Shield AI, a California-based defense technology firm, has begun construction on a new unmanned aerial systems (UAS) production facility in Hyderabad, India, as part of a $90 million joint venture with JSW Group. The move aims to bring full-scale local manufacturing of the V-BAT drone to the Indian defense sector under a long-term technology transfer […]The Ministry of Communications on had asked smartphone makers to install the government’s “Sanchar Saathi” app within 90 days and to prevent users from disabling it.
The post India Rolls Back Order to Preinstall Cybersecurity App on Smartphones appeared first on SecurityWeek.
Indian crypto investors are showing a stronger preference for diversified digital asset portfolios, marking an early shift toward more deliberate and long-term allocation behaviour.
CoinDCX’s annual report, released on Thursday, suggests that the country’s retail investor base is gradually moving away from the idea that crypto is synonymous with Bitcoin, signalling broader maturity in market participation in 2025.
This trend reflects a market becoming more confident, curious, and willing to explore varied opportunities across the expanding digital ecosystem.
The exchange found that the average user now holds around five tokens, compared with two to three in 2022.
This steady expansion of holdings indicates a growing awareness of portfolio construction and a willingness to explore different parts of the crypto market beyond the most established assets.
CoinDCX reported that layer-1 assets accounted for 43.3% of portfolio volumes.
Bitcoin, priced at $93,133, held a 26.5% share of allocations. Memecoins made up 11.8% of user portfolios, showing that speculative interest remains a part of broader diversification trends.
According to the exchange, Indian traders have become increasingly comfortable navigating different digital asset categories as adoption widens across the country.
The report noted that crypto is emerging as a natural extension of the financial products already familiar to many users.
The platform’s user base is ageing upward, with the average trader now 32 years old. Millennials continue to make up the majority of users, outpacing Gen Z in adoption, though younger traders remain active.
Gen Z users, aged 18 to 24, tend to favour emerging narratives such as layer-2 ecosystems, memecoins, and non-fungible tokens. Their behaviour reflects a greater appetite for thematic or speculative sectors.
CoinDCX also saw its number of women investors double year on year. These users are diversifying beyond Bitcoin and Ether, priced at $3,183, into tokens such as Solana at $143.04 and Sui at $1.67.
Founded in 2018 and backed by Coinbase, CoinDCX is one of India’s largest crypto exchanges with more than 20 million registered users. It remains a key gateway for retail access to digital assets.
CoinDCX noted that India continues to lead in early indicators of digital asset awareness, including mobile-first trading behaviour and high engagement across educational content on the platform.
These signals reflect strong nationwide interest in crypto as a financial category.
However, the exchange found that deeper, research-driven participation remains limited. Many users enter the market through popular assets or trending narratives rather than sustained ecosystem involvement.
As a result, the platform characterised India’s adoption as “wide” but not yet “deep”.
CoinDCX said the country is still in the early stages of its digital asset journey, leaving significant room for education, innovation, and long-term growth as user sophistication develops.
The post CoinDCX data reveals India’s rising appetite for diversified digital assets appeared first on CoinJournal.
The order, which has not been released publicly, was shared privately with select device makers.
The post India Quietly Orders Smartphone Makers to Preload State Cybersecurity App appeared first on TechRepublic.
The order, which has not been released publicly, was shared privately with select device makers.
The post India Quietly Orders Smartphone Makers to Preload State Cybersecurity App appeared first on TechRepublic.
The core of the dispute centers on how penalties for anti-competitive behavior are calculated.
The post Apple Challenges India’s $38B Fine Threat appeared first on TechRepublic.
The core of the dispute centers on how penalties for anti-competitive behavior are calculated.
The post Apple Challenges India’s $38B Fine Threat appeared first on TechRepublic.
OPINION — South Asia has once again returned to the global spotlight after a suicide bombing struck the heart of India’s capital on November 10. The bomber detonated explosives in a car near Delhi’s historic Red Fort, killing 13 and injuring 25 others. This attack—the first major attack in the Indian capital in over a decade—points to the threat of Pakistan-based terrorism beyond the border regions.
