taliban members retaliated by attacking a number of Pakistani military installations, with the opposing side suffering heavy losses. Afghan traders are losing millions of dollars every day as a result of the conflict's rapid disruption of humanitarian and commercial routes, which led to the closure of important Durand line crossings.
This breakdown was not the first. Pakistan has long accused the Afghan Taliban of harbouring the TTP, a group committed to destroying Pakistan's government but philosophically linked with Kabul's leadership. The Taliban have refuted these claims, stating that Afghanistan forbids the use of its territory against other countries. However, the Durand Line, from the colonial era, continues to function as a political and geographic fault line, trapping both sides in a never-ending blame game.
The Doha-Istanbul Ceasefire Agreement
An emergency ceasefire agreement was reached on October 19, 2025, following nearly a week of fighting, thanks to intensive mediation by Qatar and Turkey. Both parties committed to immediately stopping offensive operations, prohibiting cross-Durand line attacks, and setting up systems for ensuring compliance under the agreement. To address implementation and verification procedures, a follow-up meeting was planned for October 25 in Istanbul. The deal was heralded as a diplomatic victory, particularly since Turkey and Qatar, who both have comparatively open lines of communication with the Taliban leadership, were instrumental in facilitating communication between two regimes which do not trust one another.
Khawaja Muhammad Asif, the defence minister for the Pakistani military dictatorship, underlined that Islamabad would evaluate the truce based on the Taliban's capacity to control the TTP. "This agreement will be broken by anything coming from Afghanistan," he cautioned. The Taliban's stated position that Afghanistan "will not allow its soil to be used against any country" was reaffirmed by Zabihullah Mujahid, the regime's spokesperson. Although these declarations show official dedication, they conceal more profound disparities in ability and perspective. The Taliban government sees the threat as a matter of border integrity and sovereignty, whereas Pakistan primarily sees it through the prism of counterterrorism. It will take more than diplomatic words to bridge different viewpoints.
Istanbul Talks
The follow-up talks in Istanbul — intended to turn the Doha truce into an enforceable framework—ended without a resolution after four days of negotiations. Reporting from multiple outlets indicates that mediators could not bridge the gap over concrete action against TTP networks allegedly operating from Taliban controlled soil and over how to verify any commitments. Pakistani regime’s officials briefed that Kabul was unwilling to accept binding steps to rein in or relocate the TTP; Afghan sources countered that the Taliban does not command or control the TTP and rejects responsibility for cross-Durand line attacks.
On the eve of, and during, the Istanbul round, Pakistan’s defence minister publicly warned that failure would risk “open war,” underscoring how narrow the window is for diplomacy if violence resumes along the frontier. While he acknowledged the ceasefire had broadly held for several days, he framed the talks’ success as contingent on Kabul’s verifiable curbs on the TTP. Reports say talks in Istanbul have restarted in another attempt for a deal.
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Key unresolved issues
First, TTP-focused measures: Islamabad sought explicit commitments (dismantling safe havens, detentions/relocations, or handovers of wanted militants), while Kabul insists it won’t allow Afghan territory to be used against neighbours but resists operations that might trigger internal backlash or fracture ties with sympathetic factions. No binding text on TTP was agreed.
Second, a verification and incident-prevention mechanism: negotiators discussed joint hotlines, third-party monitoring, or liaison teams stationed in cross-Durand line hubs to investigate incidents in real time. Talks stalled over scope, authority, and who would adjudicate disputes.
Third, the Durand Line: Pakistan has fenced large stretches and wants coordinated patrols and recognized crossing protocols; the Taliban does not formally recognize the Durand Line as an international boundary, making technical fixes politically sensitive. This gap persisted in Istanbul.
Fourth, trade and crossings: business lobbies on both sides pushed for a timetable to reopen Spin Boldak–Chaman and other checkpoints for normal commerce and humanitarian flows, but negotiators did not finalize sequencing (security steps first vs. parallel reopening).
Fifth, refugees and returns: Islamabad raised concerns around undocumented Afghans and cross-Durand line facilitation; Kabul pressed for humanitarian safeguards. No durable arrangement was announced.
Obstacles to Durable Peace
The structural issues threatening Afghanistan-Pakistan ties are still mostly unaddressed in spite of the truce. First, the ceasefire does not include militant organisations like the TTP. Their independence severely restricts the enforceability of the agreement. According to analysts, the Taliban are reluctant to use force to fight the TTP because of ethnic and ideological ties that make internal Afghan politics more difficult.
Second, monitoring is quite challenging because of the porous nature of the Durand-line. Pakistan has unilaterally fenced off significant portions of the Durand Line, whereas Afghanistan does not formally recognise it as an international border. Recurrent conflicts are exacerbated by this lack of mutual recognition, especially when it comes to security patrols and cross-Durand line trading.
