DEEP DIVE — It is one of the most lauded defense developments in recent decades, providing preeminent capability to U.S. military personnel worldwide, but that prowess evidently comes with a steep cost that military leadership allowed to grow for years.

Critics have long asserted that the military failed to adequately address a mounting series of safety issues with the V-22 Osprey aircraft, even as service members died in preventable crashes. The Naval Air Systems Command review and Government Accountability Office report paint a scathing portrait of systemic failures by the Joint Program Office overseeing V-22 variants for the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy.

The Marine Corps operates approximately 348 MV-22s, the Air Force 52 CV-22s, and the Navy 29 CMV-22s, with the program of record at around 464 total across services. Japan operates 17 MV-22s, with deliveries complete or near-complete.

The Deadly Track Record

Some 30 U.S. Marines lost their lives in three separate crashes during the testing and development phase throughout the 1990s, giving the Osprey the nickname “The Widow Maker.” Since its introduction in 2007, at least 35 servicemembers have died in 10 fatal crashes.

“Initially, the V-22 suffered from Vortex Ring State, which produced crashes during development. The problem was diagnosed and remediated, and the loss rate went down dramatically,” John Pike, a leading defense, space and intelligence policy expert and Director of GlobalSecurity.org, tells The Cipher Brief. “Subsequent losses have been ‘normal accidents’ due to the usual mechanical and human failings.”

The GAO found that serious Osprey mishaps in 2023 and 2024 exceeded the previous eight years and generally surpassed accident rates of other Navy and Air Force aircraft. In August 2023, three Marines died in Australia. In 2022, four U.S. soldiers were killed in a NATO training mission, and five Marines were killed in California.

Unresolved Problems

The NAVAIR report revealed that “the cumulative risk posture of the V-22 platform has been growing since initial fielding,” and the program office “has not promptly implemented fixes.” Of 12 Class A mishaps in the past four years, seven involved parts failures already identified as major problems but not addressed.

Issues with hard-clutch engagement (HCE) caused the July 2022 California crash that killed five. The problem occurs when the clutch connecting the engine to the propeller gearbox slips and reengages abruptly, causing a power spike that can throw the aircraft into an uncontrolled roll.

There were eight Air Force servicemembers killed in the November 2023 crash off Yakushima Island when a catastrophic propeller gearbox failed due to cracks in the metal pinion gear, and the pilot continued flying despite multiple warnings, contributing to the crash.

This manufacturing issue dates to 2006, but the Joint Program Office didn’t formally assess the risk until March 2024 – nearly two decades later. A NAVAIR logbook review found that over 40 safety-critical components were operating beyond their airworthiness limits, and that 81 percent of ground accidents were due to human error.

A Broken System: Poor Communication Between Services

The GAO also found that the three services don’t routinely share critical safety information. Aircrews haven’t met regularly to review aircraft knowledge and emergency procedures. The services operate with significantly different maintenance standards, with three parallel review processes and no common source of material.

The GAO identified 34 unresolved safety risks, including eight potentially catastrophic risks that have remained open for a median of 10 years. The V-22 has the oldest average age of unresolved catastrophic safety risks across the Navy’s aircraft inventory.

Fixes May Take a Decade

The Navy report indicated fixes won’t be complete until 2033-2034. Officials now say the fleet won’t return to unrestricted operations until 2026 – a year later than planned. The V-22 program plans to upgrade gearboxes with triple-melted steel, reducing inclusions by 90 percent.

Under current restrictions, overwater flights are prohibited unless within 30 minutes of a safe landing spot, severely limiting their use by the Navy and Marine Corps.

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Osprey's Unmatched Capabilities

The Osprey still offers a game-changing advantage for U.S. troops, despite its troubled past, according to its supporters.

As it currently stands, the entire fleet operates under restrictions that prevent overwater flights unless within 30 minutes of a safe landing spot, significantly limiting its utility for Navy and Marine Corps missions.

In 1979 to 1980, American hostages were taken in Iran during Operation Eagle Claw, which gave rise to the Osprey. As five of the eight Navy helicopters that arrived at Desert One were inoperable, it was clear that rapid troop movement in harsh environmental conditions was urgently needed.

After development began in 1985, the Osprey entered service in 2007, replacing the Vietnam-era CH-46 Sea Knight.

Compared to fixed-wing transports, the Osprey can land troops just where they are needed. Airdrops with parachutes tend to scatter paratroops all over the place; see ‘Saving Private Ryan,’” Pike explained. “And compared with other rotary wing aircraft, the Osprey is much faster and has a much longer range.”