According to Indian authorities, the Delhi bombing was part of a broader plot that security agencies disrupted in the days leading up to the attack. The suicide bomber, allegedly recruited by the Pakistan-based group Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), reveals how Pakistan-backed outfits are upgrading their recruitment methods and fundraising tactics following Indian airstrikes in May that destroyed several of their operational centers. These developments highlight the fragility of regional security as both India and Pakistan edge closer to another military confrontation. With this backdrop, the United States must reassess its growing ties with Pakistan’s military establishment, which remains the epicenter of South Asia’s instability.
The Rise of a “White-Collar” Terror Network
Prior to the Delhi attack, Indian authorities uncovered a terror network across three provinces in India, including Jammu and Kashmir. Authorities seized nearly 2,900 kilograms of explosive materials near Delhi, including 360 kilograms of ammonium nitrate, confiscated assault rifles, and arrested at least ten doctors linked to the operation.
The scope of the seizure suggests that the “white collar” terrorist cell planned multiple coordinated attacks capable of mass casualties far exceeding the Delhi bombing. A hypothesis remains that the Delhi suicide bomber, Dr. Umar Nabi, acted independently after authorities preempted the larger plot and detained his associates. Nabi and another doctor from Kashmir were allegedly connected with JeM recruiters via Telegram and met their handlers in Turkey. It can be assessed with high confidence that the duo’s alleged meeting with their handlers overseas likely facilitated access to explosives, funding, and logistical support.
The revelation of the white-collar terrorist network in India marks a shift in Pakistan-based terrorist groups’ recruitment strategies—from radicalizing uneducated youth to mobilizing educated professionals with specialized skills. At the same time, JeM and other groups have shifted their financing from traditional banking channels to fintech platforms, mobile wallets, and decentralized digital payment systems. Together, these trends illustrate a strategic recalibration: a move toward more sophisticated, less detectable forms of proxy warfare aimed at destabilizing India’s internal security and social cohesion.
What national security news are you missing today? Get full access to your own national security daily brief by upgrading to Subscriber+Member status.
The Pakistan Angle
A day after the Delhi bombing, another suicide attack outside Islamabad’s District Court killed 12 people. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Defense Minister Khawaja Asif immediately blamed India, claiming the attacks were “orchestrated from Afghanistan at India’s behest.” However, the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) offshoot Jamaat ul Ahrar (JuA) claimed responsibility, contradicting the government’s narrative. Although no direct link has been established between the Delhi and Islamabad attacks, the latter exposes Pakistan’s deteriorating counterterrorism capacity and its flawed internal security policies. Official data from October indicates more than 4,700 terrorist incidents occurred in Pakistan this year alone, killing over 1,000 people despite 62,000 reported counterterrorism operations carried out by security forces. This paradox points to a chronic failure of strategy rather than a lack of effort.
Instead of reinforcing counterinsurgency grids in its northwest, Pakistan has relied on punitive airstrikes and heavy-handed tactics—often targeting civilian areas in Afghanistan. In early October, Pakistani jets carried out an airstrike in Kabul intended to kill TTP leader Noor Wali Mehsud. The botched operation, however, damaged civilian infrastructure and provoked international condemnation. Mehsud later released a video clip confirming he remains active within Pakistan, further embarrassing Islamabad. Additional airstrikes in Afghanistan’s Paktia Province killed three athletes, inflaming tensions along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and triggering sporadic cross-border shelling. These misdirected operations have played directly into the TTP’s hands, enabling its expansion and emboldening more radical offshoots like JuA, which has increasingly targeted civilians in major Pakistani cities.
Pakistan’s motivations appear less about counterterrorism and more about geopolitical signaling. Its October 9 airstrike in Kabul coincided with Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s visit to India—the first such diplomatic outreach since the Taliban takeover of Kabul. The timing suggests Pakistan’s strikes were designed to warn Kabul against strengthening ties with New Delhi. Yet, Afghanistan has refused to yield and continues to deepen cooperation with India in healthcare and infrastructure development.
Nominations for outstanding leaders in national security and intelligence are now open for the 2026 Cipher Brief Honors Dinner. Find out more here.
