EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — As Russia continues it's brutal bombardment of Ukrainian cities, talks between Moscow and the U.S. to end the war appear on very different trajectories. White House envoy Steve Witkoff is reportedly planning another trip to Moscow to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin as Moscow's winter attacks continue unabated.

This week, Russia launched hundreds of drones and dozens of missiles on cities across Ukraine, killing at least four people and striking critical energy and heat infrastructure. In the capital, Kyiv, residents are facing temperatures as low as 10 degrees farenheit without electricity or water.

On December 30, 2025, Moscow claimed a Ukrainian drone attack targeted Russian President Vladimir Putin's residence. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov threatened his country's military would launch "retaliatory strikes" and said Moscow's "negotiating position will be revised” in ongoing talks. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky rejected the claimed drone attack as “a complete fabrication”, and sources say the CIA assessed that Ukraine was not targeting the Russian leader's residence in the attack.

President Trump said in December that the U.S. was “very close” to a deal. So, what's happening?

Throughout the latest push for peace, Russia seems to conveniently reset the clock, demanding further talks as it continues its bombardments and assaults across Ukraine.

“This Russian strike sends an extremely clear signal about Russia’s priorities,” Zelensky said in a post on X referring to a strike on December 23 that killed three people and injured 12. Zeleneky condemned the attack “ahead of Christmas, when people simply want to be with their families, at home, and safe.”

That strike came just days after Putin told Russian defense ministry officials that Moscow will persist in its mission to “liberate its historic lands” and achieve its war goals “unconditionally” — by negotiations for an agreement in Moscow’s favor, or through continued war.

The continued Russian attacks and Putin’s bellicose language underscore a pattern that has defined Russia’s position on “peace” throughout its full-scale invasion of Ukraine: not budging from maximalist demands, blaming Kyiv for the lack of progress, and leveraging Western fears of escalation to World War Three.

The hardline from Putin comes as Ukraine has offered significant concessions, including Ukraine dropping NATO membership ambitions, for at least the time being, as well as a potential withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the east and the creation of a demilitarized “free economic zone.” The latest reports say Russia still wants more, including more stringent restrictions on the size of Ukraine’s military.

“The Ukrainians have been saying for over a year that they are ready to come to an agreement. They are ready to be realistic and compromise,” Glenn Corn, a former senior CIA Officer told The Cipher Brief. “It’s the Russians that are not doing that. It’s the Russians that continue to push maximalist demands and that continue to scuttle the peace process — not the Ukrainians.”

Through the eyes of seasoned intelligence professionals who have studied Putin's actions for decades, the continued attacks despite peace talks are hardly surprising. “Putin has never been sincere about a negotiated solution to his ‘Special Military Operation,’” said Rob Dannenberg, former Chief of CIA’s Central Eurasia Division.

Russia is also continuing offensive pushes on multiple fronts, including in the regions it claimed to annex - Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk and Donetsk, where the embattled strategic city of Pokrovsk is - as well as in the northern Kharkiv region. Experts warn Putin’s ambitions go far beyond.

“We've got Putin on the other side of it and the reality is he has not taken one single step towards a temporary ceasefire or a peace deal whatsoever,” General Jack Keane (Ret.), who served as Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army and is a trusted advisor to President Donald Trump, told Fox News. “Where he is, he still believes that eventually he's going to break the will and resolve of the United States and the Europeans and the Zelensky government and he will eventually have his way here,” Keane said, adding that Putin’s ultimate war goal is to “topple the government of Ukraine and expand into Eastern Europe.”

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A Tested Playbook

Russia has long used the pretense of openness to negotiations as a tool to deceive, delay, and fracture Western support for those Moscow is targeting. The pattern was visible in Georgia in 2008 and again in Crimea in 2014, when Moscow signaled willingness to talk even as it consolidated military gains on the ground, buying time and weakening Western responses.

“I always use the example of Syria during the Civil War when they [Russian forces] were killing members of the Syrian opposition while they were drinking wine and coffee with American and European interlocutors in Europe, claiming that they were trying to find an agreement,” Corn told The Cipher Brief.

Indeed, behind any Russian statement of openness to engagement and dialogue, Putin has continued to assert that Ukraine is part of Russia, that the government of Zelensky is illegitimate, and that Russian forces can achieve victory on the battlefield to justify his stonewalling — despite mounting costs for Russia and limited territorial gains.

“Putin’s strategy has been consistent: advance false narratives; adopt a non-negotiable maximalist position and make ever-increasing demands for concessions; take deliberate actions to erode U.S., Ukrainian, and NATO resolve and perceived options; employ implicit and explicit threats and intimidation; and offer false choices,” former CIA Senior Executive Dave Pitts told The Cipher Brief.

“Taken together, these represent Russian ‘reflexive control’—a subset of cognitive warfare and a strategy designed to persuade adversaries to voluntarily adopt outcomes favorable to Russia,” Pitts told us. “In the face of unreasonable sovereignty and territorial demands placed on Ukraine and none placed on Russia, an emboldened and confident Putin will now likely demand even more.”

A Hesitant West

How did we get here? Some experts say a long-running pattern of Western hesitation in keeping Russia in check has emboldened Moscow. It’s not hard to remember that at the start of the full-scale invasion, Western countries were slow to provide full military support to Ukraine, concerned about a possible wider escalation.

Retired General Philip Breedlove, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, told The Cipher Brief, “We have taken precious little action to stop the fight in Ukraine and we still find ourselves saying, ‘We're not going to do that because we've got to give peace a chance and we don't want to escalate the problem.’ And that formula is not working now and has not worked for 11 years.”

“We have virtually enabled the Russian war on Ukraine by our lack of action in a more severe way. Many of us from military backgrounds say that we have built sanctuary for Russia. From that sanctuary, we allow them to attack Ukraine.”

Experts warn that while the goal should be, as President Donald Trump has said, “to stop the killing,” awarding concessions to a Kremlin that has yet to drop its maximalist war aims is not the solution.

“The Trump Administration’s desire to end the violence in Ukraine is commendable, but not at the price of setting the stage for the next war by giving victory to the aggressor,” Dannenberg told The Cipher Brief.

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The Road Ahead

With peace talks ongoing, it is proving difficult to come up with a deal that does not force Ukraine to give too much while ensuring the proposal does not push Russia to reject the deal outright.

But beyond the negotiating table, experts say there are ways to pressure Putin to peace.

Ukraine is not waiting, continuing strikes on Russian energy infrastructure to curb energy export revenues that fund Moscow’s war machine, and bringing the cost of the war back to ordinary Russians.

For the U.S. and Europe, major sanctions on Russia - including new measures against Russian oil giants Rosneft and Lukoil - are already in place and reportedly starting to take their toll, but experts say stronger enforcement is needed to make them truly bite.

Maintaining military aid to Ukraine is also essential. In mid-December, Congress passed a defense bill that authorizes $800 million for Ukraine - $400 million in each of the next two years - as part of the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which pays U.S. companies to produce weapons for Ukraine's military. President Trump signed the measure into law on December 18. Meanwhile, while Europeans failed to agree to use frozen Russian assets to back a loan for Ukraine, the EU agreed to a 90 billion euro loan over the next two years, backed by the bloc’s budget.

"The Trump Administration should demonstrate its displeasure at Russia’s clear disregard for any so-called peace process by fully enforcing all existing sanctions, providing Ukraine with long-range weapons, and declaring that peace negotiations are suspended until Russia demonstrates it is serious about these negotiations," General Ben Hodges, former Commanding General of U.S. Army Europe, told The Cipher Brief. "Otherwise, the President’s efforts and those of his negotiators are clearly a waste of time and headed nowhere."

European countries have also fortified post-war pledges to Ukraine. Britain and France have committed to sending troops to a peacekeeping mission -- if a peace deal is reached. Experts U.S. intelligence, command and control, and logistics support is needed to give any European effort credibility.

The impact will be felt far beyond Ukraine, and long after the guns there go silent.

“For the United States, the best outcome will come from taking the longer, harder road that denies any reward for Russia’s illegal invasion, forces Putin to make reasonable concessions, and sustains the long-term sovereignty and independence of Ukraine,” Pitts said. “That longer, harder road also leads to stronger U.S. national security.

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OPINION — Current discussion of Russian "hybrid warfare" tends to revolve around concepts like disinformation, proxy militias, cyber operations, sabotage, and psychological manipulation designed to fragment, confuse, and demoralize Russia's opponents—and the respective roles these play in Russian military and national security doctrine. Yet one essential dimension remains underdeveloped in the broader debate: the organic integration of criminal structures and methods into Russia's strategic toolkit. Russia's system does more than merely operate in a "gray zone." It has become a gray state, sustained by an "Uber Krysha," a super-protection racket in which the Kremlin fuses its security apparatus with organized crime to project influence and intimidation both at home and abroad.

The enabling mentality behind this fusion can be directly tied to Russia's pre-revolutionary period. Although no longer ideologically communist, Russia's current ruling elite, led by President Vladimir Putin, has very much inherited the Bolsheviks' comfort with adopting criminal methods in the pursuit of regime objectives. Before 1917, Lenin's Bolshevik Party financed its operations partly through armed robberies justified as the expropriation of bourgeois wealth for the sake of the proletarian struggle. The Bolsheviks were revolutionary in ideology but gangster in practice, rationalizing robbery and violence not as moral lapses, but as necessary transgressions—crime rebranded as virtue in the service of power.

Furthermore, during the early years of the USSR, the communist regime was defiantly, even boastfully, dismissive in its rejection of “bourgeois” legal norms. Its November 1918 decree On Red Terror (yes, it was called that) is a good case in point. It formally authorized the secret police, the Cheka, to summarily arrest and execute perceived opponents of the revolution without trial, which it proceeded to do in the tens of thousands. In doing so, the new revolutionary state openly and unapologetically signaled to its people and to the world that it would not be bound by the ordinary moral limits of civilized life. Terror was not a regrettable excess, but a management tool. This was not moral confusion, it was moral disregard elevated to state policy, with a legacy that has left a deep imprint on the political DNA of contemporary Russia.

Even as the Soviet state engaged in its bloody ideological experiment, common criminality thrived in the workers' paradise. The inefficient Soviet economic system brought chronic scarcity, which, as it does everywhere, spawned smuggling and black-market behaviors. The state imposed tight controls, but the security services did not shy away from making expedient use of criminal gangs as instruments of control to help impose a brutal order among inmates in its sprawling GULAG camp system, or using petty thieves and prostitutes to report on dissidents and foreigners.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, however, these controls dissolved, and the roles suddenly reversed. In 1991 the Soviet security apparatus imploded, and many KGB and GRU officers migrated to the emerging oligarchic and criminal economy left in its wake. There they became security chiefs, "political technologists," oil traders, and gangsters, using their skills and muscle to help these entities provide a "krysha" (roof)—similar in meaning to "protection" in Western mafia parlance—by combining inside connections, intelligence tradecraft, violence, and financial engineering. When Putin—himself a KGB veteran whose purview over foreign trade and city assets as St. Petersburg’s Deputy Mayor brought him into contact with port rackets, fuel schemes, and the Tambov crime syndicate—rose to the presidency in 1999, he re-asserted state primacy not by dismantling this nexus, but by mastering it. Putin's Kremlin in effect became the Uber Krysha, the ultimate protection roof above the oligarchs, security chiefs, and crime bosses. The bargain was clear: enjoy your wealth and impunity, but serve the state—effectively Putin—when called. Loyalty was enforced not by law or shared purpose, but by leverage, fear, and mutual criminal exposure.

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What took place after 1991, however, was more than merely a case of inverted and re-inverted primacy. The unprecedented circulation of cadres that occurred during this period fostered a profound organizational and behavioral cross-pollination between intelligence, oligarchic, and criminal elements resulting in a qualitatively new and insidious mutation that is today’s Russia—Putin's Russia. The 1990s saw an outflow of KGB and GRU officers who "pollenated" the criminal/oligarchic economy with their tradecraft, tools, and government connections. Putin’s reconsolidation of state power in the 2000s then saw a return flow creating a "reverse-pollination" as ex-intelligence officers brought their new underworld relationships, financial channels, and expanded operational flexibility back to the security services.