The Osprey shifts from helicopter to airplane mode in under 12 seconds, reaches speeds of 315 mph, has an operational range of 580 miles, and carries 10,000 pounds – or 24 troops. It’s used for missions ranging from combat operations to the occasional transport of White House staff. During a dust storm in Afghanistan in 2010, two CV-22 helicopters rescued 32 soldiers in under four hours from a distance of 800 miles.

Chronic Readiness Problems

Yet these performance advantages have been undercut by persistent readiness shortfalls.

The NAVAIR report noted that mission-capable rates between 2020 and 2024 averaged just 50 percent for the Navy and Air Force, and 60 percent for Marines. The Osprey requires 100 percent more unscheduled maintenance than the Navy averages and 22 maintenance man-hours per flight hour versus 12 for other aircraft.

In addition, Boeing settled a whistleblower lawsuit in 2023 for $8.1 million after employees accused the company of falsifying records for composite part testing. Boeing, in its defense, claimed that the parts were “non-critical” and did not impact flight safety.

Conflicting Views on Safety

“The Osprey does not have a troubled safety record. Per a recent press release, the V-22 mishap rate per 100,000 flight hours is 3.28, which is in line with helicopters with similar missions.” a government source who works closely with the Osprey fleet but is not authorized to speak on the record contended to The Cipher Brief. “Like anything measured statistically, there are periods above and below the mean. Just because humans tend to conclude because of apparent clusters doesn’t necessarily mean there is a pattern or connection – think of how some people say that ‘celebrities die in threes.’”

The source vowed that “the design issues, such as certain electrical wiring rubbing against hydraulic and oil lines, were fixed before fleet introduction.”

“The problems with the test plan were a product of pressure applied to accelerate a delayed and overbudget program and were not repeated when the aircraft was reintroduced,” the insider pointed out. “Those mishaps, combined with the distinctive nature of the V-22, mean that any subsequent incident, major or minor, is always viewed as part of the ‘dangerous V-22’ narrative. A U.S. Army Blackhawk crash in November killed five but barely made the news. A Japanese Blackhawk crash killed ten soldiers in April, but the Japanese didn’t ground their Blackhawks.”

That perception, however, has done little to quiet families who argue that known risks went unaddressed.

Amber Sax’s husband, Marine Corps Capt. John J. Sax died in the 2022 California crash caused by hard clutch engagement, a problem the Marine Corps had known about for over a decade. “Their findings confirm what we already know: More needs to be done, and more needs to be done,” Sax said. “It’s clear in the report that these risks were not properly assessed, and that failure cost my husband his life.”

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An Uncertain Future

As the military confronts those findings, the future of the Osprey fleet is not completely clear. In 2018, the Marine Corps Aviation proposal outlined a sustainability plan for the Osprey to at least 2060.

“The quality of maintenance training curricula, maturation, and standardization has not kept pace with readiness requirements,” the report stated. “Current maintenance manning levels are unable to support demands for labor. The current V-22 sustainment system cannot realize improved and sustained aircraft readiness and availability without significant change. Depot-level maintenance cannot keep up with demand.”

Despite extensive recommendations – NAVAIR underscored 32 actions to improve safety – Vice Adm. John Dougherty reaffirmed commitment to the aircraft. Pike believes it’s a matter of when, not if, the Osprey returns to full operations.

“Once the issues are fixed, everyone will resume their regular programming,” he asserted.

Officials and insiders alike expect that process to translate into tangible fixes.

“I would expect that to lead to some type of corrective action, whether it’s a new procedure or replacing a defective part,” the insider added. “After that, I would expect a long career for the aircraft in the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force, as it’s an irreplaceable part of all three services now and gives a unique capability to the American military.”

Whether that optimism proves warranted depends on whether military leadership finally addresses the systemic failures the latest reports have laid bare – failures that cost 20 service members their lives in just the past five years.

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OPINION — “After long and difficult negotiations with Senators, Congressmen, Secretaries, and other Political Representatives, I have determined that, for the Good of our Country, especially in these very troubled and dangerous times, our Military Budget for the year 2027 should not be $1 Trillion Dollars, but rather $1.5 Trillion Dollars. This will allow us to build the ‘Dream Military’ that we have long been entitled to and, more importantly, that will keep us SAFE and SECURE, regardless of foe.”

That was part of a Truth Social message from President Trump posted last Wednesday afternoon and illustrates the emphasis on increasing U.S. military power by him and top administration officials since the successful U.S. January 3, raid in Venezuela that captured its former-President Nicolas Maduro and his wife.

As it should, public attention has been focused on Trump’s apparent desire to project force as he publicly savors the plaudits arising from not only the Venezuela operation, but also the June 2025 Operation Midnight Hammer bombing of three Iranian nuclear facilities.