Another Conflict Remains Imminent
As domestic terrorism surges, Pakistan’s civil-military leadership has diverted its focus to countering India’s strategic positioning in the region by inflicting punitive strikes on Afghanistan and increasing military cooperation with the interim government of Bangladesh, which is hostile to New Delhi. Simultaneously, Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, recently consolidated power after parliament passed the 27th constitutional amendment, granting him sweeping authority and lifetime immunity from prosecution. This move has sparked widespread criticism within Pakistan. Three senior judges have resigned in protest, and prominent civil society figures warn that the country has entered a new phase of authoritarian rule. Munir’s expanding authority mirrors the military’s long-standing playbook: when legitimacy wanes, external crises—particularly with India—serve as instruments of political survival.
The conditions for another India-Pakistan confrontation are steadily aligning. Pakistan’s military, under domestic pressure, could once again resort to conflict with India to restore its standing. Meanwhile, Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi has warned that any future operation would be far more severe than Operation Sindoor—the codename for India’s May 2025 strikes on Pakistani terrorist and military infrastructure. General Dwivedi’s statement that territory remains the “currency of victory” signals India’s willingness to pursue limited territorial gains in Pakistan-occupied areas of Jammu and Kashmir in the event of renewed hostilities.
The May India-Pakistan conflict has set a precedent that Pakistan will use nuclear saber-rattling to secure a ceasefire with India. Yet, Indian strategists increasingly regard Pakistan’s nuclear threats as coercive posturing designed to provoke U.S. intervention rather than as credible deterrence. If another conflict erupts, India may not be deterred by Pakistan’s nuclear signaling. The Indian calculus appears to favor limited conventional offensives aimed at degrading Pakistan’s militant infrastructure and securing limited territorial gains while testing Islamabad’s actual nuclear resolve. Such a confrontation would dramatically alter South Asia’s deterrence dynamics and expose the fragility of Pakistan’s “bleeding India with a thousand cuts” doctrine.
Conclusion
For the United States, these developments present a dilemma. As I warned in The Cipher Brief in September, America’s national security priorities cannot align with Pakistan’s objectives in the region. Washington’s growing diplomatic and economic engagement with Pakistan risks undermining long-term regional stability if it fails to address Islamabad’s dual game—presenting itself as a counterterror ally while nurturing militant proxies.
Washington must reexamine the foundations of its Pakistan strategy. The United States should leverage its political influence and aid frameworks to condition engagement on measurable counterterror reforms: dismantling militant networks, enforcing digital financial oversight, and halting cross-border militant activity. Without such conditionality, the United States risks legitimizing a regime that fuels the very instability it claims to combat.
The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.
Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.
Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.
Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief
The State Department has approved a possible Foreign Military Sale to India that includes Javelin anti-tank missiles, Excalibur precision artillery projectiles, and related support equipment, according to a notification sent to Congress by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The combined estimated value of the two packages is about $92.8 million. According to the DSCA […]
With over 107 million users and stricter regulations than ever, choosing the right crypto app in India isn’t just about features — it’s…
The recent clashes underscore a simple truth: kinetic escalation along a porous frontier is a multiplier. Airstrikes, artillery duels, and intermittent border closures do not remain local nuisances. They force displacement, interrupt trade and humanitarian access, and create openings for transnational violent actors to regroup and expand. At the same time, high-level diplomatic gestures, like India’s reception of a Taliban foreign minister—help normalize engagement without demanding verifiable commitments from Kabul on terrorism, human rights, or governance. The result is a dangerous two-track dynamic: escalation on the ground and normalization in the capitals.
A brief history of the rivalry on Afghan soil
Pakistan’s footprint in Afghanistan is old and deep. From the anti-Soviet jihad to the 1990s civil war, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) cultivated proxies, trained fighters in madrassas and camps, and hosted Taliban decision-making bodies in Quetta, Peshawar, and Miramshah. By the time I led Signals Intelligence at NDS, the material flows, explosives, trainers, and fighters—were a familiar pattern. As U.S. forces drew down after 2014, Islamabad’s public posture shifted; in private and in some diplomatic forums, Pakistan presented the Taliban as a political reality to be accommodated. That accommodation was always transactional, however, and it produced deep leverage inside Afghanistan—from provincial commanders to elements inside Kabul.