Among contemporary scholars, the historian and journalist Mark Galeotti stands out as the leading theorist and interpreter of this phenomenon, pointing out how modern Russia's power projection depends on cultivating deniability through criminal intermediaries. Galeotti's concept of the Kremlin as a "political-criminal nexus" and his description of its global "crimintern" offers a crucial corrective to more conventional security studies frameworks. Where others see diffusion of state control as a weakness, Galeotti sees design—a pragmatic outsourcing of coercion and corruption to actors who maintain loyalty through mutual dependence. In this arrangement, the lines between mafia, mercenaries, business, and ministries are blurred.

Russia's asymmetric tactics abroad leveraging smuggling networks, compromising criminal entanglement (kompromat), cyber hacking, illicit financing, and global shadow operations by semi-private mercenary groups, like the Wagner Group and the Africa Corps, extend this logic internationally. Liaisons between the Russian intelligence and crime groups across Europe also give Moscow access to local networks for espionage, intimidation, and assassinations that can act faster, at lower cost, and with more deniability than professional intelligence officers. But while most analysts tend to focus on this as a blending of tools—military, intelligence, cyber, informational— Galeotti’s insight is sharper: the blend itself is criminal in nature, structurally fusing coercion, corruption, and deceit into a governing logic—not as a breakdown of state power, but as its deliberate expression. Yet you will never find this asymmetric dimension acknowledged in Russian doctrinal writings despite its widespread exploitation in Russian actions.

Policymakers in the Western democracies struggle mightily to wrap their minds around this phenomenon. Their siloed agencies—CIA for HUMINT, NSA for SIGINT/cyber, DOD for military, and FBI for crime, etc.—operate under strict legal separations between these domains to protect civil liberties. Effective in their respective arenas, they are vulnerable when adversaries operate across boundaries. Russia’s mafia-state collapses these distinctions and thrives in the weeds, exploiting moral disregard and legal ambiguity to create jurisdictional confusion and cognitive overload that stymie efforts at response.

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And yet for all its advantages, the inherent pathologies of this criminal-state fusion contain the seeds of its own decay. Its reliance on criminal intermediaries corrodes institutional coherence. Loyalty is transactional, not ideological, and emptied of moral meaning. The fates of figures like Yevgeniy Prigozhin and various siloviki-linked oligarchs demonstrate how rapidly beneficiaries can become threats once their ambitions outgrow the tolerance of the Center. Moreover, by incentivizing enrichment over competence, criminal methods undermine professionalism within the military, intelligence services, government bureaucracy, and the private sector. Corruption pervades procurement, logistics, and governance, eroding capacity even as it funds loyalty. This was clearly evident in the shocking underperformance of Russia's military and intelligence operations in Ukraine.

Internationally, what appears cunning in the short term produces isolation in the long term. Russia's growing reputation as a mafia state alienates legitimate partners, of which it now has few, and hollows out whatever moral legitimacy it once had. Putin's Uber Krysha model is unsustainable in the long run because it requires continuous motion. It cannot stand on genuine law or trust, only perpetual leverage and fear, with tools that must be continuously re-coerced. The Russian people and others who are caught in its reach exist in an environment of moral blackmail that breeds cynicism rather than solidarity. Galeotti's moral edge, implicit in his scholarship, lies in showing that the criminal state is not merely a threat to others, it is a tragedy for Russia itself.

To fully understand Russian asymmetric warfare today, we must appreciate its blending of the state and criminal domains and recognize that Moscow hasn't simply rewritten the rules of war for the gray zone, it has blurred the lines between law and criminality and has itself become a gray state. It is the malignant ethos of this new Russian Uber Krysha state—the normalization of moral disregard—that, more than any cyber weapon or troll farm, has become its most dangerous export.

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THE KREMLIN FILES / COLUMN — Ask any Russian intelligence officer about “naruzhka,” and you’ll see them nod knowingly. It’s the term for physical, trailing surveillance: watchers on the street who follow targets, track meetings, and report patterns. The Russians are experts at it, and they have been for centuries, dating back to the Tsarist Secret police, the Okhrana, and even further to Ivan the Terrible’s oprichniki, the brutal enforcers of his regime. Surveillance is a subject that dominates Russian society and Russian espionage, and it also dictates how Russian intelligence officers (RIOs) conduct counter-surveillance and surveillance detection. The Russian intelligence services (RIS) still lean heavily on surveillance as both a protective and offensive tool. Given such an all-compassing presence in Russian society, the term "surveillance" and its connotations in Russia are worth exploring to better understand Russia, its state, society, and our adversaries.

Russians have a saying, “the walls have ears,” and sometimes follow it with “and the streets have eyes.” Studying in Russia in the early 1990s as an exchange student, I was repeatedly warned by my friends with this expression. It was their way of telling our group of American students that no matter how welcome we felt— and Russians have some of the best hospitality in the world when you are welcomed by them— the state was still suspicious. We came to understand very quickly that there were minders among us: Russian students and professors who reported on us back to the FSB, the successor of the KGB.

Some of our group of students were even “soft-pitched.” For example, in one case, a fellow student with a military background was asked whether he would like to meet with the FSB to discuss how interesting the Russian internal security service was (not exactly a soft approach, really). These blunt and clumsy attempts went unanswered, but the point was clear: the state was not just watching; they were operationally targeting our group of future soldiers, researchers, academics, and in at least one case, a future CIA officer.

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Anyone who has studied or lived in Russia over the past three decades no doubt has had similar experiences. But the bar of intimidation has risen dramatically in recent years. With dissidents, journalists, and even athletes targeted for intimidation, beatings, arrest, and even murder, there is no safe haven in Russia any longer for foreign citizens. They are used as targets to be entrapped for hostage exchanges with the West. The goal is to swap civilians for RIOs for the latter to escape their failings when arrested and convicted abroad.

Russians live in a state of constant fear, especially with the war in Ukraine, since opposition to the war, in any form, is now threatened by jail time. Anyone who may be a threat to the regime is subjected to overwhelming surveillance of their person, electronic communications, and contacts. The FSB has many resources at its disposal, including access to all ISPs and phone companies by law. In the early 2000s, the Russian Duma quietly passed laws giving the FSB access to all communication companies in Russia without the need for any warrants. It was the first step in creating their modern surveillance state and an early sign under Putin that democracy was dying.

Inside Russia, surveillance teams from the FSB number in the many thousands. Their origins lie in the old KGB 7th directorate. Still, their mission remains the same: monitor diplomats, suspected foreign intelligence officers, journalists, NGO workers, businesspeople, and ordinary Russians who cross the regime’s lines. The teams are, unfortunately, among the very best in the world at surveillance, given their long history of practice.

Surveillance schools in Leningrad (St. Petersburg), in particular, were known as the best in the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Young surveillance team members from the KGB, GRU, and other services of the Soviet Union were trained in the art of on-foot and vehicle surveillance, effective radio communications, and spotting intelligence tells of possible espionage operations. Today, it is no different. The FSB, in particular, devotes considerable resources to surveillance work in Moscow and across Russia in every major city of its vast surveillance apparatus. They are increasingly assisted by technology and a vast array of cameras across the country.

In Russia, all universities, think tanks, and defense contractors, have assigned security officers, what the Russians call an “OB,” who monitor the foreign contacts, make Russians report on their foreign friends, and even many of their Russian ones. The OB is usually an FSB officer, but if not, they are a cooptee of the service, reporting directly to a UFSB or a regional office across Russia. The OBs, in turn, enlist networks of agent-reporters who are only too eager to report on the travel, potential misdeeds, disloyalty to the regime, or other offenses of all those they monitor. Russia today has a network of informers to rival Stasi East Germany, Nazi Germany under the Gestapo, or any other despotic regime, including North Korea and China of today (both of whom, admittedly, may also contend for the gold and silver on despotic modern surveillance states, together with Russia).

The all-encompassing nature of the Russian surveillance state, which includes monitoring by city cameras (supplemented by drones now too), communications, and in-person surveillance, makes it clear that RIS surveillance is not confined to diplomats or foreigners suspected of intelligence affiliation. Academics, journalists, and corporate leaders can find themselves under observation or pressure when Moscow sees strategic value in them. Awareness of surveillance indicators—and how to respond—remains essential.

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Unfortunately, for decades, Westerners traveling to Russia as academics, athletes, NGO workers, and others have been naïve on this score. The refrain is frequently that “I am no one of interest, they’ll leave me alone.” The RIS never did and never will. The pressure for the Russian services, in particular the FSB, to prove worthy of their giant bureaucracy and corrupt budget means they will manufacture spy cases when they can’t find real ones.

They map the routines of foreign officials, political or business leaders. Their goal is to decide if those targets are viable recruits, potentially, or targets for other operations, like extortion, “direct action,” or even assassination attempts in Russia and abroad. This leads to another underappreciated aspect of Russian intelligence and espionage that permeates their society: setups, tricks, and double-agent operations, which the Russians call “operational games.” (That will be the topic of a future “Kremlin Files” column in The Cipher Brief.)

On Russian surveillance, the warning remains clear, and the potential risks are stark. Unfortunately, for all the beauty to be found in Russian history, its cultural sites and heritage, and with their people, traveling to the Russian surveillance state under this corrupt and authoritarian regime holds incredible risk for foreigners, and even for Russian citizens themselves. It will not change until the RIS no longer has the dominant role in society. Laws and checks on power don’t exist in the Russian services. Surveillance, in fact, guides the functioning of the Russian state, and the streets continue to have eyes- everywhere.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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OPINION — On February 14, 2022, with Russia poised to invade Ukraine, I questioned whether Vladimir Putin’s reign to that point had revealed him to be a strategic master or a strategic failure. Nearly four years later, the verdict is even more apparent. Putin, confident in his strategic calculus that the West would provide only token assistance to Ukraine, which would quickly fold under the weight and violence of Russian military might, fatefully launched his attack days later with disastrous consequences for Russia. The country he leads is now even poorer, more isolated, brittle, and dependent (on China) than before. Putin grossly underestimated Ukrainian will, overestimated the competence of his own military and intelligence apparatus, and misjudged Western cohesion. By the Fall of 2022, it was obvious even to Putin that his expected quick victory was unattainable. This was surely a bitter pill to swallow, but he quickly pivoted to a “wait and win” war strategy of grinding attrition, calculating that through sheer mass and perseverance--and Western impatience--time would be on his side. Most pundits, even those in the West, have tended to agree with him, much as they did in 2022 about the likelihood that Russia would quickly roll over Ukraine. This mindset, however--that time is on Russia’s side--risks a strategic misreading no less profound than his original blunder, because there is a strong argument to be made that Putin’s attrition strategy is eroding key foundations of Russian power faster and more deeply than it is eroding the Ukrainian front lines.

Thus far Russia has managed to sustain a high level of war spending, but there are growing signs of strain. Russia’s numerical troop advantage over Ukraine is maintained almost entirely through extraordinarily high financial incentives, but these are starting to drop steeply due to growing budget shortfalls, particularly in regional budgets on which such spending disproportionately falls. New contracts for soldiers in April-June 2025 were less than half the level of the same period in 2024, signaling a significant weakening in the effectiveness of financial inducements.

And it’s not just the money. The death toll for Russian soldiers is accelerating. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated in July of this year that the number of Russian dead for the first half of 2025 alone exceeded 100,000. This has likely contributed to a sharp increase in desertions, estimated to have doubled in 2025 with approximately 70,000 desertions, or approximately 10% of the force in Ukraine. Russia is increasingly reliant on coerced recruits, harsh punishments for desertion, including torture and extrajudicial executions, all signs of a military struggling to maintain sustainable, motivated troop levels. While tactical adaptations have allowed Russian forces to regain some initiative on the battlefield, they rest on a manpower model that burns through human capital, i.e., human beings, at a pace no country with Russia’s demographic profile can long sustain.

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As the war drags on, Russia is also becoming even more dependent on China. Post-2022 trade patterns show a Russia increasingly locked into an asymmetric partnership in which Russia humiliatingly relies on China for critical imports of technology, while Beijing gains leverage through discounted energy purchases and control over supply chains, making Moscow increasingly vulnerable to Beijing’s whims over time. For a leader obsessed with sovereignty, the long-term trajectory Putin has embarked on contains a glaring paradox: the longer he fights to keep Ukraine out of the Western orbit, the more he locks Russia into a subordinate position in China’s. Talk about strategic irony.

