The hackers trick victims into accessing GitHub or GitLab repositories that are opened using Visual Studio Code.

The post North Korean Hackers Target macOS Developers via Malicious VS Code Projects appeared first on SecurityWeek.

The North Korean state-sponsored espionage group Kimsuky has targeted government organizations, think tanks, and academic institutions.

The post FBI: North Korean Spear-Phishing Attacks Use Malicious QR Codes appeared first on SecurityWeek.

Bitcoin Magazine

Former Exchange Employee Sentenced to 4 Years for Selling Military Secrets to North Korea for Bitcoin

A South Korean crypto exchange employee was sentenced to four years in prison for attempting to recruit a military officer to sell classified secrets to North Korea in exchange for Bitcoin, the Supreme Court ruled on December 28. 

The ruling also imposes a four-year ban on the employee from financial sector activities.

Court documents revealed that North Korean hackers paid the exchange staffer $487,000 in Bitcoin to recruit a 30-year-old army captain, who received $33,500 in Bitcoin in return, according to the South Korean media outlet Dailian.

The staffer approached the officer through a Telegram chat, offering cryptocurrency for access to sensitive military data.

The staffer sent a watch-shaped hidden camera and a USB “hacking device” to the captain under hacker instructions. These devices were intended to capture and transmit information from the Korean Joint Command and Control System, a platform used to share intelligence between the U.S. and South Korea. 

Military police intercepted the devices before any breach occurred.

“The defendant must have been aware that he was attempting to uncover military secrets for a country hostile to South Korea,” the judge said. “This crime could have endangered the entire country and was committed for personal financial gain.”

The captain, surnamed Kim, was sentenced to 10 years in prison and fined $35,000 for violating the Military Secrets Protection Act. 

DLNews reporting helped with this article.

North Korea’s crypto exploits 

The U.S. Treasury Department on November 4, sanctioned eight individuals and two entities linked to North Korea’s cybercrime operations, targeting the flow of cryptocurrency stolen by DPRK hackers. 

Over the past three years, North Korea-affiliated cybercriminals have stolen more than $3 billion, primarily in digital assets, using malware, ransomware, and social engineering to attack banks, exchanges, and other platforms. 

The Treasury said the funds help finance Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and missile programs.

Among those sanctioned were bankers Jang Kuk Chol and Ho Jong Son, who managed over $5.3 million in cryptocurrency tied to ransomware attacks and DPRK IT workers abroad. Korea Mangyongdae Computer Technology Corp., which runs overseas IT delegations, and its president U Yong Su, were also targeted, alongside Ryujong Credit Bank in Pyongyang and five DPRK banking representatives in China and Russia for laundering millions in global currencies.

In September 2024, the FBI issued a warning that North Korean hackers were targeting U.S. cryptocurrency exchange-traded funds (ETFs) in an attempt to steal digital assets.

According to the agency, the attackers are employing sophisticated social engineering techniques to infiltrate companies linked to these financial products.

This post Former Exchange Employee Sentenced to 4 Years for Selling Military Secrets to North Korea for Bitcoin first appeared on Bitcoin Magazine and is written by Micah Zimmerman.

OPINION — Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly threatened that Russia might use nuclear weapons if its sovereignty or territory is threatened, as it enters the fourth year in its war of aggression in Ukraine. The Russian Federation has revised its nuclear doctrine and lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. And given the lethality of nuclear weapons, the use of nuclear weapons in any large-scale exchanges would kill tens or hundreds of millions of people.

The 1963 Cuban missile crisis brought us close to a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. It was the basis for President John F. Kennedy’s concern that more countries with nuclear weapons would create an unstable world with nuclear war more likely. President Kennedy feared that by 1970 there may be 10 nuclear powers instead of the four – the U.S. Soviet Union, United Kingdom and France – and by 1975 there could be as many as 10 or 20 nuclear weapons states. It would be “the greatest possible danger and hazard to contemplate – a nuclear arms race on a multipolar basis.” President Kennedy’s concerns are the concerns we have today, with the prospect of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and in East Asia.

The Cuban missile crisis contributed to several arms control efforts, like the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963) banning atmospheric and underwater tests and the creation of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Indeed, the NPT established a global framework for the 190-member counties to stop non-nuclear states from getting nuclear weapons.

There are now nine nuclear weapons states and concern that more countries will seek the resources necessary to produce their own nuclear weapons or to buy them.

In East Asia, North Korea has increased its stockpile of nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles to deliver these weapons of mass destruction. The Korea Institute for Defense Analysis recently publicly stated that North Korea has between 127 and 150 nuclear weapons and by 2030 they will have 200 nuclear weapons. And given the likely assistance North Korea is receiving from Russia with its nuclear and missile programs, it’s possible that South Korea and Japan, threatened by a belligerent North Korea, will conclude that they need their own nuclear deterrent programs, rather than relying on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence commitments. Indeed, a recent poll in South Korea had over 70% of the people saying they needed their own nuclear weapons program, rather than relying on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

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South Korea and Japan are watching what happens to Ukraine, a sovereign country invaded by a Russia that disregarded its security guarantees to Ukraine, with the 1994 Budapest Memorandum also signed by the U.S. and the United Kingdom. Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons for security assurances that Russia ignored. Will the U.S. and NATO be there for Ukraine this time, or should Ukraine pursue its own nuclear deterrent?