India’s engagement followed a different logic but with equally transactional ends. Delhi invested heavily in infrastructure, education and development—roads, power projects, scholarships that sent Afghans to Indian universities. Those investments built goodwill and administrative capacity. But India also positioned itself as a counterweight to Pakistan. New Delhi’s network of consulates, including two on Pakistan’s border, provided both soft-power reach and strategic insight. My colleagues and I at NDS were aware that New Delhi’s intelligence service (RAW) cultivated contacts in border provinces and maintained links that could be used against Pakistan. At the time the Afghan republic rationalized these partnerships: the enemy of our enemy was a useful ally. That pragmatic logic blinded us to a harsher reality—India’s support for Afghan institutions was, ultimately, calibrated to New Delhi’s competitive needs, not an unconditional commitment to the Republic’s survival.
Two anecdotes illustrate the corrosive effect of external rivalry on Afghan sovereignty. First, while intercepting communications as head of Signals Intelligence I once heard General Dostum pleading on the phone with Pakistan’s ambassador—an exchange that revealed how quickly even vocal opponents could seek patronage. Second, a private meeting with the RAW station chief in Kabul—held months before the Republic collapsed—left me with a hollow certainty: Indian intelligence was preparing contingency plans for the Republic’s fall rather than mobilizing to prevent it. Those were not betrayals born of malice but of strategic realism: both Delhi and Islamabad were optimizing for their own survival and leverage.
The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.
Why this rivalry matters now
Three features make the current moment particularly risky.
First, even when attacks originate with state-adjacent actors inside Afghanistan, their effects are interstate: whether Islamabad acknowledges strikes in Kandahar or Taliban-aligned groups carry out violence, the result is cross-border harm — civilians killed, infrastructure damaged, and humanitarian access disrupted.
Second, diplomatic gestures without conditionality distort incentives. India’s public reset—receiving a Taliban foreign minister—grants political space to a movement whose internal policies remain deeply repressive. If major regional powers normalize ties without demanding verifiable changes, they risk entrenching a governance model that enables radicalization and denies basic rights, particularly for women and minorities.
Third, Afghans pay the price. External competition saps Afghan agency. Political elites are incentivized to cultivate foreign patrons rather than build domestic coalitions. Former security personnel, civil servants and vulnerable communities are either abandoned or become leverage for outside actors. The human cost—displacement, loss of livelihoods, shrinking civic space—is the clearest metric of failure.
A three-part policy approach: sovereignty, de-escalation, and conditional engagement
If Washington and its partners are serious about stability in South and Central Asia, they should adopt a compact focused on three priorities.
Prevent Afghanistan from becoming the battlefield. The U.S. should lead a regional security initiative—narrow in scope but backed by monitoring and consequence mechanisms—bringing together India, Pakistan, Iran, China, and key Central Asian states. The initiative would pledge non-use of Afghan territory for hostile proxy activity, create impartial border monitoring mechanisms, and establish rapid-response channels to defuse incidents before they spiral.
Push India and Pakistan back to bilateral dialogue. The most durable way to remove Afghan soil from the rivalry is to reduce the rivalry itself. Washington should use calibrated incentives and diplomatic leverage to get Delhi and Islamabad into issue-specific talks—starting with confidence-building measures on border management, refugee handling, counter-narcotics cooperation, and a hotline for counterterrorism incidents. These are pragmatic, tradeable commitments that build reciprocity without demanding grand concessions.
Condition engagement with Kabul on verifiable benchmarks. Engagement with the de facto authorities will continue for humanitarian and security reasons—but it must not reward predation. Bilateral ties should be tied to transparent, public benchmarks: demonstrable counter-terrorism cooperation, protections for civilian populations (especially women and minorities), and steps to prevent Afghan soil from being used by transnational violent actors. Parallel support must be scaled for civil society, independent media, and the Afghan diaspora—networks that preserve the political capital needed for a future inclusive order.