These financial strains and deepening dependence on China are compounded by the continued tightening of international sanctions on the Russian energy sector, a general decrease in the price of oil and gas on which Russia is so heavily dependent as the global economy cools, and the heavy depletion of Russia’s “rainy day” sovereign wealth fund, which has dropped by almost 60% and now mostly consists of Chinese Renminbi and gold, having exhausted its hard currency holdings. Maintaining current defense spending will thus increasingly require either higher borrowing from domestic banks or visible cuts in social spending and civilian projects, further eroding living standards and stoking popular war fatigue.

Putin’s war-of-choice with Ukraine has only intensified Russia’s pre-war weaknesses. Russia’s economy, already underperforming relative to its resource base and human potential, must now deal with permanent war spending and sanctions-induced inefficiencies. Its demographics, already fragile, are being further hollowed out by horrific war casualties and the emigration of skilled workers. Russia’s civic life, already stunted, is being further smothered by wartime repression. Finally, Putin’s invasion not only failed to restore a pliant Ukrainian “little brother”, it locked Russia into a costly struggle against the second largest country in Europe, after itself, and one that is moreover more anti-Russian, better armed, and more deeply integrated with the West than before.

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And now, by slow-rolling negotiations to end the conflict, Putin misreads the trajectory of this war in the same way he misread its opening act. He underestimates the cumulative effect of casualties and consequences of economic distortions and social fatigue inside Russia; he overestimates the degree that support of the Western democracies for Ukraine will collapse under the weight of their debates and divisions; and he also, again, overestimates his ability to break Ukraine by military force. In analyzing the arc of Putin’s rule, the war in Ukraine is not an aberration from Putinism, but its logical culmination. In strategic terms, it represents a transition from a condition of chronic underperformance to one of active and acute self-harm. Nearly four years after his decision to invade Ukraine, which more than anything else will define his reign, Putin is not outplaying history on a grand chessboard by doubling down on the war, he is sacrificing Russia’s future for the sake of victories and imperial fantasies that cannot be won, much less sustained. This is the definition of strategic failure.

As a self-proclaimed student of Russian history, Putin would be wise to remember the setting of Russia’s original regime-toppling “color revolution,” the February Revolution of 1917. This was the spontaneous Russian popular uprising that led to the abdication of the Tsar and formation of a Provisional Government, not the subsequent Bolshevik coup d’etat later that year. While popular discontent with the monarchy had long been rising, it was the accumulated privations of war that brought events to a boiling point. As with that war, time in this one is not on Putin’s side.

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Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Each of my eight trips to Ukraine since retiring from the CIA in the summer of 2023 has been filled with unique challenges. Each time I’ve witnessed first-hand the sacrifices the Ukrainians are making on a daily basis to fight for their country’s independence. And while each trip has been physically exhausting, each one has also been highly inspiring because the Ukrainians are fighting to protect many of the traditional American values that I grew up believing in, including the right to self-determination, liberty and national sovereignty.

But my latest visit to Ukraine was by far the most difficult. Not just because the Russians are significantly increasing their air attacks on Ukrainian towns and cities or because Ukraine is once again going through a very cold winter while facing significant power shortages caused by Moscow’s attacks against energy infrastructure targets. But mainly because for the first time, I heard Ukrainians questioning my country’s commitment to helping them defend their country. Because I heard Ukrainian interlocutors conclude that the U.S. was not a reliable partner and because Ukrainians who are fighting to protect their country, questioned whether the U.S. was willing to abandon support for their cause in order to secure potential business deals with Russian dictator Vladimir Putin and his regime.

Remembering all the Americans I had served with over the years, especially those who made the ultimate sacrifice defending liberty and the honor of our country, it is extremely painful to consider the possibility that my country might choose to placate someone like Putin and, in doing so, turn its back on those who have suffered from Putin’s aggression.

After more than 10 years of being at war, the Ukrainians are clearly fatigued. Russia's constant attacks against civilian targets are taking a toll. Families throughout the country are living without regular access to electricity and are subjected to daily mass Russian drone and missile attacks.

Ukraine's own internal corruption challenges, including the "Operation Midas" investigation, which resulted in the resignation of President Zelensky’s longtime advisor and head of the Presidential Office, Andriy Yermak, have raised questions among many Ukrainians about Zelensky and his Administration. The scandal also opened the door for many of the opponents of continued support to Ukraine to claim that Ukraine is a corrupt country led by corrupt leaders.

Of course, these critics forget that the Midas investigation is actually evidence of Ukraine’s efforts to deal with corruption and a development that highlights Kyiv’s determination to create a more transparent government based on “rule of law” principles. And there is no comparison between Ukraine’s efforts to deal with corruption, and Russia’s lack of transparency and complete rejection of “rule of law” governance.

Ukrainian fears about being abandoned by Washington are linked to the perception that the U.S. is going to end its support for Kyiv. Fears that are amplified by the recent leaking of the "28 Point Plan" that was initially presented to Kyiv by the U.S. as part of Washington’s efforts to bring the war to an end and revelations that the bulk of the plan was written by the Kremlin and then delivered to the U.S. Special Envoy for the Middle East and Russia Steve Witkoff by Russian Sovereign Wealth Fund head Kiril Dmitriyev.

These leaks bore many of the hallmarks of a Russian disinformation campaign, and whether or not the Kremlin leaked this information, there is little doubt that Moscow is using the leaks to undermine the U.S. internationally; to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its allies in Europe; to undermine the morale of the Ukrainian population; and to deceive international and domestic audiences into believing Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to find a peaceful resolution to the war that he started.

Moscow has worked relentlessly to create the impression in Washington, Brussels and Kyiv - that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are on the verge of collapse, and it is only a matter of time before Putin achieves his military objectives.

The Ukrainians, on the other hand, are trying to counter this narrative and demonstrate that the Russians continue to make minimal battlefield gains while paying a tremendous price in terms of personnel and resources.

While people are tired, few appear ready to surrender or give up. Many equate surrender to betrayal of the memories of those Ukrainians who have died since 2014 fighting to defend the country from Russia.

Putin’s effort to control the narrative on Ukraine is partially linked to his desire to cover up how bad his own hand is at present. Putin does not want the West to focus on how the Russian military continues to struggle to take small amounts of territory, while suffering high casualty rates. He does not want others to focus on Russia’s own struggles with growing financial, economic and social problems that threaten the long-term stability of his regime and the future of Russia itself.

In recent years, the Kremlin has shifted its limited financial resources to the Military-Industrial complex, resulting in cutbacks to social spending and bringing an end to support of critical civilian infrastructure projects. While this policy has resulted in an increase in defense production, it is bankrupting the country and in recent months even Russia’s defense industry has had to implement spending cutbacks. Many factories and production sites across Russia are unable to pay workers and have been forced to reduce their work week to three or four days per week.

The money that Putin was once able to use to incentivize Russians to join the military and fight Ukraine is drying up, forcing him to once again consider mobilization plans, which will no doubt be highly unpopular with many Russians, especially with the “elites” living in the country’s main population centers.

The war has also drained off workers, resulting in significant labor shortages. Putin’s war is threatening to plunge Russia into the chaotic and painful social and economic conditions that the country faced in the early and mid-1990s.

Before leaving on my latest trip to Ukraine, I was asked to speak at an event in Washington D.C. focused on the future of U.S.-European relations. During that event, one attendee told me that recent polling in the U.S. showed that - since President Trump’s January 2025 inauguration - support for Ukraine among Republicans had risen significantly. This claim was supported by a report published by Defense One based on polling conducted by the Ronald Reagan Institute and a previous report published by the Chicago Institute on Global Affairs. These signs are heartening. In a system where the population’s interests should be considered by elected leaders, this means that the United States Government should be continuing its support for Ukraine.

The growing public support for Ukraine should give Ukrainians some hope that the U.S. is not going to abandon them. But it is hard for the Ukrainians to hear that message when it is often drowned out by much more negative news about alleged backroom deals made between Putin’s couriers and individuals close to President Trump and the very real possibility that those couriers are using their access to actively pursue a whisper campaign to influence the President and his policy decisions. That, combined with targeted leaks and distortions of facts to exaggerate the perception that Washington now prefers Moscow to Ukraine and the Europeans is painting a Russian-preferred narrative.

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It is correct when President Trump says that he inherited a terrible situation in Ukraine. I also agree that as the elected leader of the most powerful country in the world, President Trump has a responsibility to try to end the bloody and senseless conflict.

The President deserves credit for trying, although I do not agree with his periodic claims that the Ukrainians, or their President, are guilty of starting the war - or that Kyiv does not want to end the war. Vladimir Putin is guilty of starting the conflict and despite all of President Trump’s efforts and the Ukrainians willingness to try to find a compromise, Putin has continued to make maximalist demands and drag out the conflict in hopes of stealing more of Ukraine’s territory and feeding Russia’s defense industrial complex, which is now the sole functioning part of Russia’s struggling economy.

It appeared President Trump recognized this reality in October, when he canceled plans to meet with Putin in Budapest and levied new sanctions on the Russian Energy sector. Unfortunately, the President allowed Putin to manipulate the U.S. team into thinking Putin was ready to negotiate in November, opening the door to a lot of Russian disinformation and information warfare designed to undermine the U.S., Ukraine and its allies - but not designed to bring the war to an end.

Over the past year, I have seen the level of political infighting within Ukraine increase. During a discussion with one Ukrainian General in September of 2024, the General opined that historically, Ukraine had never lost a war to Russia but had lost many wars to itself. He warned that internal political struggles in the country allowed the Russians to identify and exploit the political ambitions of some leaders and use these ambitions to divide the country and undermine national unity.

Ukraine is again facing the threat of serious internal divisions that the Kremlin will manipulate and use to achieve its military and political objectives. It appears likely that the Ukrainian government will hold elections in 2026, and the U.S. and the West should be ready to help Kyiv protect those elections from Russian interference. There is also little doubt that Russia itself will not hold fair elections in 2026 or as long as Putin remains in power.

As an American, I pray that our elected leaders will not repeat the mistakes made by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain when trying to deal with Adolf Hitler. The appeasement of Hitler by forcing allies to cede territories to the Nazi regime in Berlin did not lead to “Peace in our Time”. It led to a much greater and more horrific World War that could have been stopped if the English and French had taken decisive action against Hitler at that time.

To “Make America Great Again”, Americans need to stand up for what is right. Right - is not appeasing Putin. Justice is not allowing Putin to get away with stealing large portions of Ukraine’s territory and then benefit from killing more than a million Ukrainian and Russian citizens in a war that was designed to protect Putin’s personal power and re-establish an empire that has collapsed twice in the last 150 years.

As an American, I pray that we find our way through this very confusing and troubled period, hold the aggressor, Putin, accountable for his crimes, and successfully bring this war to an end while protecting Ukraine’s sovereignty and America’s reputation in the world.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

OPINION — The fate of territory in eastern Ukraine remains the “most difficult” sticking point in the ongoing peace talks, President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged over the weekend as U.S. negotiators held separate meetings with Ukrainian and Russian officials. In pursuit of peace, the Trump administration is pushing Ukraine to bend to maximalist Kremlin demands that Russia has failed to impose militarily, while promising Kyiv “platinum standard” security guarantees to sweeten the deal.

This approach is unlikely to succeed — and may prove harmful. The administration would be wise to focus instead on pressing Russia to soften its terms.

Putin Demands Victory He Hasn’t Earned

As one of his conditions for peace, Vladimir Putin insists that Ukrainian troops withdraw from the roughly 23 percent of the eastern Donetsk region they still control. He vows that if Kyiv refuses, his military will take that territory anyways. Putin seems convinced that Russia eventually can grind down Ukraine’s undermanned forces.

Some U.S. officials have echoed those arguments, apparently believing that pressuring Kyiv into concessions offers the surest path to peace. As President Donald Trump recently put it, Russia is “much bigger” than Ukraine, and “at some point, size will win.” Ukraine is “losing,” Trump contended, so it must “accept” Russian demands. An initial U.S. peace plan released in November, drafted with Russian input, called for Ukraine to cede the remainder of Donetsk, which would become a “demilitarized buffer zone,” which Washington is now pitching as a “free economic zone.”