The U.S. bombing of Iranian nuclear sites Fordow, Isfahan and Natanz in June 2025 was in response to Iran’s continued enrichment of uranium at 60% or higher and Iran’s unwillingness to permit International Atomic Energy Agency monitors to inspect nondeclared suspect enrichment sites. Thus since 2003, when Iran said they ceased their nuclear weapons program, Iran has been a threshold nuclear weapons state, months away from being able to produce nuclear weapons if the U.S. and the European Union didn’t comply with Iran’s demands.

Given this reality, and if Iran produces or acquires nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt would rush to create their own nuclear weapons programs. The June 2025 U.S. bombing of these nuclear sites in Iran was an effort to ensure that Iran did not go nuclear, with the likelihood that these countries would also establish their own nuclear deterrent programs.

President Kennedy’s expressed concerns about a nuclear arms race during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 was prophetic. Sixty-three later, there is real concern by a few non-nuclear-weapon states that they would need their own nuclear weapons to address the nuclear threat from North Korea and Iran, and the rhetoric from Mr. Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council, who warned that Russia is prepared to use nuclear weapons if it faces defeat in Ukraine.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joseph DeTrani was first published in The Washington Times

Data from Chainalysis and Amazon offers a glimpse into North Korea’s cyber activities surrounding cryptocurrency theft and fake IT workers.

The post North Korea’s Digital Surge: $2B Stolen in Crypto as Amazon Blocks 1,800 Fake IT Workers appeared first on SecurityWeek.

EXPERT OPINION — South Korea’s Korea Institute for Defense Analysis recently publicly stated that we underestimated North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. According to their analysis, North Korea has between 127 and 150 nuclear weapons (not 50 to 60 nuclear weapons), and by 2030 they will have 200 nuclear weapons, reaching 400 nuclear weapons by 2040.

At the eighth Central Committee of the Workers’ Congress in late 2022, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ordered the exponential expansion of North Korea's nuclear arsenal and the development of a more powerful intercontinental ballistic missile. Mr. Kim reportedly said: “They are now keen on isolating and stifling North Korea…and the prevailing situation calls for redoubled efforts to overwhelmingly beef up our military muscle.”

During this six-day meeting of the Central Committee, Mr. Kim not only called for an “exponential increase in North Korea’s nuclear arsenal”, but he also called for the mass production of battlefield tactical nuclear weapons targeting South Korea, and a new ICBM with a “quick nuclear counterstrike capability; a weapon that could strike the mainland U.S.”

North Korean leaders usually say what they plan to do. Indeed, this is the case with Mr. Kim. Not only has he apparently done this with his arsenal of nuclear weapons, but in October 2025, at the parade celebrating the 80th anniversary of the Korean Workers’ Party, the Hwasong-20, a solid fuel, mobile three stage ICBM capable of targeting the whole of the U.S., was introduced to the international community. The Hwasong-20 possibly could also be capable of launching multiple nuclear warheads at different targets, a capability that would challenge any missile defense system. So, the arsenal of ICBMs that could strike the U.S. – Hwasong-18 and 19 – has also grown exponentially with the Hwasong-20, as Mr. Kim said in 2022.

North Korea has also been working on its submarine program, to include a nuclear-powered submarine. This is in addition to its extensive work on hypersonic and cruise missiles, all representing a challenge to any missile defense system.

North Korea is also developing a second-strike capability, with programs to ensure the survivability of some of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and the progress North Korea has made with solid-fuel mobile ICBMs and nuclear-armed submarines, providing a mobile launch platform. Moreover, North Korea’s doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons has changed to a preemptive, first use of nuclear weapons if a nuclear attack against the leadership or command and control systems is imminent or perceived to be imminent.

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

Russian President Vladimir visited Pyongyang in June 2024, when he and Mr. Kim signed a mutual defense treaty, part of a “Strategic Comprehensive Partnership” between Russia and North Korea, ratified in November 2024. Article 4 of the treaty states that should either nation “put in a state of war by an armed invasion, the other will provide military and other assistance with all means in its possession without delay”

In October 2024, NATO claimed North Korean soldiers arrived in Russian Kursk Oblast to join Russian forces in its war of aggression with Ukraine. Additionally, North Korea was providing Russia with artillery shells and ballistic missiles. That assistance to Russia continues.

In return, it’s likely that in addition to energy and food assistance, Russia is providing North Korea with assistance with its satellite and ballistic missile programs and, also, with its nuclear program. Indeed, Russia could help with North Korea’s nuclear-powered submarine program, especially with the design, materials and components for such a technically challenging program.

