The fossil and genetic evidence agree that modern humans originated in Africa. The most genetically diverse human populations—the groups that have had the longest time to pick up novel mutations—live there today. But the history of what went on within Africa between our origins and the present day is a bit murky.
That’s partly because DNA doesn’t survive long in the conditions typical of most of the continent, which has largely limited us to trying to reconstruct the past using data from present-day populations. The other part is that many of those present-day populations have been impacted by the vast genetic churn caused by the Bantu expansion, which left its traces across most of the populations south of the Sahara.
But a new study has managed to extract genomes from ancient samples in southern Africa. While all of these are relatively recent, dating from after the end of the most recent glacial period, they reveal a distinct southern African population that was relatively large, outside of the range of previously described human variation, and it remained isolated until only about 1,000 years ago.
Nigeria Wants to Tax Its Digital Workers — But Offers Them Nothing in Return
The quiet rise of Africa’s Digital Middle Class — and why Nigeria’s 2026 tax reform misses the moment
Every morning at 6 a.m., as the hum of generators fills the Lekki air, Chioma logs into Upwork from her one-bedroom flat. She’s a content strategist for three American SaaS companies, earning about $2,200 a month — more than most Nigerian workers. Her workday begins only after she switches to backup power and connects her Starlink router — a $600 investment she guards like gold. When the inverter fails, she packs up for a co-working space in Lekki — ₦5,000 for the day. When the Wi-Fi drops, she tethers her mobile data and watches her budget drain. Every outage costs her both money and momentum, but quitting isn’t an option.
Chioma represents a new kind of Nigerian professional: one who earns globally but survives locally. She pays for her own electricity, internet, health care, and security — the very things government systems should provide. Her success depends not on public support but on private resilience.
Across Nigeria, Kenya, and Ghana, a new Digital Middle Class (DMC) has quietly taken shape — remote developers, content creators, designers, and freelancers who earn in dollars through global platforms like Upwork, Fiverr, and others. They are globally integrated but locally invisible, unrecognized in GDP, labor law, or social protection systems. Their rise confirms a historic shift: Africa’s new labor export is digital, not physical.
When Nigeria announced its 2026 tax reform — requiring freelancers, creators, and remote workers to register, file their own taxes, and pay under a new progressive structure with rates going up to about 20–25% — it seemed like progress. At last, governments were acknowledging an invisible but rapidly growing segment of the workforce. But for many earning online, this visibility may bring vulnerability before protection.
Defining the Digital Middle Class
This class represents the first generation of Africans able to participate directly in global digital labor markets. They work remotely for clients across the US, Europe, and Asia, receive payments through fintechs or stablecoins, and contribute to a parallel economy that operates beyond borders.
I got an international remote job with zero experience,” said a young Nigerian developer on X. “They paid over ₦1 million a month to learn, and even covered $1,000 for my training. Now I’m killing it and earning more.
Recent data validates their growing influence:
Sub-Saharan Africa’s digital gig activity rose 130% between 2016 and 2020, the fastest in the world, while North America grew just 14%.
The implications are immense: dollar-paying jobs in economies where the average graduate earns less than $300 a month. Global clients are increasingly pulling top African talent out of local markets, deepening inequality but also forcing a skills revolution.
High youth unemployment pushes more young Africans online, and each success story drives the next generation to learn digital skills.
A Hidden Economic Engine
This digital migration is reshaping local economies. The drivers are clear: job scarcity, cheap mobile data, and expanding connectivity. Over 416 million Africans now use mobile internet, yet 64% remain offline due to high costs, unreliable power, and unaffordable devices.
Despite these challenges, the DMC’s dollar inflows act as a quiet stabilizer for fragile currencies. Their earnings are untracked in official remittance or export data, yet the impact is comparable to diaspora remittances. A remote worker earning $1,500 a month can sustain dependents, inject hard currency into circulation, and power small urban economies — even though this activity never appears in GDP reports or labor statistics.
Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa account for roughly 80.6% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s internet traffic directed toward online gig platforms.
While 42.9% earn between $1,000 and $2,000 monthly, another 14.3% earn over $3,000 — placing them firmly in the upper middle class by local standards and making them prime targets for aggressive taxation.
But their economic impact is invisible. Because their income flows through P2P crypto, Payoneer, or foreign platforms, it rarely touches formal banking rails. Governments miss the data — and the opportunity to build systems around this growing group.
The African Development Bank has launched a program (MADE Alliance: Africa) aiming to provide digital access to 100 million individuals and businesses by 2034, while industry estimates project Africa’s digital economy could reach $180 billion by 2025.
Still, the “invisibility paradox” remains, their contributions are absent from fiscal planning or credit systems.