In fact, it’s anything but certain that Russian forces can conquer the rest of Donetsk. They would need to seize a so-called “fortress belt” of cities and towns, just one of which — Pokrovsk — has taken Russia over a year to capture despite advantages in manpower and materiel. Despite improvements in drone warfare, Russia has remained unable to achieve a major breakthrough. That’s partly due to degraded force quality, which is unlikely to recover while large-scale hostilities continue. Russia can continue inching forward so long as it can recruit enough men to throw into the “meatgrinder.” Since 2023, Moscow has maintained a surprisingly strong recruitment rate thanks to ever-larger financial incentives. But that can’t last forever.

Although Ukrainian forces are weary and short on infantry, they are not on the verge of breaking. Ukraine continues to put up a stout defense, relying chiefly on Ukrainian-made drones to inflict disproportionate casualties. The decline in American aid has hurt. But even a complete cutoff probably wouldn’t trigger a collapse, though it would mean more Ukrainian lives lost and infrastructure destroyed.

In short, Putin is demanding that Ukraine accept defeat despite the inconvenient fact that Russia hasn’t defeated Ukraine on the battlefield and is unlikely to do so. As long as that remains the case, lopsided peace plans will be a dead end.

This is not a “Zelensky problem.” Recent polling indicates that the Ukrainian people still overwhelmingly reject ceding more territory, seen as synonymous with capitulation. Many in the Ukrainian military are understandably loathe to cede defensible terrain for which Ukrainians have bled for nearly four years. No Ukrainian leader will agree to a deal that would mean political suicide. Even if Zelensky did try to capitulate, it could ignite domestic political instability and undermine morale, which Russia would seek to exploit.

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Beware Empty Promises

In part to convince Kyiv to swallow territorial concessions, the Trump administration has been surprisingly forward-leaning on security guarantees for Ukraine. Although Washington has made clear it won’t allow Ukraine to join NATO, U.S. officials touted an “Article 5-like” commitment during recent talks in Berlin. This has enthused Ukrainian and European officials, who are rightly concerned Russia will violate any peace agreement it signs.

The White House, though, should take care not to make empty promises. Ukraine must not be left with another 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which gave Kyiv hollow security assurances in exchange for relinquishing nuclear weapons inherited from the Soviet Union.

While the administration has released few details regarding the specific commitments it made in Berlin, press reports indicate elements of the plan are sensible. The Ukrainian Armed Forces would be permitted to maintain a peacetime strength of 800,000 troops and would receive Western training and equipment, defying Moscow’s demand for Ukrainian demilitarization. A U.S.-led international monitoring and verification mechanism would ensure compliance with a ceasefire, and a deconfliction mechanism would work to prevent escalation.

However, earlier media leaks, as well as a European statement released following the Berlin talks, suggest Washington may also be offering a non-committal promise to respond with measures up to and including “armed force” if Russia re-invaded Ukraine. The Trump team says it will grant Kyiv’s request to seek Senate approval to make this pledge legally binding. Even so, the threat of U.S. military intervention lacks credibility. Both Trump and his Democratic predecessors have eschewed direct conflict with Russia over Ukraine. That’s unlikely to change under a future president, especially since Washington is trying to focus on deterring China.

If the White House is betting its bluff won’t be called, it should think again. However the current war ends, it’s unlikely to resolve Russia’s decades-long struggle to dominate Ukraine and reshape the European security order. Moscow will be racing to reconstitute its army, drawing on lessons learned in Ukraine and expanded defense-industrial capacity. Another Russian invasion is a distinct possibility. And if America’s “Article 5-like” guarantee is revealed to be hollow, it could undermine the credibility of the actual Article 5, weakening NATO deterrence.

As another part of the security guarantee package, the Trump administration apparently has agreed to support a British- and French-led multinational force in Ukraine. After hostilities cease, countries from the so-called “Coalition of the Willing” would help police Ukraine’s skies, clear naval mines, and regenerate the Ukrainian army. This would include deployments of Europe troops to Ukraine (though far from the front lines) — an idea which Moscow vehemently opposes. Other than ruling out putting American boots on the ground, the administration hasn’t publicly specified how it would support this force (likely involving intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and possibly other so-called “strategic enablers”). Nor has Washington publicly agreed to provide an air-power “backstop” if that force were attacked. If a ceasefire looks shaky and no U.S. backstop is committed, European countries will be more reluctant to put troops in Ukraine.

Another problem is that tying the force’s deployment to a ceasefire incentivizes Russia to prolong the war. Putin invaded Ukraine precisely to reverse its Westward drift, and Moscow insists that any peace settlement must bar Western troops from the country — a demand that earlier drafts of the U.S. peace plan sought to satisfy. As British scholar Jack Watling has argued, Europe could obviate the Russian veto commencing with air policing and training in western Ukraine now, before the war ends. Yet European capitals remain unwilling to do so, wary of escalation with Russia. That same fear undermines the force’s deterrent value in the first place.

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Path to Peace

Rather than gunning for a quick but lopsided deal, Washington should patiently focus on shifting the Kremlin’s calculus. Moscow has made clear that its ambitions go well beyond Donetsk. In essence, Putin seeks a settlement that locks Ukraine within Russia’s sphere of influence. Given the maximalist nature of Putin’s demands, peace will remain impossible unless Moscow reduces its expectations considerably. Ukraine will also have to make concessions, including on its NATO aspirations. But Russia is the primary obstacle.

Perversely, pressuring Ukraine to cede more territory could put a deal farther from reach. By attempting to strong-arm Kyiv, echoing Kremlin arguments about the inevitability of Russian advances, and reducing military aid for Ukraine, Washington risks hardening Putin’s intransigence.

The consequences could also extend beyond Ukraine. Since the Second World War, the United States has led the free world in opposing the acquisition of territory by military means. Discarding that now could shake allied trust in America while emboldening adversaries such as China. President Trump is right to push for peace in Ukraine, but the medicine must not be worse than the disease.

So long as Putin is overconfident in his military prospects and feels no sense of urgency to end the war, he is unlikely to make the necessary compromises. The Russian autocrat must be made to realize that more war will bring nothing but pain. The European Union just took an important step by pledging 90 billion euros to shore up Kyiv’s state budget through 2027. The United States should do its part, too. Washington could bolster Ukraine’s bargaining position by surging military assistance, much of which could be financed by Europe. This effort should include support for Kyiv’s air defense and long-range strike capabilities, helping Ukraine endure the winter and impose greater costs on Russia.

In addition, Washington should stringently enforce and build on its recent sanctions targeting Russia’s top oil companies. The Treasury Department should target unsanctioned Russian oil suppliers as well as other entities, vessels, and infrastructure that help bring that oil to market. Western countries could further ramp up the pressure by replacing the Biden-era price cap on Russian oil flows with a full ban on providing shipping or financial services for those exports.

Lastly, Kyiv’s Western partners should encourage the Ukrainian military to fight smarter. Ukraine must stop wasting precious manpower clinging to semi-encircled towns or counterattacking to reclaim insignificant positions. This penchant stems in part from concerns that admitting to battlefield setbacks would discourage U.S. support and fuel calls for territorial concessions.

The Ukrainians aren’t going to give Russia more than it can take by force of arms. Rather than trying to do Putin’s dirty work for him, Washington should put its energies into convincing Moscow to accept realistic terms.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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When the swap finally happened, Putin greeted Krasikov on the tarmac with a public embrace, an extraordinary display of presidential affection for a convicted murderer. Days later, the Kremlin confirmed his FSB status, praised his “service,” and even highlighted his past role as a presidential bodyguard. Putin’s message to his security services—and to the world—could not have been clearer: if you kill for Putin’s regime, the regime will protect you. Killing for the regime has always been a mission for Russia’s intelligence services (RIS).

State-directed murder was long embedded in the mission and culture of the RIS and their predecessors. The practice predates the Soviet Union, reaching back to the Czarist Okhrana, which routinely hunted down dissidents when exile to Siberia failed to silence them. After the 1905 revolution, Czar Nicholas II unleashed a wave of retributive assassinations that set a precedent for the violence institutionalized by the Cheka and later the KGB. He became known as “Bloody Nicholas.” The state security “organs” (as they are still known in Russia) elevated assassination into a professional craft, giving rise to the notorious phrase in Russian: vishaya mera nakazaniya — the highest measure of punishment. The term still carries its original meaning and dreaded connotation: death at the order of the state, whether by trial or extrajudicial killing.

There were many examples both at home and abroad for Soviet citizens to be afraid. Stalin’s plot to kill his arch-rival and fellow revolutionary, Leon Trotsky, was decades in the making and ended with an ice pick to Trotsky’s head while he was in Mexico City. His assassin, Ramon Mercader, was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union when he was released from prison and arrived back in the USSR.

Secret institutes like the infamous “Poison Factory,” known in the KGB as Laboratory 1 or “kamera” (for “the cell”), were set up during the early years of the Cold War to study chemical and biological agents that could be used to murder quietly. Laboratory 1 specialized in refining special toxins, like the ricin pellet the KGB provided to their Bulgarian allies, and used in the infamous assassination of Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov on a London bridge in 1978.

Today is no different. Some assassinations are believed to be directly ordered by Putin in what the Russians call “direct action” (pryamoye deistviye, also known colloquially as mokroe delo, or wet work), while others are believed to be carried out with his implied approval. Poison factories continue to function inside of Russia. Today, the FSB uses a modern “kamera” which helped refine the nerve agent Novichok for use against the defector Sergei Skripal in the 2018 Salisbury UK attack. It was the same agent used against Russian Opposition leaders Alexei Navalny in a failed assassination attempt, prior to his death in a remote Russian prison, also likely wet work at the hands of the FSB.

Why does Putin let his Chekist assassins use such a well-known, state-only produced chemical weapon like Novichok to kill defectors or dissidents? The answer: because he wants the world to know the RIS were behind the attacks and that the tradition of the “highest measure” continues. Otherwise, he could certainly have his hitmen use a gun, ice pick, or other more deniable method. There is a track record now for decades, going back to the FSB defector Alexander Litvinenko and his death from polonium in the UK. The RIS will not hesitate to murder any intelligence or military defectors that the RIS can find and reach in the West. The lack of a formidable response from the UK and the U.S. to the Litvinenko poisoning only emboldened Putin and his henchmen (one of the assassins, Lugavoy, was praised so highly within Russia that he was eventually elected to the Russian duma).

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The Russian Record of Killing their Own: Disincentivizing Dissent

Putin and his RIS siloviki want all of their officers to know that the price for treason is death, and they don’t care what government may be offended or what international laws are broken. Otherwise, the incentive for those officers to betray Russia’s corrupt services and look to a better life for themselves and their families is too high. It matters not whether the execution is ordered by a secret court, or carried out on the street, the RIS consider it within their purview to decide how and when.

Two historical points illustrate this as practice within the RIS. For decades of the Cold War, and after, the rumor proliferated within the KGB and GRU that one or both of the first GRU spies to work for the United States, Pyotr Popov and Oleg Penkovskiy, were executed by being thrown into a furnace alive. Popov was uncovered and executed in 1960. Penkovskiy was arrested and executed in May 1963 after the vital role he played in providing intelligence to the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The practice during that time period, carried over from Stalin’s purges, was more likely a bullet to the back of the head up against a wall at the infamous Lubyanka prison. But the rumor, which was spread to the West by GRU defector Viktor Suvorov, was effective and garnered a lot of attention within the services; it still does. It was purposely spread, and taught, and continues to be, at the KGB Andropov Academy through the 1980s, now known as the modern SVR Foreign Service Academy (what they call the AVR). The same rumor is taught to officers at the GRU Military Diplomatic Academy. Defectors have confirmed for years that this rumor is whispered among classes at the academies, and as a warning against dissents—“you want to be thrown into a furnace alive, shut-up you idiot!” The very idea of being burned alive in a furnace is hard for young officers to forget.

There is another example from Cold War history that illustrates the same point. In 1985, the so-called “year of the spy,” while crypto-spy John Walker and his family ring were uncovered and arrested, CIA officer Ed Howard defected to Moscow, and many other espionage incidents took place. CIA traitor Rick Ames gave his “big dump” of classified holdings to the Soviets. Ames offered up roughly a dozen different U.S. cases to the Soviet services, including many penetrations of the KGB and GRU. Most of those assets were executed in short order, sending up a giant “CI flag” of counterintelligence warning to CIA/FBI and the entire U.S. intelligence community that something was amiss. A major mole hunt, which unfortunately took nine years, eventually led to Ames’ arrest. Ames himself commented after his arrest that he was astounded that the KGB/GRU had killed so many assets: why not keep them running as controlled cases, at least for a time, in order to protect him? It was an unprecedented, even reckless reaction.