Most focus this past week has been paid to remarks Trump made to New York Times reporters during their more than two hour interview last Thursday.

At that time, when asked if there are any limits on his global powers, Trump said, "Yeah, there is one thing. My own morality. My own mind. It’s the only thing that can stop me.”

Trump added, “I don’t need international law. I’m not looking to hurt people.” Asked about whether his administration needed to abide by international law, Trump said, “I do,” but added, “it depends what your definition of international law is.”

Attention is also correctly being paid to remarks Trump’s Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller made last Tuesday during an interview with CNN.

“We live in a world in which you can talk all you want about international niceties and everything else,” Miller told CNN’s Jake Tapper, “But we live in a world, in the real world … that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power. These are the iron laws of the world.”

It is against that Trump open-stress-on-power background that I will discuss below a few other incidents last week that could indicate future events. But first I want to explore Trump’s obsession with taking over Greenland, which was also illustrated during the Times interview.

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In 1945, at the end of World War II fighting in Europe, the United States had 17 bases and military installations in Greenland with thousands of soldiers. Today, there is only one American base – U.S. Pituffik Space Base in northwest Greenland, formerly known as Thule Air Base.

From this base today some 200 U.S. Air Force and Space Force personnel, plus many more contractors, carry out ballistic missile early warnings, missile defense, and space surveillance missions supported by what the Space Force described as an “Upgraded Early Warning Radar weapon system.” That system includes “a phased-array radar that detects and reports attack assessments of sea-launched and intercontinental ballistic missile threats in support of [a worldwide U.S.] strategic missile warning and missile defense [system],” according to a Space Force press release.

The same radar also supports what Space Force said is “Space Domain Awareness by tracking and characterizing objects in orbit around the earth.”

Under the 1951 U.S.-Denmark defense agreement, the U.S., with Denmark’s assent, can create new “defense areas” in Greenland “necessary for the development of the defense of Greenland and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty area, and which the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark is unable to establish and operate singlehanded.”

The agreement says further: “the Government of the United States of America, without compensation to the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, shall be entitled within such defense area and the air spaces and waters adjacent thereto to improve and generally to fit the area for military use.”

That apparently is not enough freedom for President Trump, still a real estate man. As he explained last week to the Times reporters, “Ownership is very important, because that’s what I feel is psychologically needed for success. I think that ownership gives you a thing that you can’t do with, you’re talking about a lease or a treaty. Ownership gives you things and elements that you can’t get from just signing a document.”

This long-held Trump view that he must have Greenland was explored back in 2021. After his first term as President, Trump was interviewed by Susan Glasser and Peter Baker for the book they were writing, and they asked Trump at that time why he wanted Greenland.

Four years ago, Trump explained, “You take a look at a map. So I’m in real estate. I look at a [street] corner, I say, ‘I gotta get that store for the building that I’m building,’ et cetera. You know, it’s not that different. I love maps. And I always said, ‘Look at the size of this [Greenland], it’s massive, and that should be part of the United States.’ It’s not different from a real-estate deal. It’s just a little bit larger, to put it mildly.”

For all Trump’s repeated threats to seize Greenland militarily, it’s doubtful that will happen. Secretary of State Marco Rubio is scheduled to meet with Danish and Greenland counterparts this week, and afterwards the situation should become clearer.

Context is another test for analyzing Trump statements, and that seems to be the case when looking at his call for a $1.5 trillion fiscal 2027 defense budget.

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Last Wednesday, hours before Trump made his Truth Social FY 2027 budget statement, the White House released an Executive Order (EO) entitled, Prioritizing The Warfighter In Defense Contracting. The EO called for holding defense contractors accountable and targeted those who engaged in stock buybacks or issued dividends while “underperforming” on government contracts. According to one Washington firm, the Trump EO represented “one of the most aggressive federal interventions into corporate financial decisions in recent memory.”

The EO caused shares of defense stocks to fall. Lockheed Martin fell 4.8%, Northrop Grumman 5.5%, and General Dynamics 3.6% during that afternoon’s stock exchange trading in New York. After the stock market closed, Trump released his Truth Social message calling for the $1.5 trillion FY 2027 defense budget and the next day, January 8, defense stocks experienced a sharp rebound. Lockheed Martin rebounded with gains of around 7%; Northrop Grumman rose over 8%; and General Dynamics gained around 4%.

Trump has not spoken publicly about the $1.5 trillion for FY 2027, but in his first message, he said the added funds would come from tariffs. He wrote, “Because of tariffs and the tremendous income that they bring, amounts being generated, that would have been unthinkable in the past, we are able to easily hit the $1.5 trillion dollar number.”