And yet, behind this invisible economy is an equally invisible challenge — how to save, earn, and grow wealth in systems that were never designed for digital labor. But the more profound shift isn’t financial; it’s psychological.
The Psychological and Cultural Shift
Beyond economics, there’s a profound psychological transformation. For the first time, a generation of Africans is competing — and winning — on merit in a global labor market.
Dollar income changes identity: from survival to self-determination.
“From a noisy street in Kaduna to a quiet hotel in Abuja… from a social event in Lagos to the beach on an island — that’s the beauty and privilege of being able to work from anywhere,” wrote Ochai Emmanuel, a Nigerian creative who documents his remote journey online. “It’s not always comfortable. But it’s freedom.”
Remote work has reframed ambition. It legitimized creative labor, dissolved old stigmas around freelancing, and placed African talent at the center of global digital production.
Yet the costs are real: extreme monitoring by foreign clients, algorithmic pressure, and burnout without any safety net.
Many fund their own equipment, power backups, and healthcare.
A single platform ban can erase years of income history and professional credibility overnight.
This is the double edge of Africa’s digital awakening — independence without infrastructure.
But this psychological liberation is fragile. And Nigeria’s new tax policy threatens to turn autonomy into anxiety.
The Policy Blindspot
A Tax System Built Backward Nigeria’s 2025/2026 Tax Act prioritizes short-term revenue extraction over long-term ecosystem stability and talent retention.
The result: a policy that discourages productivity instead of rewarding it. In its current form, the government risks pushing its most capable digital workers offshore — or deeper into the shadows.
It’s a paradox: a policy that penalizes the very success it claims to formalize.
An Outdated Definition of the Middle Class Most African governments still define “middle class” through 20th-century lenses — salaried workers in banks, oil firms, or the civil service.
That excludes the new earners powering digital economies in dollars, euros, and pounds. Kenya’s last major labor law update was in 2007 — before remote work even existed. Nigeria’s tax reform arrives decades late and risks repeating the same mistake: starting with extraction instead of inclusion.
Voices from the Digital Frontline
“I’ve worked remotely for about half of my life,” says Osaretin Victor Asemota, a Nigerian tech entrepreneur. “The question of taxing remote workers makes me laugh. What are you providing to me as a government?”
His argument is pragmatic: “You can tax my consumption but not my income. If my clients want to withhold tax at source and remit it directly, that’s fine — that’s a clean, transparent system.”
Asemota also exposes the enforcement gap:
“Governments are used to raiding offices and auditing physical spaces. Digital workers have neither. That makes them nervous.”
He adds, almost wryly:
“Some can’t even do property taxes well.”
Crypto Makes Enforcement Impossible
The rise of digital currencies deepens the challenge.
“Digital nomads will be the hardest demographic to tax as crypto goes mainstream,” Asemota says. “If all my savings are in USDC wallets, outside government reach, enforcement becomes nearly impossible.”
A Constructive Path Forward
Instead of extraction, Asemota argues for incentives:
“Encourage savings for pensions. That’s the number one issue remote workers face. They need a guaranteed future — not harassment.”
He notes emerging solutions — startups building portable pensions and freelancer insurance.
“Sensible governments should be courting them, not chasing away the workers they serve.”
But Nigeria, for now, is doing the opposite — starting with extraction instead of infrastructure. Here’s what that looks like in practice:
Under the New Nigeria Tax Act 2025
The National Revenue Service (NRS) replaces the FIRS and introduces a digital-first system for registration and tax filing. It covers residents’ worldwide income — meaning freelancers and remote workers must now declare foreign earnings in naira at the official Central Bank rate and pay under new progressive bands that reach up to 25%.
For a Nigerian freelancer earning about $1,500 a month, the policy translates to nearly ₦5 million in annual taxes — roughly 18% of income — with no pension, health insurance, or safety net in return.
(Assumptions: ₦1,488/$ official rate, rent relief capped at ₦500,000 or 20%, progressive rates 0–25%; Sources: PwC Nigeria Tax Update 2025, EY Nigeria Brief 2025.)
For most digital workers, the issue isn’t just the rate — it’s the process. Registering, converting earnings at the official rate, and navigating compliance add friction to already fragile systems.
The reform could have been a bridge between informal digital work and formal recognition. Instead, it feels like a toll gate built halfway across the bridge.
For foreign employers, the stakes are high too. Under the new rules, companies hiring Nigerians remotely could face local tax exposure if contractors earn above ₦25 million or stay in-country long enough to trigger residency thresholds.
Building the Infrastructure for the Digital Middle
If governments truly want to harness this class rather than overtax it, they must build systems that match the realities of global digital labor. Africa’s digital earners need infrastructure that makes talent visible, connected, and bankable.