Why did they do it?

The answer, as some senior Russian officers including former Line KR (kontrarazvedka or CI) Chief Viktor Cherkashin would later confirm (he wrote a book that was translated in the West) was that the Soviet services had no choice. The KGB and GRU had to take drastic steps to stop the flood of espionage and leaks in the Soviet services—too many traitors! An example had to be set.

Cherkashin would know since he ran both Ames and FBI spy Robert Hanssen when he served in the Washington D.C. Residency (station) of the KGB. Reportedly, the issue went to the highest ranks of the KGB/GRU and then on to the Central Committee of the Communist Party. For all their feared security prowess in the Soviet Union, the vaunted KGB had no idea that the CIA was running so many cases under their noses, literally, in Moscow and around the world. Since their own counterintelligence, the 2nd Chief Directorate of the KGB, had failed so miserably, the decision was made to execute them all (or nearly all, a previous few escaped death in the Gulag). There had to be a hard line drawn for the tens of thousands of other Soviet intelligence officers not to betray the regime - the highest measure would be the warning.

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Murder by Order or Murder to Impress the Boss?

The FSB is no less of a counterintelligence failure than their KGB predecessors. They cannot turn the tide against the U.S., our intelligence services, and those of our allies. Instead they arrest innocent civilians like those used to barter for the 2024 swap. That is why Putin likely continues to order death to all intelligence defectors. That is why he will greet a killer like Krasikov at the airport in Moscow in front of the cameras. But Putin’s RIS don’t just kill defectors and Chechen separatists. The RIS were almost certainly behind many political hits in Russia like Navalny, Boris Nemtsov and many others “falling out of windows” from Putin’s own government in recent years. Here it is important to recall that under President Yeltsin, Russia abolished the death penalty. So what were once judicial executions, ordered by the state, have become extra-judicial killings in the Putin era. But for the RIS, there is no distinction.

There have been many assaults and killings of journalists like Anna Politkovskaya. The question often arises—does Putin know about and order all of these murders? Perhaps, but there may be something else at play as well, an effort to impress “the boss.” This could also explain some of the more reckless acts of sabotage playing out in Europe at the hands of the RIS. Mafia families work in the same way - they surprise the boss with new income streams or take out a threat to the family with a hit, to earn one’s “button” and become a “made man.”

Indeed, the RIS function within mob-like cultures, fostered by patronage relationships, and corruption at every level. Officers are encouraged to pay bribes up the chain of command, and frauds of all kinds at every level infect their services. Putin has no doubt told aspiring leaders in the SVR, GRU and especially the FSB, his favorite service, to surprise him with new and inventive operations meant to hit back against the West, particularly regarding Ukraine. This has led to a cascading series of actions by the RIS, including sabotage, exploding parcels, and, yet again, like earlier in their history, attempted assassinations. The most brazen plot uncovered so far was the GRU plot that was unraveled in Germany in 2024 to assassinate the CEO of Rheinmetall, a leading provider of arms to Ukraine. GRU unit 29155 is likely behind that plot, just as they were behind the Skripal attack, and others.

The RIS attack dogs in Putin’s services are simply continuing a tradition of state-directed violence. Yet in the West, we often hesitate to assign blame, waiting for courtroom-quality evidence. But the evidence is already written across decades of Russian intelligence tradecraft, and reinforced by independent investigations.

Open-source teams like Bellingcat have repeatedly identified the GRU and FSB officers behind some of Moscow’s most feral operations - from the Skripal poisoning in Salisbury to the attempted assassination of Alexei Navalny. Still, conclusive proof of Kremlin authorization often appears only when an insider defects with hard intelligence. Those who contemplate such a step know they will be protected and given a new life in the West. They also know the stakes, however, if caught.

The absence of courtroom proof in every case of murder, poisoning, or a fall from a window should not silence the West. Putin’s record speaks for itself. His regime has presided over the killings of journalists, opposition figures, exiles abroad, and tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians. He operates as a modern bloody czar, no different in impulse from Nicholas II—ordering assassinations, reprisals, and revenge killings with impunity. And the pattern is escalating. It is only a matter of time before Russian intelligence pushes further, testing its reach against U.S. and allied targets. The warning signs are unmistakable. The question is no longer whether the threat exists, but what the West intends to do about it.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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OPINION — President Donald Trump’s 28-point peace plan is a humanitarian attempt to halt the killing and destruction in Ukraine, although Russia’s President Vladimir Putin may view the peace plan as an attempt to appease Russia. Since Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008, the U.S. and its NATO allies have not been able to deter an aggressive Russian Federation.

When Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, this was a clear signal, especially to NATO, that Russia was prepared to use force in the “near abroad” when their interests weren’t respected. The response from the U.S. and NATO was weak: no military support to Georgia or strong punitive actions against Russia

In 2014, Russia seized Crimea, with minimal consequences. The muted response in 2008 to Russia’s invasion of Georgia no doubt convinced the Kremlin that the U.S. and NATO would not risk a military confrontation with Russia. Although Russia was suspended from the G8 and the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning Russia’s annexation of Crimea, NATO’s military response – suspending all cooperation with Russia -- was weak:

The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021reinforced the Russian view that U.S. and NATO “red lines” were either not clear or not credible. Indeed, Russia viewed the withdrawal as a weakening of U.S. deterrence credibility.

On February 4, 2022, just weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Mr. Putin met with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Beijing Winter Olympics. The joint statement from their discussion was clear in stating a “no-limits” partnership and “no forbidden areas of cooperation” between Russia and China.

And prior to Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. publicly stated that they had credible intelligence of Russia’s plan to invade Ukraine. Unfortunately, however, even with this insight, the U.S. could not convince Mr. Putin an invasion of Ukraine would cross a red line and result in sanctions and other consequences for Russia. We failed to deter Russia from this bloody four-year war, with over 400,000 Ukrainian casualties and over one million Russian casualties.

The 28-point peace plan is being reviewed by the leadership in Ukraine and NATO and it’s possible the peace plan will be amended, to secure greater support from Ukraine and NATO.

What’s clear from Russia’s actions in Georgia, Crimea and Ukraine is that U.S. and NATO deterrence failed. A credible deterrence strategy would have made it clear to Russia that their aggressive military behavior would have resulted in significant consequences, to include biting sanctions, pariah status and a likely military response.

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China, North Korea and Iran, allies of Russia, are watching closely how the war in Ukraine ends. Indeed, their interest in what’s included in the peace plan and the consequences for Russia, given their invasion of a Ukraine that had security assurances from Russia – and the U.S. and United Kingdom – in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, which pledged to respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and existing borders.

Hopefully, none of Russia’s allies will view the Ukraine peace plan as license to foment trouble in their region. Clearly, China understands U.S. policy: A peaceful resolution of issues between China and Taiwan, in accord with the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. North Korea knows that the U.S. has extended deterrence commitments to our ally in South Korea and Iran should appreciate – - especially since the June 2025 bombing of their Fordow nuclear facility -- that Israel is a close ally of the U.S, with strong security commitments.

Deterrence credibility is important. That’s why the U.S. is providing Taiwan with about $387 million in defensive arms sales in 2024. And that’s why we have a Washington Declaration with South Korea, enhancing the nuclear deterrence alliance. Iran saw clearly, with the bombing of Fordow, how close our allied relationship is with Israel.

These allies of Russia would be making a grievous error if they try to exploit any peace agreement with Russia to end the war in Ukraine. And Mr. Putin would be advised to comply with any peace accord to end the Ukraine war and to refrain from any future attempt to violate the sovereignty of any of the 32 NATO members.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joseph DeTrani was first published in The Washington Times

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EXPERT OPINION – The recently leaked 28-point peace plan to end the war in Ukraine is nothing short of an appeasement that satisfies the maximalist demands of the aggressor in the conflict, Russian President Vladimir Putin. This is nothing short of the side on the verge of victory (eg, the free world) conceding to the side on the verge of defeat (Putin, the leader of the anti-west coalition). Sadly, it comes at a time when the situation on the battlefield is more or less a draw, both sides are effectively attacking energy infrastructure, and Russia’s economy is moving toward recession.

According to Russian data, third Quarter GDP growth in Russia was 0.6%. The expectation is that Q4 data will show the beginning of a recession. Sberbank has just decided to let 20% of their workforce go. Russia has for the first time, begun to sell gold reserves, presumably to make up for lost revenue from the recently imposed sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil. Russia’s wartime transition to a command economy is not sustainable with a declining workforce sapped by the loss of young men sacrificed in Ukraine and those who have voted with their feet by leaving Putin’s kleptocracy.

The key points of the 28-point plan amount to nothing less than surrender by Ukraine and make in vain the sacrifices made by their valiant soldiers and citizens in their three plus years of war of full-scale war since Russia’s deadly invasion.

The agreement will be remembered in history with the same ignominy of the Munich Agreement of 1938 and will have the same consequence of setting the stage for a larger war to come.

Perhaps most egregious in the terms of the draft agreement is the re-establishment of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine and the establishment of Russian as the official language. This indignity on top of the kidnapping of hundreds - if not thousands - of Ukrainian children to Russia and the forced conscription into the Russian army of men from Russian occupied territory. Then, of course, there is the massacre of innocent citizens by Russian soldiers in places like Bucha, all of which will go unaccounted for under the draft agreement. No judgement at Nuremberg for Russian war criminals.

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The plan U.S. officials have negotiated is nothing more than cultural genocide against the people of Ukraine. That the U.S. would be part of an agreement that almost certainly would result in the arrest, deportation and incarceration of a generation of brave Ukrainians who have bravely resisted Putin’s aggression is simply unthinkable.

Mr. Trump, every member of your national security team should be required to watch episode nine of the brilliant HBO series Band of Brothers. The episode’s title is “Why We Fight” and the reasons for standing up to autocracy and evil portrayed in that episode are perfectly applicable to the situation today with the free world standing strong against the aggression of a malevolent dictator.

The Trump Administration’s desire to end the violence in Ukraine is commendable, but not at the price of setting the stage for the next war by giving victory to the aggressor. The men who reportedly negotiated the key points of the agreement have no experience dealing with Russia or Russians of the KGB ilk. The promises of “peace” offered by the Russian side are a chimera at best. Putin and the gang of thieves in his government know perfectly well how to manipulate representatives of the character of Steve Witkoff, President Trump’s real estate specialist now in charge of negotiating with Russia over Ukraine. Perhaps those negotiators are working with the idea of “Commander’s intent” that the President believes an agreement can be reached and counted upon with a counter-party like Putin. This is a serious misjudgment with serious consequences.

Those who have studied Putin for decades, understand clearly that he wants nothing but the destruction of the United States, our system of government and the set of ideals for which we stand. This is core to his beliefs. Putin and his security services will do everything they can to undermine the United States. One should not be surprised if the Russian services do not use every opportunity in the context of the Epstein revelations to attack every angle of the political spectrum in the U.S. that they can, including President Trump.

President Trump is now facing the most significant foreign and national security moment of his presidency. It appears the representatives he has chosen to negotiate with the Russian side have left him in a position to be remembered forever in history as the Chamberlain of the 21st century. Mr. Trump would do well to recognize that history does not remember Neville Chamberlain for any achievements in his political career in economic or domestic policy in Great Britain. He is remembered solely for Munich and "peace in our time". Mr. Trump is setting himself up to be remembered by history similarly. Sadly, it could also be the legacy of the country that was once the pillar of strength of the free world.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Russia’s intelligence services (RIS) have failed spectacularly in Ukraine: in planning, execution, and analysis, yet they will face no reckoning. Vladimir Putin cannot afford to hold the SVR, GRU, or FSB accountable because they are not merely instruments of the state; they are the pillars of his personal power. The RIS misled the Kremlin into believing Ukraine would fall in days, Europe would divide, and NATO would hesitate. Instead, they exposed the rot at the core of Russia’s national security system: corruption, internecine rivalry, and a profound detachment from reality. Understanding this dynamic matters for the West because it reveals not only how Russia fights its wars but how it fails, and how it will likely fight again.