If that were not enough, Trump added that the new funding would produce “an unparalleled military force, and having the ability to, at the same time, pay down debt, and likewise, pay a substantial dividend to moderate income patriots within our country!”

What can be believed?

The nonpartisan Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (CRFB) said the $500 billion annual increase in defense spending would be nearly twice as much as the expected yearly tariff revenue, and the spending increase would push the national debt $5.8 trillion higher over the next decade. CRFB added, “Given the $175 billion appropriated to the defense budget under the [2025] One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), there is little case for a near-term increase in military spending.”

I should point out that the FY 2026 $901 billion defense appropriations bill has yet to pass the Congress.

One more event from last week needing attention involves Venezuela.

Last Tuesday January 6, 2026, as Delcy Rodriguez, former Vice President, was sworn in as Venezuela's interim president, General Javier Marcano Tabata. the military officer closest to Maduro as his head of the presidential honor guard and director of the DGCIM, the Venezuelan military counterintelligence agency, was arrested and jailed, according to El Pais Caracas.

Marcano Tabata was labeled a traitor and accused of facilitating the kidnapping of Maduro by providing the U.S. with exactly where Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores were sleeping, and identifying blind spots in the Cuban-Venezuelan security ring protecting them, according to El Pais Caracas.

What’s the U.S. responsibility toward Marcano Tabata if the El Pais Caracas facts are correct ?

I want to end this column with another Trump statement last week that stuck in my mind because of its implications.

It came up last Friday after Trump, in the White House East Room, started welcoming more than 20 oil and gas executives invited to discuss the situation in Venezuela.

“We have many others that were not able to get in…If we had a ballroom, we'd have over a thousand people. Everybody wanted. I never knew your industry was that big. I never knew you had that many people in your industry. But, here we are.”

Trump then paused, got up and turned to look through the glass door behind him that showed the excavation for the new ballroom saying, “I got to look at this myself. Wow. What a view…Take a look, you can see a very big foundation that's moving. We're ahead of schedule in the ballroom and under budget. It's going to be I don't think there'll be anything like it in the world, actually. I think it will be the best.”

He then said the remark I want to highlight, “The ballroom will seat many and it'll also take care of the inauguration with bulletproof glass-drone proof ceilings and everything else unfortunately that today you need.”

Who, other than Trump, would think that the next President of the United States would need to hold his inauguration indoors, inside the White House ballroom, with bullet-proof windows and a roof that protects from a drone attack?

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Asked if there were any restraints on his global powers, [President Trump] answered: “Yeah, there is one thing. My own morality. My own mind. It’s the only thing that can stop me.”

“I don’t need international law."

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Nicholas Maduro’s fate seems sealed: he will stand trial for numerous violations of federal criminal long-arm statutes and very likely spend decades as an inmate in the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

How this U.S. military operation that resulted in his apprehension is legally characterized has and will continue to be a topic of debate and controversy. Central to this debate have been two critically significant international law issues. First, was the operation conducted to apprehend him a violation of the Charter of the United Nations? Second, did that operation trigger applicability of the law of armed conflict?

The Trump administration has invoked the memory of General Manuel Noriega’s apprehension following the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama, Operation Just Cause, in support of its assertion that the raid into Venezuela must be understood as nothing more than a law enforcement operation. But this reflects an invalid conflation between a law enforcement objective with a law enforcement operation.

Suggesting Operation Just Cause supports the assertion that this raid was anything other than an international armed conflict reflects a patently false analogy. Nonetheless, if - contrary to the President’s dismissal of international law quoted above – international law still means something for the United States - what happened in Panama and to General Noriega after his capture does have precedential value, so long as it is properly understood.

Parallels with the Noriega case?

Maduro was taken into U.S. custody 36 years to the day after General Manuel Noriega was taken into U.S. custody in Panama. Like Maduro, Noriega was the de facto leader of his nation. Like Maduro, the U.S. did not consider him the legitimate leader of his country due to his actions that led to nullifying a resounding election defeat of his hand-picked presidential candidate by an opposition candidate (in Panama’s case, Guillermo Endara).

Like Maduro, Noriega was under federal criminal indictment for narco-trafficking offenses. Like Maduro, that indictment had been pending several years. Like Maduro, Noriega was the commander of his nation’s military forces (in his case, the Panamanian Defense Forces, or PDF).

Like Maduro, his apprehension was the outcome of a U.S. military attack. Like Maduro, once he was captured, he was immediately transferred to the custody of U.S. law enforcement personnel and transported to the United States for his first appearance as a criminal defendant. And now we know that Maduro, like Noriega, immediately demanded prisoner of war status and immediate repatriation.