It starts with skills. Africa needs bootcamps and university programs designed for remote work, not just local employment. Think of India’s export-ready model: practical, globally benchmarked, and outcome-driven. The same shift — from degrees to demonstrable skills — can position African workers for global demand.
But skills alone don’t build security. To truly anchor this new middle class, governments and fintechs must create the financial rails that make stability possible — access to credit based on verified earnings, portable pensions that travel with the worker, and micro-insurance that cushions income shocks. Without these, digital work remains freedom without a safety net.
Infrastructure also means access — reliable internet, affordable power, and professional spaces where remote workers can thrive without spending half their income keeping the lights on. A Lagos designer shouldn’t need to run a mini-power plant to stay employed.
Finally, it means trust — not just in systems, but in people. For many African professionals, credibility isn’t questioned because of ability, but because of origin. A Nigerian senior software engineer recently lost a signed CTO offer worth over $260,000 after the company’s compliance review flagged his nationality. The decision wasn’t about competence — it came from a government regulation that prohibited hiring Nigerians. His passport, not his performance, ended the contract.
Other workers face a quieter but equally damaging bias: job postings that quietly exclude Nigerians, algorithms that flag their accounts as “high-risk,” or assumptions that poor connectivity means poor reliability. The result is a double barrier — systemic restrictions on one side, perception gaps on the other.
Infrastructure must solve both. Africa needs credibility systems that prove trustworthiness beyond geography — verified work histories, consistent identity standards, and connectivity that’s fast and affordable enough to erase the stereotype of unreliability. True inclusion means making digital credibility as universal as digital opportunity — so that skill, not nationality, determines who gets hired.
This is the social contract rebuilt for a digital age — one where governments don’t just collect from their most productive citizens, but invest in them. Without it, Africa will keep exporting talent and importing frustration.
The Larger Transformation
The Digital Middle Class (DMC) represents more than income — it’s a shift in how Africans engage with globalization. Instead of exporting raw materials, they now export knowledge and creativity. They’ve built parallel economies across borders, currencies, and cultures.
“I don’t know how to explain how much I love working for American clients from home in Nigeria,” wrote another remote worker on X. “The time zone makes it easy, and the pay is even better.”
Nigeria’s tax debate isn’t really about compliance; it’s about recognition — of a class that has quietly built resilience without state help. Africa’s digital century depends on whether governments choose to exploit or empower them.
The success of the Digital Middle Class is not anecdotal — it’s structural, scalable, and, if formalized correctly, could anchor Africa’s next major economic transformation.
Africa’s digital century will hinge on whether formalization empowers its creators — or erases their hard-won autonomy.
South Africa does not have a “strong immediate need” for a central bank digital currency (CBDC) for the time being, according to the country’s central bank. The South African Reserve Bank has published a position paper on the viability of…
South Africa’s central bank has cooled expectations for a retail central bank digital currency, saying the country does not face an urgent need to launch one and should focus instead on upgrading the existing payments system.
Key Takeaways:
South Africa’s central bank says a retail CBDC is not needed now and is prioritizing payments system upgrades instead.
The SARB will focus on wholesale digital currency uses and improving cross-border payments.
Officials also warned that crypto and stablecoins pose financial risks and could be used to bypass exchange controls.
In a research paper published Thursday, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) said a consumer-facing CBDC is technically possible but not necessary in the near term.
SARB Prioritizes Payments Reform Over Retail CBDC Rollout
The bank argued that current reforms aimed at improving the national payments rails, adding faster settlement, and widening participation by non-bank providers offer a more practical route to better financial access for now.
“While the SARB does not currently advocate for the implementation of a retail CBDC, it will continue to monitor developments and will remain prepared to act should the need arise,” the paper said.
Rather than pursuing a digital rand for everyday use, the central bank plans to focus on wholesale applications of digital currency and on boosting the efficiency of cross-border payments.
The move reflects a view that targeted infrastructure upgrades could deliver benefits sooner than a broad consumer rollout that would require new legal, technical and operational frameworks.
SARB’s researchers also tested whether a retail CBDC would solve gaps in the country’s payments network and found mixed results.
About 16% of adults remain unbanked, but the bank said a digital currency would need to match or beat cash on key features such as offline use, universal acceptance, ease of use, privacy and low cost to make a meaningful dent in that number.
The SA Reserve Bank (SARB) has published a position paper and background note on the necessity of a retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) in South Africa. Drawing on years of research, technical experimentation and stakeholder engagement, the SARB finds that ‒ while a… pic.twitter.com/hCAMGAHOdP
The paper landed as the central bank issued fresh warnings about crypto assets and stablecoins.
In a separate report this week, SARB flagged the sector as a growing risk to technology-led finance and cautioned that digital tokens could be used to route money around the country’s exchange controls, which govern capital flows.
Globally, the CBDC push remains uneven.