As the war approaches its fourth year, the front lines have grown static, and speculation about an eventual end has returned. Certainly, the world hopes for peace and relief from the suffering that has defined Europe’s largest land conflict since 1945. Yet even when the drones stop flying, Ukraine’s struggle to rebuild will begin, and within the Russian government another kind of reckoning will unfold. The aggressor’s armed forces and intelligence services will take stock of losses and lessons learned. But unlike in the West, where failure invites inquiry and reform, Russia’s services are more likely to protect the system that failed them and pin any blame on each other.

Russian post-war accounting will not play out like we in the West might imagine. We are accustomed to commissions and legislative investigations after wars and major national security events, often resulting in harsh criticism for various agencies, and sweeping reforms. In Russia, however, Putin will largely give the RIS a pass.

To understand why, it is important to understand the roles the RIS played in the war and in the Russian government more broadly. The SVR (the Foreign Intelligence Service), the GRU (the Main Intelligence Directorate - military intelligence), and the FSB (the Federal Security Service), serve first and foremost as Putin’s Praetorian Guard. Their primary responsibility is securing his regime and hold on power. Moreover, Putin rose up through the RIS ranks in the KGB, and later held the post of FSB Director. His feelings toward the RIS are hardly objective. The reputations of Putin and the services are inextricably linked. Anything that significantly tarnishes the highly cultivated myth of RIS omnipotence inevitably damages his own hold on power.

If Putin and the “siloviki” (strongmen) who make up his inner circle try to call the RIS to account for their performance when the fighting stops, the one thing all three services will argue is that the war was an absolute success. Each will extoll their roles with little regard for the number of Russian lives lost and military assets squandered. Going back to Tsarist and Soviet times, casualties and human suffering were never a mark for a war’s success or failure in Russia. The RIS will focus on territory gained, Ukraine’s membership in NATO being halted (from their optic), and the alliance, they will claim, weakened. They will ignore the addition of two capable new members to the alliance (Finland and Sweden), the doubling of the length of NATO’s border with Russia, and the resuscitation of NATO’s military spending and defense industrial base. Facts will not stop the RIS from claiming success with Putin. But it is useful to further break down some of their likely claims, and actual performance, by service.

The SVR: “Speak up Sergey!”

Among the RIS, and especially relative to the FSB, Putin has never been particularly fond of the foreign intelligence service, the SVR. Its claims of success on Ukraine will likely not impress him or the other siloviki much. Recall Putin’s public dressing down of SVR Director Sergey Naryshkin on Russian TV in the days before the invasion for indecisiveness: “Come on Sergey, speak up, speak plainly!” But Sergey did not speak up, nor make much of a difference in the war.

Since they do not have troops or special ops elements in the war (their main Spec-Ops team, ZASLON, is used more for protection abroad), the SVR will likely try to boast of the success of its “active measures” operations. This is the traditional term the Russians have used for covert influence and disinformation activities intended to weaken, confuse, or disrupt their adversaries. Their modern term, however, is to refer to them as “measures of support” (MS). The SVR has an entire “Directorate MS” devoted to this line of operational work: using troll farms, social media, cyber operations, and recruited agents of influence to meddle in the internal politics, public opinion, and elite decision-making of its adversaries to Russia’s advantage. The Russians believe their active measures contributed to their successes in the Georgia invasion in 2008 and occupation of Crimea and parts of the Donbas in 2014. They believed they confused and stunted the West’s response and, to a degree, they were right.

But the SVR will have trouble claiming active measures succeeded in the current Ukraine war. They will perhaps try to sell Putin that the SVR sowed confusion at critical policy decision points when the U.S. and its European allies were not always in sync—hesitation in providing this or that weapons system, unity or lack thereof at times on sanctions, asset seizures, etc. Their efforts, however, did not materially alter Russia’s failure to achieve its war aims. If they were effective at all, it was only in the margins. There will be no dramatic accounting for the SVR but expect to see the SVR’s relative influence decline among the RIS, a continuation of trend since Putin’s rise to power.

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GRU: Plowed into the Grinder, and Re-Special Purposed

The GRU will likely point to the various sabotage acts, conducted in Europe after the invasion, some successful but most not, including exploding packages, industrial arson, cable cuts in the Baltic Sea, and assassinations, or attempts at them. These are the purview of the GRU and its various numbered units, such as Unit 29155, which was behind both the attempted assassination of GRU defector Sergey Skripal in the UK in 2018, and likely also the thwarted assassination plot against the CEO of Germany’s Rheinmetall in 2024. The Lithuanian government is convinced the GRU also was behind the crash of a DHL plane that same year. But these actions failed in their primary mission, to intimidate and deter Europe and NATO from assisting Ukraine. If anything, the actions have only emboldened members to continue support for Ukraine.

Another shocking GRU failure, one heavily criticized in Russia’s pro-war blogosphere but receiving less attention in the West, was its squandering of precious, highly trained Spetsnaz units on the Ukrainian battlefield. There are nine Spetsnaz, or “Special Purpose,” brigades under the GRU’s 14th Directorate (roughly analogous to Tier 1 elements in the U.S. SOCOM). Nearly all were heavily deployed in Ukraine, and all suffered extremely heavy casualties. The planned decapitation strike against the Ukrainian leadership in the first days of the war, spearheaded by Spetsnaz units, was a complete and costly failure (the failed seizure of Hostomel airport was part of this). Many Spetsnaz were also used foolishly in frontal assaults and to plug gaps in forward lines when Russian “kontraktniki” (paid soldiers, but often supplemented in frontline units with conscripts) failed. GRU Spetsnaz have a storied history and culture. It will be hard for them to recover the reputation for being “elite” without notable successes to point to in Ukraine. They failed to impact the direction of the war in any significant way.

As with the SVR, the GRU will likely avoid any dramatic negative consequences. There will probably be some modest reorganizations, just as there have been since the collapse of the USSR. In fact, the GRU is technically not even called the GRU any longer. It was formally redesignated the “GU” (Main Directorate), although many stubborn officers still refer to themselves as “GRU-chniki.” One reorganization has already occurred since the war began, the standup of something called the Department for Special Tasks (SSD). Its function and exact composition are still not fully known, but it appears to combine various Russian-termed “direct actions” (e.g., assassinations, sabotage) units, such as Unit 29155, into a unified structure. The SSD is broadly equivalent to the CIA’s Special Activities Center in terms of covert action, but dwarfs it in size (and the CIA is bound by law not to carry out assassinations). The GRU is a mammoth bureaucracy and it will likely only grow more after the war.

FSB: Failed, But Still Putin’s Favorite

Despite their many failures, there will be few significant negative consequences for the FSB, which Putin once ran. In many ways, though, the FSB’s shortcomings in Ukraine were the most egregious and consequential. The FSB was in charge of the war’s planning, particularly the hybrid dimensions, or what Russian doctrine refers to more broadly as “non-contact war.” The FSB's lead for the Ukraine invasion was its Fifth Service, which heads up both operational analysis and reporting to the President on the war. The FSB has organizational primacy for RIS operations in the “near abroad,” i.e., the states of the former USSR, including Ukraine. In the pre-war planning phase, the Fifth Service was wrong about everything: wrong about Ukrainian resilience, wrong about how quickly and substantially Europe and NATO would react, and wrong about the FSB and Russian Armed Forces’ capabilities on the ground.

FSB Spetsnaz units Alpha and Vympel all participated in the war, but like their GRU cousins, they have not distinguished themselves. Still they are still frequently lauded in the Russian press for “actions that cannot be disclosed.” The FSB also has the lead for cyber operations against Ukraine with its 16th Center, but those cyber-attacks have not materially altered the direction of the war in Russia’s favor. The battle over bytes was not won in any way by Russian FSB hackers, whose ranks were bolstered by Russian criminal groups hacking for the state and their coffers.

The FSB will likely be the RIS agency most affected by the war. But instead of accountability for failure, its power and influence will likely only grow. First, because of all the services, the FSB, in its secret police role, is the critical player in securing Putin’s rule. In the bureaucratic pecking order, the FSB sits at the very top and will remain there. FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov holds the military rank of full General, and he is treated as such by Russian military generals, despite never having served in the military. Second, if there is a formal investigation or after-action when the fighting stops, the FSB will lead it, just as it did in the investigations of the 2002 Nord-Ost theater terrorist attack, the 2004 school seizure in Beslan, and the more recent Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in 2024, each of which involved breathtaking intelligence and operational failures, but did not have significant negative repercussions for the FSB. The FSB pretends to clean up after it performs incompetently.

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In conclusion, the one thing the West can count on is that the Russian services will continue to relentlessly compete with and back-stab one another. There is no “intelligence community” in Russia remotely similar to the one we have in the United States. The rivalries within our community pale in comparison. This presents opportunities to recruit personnel from all the RIS services, many of whom will have lost colleagues in the war for a cause and for leaders whose competence an increasing number of them will come to doubt. This and the pervasive corruption in Russia are still strong incentives for espionage against those who have led Russia down this disastrous path.

The RIS will not prevent another war for Russia; if anything, they will foment one. Before they do, the US and our allies must understand these failures, but also, and critically, the Russian services’ likely self-evaluation and the lessons they themselves will draw, or fail to draw, from those lessons. When the current war ends, Putin may plan another intervention or aggression--in Europe, again in Ukraine, or elsewhere. Before he does, we need to be ready to counter the next iteration of the FSB, GRU, and SVR tactics to encourage and support war. We can better do so by studying their playbook and some of their attempted actions, and dramatic failures.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

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Yet the Russian army continues to engage in desperate efforts to regain limited territory to the west. British intelligence estimates that since the start of 2025 Russia has suffered 332,000 casualties, the highest loss rate since the invasion. Russia has made only marginal gains, which Putin trumpets as victories as he throws more men and equipment into the Ukraine meatgrinder.

Of course, Putin cannot afford to admit failure, but it nonetheless seems as if he actually believes his strategy is succeeding. Why?

The answer lies in the perverse incentives of Russian command and control (C2), which conceal the weaknesses of Russian FS. Russian C2 is concentrated in one civilian with no military training (Putin), and his small circle of advisers.

Putin’s leadership discourages innovation by field officers and welcomes blind obedience. Bad news from field officers of all ranks is punished with demotion or arrest. Good news is rewarded with promotion. As a result, field officers routinely lie about their failures in hopes of promotion and reassignment. There is almost no active search for information by headquarters to correct misinformation sent by field officers.

Russian force structures are notoriously corrupt—a corruption that is expected and tolerated, but also can be an excuse for punishment. Officers steal from their units by exaggerating the size of the unit and pocketing the unused pay. Hence, many Russian units are severely understaffed. Soldiers steal from their units by selling weapons, ammunition, and fuel, leaving their units under-equipped. The vast majority of battle-hardened soldiers are long gone, as are military trainers, who were all sent to the front lines. New Russian recruits are untrained and unaware of the risks they face.

Russia's C2 and FS Problems from the Start of the Invasion

A brief review makes it clear that C2 and FS problems have bedeviled the Russian invasion from the start of the 2022 invasion. Planning for the invasion ignored standard military doctrine, which emphasizes that successful invasions require sufficient scale, speed, and force. The considerable literature on the force differentials needed for an invasion, including Soviet doctrine, agrees on the classic rule that a frontal assault requires a 3:1 force ratio to compensate for the higher casualties suffered by the invaders.

Effective command and control are also essential for the success of an invasion. This includes accurate intelligence about enemy forces, freedom for field officers to improvise as needed, rapid field intelligence upward to inform tactics and strategy as the invasion proceeds, and quick top-down decisions in response to field intelligence.

The 2022 invasion violated all these requirements. In order to conceal its intentions and achieve an operational surprise, the planning of the invasion was limited to a very small group led by Putin. Not even Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, was included in this group. The Russian field commanders on the ground in Belarus for military exercises had no idea that they would be leading an invasion. The success of this secrecy came at a high cost: there was no opportunity for critiquing the invasion plan and no consideration of fall-back strategies.

Russian intelligence about the Ukraine’s response was based entirely on faulty assumptions that a high-speed invasion would demoralize the Ukrainian military, the Russian military would easily defeat the Ukrainian military on the battlefield, the top Ukrainian leaders would be quickly captured and executed, and that the vast majority of Ukrainians would either welcome the Russian invaders or remain passive.