It is therefore unsurprising that commentators – and government officials – immediately began to offer analogies between the two to help understand both the legal basis for the raid into Venezuela and how Maduro was captured will impact his criminal case. Like how the Panama Canal itself cut that country into two, it is almost as if these two categories of analogy can be cut into valid and invalid.

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False Analogy to Operation Just Cause

Almost immediately following the news of the raid, critics – including me – began to question how the U.S. action could be credibly justified under international law?

As two of the most respected experts on use of force law – Michael Schmitt and Ryan Goodman - explained, there did not seem to be any valid legal justification for this U.S. military attack against another sovereign nation, even conceding the ends were arguably laudable.

My expectation was that the Trump administration would extend its ‘drug boat campaign’ rationale to justify its projection of military force into Venezuela proper; that self-defense justified U.S. military action to apprehend the leader of an alleged drug cartel that the Secretary of State had designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization. While I shared the view of almost all experts who have condemned this theory of legality, it seemed to be the only plausible rationale the government might offer.

It appears I may have been wrong. While no official legal opinion is yet available, statements by the Secretary of State and other officials seem to point to a different rationale: that this was not an armed attack but was instead a law enforcement apprehension operation.

And, as could be expected, Operation Just Cause – the military assault on Panama that led to General Noriega’s apprehension – is cited as precedent in support of this assertion. This effort to justify the raid is, in my view, even more implausible than even the drug boat self-defense theory.

At its core, it conflates a law enforcement objective with a law enforcement operation. Yes, it does appear that the objective of the raid was to apprehend an indicted fugitive. But the objective – or motive – for an operation does not dictate its legal characterization.

In this case, a military attack was launched to achieve that objective. Indeed, when General Caine took the podium in Mara Lago to brief the world on the operation, he emphasized how U.S. ‘targeting’ complied with principles of the law of armed conflict. Targeting, diversionary attacks, and engagement of enemy personnel leading to substantial casualties are not aspects of a law enforcement operation even if there is a law enforcement objective.

Nor does the example of Panama support this effort at slight of hand. The United States never pretended that the invasion of Panama was anything other than an armed conflict. Nor was apprehension of General Noriega an asserted legal justification for the invasion. Instead, as noted in this Government Accounting Office report,

The Department of State provided essentially three legal bases for the US. military action in Panama: the United States had exercised its legitimate right of self-defense as defined in the UN and CM charters, the United States had the right to protect and defend the Panama Canal under the Panama Canal Treaty, and U.S. actions were taken with the consent of the legitimate government of Panama

The more complicated issue in Panama was the nature of the armed conflict, with the U.S. asserting that it was ‘non-international’ due to the invitation from Guillermo Endara who the U.S. arranged to be sworn in as President on a U.S. base in Panama immediately prior to the attack. But while apprehending Noriega was almost certainly an operational objective for Just Cause, that in no way influenced the legal characterization of the operation.

International law

The assertion that a law enforcement objective provided the international legal justification for the invasion is, as noted above, contradicted by post-invasion analysis. It is also contradicted by the fact that the United States had ample opportunity to conduct a military operation to capture General Noriega during the nearly two years between the unsealing of his indictment and the invasion. This included the opportunity to provide modest military support to two coup attempts that would have certainly sealed Noriega’s fate.

With approximately 15,000 U.S. forces stationed within a few miles of his Commandancia, and his other office located on Fort Amador – a base shared with U.S. forces – had arrest been the primary U.S. objective it would have almost certainly happened much sooner and without a full scale invasion.

That invasion was justified to protect the approximate 30,000 U.S. nationals living in Panama. The interpretation of the international legal justification of self-defense to protect nationals from imminent deadly threats was consistent with longstanding U.S. practice.

Normally this would be effectuated by conducting a non-combatant evacuation operation. But evacuating such a substantial population of U.S. nationals was never a feasible option and assembling so many people in evacuation points – assuming they could get there safely – would have just facilitated PDF violence against them.

No analogous justification supported the raid into Venezuela. Criminal drug traffickers deserve no sympathy, and the harmful impact of illegal narcotics should not be diminished.

But President Bush confronted incidents of violence against U.S. nationals that appeared to be escalating rapidly and deviated from the norm of relatively non-violent harassment that had been ongoing for almost two years (I was one of the victims of that harassment, spending a long boring day in a Panamanian jail cell for the offense of wearing my uniform on my drive from Panama City to work).

With PDF infantry barracks literally a golf fairway across from U.S. family housing, it was reasonable to conclude the PDF needed to be neutered. Yet even this asserted legal basis for the invasion was widely condemned as invalid.