North Korea’s mutual defense treaty with Russia, and its participation in the war with Ukraine, was a major failing of the U.S. and South Korea. We should have seen movement in this direction and did more to prevent it from happening. Of course, there is irony in Russia now saying North Korea should have nuclear weapons when in the Six Party Talks with North Korea, Russia, with China, Japan, South Korea and the U.S., was in sync arguing that North Korea should not have nuclear weapons.

North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs are an existential threat to the U.S. and its allies. Our past policy to “contain and deter” North Korea and to be “strategically patient” with North Korea didn’t work. They failed, as evidenced by North Korea’s robust nuclear and ballistic missile programs and their allied relationship with Russia – and China. Indeed, efforts should be made by the leadership in the U.S. and South Korea to get Mr. Kim to reengage, especially with President Donald Trump.

As South Korean President Lee Jae Myung said, North and South Korea are in a “very dangerous situation” where an accidental clash is possible at any time.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joseph DeTrani was first published in The Washington Times

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

DEEP DIVE — While Washington is focused on Iran’s accelerating uranium-enrichment program and increasingly aggressive regional posture, an equally consequential shift is unfolding with seemingly less fanfare: North Korea’s rapid nuclear and missile advancements are quietly reshaping the global threat landscape.

For U.S. policymakers, the danger is no longer a pair of isolated challenges but a converging two-front nuclear problem—one that threatens to push America’s deterrence posture, crisis-management capacity, and alliance coordination closer to a breaking point. To understand how these two fronts could interact, experts emphasize that Iran and North Korea share a long-standing strategic alignment.

“The Iran–North alliance represents a four-decade-long partnership driven by shared hostility toward the United States, economic needs, and strategic isolation,” Danny Citrinowicz, a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and former head of the Iran Branch in the Research and Analysis Division (RAD) in Israeli defense intelligence, tells The Cipher Brief. “The Iranians need to rearm and prepare for another campaign, which requires additional and fresh thinking regarding the depth of the relationship between Tehran and Pyongyang.”

He also warns that this moment may become an inflection point.

“If Iran seeks to change its nuclear strategy, it could ask North Korea for nuclear bombs or highly enriched material or spare parts for the destroyed nuclear facilities, such as the conversion facility in Isfahan,” Citrinowicz continued. “The potential damage in the event of such an event is so severe that it is essential that the intelligence organizations of the United States, South Korea, and Israel identify signs of this.”

Pyongyang’s Nuclear Threat

Despite UN sanctions and diplomatic efforts, a recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) brief underscored that North Korea continues to surge forward with both nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile development. For Kim Jong Un, analysts note, nuclear weapons are a guarantor of regime security, and he has no intention of abandoning them.

North Korea’s nuclear doctrine and capability sets are evolving in troubling ways. The 2025 CRS brief states that a September 2023 law expanded the conditions under which Pyongyang would employ nuclear weapons, lowering what had been a high threshold for use. The same report noted the regime “promised to boost nuclear weapons production exponentially and diversify nuclear strike options.”

On the delivery side, the brief outlines how North Korea is fielding solid-fueled road-mobile ICBMs, sea-based launch systems, and pursuing multiple warheads on a single missile — all elements that raise the question not just of deterrence but of crisis stability and escalation control. In short, Pyongyang appears to be reaching toward a survivable deterrent — or perhaps a warfighting capability — that can impose calculations on the U.S. and its allies in a far more challenging way than before.

“Kim’s investment in new nuclear-capable delivery systems reflects the strategic importance of the country’s nuclear arsenal,” Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy at the Arms Control Association, tells The Cipher Brief. “North Korea is better positioning itself to evade and overwhelm regional missile defenses and target the U.S. homeland.”

Treston Wheat, chief geopolitical officer at Insight Forward, reinforces that intelligence picture, stressing that open-source assessments now “frame North Korea as a maturing nuclear-warfighting state,” with doctrine “trending toward first-use options in extreme regime-threat scenarios.” He notes that U.S. intelligence already evaluates Pyongyang as having achieved miniaturization: “A 2017 DIA assessment judged DPRK miniaturization sufficient for SRBM-to-ICBM delivery.”

Taken together, those capabilities point to a shifting threat environment for Washington.

“North Korea has tested missiles with the range necessary to target the continental United States,” Davenport underscored. “U.S. military planners have to assume that North Korea can target the United States.”

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Iran’s Nuclear Surge

Meanwhile, Iran is not standing still. Tehran has begun openly emulating aspects of Pyongyang’s nuclear playbook, indicating that if Western strikes against Iranian nuclear infrastructure forced Tehran to go underground, it could adapt quickly. That duality matters: Iran can arguably deploy its program overtly, under inspection and diplomatic cover, but at some threshold, it may decide the only path to survival is accelerated weaponization. If that happens while North Korea is already pushing new strategic capabilities, the U.S. is confronted with two simultaneous flashpoints — one in the Middle East, the other in Northeast Asia.

Deterrence, by definition, demands clarity of purpose, credible capabilities, and correctly calibrated signals. When the U.S. must manage a nuclear-armed North Korea and a near-breakout Iran at the same time, the risk is that strategic bandwidth becomes overstretched.