Third, there is still an imbalance of interests. Attacks by militants coming from Afghanistan are the problem for Pakistan. Pakistan's repeated airstrikes and backing of anti-Taliban groups are the source of Kabul's resentment. Joint security coordination is hampered by these conflicting narratives.
Fourth, pressure from within both governments is increasing. While the Taliban in Afghanistan must strike a compromise between meeting external demands and preserving their credibility among nationalist and tribal factions, public annoyance in Pakistan has increased due to an increase in attacks on security forces. Internal resentment could result from any impression of giving in.
Last but not least, the economic aspect introduces another level of complication. Afghanistan relies significantly on cross-border trade through Pakistan for imports and transit to global markets. Significant financial losses and humanitarian difficulties have resulted from the bridge closures. Unless trade flows restart fully, the truce will have limited practical effects.
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The Strategic and Regional Implications
There are wider ramifications for South and Central Asia from the crisis and the resulting truce.
Stability and militancy in the region: Should the truce fail, transnational militant networks, such as IS-K and al-Qaida elements, may gain more confidence. Resuming hostilities might destabilise the entire region, as these organisations flourish in uncontrolled border areas.
Taliban governance: The truce also serves as a litmus test for the Taliban's ability to govern. Global opinions of its legitimacy as a ruling power will be influenced by its capacity to maintain territorial control, interact diplomatically, and quell militant groups.
Realignments in diplomacy: The participation of Qatar and Turkey demonstrates how regional diplomacy is changing. Both nations have established themselves as go-betweens that can interact with the Taliban government without granting official recognition. Their mediation highlights a changing power dynamic in South Asia, where non-Western actors are having a greater impact on resolving disputes.
Economic and humanitarian impact: The conflict's humanitarian effects go beyond its security implications. Food and medical supplies have been disrupted by the closing of the Cross-Durand line, and the situation for displaced people on both sides of the frontier is getting worse. Maintaining peace will depend on reopening trade channels and making sure help is delivered.
The Road Ahead
The establishment of cooperative verification systems, a quantifiable decline in militant attacks, and the resumption of trade are important markers to keep an eye on. If any party breaks the agreement, the area can quickly revert to hostilities. It will be a careful balancing act for Pakistan to keep pressure on the Taliban without inciting escalation. The ability of the Taliban to control militant organisations while maintaining internal unity and sovereignty will be put to the test in Afghanistan. Supporting monitoring, communication, and de-escalation procedures is essential for regional partners, especially Qatar and Turkey, to continue their mediation efforts beyond symbolic diplomacy. As of October 28, the Istanbul process has adjourned without a deal, leaving these markers unmet and the ceasefire’s durability uncertain until verifiable steps are negotiated.
In the end, the ceasefire between Afghanistan and Pakistan serves as an example of the potential and vulnerability of regional diplomacy in a post-Western security context. In addition to bilateral discussions, broad regional collaboration tackling the interconnected problems of militancy, Durand-line governance, and economic interdependence will be necessary for a lasting peace. The willingness of both regimes to turn promises into tangible, verifiable action will determine whether this armistice develops into long-lasting stability or just serves as another brief break in a lengthy history of antagonism.
The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.
Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.
Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.
Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief
The recent clashes underscore a simple truth: kinetic escalation along a porous frontier is a multiplier. Airstrikes, artillery duels, and intermittent border closures do not remain local nuisances. They force displacement, interrupt trade and humanitarian access, and create openings for transnational violent actors to regroup and expand. At the same time, high-level diplomatic gestures, like India’s reception of a Taliban foreign minister—help normalize engagement without demanding verifiable commitments from Kabul on terrorism, human rights, or governance. The result is a dangerous two-track dynamic: escalation on the ground and normalization in the capitals.
A brief history of the rivalry on Afghan soil
Pakistan’s footprint in Afghanistan is old and deep. From the anti-Soviet jihad to the 1990s civil war, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) cultivated proxies, trained fighters in madrassas and camps, and hosted Taliban decision-making bodies in Quetta, Peshawar, and Miramshah. By the time I led Signals Intelligence at NDS, the material flows, explosives, trainers, and fighters—were a familiar pattern. As U.S. forces drew down after 2014, Islamabad’s public posture shifted; in private and in some diplomatic forums, Pakistan presented the Taliban as a political reality to be accommodated. That accommodation was always transactional, however, and it produced deep leverage inside Afghanistan—from provincial commanders to elements inside Kabul.