Noriega was ultimately apprehended and brought to justice. But that objective was never asserted as the principal legal basis for the invasion. Nor did it need to be. Operation Just Cause was, in my opinion (which concededly is influenced from my experience living in Panama for 3.5 years leading up to the invasion) a valid exercise of the inherent right of self-defense (also bolstered by the Canal Treaty right to defend the function of the Canal).

Nor was the peripheral law enforcement objective conflated with the nature of the operation. Operation Just Cause, like the raid into Venezuela, was an armed conflict. And, like the capture of Maduro, that leads to a valid aspect of analogy: Maduro’s status.

Like Noriega, at his initial appearance in federal court Maduro asserted his is a prisoner of war. And for good reason: the U.S. raid was an international armed conflict bringing into force the Third Geneva Convention, and Maduro by Venezuelan law was the military commander of their armed forces.

The U.S. government’s position on this assertion has not been fully revealed (or perhaps even formulated). But the persistent emphasis that the raid was a law enforcement operation that was merely facilitated by military action seems to be pointing towards a rejection. As in the case of General Noriega, this is both invalid and unnecessary: what matters is not what the government calls the operation, but the objective facts related to the raid.

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Existence of an armed conflict

Almost immediately following news of the raid, the Trump administration asserted it was not a military operation, but instead a law enforcement operation supported by military action. This was the central premise of the statement made at the Security Council by Mike Waltz, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Notably, Ambassador Waltz stated that, “As Secretary Rubio has said, there is no war against Venezuela or its people. We are not occupying a country. This was a law enforcement operation in furtherance of lawful indictments that have existed for decades.”

This characterization appears to be intended to disavow any assertion the operation qualified as an armed conflict within the meaning of common Article 2 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. That article indicates that the Conventions (and by extension the law of armed conflict generally) comes into force whenever there is an armed conflict between High Contracting Parties – which today means between any two sovereign states as these treaties have been universally adopted. It is beyond dispute that this article was intended to ensure application of the law of armed conflict would be dictated by the de facto existence of armed conflict, and not limited to de jure situations of war.

This pragmatic fact-based trigger for the law’s applicability was perhaps the most significant development of the law when the Conventions were revised between 1947 and 1949. It was intended to prevent states from disavowing applicability of the law through rhetorical ‘law-avoidance’ characterizations of such armed conflicts. While originally only impacting applicability of the four Conventions, this ‘law trigger’ evolved into a bedrock principle of international law: the law of armed conflict applies to any international armed conflict, meaning any dispute between states resulting in hostilities between armed forces, irrespective of how a state characterizes the situation.

By any objective assessment, the hostilities that occurred between U.S. and Venezuelan armed forces earlier this week qualified as an international armed conflict. Unfortunately, the U.S. position appears to be conflating a law enforcement objective with the assessment of armed conflict. And, ironically, this conflation appears to be premised on a prior armed conflict that doesn’t support the law enforcement operation assertion, but actually contradicts it: Operation Just Cause.

Judge Advocates have been taught for decades that the existence of an armed conflict is based on an objective assessment of facts; that the term was deliberately adopted to ensure the de facto situation dictated applicability of the law of armed conflict and to prevent what might best be understood as ‘creative obligation avoidance’ by using characterizations that are inconsistent with objective facts.

And when those objective facts indicate hostilities between the armed forces of two states, the armed conflict in international in nature, no matter how brief the engagement. This is all summarized in paragraph 3.4.2 of The Department of Defense Law of War Manual, which provides:

Act-Based Test for Applying Jus in Bello Rules. Jus in bello rules apply when parties are actually conducting hostilities, even if the war is not declared or if the state of war is not recognized by them. The de facto existence of an armed conflict is sufficient to trigger obligations for the conduct of hostilities. The United States has interpreted “armed conflict” in Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to include “any situation in which there is hostile action between the armed forces of two parties, regardless of the duration, intensity or scope of the fighting.”

No matter what the objective of the Venezuelan raid may have been, there undeniable indication that the situation involved, “hostile action between” U.S. and Venezuelan armed forces.

This was an international armed conflict within the meaning of Common Article 2 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 – the definitive test for assessing when the law of armed conflict comes into force. To paraphrase Judge Hoeveler, ‘[H]owever the government wishes to label it, what occurred in [Venezuela] was clearly an "armed conflict" within the meaning of Article 2. Armed troops intervened in a conflict between two parties to the treaty.’ Labels are not controlling, facts are. We can say the sun is the moon, but it doesn’t make it so.

Prisoner of war status

So, like General Noriega, Maduro seems to have a valid claim to prisoner of war status (Venezuelan law designated him as the military commander of their armed forces authorizing him to wear the rank of a five-star general). And like the court that presided over Noriega’s case, the court presiding over Maduro’s case qualifies as a ‘competent tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 5 of the Third Convention to make that determination.