Only three countries, including Nigeria, Jamaica, and The Bahamas, have fully launched digital currencies, while dozens of others are running pilots or are in development or research phases, according to the Atlantic Council’s tracker.
US to Shelve CBDC as Congress Advances Stablecoin and Crypto Bills
In July, the US House narrowly passed a key procedural vote, clearing the path for final decisions on three major crypto bills: the GENIUS stablecoin bill, the CLARITY Act, and the Anti-CBDC Surveillance State Act.
In September, House Republicans moved to combine the measure banning the Federal Reserve from creating a CBDC with the CLARITY Act.
However, the CLARITY Act has not been signed into law, but is still under consideration in the Senate. The bill requires passage by both the Senate and the House, and then presidential approval, before it can be enacted.
DEEP DIVE — Entire cities in the Darfur region of Sudan have been burned and razed, millions have fled their homes, and unspeakable terror and violence plague those left behind. When fighting erupted on April 15, 2023, between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under Abdel Fattah al‑Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti, few predicted the conflict would become one of Africa’s worst humanitarian disasters.
There is, however, more to this war than just an internal battleground. The war in Darfur is no longer simply a domestic power struggle. It has become a multilayered proxy battlefield involving Egypt, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran and more — each supporting rival Sudanese actors to secure strategic footholds.
“The current phase has Darfur as a killing field. The Sudanese protagonists have sorted out somewhat the areas each controls. Still, on the political front, both are committed to eliminating the other in a fight to the finish,” United States Ambassador to Sudan during the George W. Bush administration, Cameron Hume, tells The Cipher Brief. “There may be agreement on a time-limited humanitarian ceasefire, but no one is aiming at a durable political settlement between the two main parties.”
Infographic with a map showing areas controlled by the army, the Rapid Support Forces and neutral groups in Sudan as of September 23, 2025, according to the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute and the AFP. (Infographic with a map showing areas controlled by the army, the Rapid Support Forces and neutral groups in Sudan as of September 23, 2025, according to the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute and the AFP (Graphic by AFP) (Graphic by Olivia Bugault, Valentina Breschi, Nalini Lepetit-Chella/AFP via Getty Images)
United Arab Emirates
Despite official denials, the UAE remains the RSF’s cornerstone patron in Darfur, suspected of funneling advanced weaponry — including Chinese CH-95 and “Long Wang 2” strategic drones for 24-hour surveillance and strikes, Norinco-guided bombs, howitzers, and thermobaric munitions —via a covert air bridge of more than 240 UAE-chartered flights from November 2024, often landing at Chad’s Amdjarass airfield or South Darfur’s Nyala base.
These supplies, additionally routed through Libyan intermediaries like Khalifa Haftar’s networks and Ugandan/Somali airfields, have empowered RSF assaults, such as the latest siege and takeover of El Fasher. Economically, UAE-based firms like Hemedti’s Al-Junaid control Darfur’s Jebel Amer and Songo gold mines, exporting $1.6B in 2024, reportedly laundered via seven sanctioned Dubai entities to fund RSF salaries, Colombian mercenaries and further arms.
“The United Arab Emirates is the key sponsor of the RSF in strategic terms. Its interest is to convert influence in western Sudan into leverage over corridors, gold monetization and logistics, and to prevent an outcome in which Islamists consolidate in Khartoum,” Dr. Andreas Krieg, Associate Professor at King’s College London, tells The Cipher Brief.
Sudan’s gold — its primary export — has also become a lifeline for the UAE, feeding Dubai’s markets with more than ten tons a year from RSF-controlled areas. The trade aligns with Abu Dhabi’s long-term ambitions and its stance against the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as its past reliance on RSF fighters in Yemen. Despite Emirati denials and Sudan’s failed genocide case against the UAE at the ICJ, evidence ties the UAE directly to embargo breaches, from passports recovered in Omdurman to Emirati-made vehicles found at RSF sites.
As the UAE expands its influence through RSF control of Darfur’s 700-kilometer Red Sea corridor, reviving stalled DP World and AD Ports projects to rival Saudi NEOM, it effectively uses the militia as a proxy to secure resources and block SAF dominance. Approximately 70 percent of Sudan’s gold production from RSF-controlled areas is smuggled through Dubai, while overall illicit exports account for around 40 percent of the country’s total gold output.
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Turkey
Ankara, seeing the Darfurian conflict as both a threat to its regional ambitions and a challenge to Islamist allies, has backed al-Burhan’s forces with drones worth $120 million, delivered through Egypt. Their weapons supply assisted SAF in retaking Khartoum earlier this year but comes with deeper incentives: ideological ties with Burhan’s Islamist faction and strategic objectives for Red Sea access.