“Despite the failure of that approach, Iran maintains that its nuclear doctrine is unchanged and it does not intend to pursue nuclear weapons,” Davenport noted. “(But) without a pragmatic diplomatic approach that addresses Iranian economic and security concerns, Tehran’s thinking about nuclear weapons could shift.”

That potential shift in Tehran’s calculus becomes even more concerning when paired with broader warnings about Western inattention.

“If Western focus on the Iran threat dwindles, there is a risk the regime could take a new, covert path to nuclear weapons using remaining or reconstituted assets or foreign help,” Andrea Stricker, Deputy Director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, tells The Cipher Brief. “Such a lack of focus is similar to how North Korea became nuclear-armed.”

Tehran, experts caution, still retains deep technical capacity.

“Iran retained enough fissile stock and technical expertise to rebuild quickly, meaning the setback was tactical rather than strategic,” Wheat noted.

From Washington’s vantage point, the real danger is a dual crisis hitting at once — an Iranian enrichment surge or strike on its facilities in West Asia, paired with a North Korean missile volley or nuclear test in East Asia. That scenario forces the U.S. into parallel decision-cycles, stretching military, diplomatic, and intelligence resources, straining alliances, and creating openings that adversaries could exploit.

North Korea’s expanding warfighting delivery systems add another layer of risk: limited, precision escalation meant to test U.S. resolve. As the CRS notes, its ballistic-missile testing is designed to evade U.S. and regional defenses, putting American and allied forces at heightened risk. In effect, Pyongyang is developing not only a survivable deterrent but potential coercive leverage — just as Iran’s enrichment trajectory edges closer to a threshold that could trigger a U.S.-led military response.

“The possibility of Pyongyang providing nuclear assistance to Tehran is increasing,” Citrinowicz said. “The United States will need to focus its intelligence on this possibility, with the help of its allies who are monitoring developments.”

But that intelligence challenge intersects with another problem: mounting questions about U.S. credibility.

“President Trump has dealt a serious blow to U.S. credibility in both theaters,” Davenport asserted. “This risks adversaries attempting to exploit the credibility deficit to shift the security environment in their favor.”

U.S. Intelligence and Strategic Implications

Open-source intelligence paints a worrying picture: North Korea may have enough fissile material for perhaps up to 50 warheads, though the accuracy and reliability of delivery remain questions. It also signals Pyongyang’s development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and multiple-warhead ICBMs. The regime has restored its nuclear test site and is now postured to conduct a seventh nuclear test at a time of its choosing.

The IAEA’s November 2025 report says it can no longer verify the status of Iran’s near–near-weapons-grade uranium stockpile after Tehran halted cooperation following the June 2025 Israeli and U.S. strikes on Natanz, Fordow, and Esfahan.

The last confirmed data, from September, showed Iran holding 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to 60 percent — a short step from weapons-grade and potentially enough for up to 10 bombs if fully processed. IAEA chief Rafael Grossi says most of this material is now entombed in damaged facilities. Moreover, satellite imagery activity around storage tunnels in Isfahan has raised serious red flags. The IAEA further cautions that oversight of this highly-enriched uranium site is “long overdue,” warning that the agency has lost “continuity of knowledge.”

Moreover, before the strikes, the IAEA assessed Iran could produce enough weapons-grade material for one bomb in about a week using part of its 60 percent stockpile at Fordow. Damage to centrifuges has likely slowed that timeline. Still, the larger question is political: whether Iran, under renewed UN sanctions and scrutiny, decides that staying within NPT safeguards costs more than openly moving toward a weapon, particularly if work resumes at undeclared or rebuilt sites.

“The U.S. and Israeli strikes have created a window of respite. What happens next depends greatly on Iran’s will to provoke new Israeli strikes,” Stricker said. “North Korea is a wild card and could provide nuclear fuel, facilities, and equipment to Iran.”

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Looking Ahead

For Washington, the takeaway is stark: systems designed to manage one nuclear threat at a time may crumble should two crises flare simultaneously. The U.S. would need tighter allied coordination, faster intelligence sharing, and stronger, more flexible military deployments to cope.

Yet above all, policymakers must anticipate the possibility of simultaneous escalation in different theatres.

In the coming months and years, key indicators will include North Korea’s choice to conduct a seventh nuclear test or field a credible submarine-launched nuclear force, and Iran’s enrichment trajectory or decision to strike a covert breakout path. The U.S. must also watch for signs of cross-coordination between Moscow and Pyongyang, or between Tehran and Pyongyang — though open links remain murky.

From a policy perspective, a dual-front scenario demands updated wargames, an inter-theatre force posture review, and close allied coordination across NATO, the Indo-Pacific, and Middle East partners. Washington must also guard against the “umbrella illusion” — the belief that the same deterrence logic will apply unchanged across two theatres facing two distinct adversaries with differing doctrine, capabilities, and thresholds.