But will it really matter? The answer will be the same as it was for Noriega: not that much. Most notably, it will have no impact on the two most significant issues related to his apprehension: first, whether he is entitled to immediate repatriation because hostilities between the U.S. and Venezuela have apparently ended, and 2. Whether he is immune from prosecution for his pre-conflict alleged criminal misconduct.

Article 118 of the Third Convention indicates that, “Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.” However, this repatriation obligation is qualified. Article 85 specifically acknowledges that, “[P]risoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture . . .”

Article 119 provides, “Prisoners of war against whom criminal proceedings for an indictable offence are pending may be detained until the end of such proceedings, and, if necessary, until the completion of the punishment. The same shall apply to prisoners of war already convicted for an indictable offence.”

This means that like General Noriega, extending prisoner of war status to Maduro will in no way impede the authority of the United States to prosecute him for his pre-conflict indicted offenses. Nor would it invalidate the jurisdiction of a federal civilian court, as Article 84 also provides that,

A prisoner of war shall be tried only by a military court, unless the existing laws of the Detaining Power expressly permit the civil courts to try a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power in respect of the particular offence alleged to have been committed by the prisoner of war.” As in General Noriega’s case, because U.S. service-members would be subject to federal civilian jurisdiction for the same offenses, Maduro is also subject to that jurisdiction.

This would obviously be different if he were charged with offenses arising out of the brief hostilities the night of the raid, in which case his status would justify a claim of combatant immunity, a customary international law concept that protects privileged belligerents from being subjected to criminal prosecution by a detaining power for lawful conduct related to the armed conflict (and implicitly implemented by Article 87 of the Third Convention). But there is no such relationship between the indicted offenses and the hostilities that resulted in Maduro’s capture.

Prisoner of war status will require extending certain rights and privileges to Maduro during his trial and, assuming his is convicted, during his incarceration. Notice to a Protecting Power, ensuring certain procedural rights, access to the International Committee of the Red Cross during incarceration, access to care packages, access to communications, and perhaps most notably segregation from the general inmate population.

Perhaps he will end up in the same facility where the government incarcerated Noriega, something I saw first-hand when I visited him in 2004. A separate building in the federal prison outside Miami was converted as his private prison; his uniform – from an Army no longer in existence – hung on the wall; the logbook showed family and ICRC visits.

Concluding thoughts

The government should learn a lesson from Noriega’s experience: concede the existence of an international armed conflict resulted in Maduro’s capture and no resist a claim of prisoner of war status. There is little reason to resist this seemingly obvious consequence of the operation.

Persisting in the assertion that the conflation of a law enforcement objective with a law enforcement operation as a way of denying the obvious – that this was an international armed conflict – jeopardizes U.S. personnel who in the future might face the unfortunate reality of being captured in a raid like this.

Indeed, it is not hard to imagine how aggressively the U.S. would be insisting on prisoner of war status had any of the intrepid forces who executed this mission been captured by Venezuela.

There is just no credible reason why aversion to acknowledging this reality should increase the risk that some unfortunate day in the future it is one of our own who is subjected to a ‘perp walk’ as a criminal by a detaining power that is emboldened to deny the protection of the Third Convention.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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EXPERT OPINION — For about a week we experienced significant controversy over the first military attack on alleged narco-trafficker small boats off the coast of Venezuela (and later Ecuador). The controversy began with news that the Secretary of Defense had ordered the Special Operations Command Task Force commander to, “Kill them all.” This was linked to reports that the boat was attacked not once, but twice; the second attack launched with full knowledge that two survivors from the first attack were hanging on the capsized remnants.

Critical commentary exploded, much of it based on the assumption that the “kill them all” order had been issued, and that it was issued after the first strike. Even after the Admiral who ordered the attacks refuted that allegation, critics continued to assert that the attack was, ‘clearly’ a war crime as it was obviously intended to kill the two survivors.

The public still does not know all the details about these attacks. What is known, however, is that Congress held several closed-door hearings that included viewing the video feed from the attacks and testimony from the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Admiral who commanded the operation.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the reaction to these hearings has crystalized along partisan lines. Democratic Members of Congress and Senators have insisted they observed a war crime and called for public release of the video. Republicans, in contrast, have indicated they are satisfied that the campaign is based on a solid legal foundation and that nothing about the attacks crossed the line into illegality.