“Turkey’s quiet intelligence-sharing and counterterrorism pacts give it outsized sway over local regimes,” John Thomas, managing director of strategic policy firm Nestpoint Associates, tells TheCipher Brief.
The result, experts say, is a dangerous and growing proxy war between the UAE and Turkey — one now fought with advanced drones and air defenses across Sudan’s skies. The stalemate has fractured the country, spilled instability into Chad and Libya, and left tens of thousands dead, a toll experts warn could further destabilize the Horn of Africa.
Beyond the pace and scale of Turkish arms transfers, the presence of Turkish private military contractors (PMCs) in Africa merits closer scrutiny.
“In addition to the pace and spread of Turkey’s arms flow, I would say the presence of Turkish PMCs in Africa is something policymakers really ought to focus on more closely,” Will Doran, Turkey researcher at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, tells The Cipher Brief. “A lot of these PMCs, like Erdogan himself, are warm towards the Muslim Brotherhood and have some questionable ties to Islamist militias on the ground in the Sahel. This isn’t to say Turkey is backing the region’s big names in terrorism. For one, Ankara’s deployed against al-Shabaab in Somalia, but the PMC trend is worrisome nonetheless.”
Egypt
Egypt views Sudan as a vital flank for its national interests. The Nile River flows from Sudan into Egypt, and Cairo has long been vigilant about any instability upstream. Egypt supports General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) because Cairo views them as the most dependable group to safeguard Egypt’s key national interests — namely, the Nile River corridor, which is Egypt’s sustenance for water and trade, and the southern border, which it shares with Sudan.
According to Dr. Krieg, “Egypt is the principal state backer of the army.”
“Its strategic priorities are the security of the Nile heartland, avoidance of an Islamist resurgence, and denial of hostile basing or rival influence along the Red Sea,” he continued.
Egypt, already hosting more than a million refugees, also fears that if Khartoum collapses into chaos, the resulting instability — such as refugee flows, arms trafficking, or militant activity — could spill over the border into its territory. Diplomatically, Cairo has kept direct intervention limited and insists on a Sudan-led solution, yet it retains close military and political ties to Burhan.
Saudi Arabia
Riyadh shares a parallel concern: as the Gulf kingdom pursues its Vision 2030 and Red Sea coastal investments, it has an interest in a stable Sudan firmly aligned with its regional agenda. Riyadh has backed the SAF via financial and diplomatic support, while also positioning itself as a mediator.
“Saudi Arabia is perhaps the outside player with potential influence that gets the least attention,” said Amb. Hume.
Dr. Krieg also observed that “Saudi Arabia has positioned itself as a convenor and would prefer a unified state that secures the Red Sea.”
“Chad and the Haftar camp in eastern Libya function as corridors and logistics enablers, and their choices directly affect the intensity of fighting in Darfur,” he explained. “Those intermediaries in Libya and Chad are all part of the UAE’s Axis of Secessionists; a network of non-state actors that are all tied to Abu Dhabi directly or indirectly.”
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Iran
Since late 2023, Iran has resumed ties with SAF leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan after a seven-year break, sending Mohajer-6 and Ababil drones, artillery, and intel via seven Qeshm Fars Air flights to Port Sudan from December 2023 through July 2024. This aid helped SAF retake Khartoum in March 2025 and strike RSF in Darfur. In addition, Iran uses Sudan’s Yarmouk arms factory to counter the UAE-backed RSF. Tehran’s overarching goal? Access to Port Sudan to support the Houthis in Yemen and spread Shiite influence — risking wider regional proxy conflict.
“Iran’s military support has helped shift momentum toward the SAF. As one of many foreign actors exacerbating Sudan’s internal tensions, Iran contributes to the country’s unfolding humanitarian disaster,” Jonathan Ruhe, Director of Foreign Policy at the JINSA Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy, tells The Cipher Brief. “And as one of many foreign actors trying to claim concessions from the government and vying to exploit Sudan’s natural resources, Iran helps worsen the country’s already high levels of impoverishment.
Research Fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, Husain Abdul-Hussain, also underscored that while Iranian involvement in Sudan is still in its infancy, “it will certainly grow as the war grinds on.”
“The more reliant Islamist militias become on Iran, the stronger they become and the more indebted to Tehran,” he explained. “Eventually, relations between Iran and Sudanese Islamist militias will be similar to its relations with Islamist militias in Lebanon (Hezbollah), Iraq (Hashd Shaabi), Gaza (Hamas) and Yemen (Houthis). Note that Sudan Islamist militias are Sunni (like Hamas in Gaza), and unlike Shia Iran and its Lebanese and Iraqi Shia militias. The Houthis are their own breed of Islam (Yazidis) but are allied with Shia Iran.”