Finally, media and public attention naturally tend to focus on Iran’s progress or North Korea’s missile launches — one at a time. However, deterring two simultaneous nuclear-adversary theatres demands strategic awareness that the world may not be sequentially configured. For the U.S., what happens in one theatre may shape adversary calculations in the other. The risk is that by the time Washington pivots from Iran, Pyongyang — or Tehran — may have forced a new reality.

In this two-front nuclear dilemma, the question is no longer whether to monitor Iran or North Korea, but how the U.S. will deter both at the same time — and whether its strategic framework is ready for that challenge.

Emerging forms of collaboration amplify that challenge.

“More concerning is that North Korea is positioning itself to benefit from Russian expertise and to further refine its missile systems using data collected from Russia’s use of North Korean systems against Ukraine,” Davenport added.

Mr. Kim’s recent meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin and the new mutual defense treaty with the Russian Federation have developed into an alliance of unexpected consequences. The 15,000 North Korean troops assisting Russian forces in the Kursk region and the massive amount of artillery shells, drones and ballistic missiles provided to Russia for its war of aggression in Ukraine was a significant development that surprised many of the pundits who viewed North Korea as a distraction, confined to the Korean Peninsula.

Indeed, Mr. Kim’s presence in Beijing for the 80th anniversary of World War II Victory Day celebrations, standing next to Chinese President Xi Jinping and Mr. Putin was testimony to China’s decision that North Korea cannot be ignored and a close alliance with North Korea is in China’s interest.

And certainly, last Friday’s parade and gala in Pyongyang on the 80th anniversary of the founding of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party was an emboldened Mr. Kim announcing to the world that North Korea has arrived and can not be ignored. In the presence of Chinese Premier Li Qiang, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Vietnam’s Communist Party Chief To Lam and others, Kim made it clear when he said North Korea “was a faithful member of Socialist forces… and a bulwark for independence… against the West’s global hegemony.”

Doubling down, North Korea at the military parade introduced their new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, the Hwasong-20, a solid fuel massive missile capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads and capable of targeting the whole of the U.S. Other weaponry, to include hypersonic and cruise missiles also were on display, making it clear that Mr. Kim was serious when he said North Korea would enhance its nuclear capabilities.

At a recent Workers’ Party Plenary session, Mr. Kim said he was prepared to meet with Mr. Trump, on the condition that the U.S. would accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. Mr. Kim spoke of fond memories of his previous encounters with Mr. Trump. And at the United Nations on September 29, after seven years of no-show, North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister Kim Son-Gyong said North Korea would never give-up its nuclear weapons; to do so would be tantamount to giving up its sovereignty.

Indeed, North Korea succeeded in getting Russia to accept its nuclear weapons status. Russia was a member of the Six Party Talks with North Korea and actively assisted the U.S., South Korea, Japan and China in demanding that North Korea denuclearize completely and verifiably. Russia is now saying North Korea should retain and enhance its nuclear weapons and is probably assisting North Korea with its nuclear weapons program.

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Hopefully, China will not relent and continue to demand that North Korea denuclearize. Some say that China is now less committed to North Korean denuclearization than in the past. It’s likely this was discussed when North Korea’s Foreign Minister, Choe Son Hui, met with her counterpart in China, Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Interestingly, both participated in the Six Party Talks with North Korea, when Mr. Wang was the chairman of the Talks in Beijing and Ms. Choe was an adviser to Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan, head of the North Korean delegation to the Talks.

North Korea’s goal is to have a normal relationship with the U.S. This is something Mr. Kim’s father, Kim Jong il, and grandfather, Kim il Sung, pursued since 1994. A relationship with the U.S. would give North Korea international credibility and access to international financial institutions for economic development purposes. It will also untether North Korea to China. It is no secret that historically, and even after Mr. Xi assumed power in China in 2013, the bilateral relationship between North Korea and China has been tense.

And indeed, given North Korea’s experience in dealing with the former Soviet Union in 1991, at the end of the Cold War, when Moscow downgraded relations with North Korea and in 1995, when Russia officially renounced the mutual assistance treaty with North Korea. It, therefore, should be obvious to North Korea that once the war in Ukraine is over, Russia’s need for continued North Korean assistance will end and the relationship will likely be downgraded.

This is the time for Mr. Trump to meet with Mr. Kim to talk about security assurances and a path to normal bilateral relations. The issue of North Korea’s nuclear status need not be the focal point for future discussions. It should, however, continue to be our goal, but at an appropriate time.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Joseph Detrani was first published in The Washington Times.

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EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — In 1943, a body washed up on a beach in Huelva, Spain. It was the body of a Royal Marine officer, Major William Martin. Martin was carrying papers, cuffed to his wrist in a briefcase, suggesting that the Allies would invade Greece and Sardinia, not Sicily. Spain was officially neutral, but a few Spanish officials sympathetic to the Nazis allowed German agents to discreetly photograph the documents before Spain quietly passed the documents to the British. Those British officials appeared to be in a state of panic over the lost briefcase.