Need a daily dose of reality on national and global security issues? Subscriber to The Cipher Brief’s Nightcap newsletter, delivering expert insights on today’s events – right to your inbox. Sign up for free today.
Realism with consequences
Some will argue that Delhi’s and Islamabad’s actions are driven by existential fears and that external pressure has limited purchase. That is true. But realism also recognizes that incentives, reputational costs, and monitoring can alter strategic calculations. The goal is not to force idealism but to make proxy strategies less profitable—politically, economically and reputationally—than cooperation.
Conclusion
The recent ceasefire and high-profile diplomatic activity are warnings more than signals of resolution. Afghanistan’s sovereignty must not be treated as negotiable currency in a broader regional rivalry. If the international community fails to act, Afghans will continue to suffer as their country becomes the chessboard for others’ strategies. The path forward is straightforward, if politically difficult: prevent kinetic escalation, push India and Pakistan toward practical dialogue, and condition engagement with Kabul on measurable protections for Afghan people. For the sake of Afghanistan—and for regional security—that is the responsible, pragmatic choice.
The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.
Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.
Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.
Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief
OPINION — During the ten-year Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the United States leveraged Pakistan’s geostrategic position to support the Afghan Mujahideen in their fight against the Red Army. What began as a marriage of convenience evolved into a strategic partnership after the Bush administration launched the Global War on Terror in 2001. Washington required Islamabad’s cooperation in its military campaign in Afghanistan, and in return, Pakistan received billions of dollars in annual aid. For subsequent administrations, however, relations with Pakistan were approached more cautiously, given Islamabad’s political instability and its Islamist tendencies, particularly its support for Salafi-Jihadist (SJ) groups in the region.
Donald Trump’s second term has marked a departure from decades of U.S. policy toward Pakistan, bringing the quasi-military state closer to Washington. President Trump has reportedly dined with Pakistan’s de facto ruler, Chief of Army Staff Field Marshal Asim Munir, and even offered to mediate on Kashmir against India’s objections. In return, Pakistan facilitated operations for a Trump-backed cryptocurrency firm to establish a crypto reserve in the country, allowed U.S. companies to explore its untapped oil reserves, and nominated Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. Notably absent from these exchanges, however, was any discussion of combating transnational terrorism.
National security priorities must take precedence over economic ties. Ignoring Pakistan’s track record of harboring global terrorists and supporting transnational SJ groups is likely to backfire in the near term. Washington must demand concrete accountability on core national and regional security issues before granting Islamabad further concessions.
Pakistan’s Transnational Terrorist Network
The aftermath of the four-day India-Pakistan war in May exposed Pakistan’s enduring ties to regional terrorism. During Operation Sindoor, the Indian Air Force struck nine alleged Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) training centers in eastern Pakistan—both groups designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) by the United States. Indian intelligence reports indicate these groups are now actively recruiting and fundraising in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPK) to reconstitute their ranks. At one such event, senior JeM commander Maqsood Illyas Kashmiri openly boasted about carrying out attacks in Delhi and Kandahar, including operations targeting U.S.-backed troops. Kashmiri further claimed that Field Marshal Asim Munir dispatched senior general officers to attend the funerals of terrorists killed during Operation Sindoor. This assertion is reinforced by the widely circulated image of senior Pakistani army officers, led by U.S.-designated terrorist Hafiz Abdur Rauf, offering funeral prayers for slain militants in Muridke, Punjab Province. The presence of uniformed generals with full military protocol at these funerals underscores the deep ties between Pakistan’s military establishment and terrorist organizations. In a separate video, an LeT commander pledged to rebuild the sites destroyed by India and urged Pakistani youth to join the group’s ranks.