Russia
Moscow, meanwhile, has played both sides in Sudan’s civil war for profit and power. Before 2024, the Wagner Group, now under Russia’s Defense Ministry, backed the RSF with arms like surface-to-air missiles, in return for gold from RSF-held mines like Jebel Amer — smuggling up to 32.7 tons worth $1.9 billion via Dubai from 2022 to 2023 to skirt Ukraine war sanctions and fund operations. This fueled RSF violence, including the 2023 to 2025 massacres in el-Geneina and el-Fasher.
Around midway through last year, in the aftermath of Prigozhin’s demise, Moscow flipped to bolstering the SAF in its quest for a Port Sudan naval base. Russia subsequently vetoed a UN ceasefire resolution last November to keep up its influence in Khartoum, while reports emerged of Russian mercenaries operating in West Darfur, worsening the fear and displacement.
“Russia linked commercial and security networks remain present around gold flows and in facilitation roles close to the RSF camp,” said Dr. Krieg.
Why So Many Foreign Players?
At the heart of Sudan’s crisis lie three intertwined forces: geography, resources, and regional rivalry. Poised along the Nile, the Red Sea, and the Horn of Africa, Sudan is pivotal to everything from Cairo’s water security to the maritime goals of Gulf States to the influence ambitions of Moscow and Ankara. Moreover, its ports and resource-rich land have morphed domestic infighting into a lucrative war economy.
“Material backing has lengthened the war and structured its geography,” Mr. Krieg said. “The result is not a decisive victory for either side but a hardening of zones, with the RSF advantaged in a peripheral theatre where it can police corridors and extract revenue, and the army entrenched where the state’s core institutions, population and donor attention reside.”
Why It’s So Hard to End the War
With so many players in the field and a deep distrust among warring parties, ending the war in Sudan has become extraordinarily difficult. The United States, for its part, leads the “Quad” alongside the UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, pushing for a three-month humanitarian truce. The RSF agreed to a deal on November 6, and Washington is now pressing the Sudanese army to do the same in hopes of easing the fighting and starting talks on the war’s deeper causes.
If the war in Sudan continues, the U.S. faces a growing humanitarian catastrophe: estimates suggest more than 150,000 deaths and over 14 million people displaced, with nearly 25 million facing acute hunger. Regionally, unchecked control of the RSF in Darfur could destabilize the Red Sea corridor, a vital route for global trade and U.S. allies. Domestically, failure to resolve the conflict would erode U.S. credibility on human rights and genocide prevention, heighten refugee pressures in North Africa and Europe, and contradict the moral precedent set during the 2003 Darfur genocide.
“Washington will be paying more attention,” one White House-connected source tells The Cipher Brief. “It isn’t ignored. It is a conflict Trump wants to see ended.”
Dr. Krieg asserted that Sudan is entering a consolidation phase in which the Rapid Support Forces have turned Darfur into a defensible rear area and administrative base. The fall of El Fasher removed the last significant government foothold in the region. It gave the RSF control of the interior lines across West, South, Central, and much of North Darfur, as well as access to Libya and Chad for resupply and commerce.
He thus asserts that Sudan’s future is likely to go one of two ways.
“The Sudanese Armed Forces still hold the Nile corridor, the capital area and much of the east, which creates a west versus centre geography. That configuration points to two near-term paths. Either the front stabilises into a frozen conflict that resembles an informal partition, or the RSF seeks to push east through North Kordofan and test the approaches to the center,” Dr. Krieg added. “Humanitarian conditions are acute, with siege tactics, displacement and food insecurity now baked into the conflict economy. The political tempo has slowed rather than accelerated, since battlefield gains in Darfur give the RSF reasons to bank advantages before contemplating concessions.”
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DEEP DIVE — On the night of June 20, 2025, the Nigerien village of Manda became the stage for one of the deadliest massacres in the Sahel in recent memory. As dozens of worshippers gathered at a mosque for evening prayers, militants from the Islamic State’s Sahel Province encircled the village and opened fire without pause. Bullets tore through the congregation,killing at least 71 men, women, and children and wounding dozens more.
Survivors later recalled the horror of lying motionless beneath the bodies of neighbors and relatives to avoid being shot, while houses were torched and families scattered in the chaos. The bloodshed was not only an assault on a remote community in Tillabéri, but a stark signal of how deeply jihadist violence has penetrated this once quiet borderland.
In the span of a few hours, Manda joined the growing list of towns and villages reduced to symbols of terror, underscoring the reality that groups like Islamic State in the Sahel now operate less as rogue insurgents than as entrenched power brokers whose reach stretches across Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. For the United States, the massacre is more than a humanitarian catastrophe — it is a sobering reminder that the doctrine of forward defense faces its most formidable test yet in Africa’s most fragile frontier.