Would this opportunistic espionage expose a critical Allied operation? In reality, Major William Martin never existed. The body was that of Glyndwr (“Glendure”) Michael, a Welsh drifter who died from consuming rat poison. You probably recognize this as Operation Mincemeat. British intelligence developed this incredible ruse, with American approval, and painstakingly developed a plan for the body to wash up near Huelva Spain and provided background and a personal story for Michael that allowed the body to pass convincingly as a Royal Martine officer who perished at sea while delivering sensitive documents.

The Germans took the bait. Convinced by this fabricated narrative, Hitler diverted significant forces away from Sicily. When the Allies landed in Sicily, they encountered far less resistance than expected, saving countless lives and accelerating the collapse of Axis defenses in southern Europe.

Beyond innovation and sheer audacity, this was a master class in story-telling, in knowing the pressures facing the target audience (Hitler), in creating a believable altered reality, in understanding how information moved through Nazi circles and among those who enabled them and, most importantly, in persuading our adversaries to make consequential decisions that advanced our interests over theirs. It was cognitive warfare on the offense, it represented a cognitive advantage during a perilous period, and it remains a reminder of the timeless power of cognitive persuasion.

History has many other examples of where commanders and leaders have stepped beyond traditional thinking and conventional operations into the information and cognitive space to confuse our adversaries, to win the day, and, at times, to change history.

Is this important today? Let us put cognitive warfare in strategic perspective.

First, great power competition is intensifying and the stakes are high.

The U.S is now facing the most significant global challenges than at any time in our history. We face more capable peer adversaries, more aspiring regional nations, and more proxy threats than ever before. The global environment is more uncertain than ever, and our place in it is not guaranteed. If we are to remain the global leader, we’ll have to be ready for today’s and tomorrow’s rapidly evolving competition and warfare. We must look to prioritize and commonly orient our Nation’s capabilities toward actively maneuvering and gaining advantage across the cognitive landscape to help ensure our security interests, and to actively deny any adversary their own advantage.

Second, great powers will go to great lengths to avoid direct military engagement that could have catastrophic consequences. Russia has lost the equivalent of what would be one of the world’s largest militaries and it has experienced a massive reduction in national power in the war with Ukraine. We also know the examples from WWII when nations and great militaries were defeated and even decimated as a result of great power conflict.

China has advocated winning without fighting for decades, and it still does. Khrushchev famously said “We will take American without firing a shot. We do not have to invade the U.S. We will destroy you from within.” Putin is a believer and practitioner in that approach.

Their approaches are not a mystery. Our adversaries have telegraphed how they plan to attack us, and to defeat us, without direct military engagement.

Third, given those considerations, our adversaries are increasingly relying on operations in the gray zone, or gray warfare, to advance their national interests and to take steps to undermine and weaken the United States, without risking a superpower conflict. They have prioritized their resources, decisions, and actions toward this end.

China and Russia, and even Iran and North Korea, believe there are more gains than risks in the gray zone, and any risks they do face are manageable, so we should expect them to expand their activities. If we solely maintain an unblinking stare at the conventional military capabilities of our adversaries, we might miss the real war already well underway in the gray zone.

Finally—cognitive warfare stands as the most prevalent and consequential activity our adversaries conduct in the gray zone.

This is not your grandfather’s Cold War disinformation. This is an assault on cognition, powered by advanced technology and enabled by an information environment that provides camouflage, infrastructure, and operational resources for our adversaries. Ultimately, cognitive warfare is a contest for truth and knowledge—a struggle to shape perception, control understanding, and influence both the decision-making process and its outcomes.

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Never before in history have individuals, organizations, societies, and nations faced such a sustained assault on our ability to make our own decisions—our autonomy to think, decide, and act in our own best interests. From our adversaries’ perspective, controlling perceptions, manufacturing realities, steering decision-making, intimidation as persuasion, decision fatigue, and manufactured false choices make for persuasive and effective strategy.

In this global information landscape, where technology levels the playing field, any individual or group, and state or non-state actors can reach global audiences almost immediately. Thousands of internet sites, fake users, fabricated organizations, bots, and willing surrogates, managed by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, wage cognitive warfare against the U.S., our allies, and our partners at unprecedented scale and velocity. Artificial intelligence now serves as a force multiplier—amplifying reach, supercharging deception, automating the manipulation of public opinion, and constricting time in the information maneuver space.

As individuals and groups within America, this is everything from how we see the world, how we vote, how we invest, whom and what we trust, which policies we support or oppose, and who we believe are our friends and partners—locally, regionally, and globally.

For national security leaders, policymakers, and corporate and military decision-makers, our adversaries seek to influence consequential decisions on issues like Ukraine, Taiwan, trade, military posture, supply chains, alliances, participation in international organizations, technology development, and a host of other issues that could tip the balance in our adversaries’ favor.