Pakistani terrorist groups also exploit public platforms to advance their broader pan-Islamist agenda. Talha Saeed, son of LeT founder Hafiz Saeed—who orchestrated the 2008 Mumbai attacks—has openly held election rallies in Pakistan, despite being under global scrutiny for terrorist links. At one such rally in Punjab, Talha even threatened to assassinate Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This highlights the alarming impunity with which designated FTO members operate in Pakistan. Similarly, LeT deputy leader Saifullah Kasuri has made multiple public appearances since being identified by Indian intelligence as a key planner of the April 2025 Pahalgam terrorist attack. Kasuri, who also heads LeT’s political front party, Milli Muslim League (MML), traveled to Doha in August 2024 to meet Hamas leader Khaled Mashal and offer condolences on the assassination of Hamas Chief Ismail Haniyeh. Despite Kasuri and his political outfit being sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury, he managed to travel to Qatar and meet with members of other global terrorist groups—an act unlikely to have occurred without logistical and financial backing from the Pakistani state machinery.
In theory, Pakistan has been central to U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the region. In practice, however, it has remained a key sponsor and enabler of transnational terrorism. With the state and military’s tacit support, local jihadist groups have gained a stronger voice in the global pan-Islamist movement. Field Marshal Munir has faced no serious pressure to dismantle these organizations. On the contrary, their continued presence serves his interests—an emboldened position reflected in his past threats, including a chilling remark at a private dinner in Tampa, Florida, where he invoked Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal against India.
The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.
Know Thy Client
The United States must recognize the inherent risks of deepening economic engagement with Pakistan. Today, Pakistan’s notorious Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) remains deeply embedded across society, conducting mass surveillance and systematically persecuting minority groups in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. According to a recent Amnesty International report, Pakistan’s intelligence services employ Chinese surveillance technology to suppress dissent in regions with strong secessionist tendencies. If Washington seeks to explore Balochistan’s mineral-rich reserves, it must account for the serious security risks posed by reprisal attacks. Beijing’s experience with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) offers a stark warning. Baloch militant groups have repeatedly attacked Chinese infrastructure, killed Chinese workers, and sabotaged projects, stalling progress for years. U.S. contractors and private citizens would likely face similar threats, as many Baloch view outside exploration as illegitimate.
At the same time, joint financial ventures in Pakistan risk fueling unregulated and unchecked transactions that could benefit terrorist groups. In 2022, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) removed Pakistan from its grey list after the government complied with anti–money laundering standards. Yet Pakistan’s own finance minister recently warned the country could slip back onto the list due to the high volume of unregulated digital transactions. If the United States invests in Pakistan’s cryptocurrency reserve—which currently lacks safeguards or regulatory oversight—it risks inadvertently enabling terrorist organizations that exploit this unregulated environment. The potential reputational damage to the Trump administration from such complicity would be severe and far-reaching.
Conclusion: The Way Forward
The United States must urgently reevaluate the foundations of its engagement with Pakistan. Rather than maintaining a short-sighted, transactional approach, Washington needs a long-term strategic forecast that accounts for the risks of dealing with an unstable quasi-military state. Civil conflict, large-scale terrorist attacks, and violent reprisals from marginalized minority groups remain immediate dangers. For example, on September 22, the Pakistan Air Force carried out airstrikes in KPK's Tirah Valley that killed at least 24 Pashtun civilians, including women and children. Such botched operations are likely to fuel reprisal attacks by Pashtun-dominated groups such as the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) and their affiliates. U.S. officials must therefore assess Pakistan’s volatile political and security landscape before expanding American stakes in the country.
Leaving behind a legacy that strengthens Islamist groups in South Asia would undermine both U.S. security interests and President Trump’s political standing. Before deepening ties, Washington must extract meaningful accountability from Pakistan’s civil-military establishment. History makes clear that Pakistan cannot be fully aligned with American priorities; at best, it can be managed. The United States must therefore tread carefully—demanding guarantees, setting strict conditions, and preparing contingencies—if it is to avoid becoming complicit in Pakistan’s destabilizing behavior.
The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.
Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.
Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.
Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief
The cannabis industry’s fastest-growing product category — pre-rolls — hit a supply chain snag when the U.S. imposed a 50% tariff on imports from India.