“The threat from Sahelian jihadists is really two-fold,” Caleb Weiss, editor of FDD’s Long War Journal, tells The Cipher Brief. “They are destabilizing wider West Africa, particularly the Gulf of Guinea states, which have been firm U.S. and Western allies. And secondly, there is worry about European security if jihadis in the Sahel are allowed to operate freely. The Sahel can become a base of operations from which to launch or even sponsor attacks into continental Europe.”
Hans-Jakob Schindler, Senior Director of the Counter Extremism Project, frames the problem in similarly stark terms.
“There are two primary terrorist threats that can be identified,” he tells The Cipher Brief. “First of all, the rapid expansion of the al-Qaeda affiliate JNIM as well as the ISIS affiliates ISSP and ISWAP in the Sahel region has destabilized several countries, in particular Burkina Faso, Mali and to a growing extent also Niger, with continuing serious security problems in the North of Nigeria.”
From Margins to Mainstream: The Rise of Sahelian Jihadism
The massacre in Mandareflects a decade-long unraveling of state control. Thecollapse of Libya in 2011 unleashed vast armories and fighters into the desert, reigniting dormant rebellions and enabling extremist groups to entrench themselves in northern Mali. The Malian state itself fragmented in 2012 following a coup, allowing jihadist coalitions to seize major northern cities.
Over time, groupssplintered and reformed. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate, emerged in 2017, while the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) evolved into the Islamic State’s Sahel Province. These factions began imposing taxes, adjudicating disputes, and governing their respective territories. According to Vision of Humanity, the Sahelaccounted for 51 percent of global terrorism deaths in 2024, with nearly 25,000 conflict-related fatalities — a neartenfold increase since 2019.
Liam Carnes-Douglas of the Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC) says the rise reflects more than battlefield victories.
“Some of the most urgent threats posed by Sahel-based jihadist groups stem from the destabilization of key regional partners,” he tells The Cipher Brief. “Once among the strongest U.S. allies in counterterrorism, these governments have shifted rapidly from fragile democracies to military juntas, fueled in part by the failures of Western-backed security initiatives. That has sidelined the United States as anti-Western sentiment grows.”
Andrew Lewis, president of the operational intelligence firm Ulysses Group, agrees that the power vacuum extends beyond the battlefield.
“In the truest sense, the U.S. has limited national security interests in the region. But we do have resource and energy interests that underpin our national security strategy — particularly in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso,” he tells The Cipher Brief. “The control of trade routes, ports, and export conduits of critical minerals is a strategic concern. We would like to see JNIM, ISIS, and their affiliates contained before they threaten those supply chains.”
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Tactical Adaptation and Regional Spillover
Over the last eighteen months, jihadist groups in the Sahel have evolved their tactics in ways that suggest a larger ambition. Motorcycles enable lightning raids across ungoverned stretches. Drone warfare — once limited to surveillance — has evolved into an offensive capability. JNIM has carried out more than 30 confirmed drone strikessince late 2023.
“Both al-Qaeda’s JNIM and the Islamic State’s Sahel Province have deployed suicide drones,” Weiss noted. “They’re also utilizing Starlink to stay connected in remote areas. Helping counter drones, exploiting Starlink’s vulnerabilities, and shutting off externally sourced financing would help the region tremendously.”
Carnes-Douglas also warns that “rapid technological advancements are increasingly shaping warfare.”
“Drones and Starlink-enabled communications stand out as particularly transformative, yet both regional security forces and U.S. capabilities lag significantly behind,” he continued, pointing out that lessons from Ukraine “demonstrate how these technologies are quickly adapted for combat,” and their proliferation “signals that warfare in the Sahel is entering a transitional, high-tech phase.”
Schindler underscores a connected, transnational risk.
“The Sahel region is also a key network hub for the international drug transportation pipeline of Hezbollah-linked drugs that are transported from South America via West Africa to Europe for sale there,” he explained. “This pipeline directly funds Hezbollah’s activities in Lebanon. Given the central role that the U.S. is playing in the current negotiations between Hezbollah and Israel, this income stream for Hezbollah will continue to ensure that this terror group will be able to continue to fund its activities both within Lebanon and beyond.”
Across Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, militants are consolidating control.
“Islamic State in the Greater Sahara has long used the tri-border area to evade interdiction,” Carnes-Douglas explained. “That makes coordinated regional responses not just useful but necessary.”
The violence, however, is also spilling outward.
“Sahelian jihadis are now inching closer to Senegal,” Weiss said. “They’re creating a jihadist land bridge between the Sahel, littoral West Africa, and Nigeria — effectively one large area of jihadist operations encompassing a significant chunk of the continent.”
This expansion also has a sectarian dimension. Lewis surmised that more than 50,000 Christians have beenmurdered in Nigeria since 2009, “with more than 7,000killed in 2025 alone.”