For China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, this is integrated national strategy where the instruments of national power—government, private sector, and surrogates—are combined to achieve strategic impact. Further, the willingness of our adversaries to defy international law; challenge economic interests, and violate the sovereignty and laws of every country including the U.S.; engage in bribery, political coercion, sabotage, and assassinations—essentially a “no limits” approach” to cognitive warfare—gives them considerable leverage—made more effective by our lack of focused emphasis on recognizing, prioritizing and taking action to mass and commonly orient our great national strengths.

If we are to make consequential decisions with confidence, we must have high certainty in the information we receive, value, and share. In the cognitive domain, truth is a strategic asset—precious, powerful, and fragile. To endure, it must be shielded from the relentless assault of manipulation, coercion, and altered realities initiated by our adversaries to shape the strategic landscape and create influence attack vectors intended to undermine and disable our ability to do the same.

Churchill recognized both the strategic value and fragile nature of truth in a time of conflict. He famously said, “In wartime, the truth [is] so precious that it should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.” The lesson is clear. Today, just as in 1943, we must seize and defend the cognitive advantage if we are to navigate these equally perilous times.

What do we need to do to achieve a cognitive advantage?

- First, we need to reassert a strong U.S. national narrative.

In the cognitive domain, our national narrative is both sword and shield. It projects power, influence, and advances our interests. It tells the story of our values, our history, our aspirations, our view of the world, and our resolve and is reinforced by actions and deeds. Our military and economic strength and our global leaderships are strong parts of this narrative. It supports confidence in our actions, our institutions, and our commitments. It also counters adversary narratives and actions that seek to undermine America within our own borders and across the world. We all know today that our national narrative is being questioned by some at home and abroad. Regardless of how we see the political environment, we must articulate and advance a strong seamless U.S. national narrative as foundational to a cognitive advantage. We must take this on.

- Second, we need to empower our master storytellers.

Our master storytellers are not just communicators; they are architects of persuasion. We all know this; we read, we watch movies, and we listen. Facts are fleeting, but stories remain with us—they shape how we feel which in turn drives how we behave. In the cognitive domain, well-crafted stories—including those tailored to navigate today’s hyper-technical environment and chaotic information environment—shape threat perceptions, influence our perception of reality, sustain resolve, and can tip the balance in competition or conflict.

Adversaries recognize the power of narrative and weaponize it; even the truth is more persuasive when it is delivered as part of a compelling story. History proves the advantage: in cognitive warfare, facts alone rarely shift outcomes—compelling narratives and persuasive storytelling do. As in 1943, our edge will be defined by those who can craft and deliver the stories that influence minds and shape events. Yes, we need our master storytellers as much today as we did in 1943.

- Third, we need to see and understand our adversaries’ capabilities and intentions in the cognitive domain—where perception, knowledge, and decision-making are contested. Our adversaries, of course, go to great lengths to mask and conceal their activities. It is time for cognitive intelligence—intelligence in and about the cognitive domain and our ability to reliably understand how, where, and why adversaries seek to shape our thinking and decisions—to emerge as a priority.

- Fourth, we need a sustain a technological edge in AI, Cognitive Science, Cyber, and other technologies that force our adversaries to go on the defensive. China in particular is working to take that advantage from us by its own means but also by stealing U.S. data, technologies, and intellectual property to use against us. We must safeguard the extraordinary capabilities of U.S. technologies—including those small, bold startups—that not only provide a critical national security advantage but are also relentlessly targeted by our adversaries.

- Fifth—and critically important—we need to plan, organize and drive designed strategies and actions across our governmental institutions, international partners, and private sector at the intersections of shared security interests to defend against adversary tactics that target our economic, military, infrastructure, informational and Cyber pillars of security each fueled by human perception, reasoning, and effective decision-making. If you remember anything from this article, please remember this. As a priority, we need a strategy and a commitment to play offense in a quiet but relentless manner that confuses our adversaries, shatters their confidence, and forces them—not us—to deal with the uncertainties of cognitive warfare.

- Finally, if all of this is to work, we need to harness the incredible intellectual power, critical thinking, and collaboration among government, private sector, academia, and in many cases, our allies. We need to work at the nexus of shared interests. In this collaboration; we need leaders; not to overly prescribe or to build bureaucracy, but to inspire, convene, add clarity of purpose, and to enable the incredible capability this community offers. We must use the power to convene to commonly inform and set conditions for mutually beneficial action and outcomes, and to help close the relationship seams used by our adversaries as attack vectors.

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For our leaders, a reminder that when relegated to small tasks and small thinking, influence operations in the cognitive domain will achieve small results. This is a time for vision, for big thoughts, innovation, and audacity. With those attributes, and thinking back to the remarkable achievements of 1943, today’s operations in the cognitive domain can and will do remarkable things.

Those elements, we believe, are the foundation of a cognitive advantage. If we are successful, it means we have a sustained ability to protect our decision-making autonomy at all levels; we preserve domestic and allied social cohesion; we retain global influence, credibility and narrative power; we expose and undermine adversary efforts at cognitive warfare; and we achieve U.S. objectives without resulting in direct conflict. Challenging?—Yes. Attainable?—Certainly.