President Trump’s India tariffs threaten cannabis industry’s fastest-growing segment is a post from: MJBizDaily: Financial, Legal & Cannabusiness news for cannabis entrepreneurs
This Eggless Cherry Chocolate Tart Cake is a delicious and easy-to-make dessert perfect for hot summer days when cherries are abundant. The tart cake is one I make quite often, and this tart tin was one of my best buys. This versatile dessert can be soaked in Kirsch or cherry juice for added flavor. The raised flan tart tin ensures perfect results, inspiring creativity with various flavor combinations and customizations.
The post Eggless Cherry Chocolate Tart Cake … delicious cakes for summer! appeared first on Passionate About Baking.
Chataka Dal is a spicy flavorful Dal from the Indian state of Maharashtra. It is made from yellow split pigeon peas simmered along with tomatoes, then seasoned with a spicy chili tempering. Gluten-free, soy free and nut free.
I grew up in Maharashtra state and the dishes of this particular cuisine have a special place in my heart! Simple dals, bhaji like my jackfruit brown chickpea bhaji, saoji , kohlapuri, and Zunka are already on the blog! You can find misal pav and Amti dal in my cookbook.
This Chataka dal is another dish I love – it’s a simple dal with few ingredients but trust me, it’s far from simple in taste. It’s fiery with the added chili powder tempering. As always, you can adjust the spice level to your preference.
To serve, I serve with flatbread or rice. This dish goes incredibly well with rice but you could also serve this with cauliflower rice.
Dals are soul food with many variations from various states and regions in India.
There are several types of Dals and legumes used in Indian cuisine. You can see a list with pictures here.
This Chataka dal is quick and delicious. Traditionally it used 1-2 tablespoon of the Indian chili powder, but that is going to be a lot of heat for most . So I use less. You can use whichever lentils or split peas you have for this recipe. Just cook them long enough until tender and then add the tempering/Tadka.
Continue reading: Chataka Dal – Spicy Maharashtrian Toor Dal
The post Chataka Dal – Spicy Maharashtrian Toor Dal appeared first on Vegan Richa.
Saag Cornbread Casserole – a fragrant Indian mustard greens stew baked in the oven and topped with a cornbread topping. So flavorful and comforting. Baked Sarson da saag Makki roti casserole. Nutfree Soyfree recipe. Oil-free and gluten-free versions are included.
I am back with another Indian-inspired casserole dish! To help you try Indian flavors and foods in a a simpler format. Saag Cornbread Casserole – flavorful, super nourishing and oh-so satisfying.
Saag is a dish from the northern part of India that uses greens. It can use different types of greens that are locally available. The most common version uses either all mustard greens or a mix of mustard greens and spinach or bathua (a type of amaranth) leaves. It is often slow cooked for a while then mashed and cooked again to make a spiced mashed greens stew that is served topped with vegan butter, Indian pickle and with flatbread.
Saag is usually served with a maize flour/fine cornmeal based flatbread (called Makki ki roti).
Makki/makai ki roti (corn flatbread) is somewhat similar to Mexican corn tortillas but uses maize flour that hadn’t been nixtamalized. Hence it has a different flavor and texture from corn tortillas. The process for making both the roti and saag can take quite some time, so I converted this delicious Punjabi comfort food staple into a simple casserole dish that you can make in a baking dish!
The greens used in this casserole are chopped up and placed at the bottom of the casserole dish alongside the tempered spices and flavors of Saag. I add some quinoa to increase the protein content of this vegan casserole dish. You can use split red lentils instead or some potatoes.
While our saag casserole bakes, we make a cornbread-type topping using Indian spices and cornmeal instead of making corn flatbread on the side.
Then we layer that cornbread mixture over the pre-cooked greens, cover it with parchment paper and bake the whole assembled casserole again until the cornbread sets.
I love to serve this as is or with some vegan butter on top. It’s hearty, delicious and checks all the Makki ki roti and sarson da saag flavor and the ease of a casserole.
Jalapeno Chili Cornbread Casserole
Baked Kitchari Casserole (Spiced Lentil Rice Casserole)
South Indian Eggplant Curry Recipe (Baked Casserole)
Continue reading: Saag Cornbread Casserole
The post Saag Cornbread Casserole appeared first on Vegan Richa.
Login