India’s engagement followed a different logic but with equally transactional ends. Delhi invested heavily in infrastructure, education and development—roads, power projects, scholarships that sent Afghans to Indian universities. Those investments built goodwill and administrative capacity. But India also positioned itself as a counterweight to Pakistan. New Delhi’s network of consulates, including two on Pakistan’s border, provided both soft-power reach and strategic insight. My colleagues and I at NDS were aware that New Delhi’s intelligence service (RAW) cultivated contacts in border provinces and maintained links that could be used against Pakistan. At the time the Afghan republic rationalized these partnerships: the enemy of our enemy was a useful ally. That pragmatic logic blinded us to a harsher reality—India’s support for Afghan institutions was, ultimately, calibrated to New Delhi’s competitive needs, not an unconditional commitment to the Republic’s survival.
Two anecdotes illustrate the corrosive effect of external rivalry on Afghan sovereignty. First, while intercepting communications as head of Signals Intelligence I once heard General Dostum pleading on the phone with Pakistan’s ambassador—an exchange that revealed how quickly even vocal opponents could seek patronage. Second, a private meeting with the RAW station chief in Kabul—held months before the Republic collapsed—left me with a hollow certainty: Indian intelligence was preparing contingency plans for the Republic’s fall rather than mobilizing to prevent it. Those were not betrayals born of malice but of strategic realism: both Delhi and Islamabad were optimizing for their own survival and leverage.
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Why this rivalry matters now
Three features make the current moment particularly risky.
First, even when attacks originate with state-adjacent actors inside Afghanistan, their effects are interstate: whether Islamabad acknowledges strikes in Kandahar or Taliban-aligned groups carry out violence, the result is cross-border harm — civilians killed, infrastructure damaged, and humanitarian access disrupted.
Second, diplomatic gestures without conditionality distort incentives. India’s public reset—receiving a Taliban foreign minister—grants political space to a movement whose internal policies remain deeply repressive. If major regional powers normalize ties without demanding verifiable changes, they risk entrenching a governance model that enables radicalization and denies basic rights, particularly for women and minorities.
Third, Afghans pay the price. External competition saps Afghan agency. Political elites are incentivized to cultivate foreign patrons rather than build domestic coalitions. Former security personnel, civil servants and vulnerable communities are either abandoned or become leverage for outside actors. The human cost—displacement, loss of livelihoods, shrinking civic space—is the clearest metric of failure.
A three-part policy approach: sovereignty, de-escalation, and conditional engagement
If Washington and its partners are serious about stability in South and Central Asia, they should adopt a compact focused on three priorities.
Prevent Afghanistan from becoming the battlefield. The U.S. should lead a regional security initiative—narrow in scope but backed by monitoring and consequence mechanisms—bringing together India, Pakistan, Iran, China, and key Central Asian states. The initiative would pledge non-use of Afghan territory for hostile proxy activity, create impartial border monitoring mechanisms, and establish rapid-response channels to defuse incidents before they spiral.
Push India and Pakistan back to bilateral dialogue. The most durable way to remove Afghan soil from the rivalry is to reduce the rivalry itself. Washington should use calibrated incentives and diplomatic leverage to get Delhi and Islamabad into issue-specific talks—starting with confidence-building measures on border management, refugee handling, counter-narcotics cooperation, and a hotline for counterterrorism incidents. These are pragmatic, tradeable commitments that build reciprocity without demanding grand concessions.
Condition engagement with Kabul on verifiable benchmarks. Engagement with the de facto authorities will continue for humanitarian and security reasons—but it must not reward predation. Bilateral ties should be tied to transparent, public benchmarks: demonstrable counter-terrorism cooperation, protections for civilian populations (especially women and minorities), and steps to prevent Afghan soil from being used by transnational violent actors. Parallel support must be scaled for civil society, independent media, and the Afghan diaspora—networks that preserve the political capital needed for a future inclusive order.
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Realism with consequences
Some will argue that Delhi’s and Islamabad’s actions are driven by existential fears and that external pressure has limited purchase. That is true. But realism also recognizes that incentives, reputational costs, and monitoring can alter strategic calculations. The goal is not to force idealism but to make proxy strategies less profitable—politically, economically and reputationally—than cooperation.
Conclusion
The recent ceasefire and high-profile diplomatic activity are warnings more than signals of resolution. Afghanistan’s sovereignty must not be treated as negotiable currency in a broader regional rivalry. If the international community fails to act, Afghans will continue to suffer as their country becomes the chessboard for others’ strategies. The path forward is straightforward, if politically difficult: prevent kinetic escalation, push India and Pakistan toward practical dialogue, and condition engagement with Kabul on measurable protections for Afghan people. For the sake of Afghanistan—and for regional security—that is the responsible, pragmatic choice.
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