The 3:1 force differential rule should have required an invasion of 590,000 Russian, given that the Russians knew the Ukrainian military had 196,600 active-duty personnel. Instead, the Russians planned an invasion of 190,000 personnel, actually smaller than the combined Ukrainian armed forces. Even worse, instead of massing its invasion force at one point to achieve a breakthrough, the Russians decided to attack on six different axes: from the Black Sea in the southeast, from Crimea in the south, from Donbas in the east, from Belgorod in the northeast (towards Kharkiv), from Kursk in the northeast (towards Kyiv), and from Gomel, Belarus, in the north (towards Kyiv).

All the Russian invasion routes faced unexpected problems, but the flaws in Russian C2 and FS can be illustrated by the fate of Russia’s most promising attack, coming from Gomel, Belarus, and aimed at Kyiv. This included an airborne assault on Antonov airport, in the Kyiv suburb of Hostumel. The Ukrainians had not expected an attack from Belarus and were unprepared for both the land invasion and the airborne assault.

Why did these attacks fail? Russian secrecy about the invasion had left the Russian ground forces in Belarus completely unprepared. They were informed of their roles in the invasion only 24 hours before the invasion. As a result, they lacked ammunition, fuel, food, and communications. They did not anticipate heavy fighting. Mud forced their armor to use the few roads, causing traffic jams. They encountered entire towns that were not on their maps, requiring them to stop and ask civilians where they were. Residents reported the Russian positions to Ukrainian authorities.

The Ukrainians acted swiftly to confront the Russian assault from Gomel, which was approaching the outskirts of Kyiv. They committed most of their available special forces and special units of other security units, called up all their reserve units, and mobilized the cadets and staff of their military academies into new battalions, supported by two brigades of artillery and one mechanized brigade. Even so, the Russians had a 12:1 troop advantage on the Gomel axis. On 27 February, their advance units were able to capture the suburb of Bucha, just west of Kyiv.

However, the phone calls from residents from towns in the Russian path permitted Ukrainian artillery to target the Russian columns. The Ukrainian forces knew the territory well, giving them a huge tactical advantage, and they were able to assault the slow-moving Russian columns almost at will, causing panic, abandonment of equipment, and blockage of the roads. As the Russian columns stopped moving, their losses multiplied. The Russian advance units that had reached Bucha were short on fuel, ammunition, and manpower. They assumed defensive positions, waiting for reinforcements that never arrived.

In the battle for Antonov airport on the edge of Kyiv, the Russians used helicopters and elite airborne troops. These troops were to capture and execute the Ukrainian leadership. But the Ukrainians surrounded the airport with heavy armor, pounding the Russians. They were able to capture the airport, driving the Russians into the surrounding woods. While the Russians were able to recapture the airport after a couple of days, the Ukrainians had time to destroy the runways, making impossible the landing of reinforcements and preventing the Russians from capturing the Ukrainian leadership.

On March 16th the Ukrainian government announced a counteroffensive in the Kyiv region, and by the end of March, Russian ground forces were retreating north from the Bucha area. By April 2nd the entire Kyiv oblast was back in Ukrainian hands, including the area bordering Belarus.

What was the Russian response to this humiliating defeat? Those Russian generals who were not killed, were mostly cashiered or arrested, as were many of the colonels. The disaster resulted largely from Putin’s leadership, but the defeated units took the blame. This added to the incentive for officers to lie about failure and pretend achievement.

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The First Stalemate

The war has continued through various phases. The second phase, from early April through the end of August, 2022, was marked by active fighting along front lines, with heavy Russian losses, but was a relative stalemate in terms of territorial gains by either side.

The Second Ukrainian Offensive

The third phase began on September 6, 2022, when Ukrainian troops attacked the Kharkiv front near the Russian border. On September 9, Ukrainian mechanized units broke through. Ukrainian forces raced north and east. The cities of Kupiansk and Izium fell to the Ukrainians on 10 September. By the next day the Russian forces north of Kharkiv had retreated over the border, leaving all of the Kharkiv Oblast under Ukrainian control. Pressing on to the east, Ukrainian forces on 12 September crossed the Siverskyi Donets, and on 1 October the Ukrainians recaptured Lyman, a major railway hub, and took as prisoners an estimated 5,000 Russian troops.

As Russian forces rushed to the northeast front, Ukraine launched its counteroffensive in the Kherson region on October 2. By 9 October Ukrainian forces had retaken 1,170 square kilometers of territory, pressing on toward the Dnieper River and the city of Kherson. On 11 November, Kherson was occupied by the Ukrainians.

The Second Stalemate

The second period of stalemate dates from 12 November 2022 until the present. During this three-year period, the war has seen the introduction of drone warfare on a massive scale, first by Ukraine and then by Russia. As a result of the drone warfare, the entire conflict has changed in character. Drones have made assaults by armored vehicles so costly that the war has reverted to trench warfare reminiscent of World War I. Drones now account for two-thirds or more of front-line casualties in the war.

Ukraine’s government discarded Soviet-era regulations to provide tax breaks and profit incentives to independent Ukrainian drone producers, authorizing the Ukrainian military to contract with them. These independent companies have made good use of Ukraine’s large cadre of skilled aeronautical engineers and information technology specialists. About 200 of these companies are officially recognized to receive military contracts, and as many as 300 other groups manufacture drones and donate them directly to military units. However, financial resources remain a limiting factor.

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Russia has rapidly developed its own drone capacity. Moreover, Russia has the resources to outproduce Ukraine, even if its drones are less sophisticated. Russian drone production is limited less by finances than by the search for microchips, smuggled from the west or bought from China. Russia also has ballistic and airborne missile systems that are hard for Ukraine to bring down. Russia has been using massive barrages of drones and missiles to demoralize Ukraine. But this effort is counterproductive. Bombings anger enemy populations and stiffen resistance, as shown in WWII by the Blitz of London and Allied carpet bombings of Germany. Russian barrages may have strained Ukraine’s economy, but they have not lessened resistance.

While the drone/missile war is well known, Ukraine’s other defense industry growth is less known. Ukraine now produces more artillery shells than all of NATO’s 32 members and Europe. Since 2022, domestic production of armored personnel carriers has increased by 400 percent, artillery by 200 percent, ammunition by 150 percent, and anti-tank weapons by 100 percent. By 2025, a single Ukrainian factory was producing 20 Bohdana howitzers each month, similar in specifications to the French Caesar. Ukrainian defense companies deliver howitzers in 60 days for $2.5 million compared to a several-year wait and a cost of $4.3 million in the West.

Russia has had to develop a new tactical approach for the active fronts. Groups of two or three soldiers are forced (by firing squads) to run towards Ukrainian lines and if they live, conceal themselves to fight later. Specialized units such as snipers, artillery spotters, or drone operators try to identify and target the sources of firing at these individuals. Then larger assault units move forward to capture territory. However, these assault units are now poorly trained, and their equipment is obsolete armor or more often simply cars, vans, and motorcycles, often heavily camouflaged. Ukrainian spotter drones are waiting for these assaults, and once the Russian vehicles are in motion and supported by Russian artillery, Ukrainian drones blow up both the vehicles and the artillery. On a typical day in autumn 2025, the Russians were losing 1,000 soldiers, 10 armored units, 25 artillery barrels, and 100 vehicles. By offering increasingly high incentives, Russia was recruiting 30,000 soldiers a month, barely enough to cover losses.

Russian electronic warfare has improved dramatically, with a focus on disrupting Ukrainian drones. As a result, Ukrainian forces are now losing about 10,000 drones per month. Russian air defenses also have improved, reducing the ability of Ukrainian fighter jets to attack. Russian engineers have been effective in designing and building defensive trenchworks, minefields, and tank traps in areas they control.

However, Ukraine air defenses have also improved. Russian airplanes now must launch airborne missiles from Russian territory, with a considerable loss of accuracy. Russian ground to ground ballistic missiles are hard to bring down, but also lack accuracy.

Faced with the hardening of Russian front lines, Ukrainian forces are focused on inflicting high Russian casualties, rather than attacking themselves. The exception occurs when the Ukrainians decide to roll back a Russian salient to prevent it from being hardened. The massive Russian missile and drone attacks deep in Ukraine have required the Ukrainians to invest heavily in missile and drone defenses of all types, which have something like a 90% success rate. Nonetheless, Ukraine suffers considerable damage. This serves as a constant reminder to Ukrainians of what is at stake.

Conclusion

Putin’s war in Ukraine has provided him with a rationale for stifling dissent in Russia, redirecting vast resources to turn Russia’s economy to military production, sponsoring efforts to overturn governments that support Ukraine, and preparing for additional invasions that will re-establish the Russian empire and cement his legacy as a modern Stalin.

In spite of all this, Putin is still losing the war in Ukraine. That conflict is chewing up men and equipment at an unsustainable rate. Moreover, it has been a strategic disaster. The war strengthened Ukrainian nationalism. It energized the European members of NATO and caused Finland and Sweden to join NATO, which doubled the length of NATO’s frontier with Russia. It destroyed the myth of Russian military superiority. It ended Russian natural gas exports to the European Union, which had been carefully cultivated for decades. It led to the emigration of more than half a million of Russia’s best and brightest.

Most NATO countries are now rearming and expanding their militaries. The E.U. countries combined gross domestic income EU GDP of $19.4 trillion in 2024 added to the UK GDP of $3.6 trillion totaled over 23 trillion dollars, whereas the gross domestic income of the Russian Federation RF GDP in 2024 was 2.1 trillion. Over the long run, Russia cannot compete with Western Europe. Europe can afford to support Ukraine’s economy and war effort while European countries ramp up their defense industries and military infrastructure. Putin will eventually lose not only his Ukraine War, but also his dream of a new Russian empire.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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- John Steinbeck, East of Eden

Evil people don’t have songs. How is it, then, that the Russians have songs?

- Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols

OPINION -- The war that Russian President Vladimir Putin started in Ukraine may finally be turning in a direction that will result in Russia’s defeat as the strategic tide seems to be turning against Putin.

Russian casualties in Ukraine continue to mount as the Ukrainians are now effectively taking the war to the Russian Federation. Russia’s wartime economy is starting to show signs of strain, and evidence may be emerging that discontent with Putin leadership is starting to grow in some of Moscow’s elite circles.

One hopes that when he returns from his Asia trip, President Trump will turn his focus to the actions of his erstwhile friend Putin. This is a good time to soberly assess Russia and Putin’s current situation and the prospect that Russia might be on a path to losing the war they started.

In recent weeks, there have been a number of reported incidents of Russian drone and aircraft incursions over neighboring states, including the airspace of NATO members. In an escalation of nuclear saber rattling, Putin has tested a Burevestnik cruise missile, a Poseidon nuclear capable “super-torpedo” and conducted large-scale nuclear drills.

These are signs of weakness not strength and are certainly designed to intimidate leaders in the West—including President Trump—to reduce military and economic support to Ukraine. Putin’s strategy with regard to Trump again seems to have backfired with Trump announcing that the U.S. will resume nuclear testing after a pause of more than thirty years.

President Trump also made public the fact that the U.S. has nuclear capable submarines stationed off Russia’s coast. This is not the revelation of a strategic or military secret — just a reminder to Putin (and Russia’s elites) that the U.S. is a strategic nuclear power and Putin’s use of a nuclear weapon would result in the destruction of the Russian Federation and his kleptocracy.

Some Ukrainian leaders believe that there is a number of Russian casualties they can inflict that would bring about the collapse in the fighting effectiveness of the Russian army in Ukraine. While hard data on Russian casualties is difficult to gather, credible estimates put Russian combat deaths at over 200,000 and total casualties at over 1.1 million - many of those killed in 2025 as a result of Russia’s strategy of fighting a war of attrition using outmoded tactics to gain territory that can be measured in tens of kilometers.

Ukrainian leaders also believe that taking the war to the Russian people will have an impact on Moscow’s ability to sustain the invasion. Ukraine has done this effectively in recent months, even without Tomahawks.

Ukraine has used targeting data and weapons supplied by the West (Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missiles and ATACMs) to strike targets deep inside of Russia. These weapons combined with Ukrainian long-range drone capabilities (and ingenious operations such as SPIDER WEB) are taking the fight to the Russian Federation and making the war visible to the average Russian, despite efforts by Russian state-controlled media to push the false narrative that Russia is winning the war.