A final word. Last June, Dave Pitts visited Normandy for the 80^th Anniversary of D-Day—which was our last conventional war of great powers. It was a war that resulted in a devastating loss of human life and unprecedented destruction. Omaha Beach, the Drop Zones around St. Mere Eglise, and the American Cemetery were vivid reminders. That war established the U.S as a global superpower and established a world order that has lasted 80 years. It also enshrined in history the “Greatest Generation.”

Today, authoritarian rule is on the rise, national sovereignty around the world is being undermined, and the global order as we know it is under attack. Once again, our preeminence, leadership, and resolve are being challenged. Let’s be clear, the next war—a quieter war, a gray war—is already underway. The outcome of that war will be as consequential as conventional war.

Cognitive warfare may very well be the defining contest of this era—a generational challenge—given the threats it poses to U.S. national security, our place and influence in the world, and our commitment to our own self-determination. If you are a professional in this space—government, private sector, academia, and ally—this is clearly your time.

Today, we are surrounded by threats, but we are also surrounded by opportunities, by extraordinary expertise, and by willing partners. The challenges ahead are formidable, but so are our experiences and capabilities as a nation. The incredible resolve, sacrifice, and refusal to fail—hallmarks of the Greatest Generation—are woven into the fabric of America and will continue to serve us well. Securing our future now demands leadership, collaboration, a bias for action, and adaptability—the hallmarks of this generation. We have what it takes.

Yes, confidence is clearly justified—but we must just as clearly match that confidence with decisive action. Time is not on our side as others have already decided to prioritize cognitive related strategies. It is time to take a bold step forward in the cognitive domain and to seize the cognitive advantage.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

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I’m not surprised by Mr. Kim’s comments. When the Six Party Talks with North Korea commenced in 2003, North Korea’s principal representative to the Talks often mentioned that North Korea wanted nuclear weapons as a deterrent, never to be used for offensive purposes. They asked to be treated as we treated Pakistan, a country that has good relations with the U.S. The North Korean representative said North Korea wanted a good, normal relationship with the U.S., promising to be a good partner. with the U.S.

North Korea has consistently been told that the U.S. would never accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. But with complete and verifiable denuclearization, North Korea would receive security assurances, sanctions relief, economic development assistance, to include the provision of Light Water Reactors for civilian purposes and eventual normalization of relations with the U.S. Mr. Kim’s father, Kim Jong il, seemingly accepted this U.S. offer and in September 2005, North Korea did agree to a Joint Statement committing North Korea to complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

That was 2005. The situation has changed profoundly over the past twenty years. North Korea now has a formidable arsenal of nuclear weapons; some estimates are between 50 and 60 nuclear warheads, reportedly with sufficient fissile material to annually produce 15 to 20 nuclear warheads that can be miniaturized and mated to ballistic missiles.

North Korea’s sixth nuclear test in 2017 was assessed to be a test of a thermonuclear weapon. And in 2024, North Korea successfully launched the Hwasong/19, a mobile, solid fuel ballistic missile capable of targeting the whole of the U.S. In addition to advances in nuclear weaponization and ballistic missiles, North Korea has made significant progress with Hypersonic and cruise missiles and advances with its nuclear submarine program.

Of note is North Korea’s new mutual defense treaty with the Russian Federation and the 12,000 combat troops North Korea sent to Russia for its war with Ukraine. In addition to the troops, North Korea has provided Russia with large quantities of artillery shells and ballistic missiles. In exchange, Russia has provided North Korea with considerable technical support for its satellite and nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

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We are now dealing with a different North Korea. Mr. Kim is more self-confident, given his new relationship with Russia and his continued close allied relationship with China. Having two of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council ensures that North Korea no longer must be concerned with UN sanctions. And the pictures of Mr. Kim at the parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two in Beijing, standing next to China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin, gave Mr. Kim significant international credibility, especially with the Global South.

A meeting of President Trump with Chairman Kim could develop into a series of meetings that could result in North Korea halting the further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, with no additional nuclear tests and a moratorium on ballistic missile launches. This would be a major success for Mr. Trump and the U.S. It would also lessen tension with South Korea and Japan.

The “eventual” U.S. goal should continue to be complete and verifiable denuclearization. However, this doesn’t have to be up front. It’s an eventual goal that should be pursued as relations with North Korea improve, with an action-for action process: As North Korea halts the production of fissile material and stops producing more nuclear weapons and refrains from ballistic missile launches, UN sanctions imposed subsequent to 2016 could be lifted with security assurances and economic development assistance and a discussion of liaison offices in our respective capitals. North Korea should be encouraged to rejoin the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT).

Mr. Trump entering talks with Mr. Kim could develop into a relationship with North Korea that could prove beneficial for the U.S. and its allies and partners.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Joseph Detrani was first published in The Washington Times.

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by Gary Miliefsky, Publisher, Cyber Defense Magazine Every year, Black Hat showcases not just the latest innovations and products from the cybersecurity industry but also the presence of major government...

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