“It’s difficult to assess the true scale of persecution Islamist militant groups are carrying out,” he underscored. “But it’s happening.”
Schindler also highlights an alarming operational trend: “Currently they are not only able to conduct multi-layered attacks against single targets (such as a military camp) but also to conduct simultaneous and coordinated attacks on multiple targets across relatively large geographic areas.”
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U.S. Policy Today: A Detachment Problem?
For years, the U.S.viewed the Sahel as a key front in counterterrorism, maintaining drone bases and training missions in Niger. But the 2023 coup upended that equation. Washington froze over $500 million in aid and limited cooperation even as the juntaexpanded ties with Russia’s Wagner Group. The result is a fragile balance between limited engagement and strategic erosion.
“Outside of JSOC, U.S. efforts in the region have been marginal at best. That’s evident in the surge in violence and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States, which pivoted away from the West to Russia,” Lewis said. “None of our 333 programs in the region has dented terror operations. We rely heavily on intelligence-led frameworks but have very little real-time intelligence since withdrawing key assets from Niger.”
Carnes-Douglas echoes that concern. “American counterterrorism efforts have achieved tactical successes but strategic failures,” he observed. “Short-term gains from drone strikes or training are constantly undermined by state fragility, coups, and shifting alliances.”
Moreover, while France’s drawdown from Operation Barkhane — the 2014–2022 French-led counterterrorism campaign across the Sahel that deployed more than 5,000 troops to combat Islamist insurgencies in Mali, Niger, and Chad — created a vacuum, “the U.S. has not yet developed a sustainable replacement strategy,” Weiss stressed. “There are some indications the U.S. has resumed limited intel support to Sahelian juntas, but nothing that matches previous levels of engagement,” he continued.
Schindler argues that the disengagement itself has worsened the crisis.
“Although a lot of criticism has been levied against the UN, EU and US counter terrorism operations in West Africa and the Sahel in the past, the current situation, in which the UN, the EU and the US have largely disengaged from the region clearly demonstrates that overall, the counterterrorism efforts had been successful in stemming the tide of terrorist expansion in the region,” he said.
A Strategic Imperative: What Must Washington Do Next
Analysts emphasize that the path forward requires reimagining engagement. Weiss argues that U.S. support should focus on technology denial and intelligence integration, not just kinetic strikes.
“Helping counter drones, exploiting the use of Starlink and the data vulnerabilities therein, and helping to shut off externally sourced financing would help the region tremendously,” he said.
Washington, Lewis highlighted, must also think pragmatically about force posture.
“If we want to contain JNIM and ISIS, the focus should be on protecting the coastal regions with ISR and targeted strikes where success is measured by territory denied, not by how many host forces we train,” he said. “But that requires basing rights, logistics, and political will, and China and Russia hold significant leverage over potential host countries.”
Indeed, Beijing’s influence looms large.
“China has financed major ports, railways, and industrial projects across Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Senegal,” Lewis explained, noting that this gives it immense leverage to counter U.S. influence and deny access to infrastructure critical for forward operations.
Carnes-Douglas, meanwhile, advocates for a recalibrated diplomacy that acknowledges political realities.
“Although U.S. foreign policy appears to be shifting away from involvement in these conflicts, Washington should recommit pragmatically to directly limit jihadist groups’ ability to threaten American interests,” he asserted. “This, in turn, would form stronger relationships with the newly formed governments and in turn could be an industrial and economic boon, as well benefiting all partners.”
Schindler proposes a containment-first approach, prioritizing direct engagement with the littoral Gulf of Guinea states.
“One primary goal should be containment, ensuring that the expansion of terrorist activities and control in the region does not affect additional countries, in particular the littoral states of the Gulf of Guinea,” he said.
The slaughter at Manda, the border ambushes, the drone blitzes — all are signs of a metastasizing threat.
“Through the increasing influence and power of these terrorist affiliates in the Sahel region, the threat to US interests in the region, as well as potentially to the US homeland, is increasing in parallel,” he added.
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InfoSecSherpa: Your Guide Up a Mountain of Information!
One of my mentees, Elizabeth Ekedoro, received a scholarship to attend the Women in Cybersecurity (WiCyS) conference in Dallas, Texas.
Her scholarship does not cover airfare, and Lizzie needs to fly from Lagos, Nigeria (LOS) to Dallas, Texas (DFW) to attend this event she worked so hard to qualify for.
I became her mentor through the CyberSafe Foundation’s CyberGirls program a few years ago. Elizabeth Ekedoro is deserving of this scholarship and is a rising star in African cybersecurity.
Please help to make the WiCyS 2025 conference a reality for her by helping with her fundraising campaign. It would really me a lot to her, of course, but also to me. Thank you!
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