The economic impact of strikes against Russian energy infrastructure is beginning to be felt outside of Moscow as Russia diverts available energy from the regions to keep Moscow supplied. There are shortages and energy price hikes that the Kremlin can no longer conceal.

Russia’s economy is also suffering the impact of more effective and comprehensive sanctions on Russian energy production and sales. European purchases of Russian hydrocarbons are diminishing and the U.S. has levied new sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil and a number of their subsidiaries. This will have an impact on the network of oligarchs that support Putin. Inflation is also rising at an 8 percent increase year on year. There is scarcity of critical parts affecting the production of things like automobiles, aircraft and consumer appliances. It is only technology provided by China that keeps Russia’s defense industrial base functioning.

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Even this may be less sustainable in the long run if there is any truth to reports that Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping had productive conversations on ending the war. (I’m personally skeptical that Xi will do much to disappoint his partner and friend, Putin.)

There are also unconfirmed reports of growing discontent among Russian elites. A number of media sources now suggest that Mikhail Khordokovsky may be trying to organize a coup to remove Putin from power. It was only about 18 months ago that Yevgeniy Prigozhin launched a rebellion that saw his forces moving with surprising speed and success toward Moscow. Apparently in some circles in Russia, Putin is derisively referred to as the “moth.” And since Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022, an estimated one million Russians, mostly youth, have emigrated, creating a brain drain and, together with military casualties, exacerbating a labor shortage.

The situation is increasingly bleak. Finland and Sweden have joined NATO - turning the Baltic into a NATO lake. Ukrainian strikes have driven Russia’s Black Sea fleet from the eastern reaches of the Black Sea undermining Russian naval power. Europe is rearming and defense spending in NATO states is moving toward compliance with Treaty requirements or beyond. The alliance itself has been given new purpose.

Putin has destroyed any possibility of peaceful accommodation with Ukraine and in the process, has created a nation that will move inexorably toward a Western political and economic model. This is a strategic failure of Putin’s that cannot be undone.

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In other areas of the former Soviet Union, Russian influence continues to wane.

Azerbaijan and Armenia have agreed to a U.S.-brokered peace agreement. Kazakhstan is showing new political and economic independence. Putin’s ally Iran has suffered significant setbacks at the hands of U.S. ally Israel. Putin’s friend and supporter Bashar al Assad lost his hold on power in Syria and is in hiding in Moscow. The U.S. has led peace efforts in the Middle East as Moscow has been sidelined.

Now is the time for decisive action to end the conflict in Ukraine.

The action needs to take place on three levels: political, economic and military.

As discussed at the recent Cipher Brief Threat Conference in Sea Island, Georgia, the West has yet to meaningfully coalesce international political support behind Ukraine beyond gatherings of European and or NATO leaders. The U.S. should sponsor a global meeting of heads of states from around the world to decisively declare support for Ukraine, brand Russia and Putin as the aggressor in the conflict, and call for Russian withdrawal, payment of reparations for war damage and remand war criminals to justice. The simple message should be, “Mr. Putin, end this war!”

Secondly, the U.S. and the West need to increase further pressure on Russia’s economy to weaken Russia’s ability to prosecute the war.

And thirdly, military support to Ukraine needs to be increased, particularly in air defense technology and the delivery of systems that allow Ukraine to continue to take the war to the Russian Federation and make Russians feel the pain of the conflict. A concerted effort on these fronts will almost certainly lead to Putin’s demise and the end of the war.

Putin and his Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov constantly talk about the need to address the ”root causes” of the conflict. Quite simply, Putin is the root cause of the conflict and addressing his delusions of empire is the surest way to end it. That can’t come soon enough for the brave people of Ukraine and the world.

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For months, the U.S. president tried to play peacemaker, but Viktor Orban’s friend in Moscow ignored him – escalating missile strikes on Ukrainian cities and expanding hybrid warfare across Europe. Putin’s resolve to escalate only makes Trump look weak, and Trump does not tolerate looking weak. Now he appears to be bringing a stick to the negotiations. If Ukraine is indeed receiving Tomahawk missiles, things will only get worse for Putin. And for his friend in Budapest.

Orban appears to be sleepwalking into a crisis of his own making. His love affair with Putin has isolated him in Europe. His reliance on Russian oil threatens to result in an economic catastrophe if and when the oil stops flowing through Ukraine. His revanchist claims on Ukraine’s Zakarpattia Province has angered Kyiv, without winning Ukraine’s Hungarians to his side. And if he continues to provoke the drone superpower in Kyiv by violating Ukrainian airspace with Hungarian drones, he may one day find himself on the receiving end of a heavy stick.

How different things were in 1989, when more than 200,000 Hungarians gathered in Budapest’s Heroes’ Square for the reburial of Imre Nagy, the executed leader of the 1956 Revolution. The ceremony culminated in a bold seven-minute speech by a young Viktor Orban, who called for free elections and the withdrawal of Soviet troops still stationed in Hungary. It was that same Orban who during Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, condemned it as an “imperialistic action of pure power politics.” But by 2022, he was captured by Russian money.

Whether Orban harbors imperial ambitions or simply covets the totalitarian control exerted by a corrupt Kremlin, Hungary has become a bastion of Chinese and Russian influence in the heart of Europe and has actively supported Putin’s war and provoked Kyiv.

In May 2025, Ukraine’s Security Service exposed a suspected Hungarian military intelligence network, marking the first time an EU state had been caught spying against Kyiv.

Then in September 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that reconnaissance drones likely belonging to Hungary had violated Ukraine’s airspace, the first such reported breach. Kyiv accused the aircraft of scouting Ukraine’s industrial capacity along the border.

Orban even shrugged off the violation while speaking on a talk show, saying that Hungarian drones “either crossed or not” into Ukraine’s skies, before adding that “Ukraine is not a sovereign country” and Hungary was not its enemy, so there was no problem. This reckless attitude is reflected within his own government. In a leaked 2023 recording, Defense Minister Kristóf Szalay-Bobrovniczky spoke of “breaking with the peace mentality” and entering “phase zero of the path to war.” This was the kind of language you’d expect from Moscow, not from the capital of a NATO ally.

That arrogance carries risks. In August 2025, Ukraine struck the Druzhba oil pipeline, cutting flows of Russian crude to Hungary and Slovakia – the only EU states still addicted to Moscow’s energy. Kyiv had little reason to spare countries that blocked aid in Brussels, and the strike showed that Hungary’s dependence on Russian pipelines is a vulnerability Ukraine can easily exploit. That Hungary signed a deal with France’s Engie to buy liquefied natural gas changes nothing, since Orban says he has no plans to stop importing gas and oil from Russia.

What’s the point of Orban’s provocations? Does he really believe that Russia is winning a war that’s cost it over 1 million casualties? Does he truly believe that Hungary can reestablish the borders it had during the Habsburg Empire and help Russia dismantle Ukraine? Does he not see that he’s compelling the EU and NATO to adopt measures that will ultimately isolate Hungary and negate its baneful influence?

A rational politician in a small, landlocked country that’s benefited inordinately from its neighbors’ largesse would certainly sing a different tune. Instead, Orban is, like Putin, driving his country toward disaster.

It’s possible that the erstwhile Hungarian patriot has become a Hungarian imperialist who models himself on Moscow’s dictator. More likely, Orban and his legitimacy are trapped in the revisionist ideology that helped him consolidate power. According to him and his propaganda apparatus, Hungary was victimized in both world wars, whereas the reality is that it happened to ally with the wrong side, thereby bringing its troubles upon itself.

That narrative, and Orban’s dictatorial pretensions, appear to have outlived their purpose. His opponent, Peter Magyar, leads Orban by around 10 percentage points and is likely to win the parliamentary elections in April 2026. Investors are already betting that a change of government would unlock as much as €18 billion in frozen EU aid, roughly a tenth of Hungary’s GDP, fueling a rally in the Hungarian forint.

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Orban would be wise to change course and return to being the man who inspired thousands in 1989. He should stop pushing the Ukrainians, if only because that makes him look ridiculous. As Szabolcs Panyi, a Hungarian investigative journalist, has said, “Hungary’s army is wholly unprepared for any type of conflict with anyone. Ukraine’s army is so superior that it’s completely unrealistic that Orban would engage in direct fighting.”

Orban also declared that Hungary was “not afraid” to shoot down Russian drones if they violated his country’s airspace. Perhaps what he truly fears is cutting off the payments from Moscow that keep him loyal. In any case, Budapest would be the weak link in any European “drone wall,” should it soon be built. Still, the Russians seem to have been launching drones from ships, which would weaken any future drone wall.

As to the EU and NATO, Orban should realize that it makes no sense to bite, again and again, the hand that feeds you. Alas, Orban still has a long way to go. On October 1, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz reportedly clashed with Orban at an EU summit in Copenhagen after the Hungarian leader disrupted talks on the bloc’s security strategy and aid for Ukraine.

His hostility has only sharpened since. On October 6, Orban accused Zelensky of using “moral blackmail” to push Ukraine’s EU bid, claiming Hungary had “no moral obligation” to support it.

Unless a miracle happens, Orban will lose and be thrown out of office. Hungary could then become what it was in 1956 and 1989: a beacon of hope for democracy and human rights.

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The wars in Ukraine and Gaza must stop. Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a sovereign nation with 1994 security assurances from Russia, has killed or maimed tens of thousands of combatants and civilians. Efforts by President Donald Trump to end this war have failed, with an emboldened Vladimir Putin escalating hostilities in Ukraine, while probing the credibility of NATO, flying drones into Poland and Romania and recently violating Estonia’s airspace. This is the Putin who lamented the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and vowed to recreate the Russian Empire. And that’s what he’s doing. Georgia and Crimea in 2008 and 2014 was a prelude to his invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The Baltic states - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – are next, on Putin’s quest to recreate the Russian Empire.

It's obvious what Putin is doing. He got away with Georgia and Crimea and Putin is confident he’ll prevail in Ukraine with minimal consequences. So, what could the UN do to sanction Russia for its violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty? Indeed, there should be an outcry from the UN demanding that Mr. Putin halt his invasion of Ukraine and enter negotiations with Kyiv.

Iran’s continued refusal to permit UN nuclear inspections and refusal to resume nuclear talks with the U.S. resulted in the reimposition — on September 28 — of sanctions lifted in 2015. So, given that Iran has not changed its attitude and in fact has become more defiant, “snap back” sanctions ban nuclear enrichment, establish an arms embargo and ban tests and transfers of ballistic missiles. It’s clear that Iran wants the option to acquire nuclear weapons capability. A nuclear-armed Iran will be an existential threat to Israel -- an adversary Iran wants to annihilate – and the region.

But for Iran it’s more than acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism, working with its proxies – Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis -- to destabilize and terrorize the region. On September 17, the Department of State also designated three Iraqi militia groups aligned with Iran as terrorist organizations. These terrorist groups have attacked the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and bases hosting U.S. and Canadian forces.

Indeed, the human rights situation in Iran is equally dismal. The 2009 presidential election protests and the 2022 killing of Mahsa Amini by the so-called morality police for incorrectly wearing her head scarf sparked national protests that were brutally suppressed by the ruling theocracy. Nationwide arrests and executions were conducted by a weak and corrupt theocracy that was threatened by the public and its outcry for justice and liberty.

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Ensuring that food and water are available to the people of Gaza is a priority objective, as is ending this bloody war. The onslaught in Gaza was caused by Hamas’s October 7 attacks that killed approximately 1,200 people, mostly civilians, and the abduction of 251 hostages. This was the bloodiest day for Israel since its independence on May 14, 1948. Indeed, Hamas is a terrorist organization closely affiliated with Iran, which provides Hamas with the weaponry and support needed for its acts of terrorism.

The situation in the South China Sea could escalate quickly between China and the Philippines. The irony is that a 2016 ruling by a UN-backed arbitration tribunal invalidated China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea, ruling overwhelmingly with the Philippines. The ruling was deemed final and binding, although China has rejected the ruling and continues to defy it.

These are just some of the national security issues the UN should openly discuss and attempt to resolve. The wars and turmoil in Myanmar, Sudan, Yemen, Haiti and Libya also require immediate UN attention. This is the mission of the UN.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Joseph Detrani was first published in The Washington Times.

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