What is less obvious than the partisan reaction is how what began as a problem for the administration has ended up becoming a windfall. When Senator Roger Wicker, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, announced after the second closed door briefing that he was satisfied with the administration’s legal theory and saw no evidence of a war crime, it provided a signal to the administration that this Congress is not going to interfere with its military campaign. Democrats will try: they will continue to demand hearings, they have asserted violation of the War Powers Act and propose legislation requiring immediate termination of the campaign, and they will continue to insist the U.S. military has been ordered to conduct illegal killings. But so long as the Republican majority is tolerant of this presidential assertion of war power, there is virtually nothing to check it. This so-called ‘double tap’ tested the political waters, and it turns out they are quite favorable for the President.

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From a legal perspective, the reaction to this incident has reflected overbreadth and misunderstanding from both ends of the spectrum. For example, characterizing the second attack as a war crime – or rejecting that conclusion – implicitly endorses the administration’s theory that it is engaged in an armed conflict against Tren de Aragua, an interpretation of international law that has been rejected by almost all legal experts. Equally overbroad has been the assumption that the second attack must have been intended to kill the survivors from the first attack – an assumption that renders that attack nearly impossible to justify, even assuming it was conducted pursuant to a valid invocation of wartime legal authority. But even release of the video would be insufficient to answer a critical question in relation to this assumption: was the second attack directed against the survivors, or against the remnants of the boat with knowledge it would likely kill the survivors as a collateral consequence? Only the Admiral and those who advised him can answer that question. And if the answer is, ‘the remnants, not the survivors’, other difficult questions must be addressed: what was the military necessity for ‘finishing off’ the boat? And, most importantly, why wasn’t it operationally feasible to do something – perhaps just dropping a raft into the water – to spare the survivors that lethal collateral effect?

But the true significance of this incident and the reaction it triggered extends far beyond the question of whether that second attack was or was not lawful; it is the implicit validation of the foundation for the legal architecture the administration seems to be erecting to justify expanding the conflict to achieve regime change in Venezuela. In this regard, it is important to recognize that the Trump Administration is implicitly acknowledging it must situate its campaign and any extension of this campaign within the boundaries of international law, even as it seeks to expand them beyond their rational limits. Understanding this consequence begins with two essential considerations. First, the Trump Administration’s consistent invocation of international legal authority for its counter-drug campaign - albeit widely condemned as invalid – indicates that any expansion of this campaign will be premised on a theory of international legality. Second, that theory will have to align with the very limited authority of a state to use military force against another state enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

That limited authority begins with Article 2(4) of the Charter, which prohibits a state’s threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other United Nations member state. This prohibition is not, however, conclusive. Instead, the Charter recognizes two exceptions allowing for the use of force. First, military action authorized by the Security Council as a measure in response to an act of aggression, breach of the peace, or threat to international peace and security. Such authorizations have been used since creation of the U.N., one example being the use of force authorization adopted in 2011 to establish humanitarian safe areas in Libya; the authorization that led to the Libyan air campaign. The reason such authorizations have been infrequent is because any one of the five permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) may veto any resolution providing for such authorization for any reason whatsoever. It is inconceivable the U.S. could garner support for such authorization to take military action in and/or against Venezuela, much less even seek such an authorization.

The second exception to the presumptive prohibition on the threat or use of force is the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense enshrined in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. That right arises when a state is the victim of an actual or imminent armed attack. Furthermore, the understanding of that right has evolved in the view of many states – and certainly the United States – to apply to threats posed by both states and non-state organized armed groups like al Qaeda.

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From the inception of this counter-narcotics campaign the Trump administration has asserted that the smuggling of illegal – and all too often deadly – narcotics into the United States amounts to an ‘armed attack’ on the nation. This characterization – coupled with the more recent designation of fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction – is obviously intended to justify an invocation of Article 51 right of self-defense. As with the assertion that TdA is engaged in an armed conflict with the United States, this invocation has been almost universally condemned as invalid. But that seems to have had little impact on Senators like Wicker or Graham and other Republicans who have indicated they are satisfied that the campaign is on solid legal ground.

To date, of course, the campaign based on this assertion of self-defense has been limited to action in international waters. But President Trump indicated in his last cabinet meeting that he intends to go after ‘them’ on the land – ostensibly referring to members of TdA. So, how would an assertion of self-defense justify extending attacks into Venezuelan territory, and what are the broader implications for potential conflict escalation?

The answer to that question implicates a doctrine of self-defense long embraced by the United States: ‘unable or unwilling.’ Pursuant to this interpretation of the right of self-defense, a nation is legally justified in using force in the territory of another state to defend itself against a non-state organized armed group operating out of that territory when the territorial state is ‘unable or unwilling’ to prevent those operations. It is, in essence, a theory of self-help based on the failure of the territorial state to fulfill its international legal obligation to prevent the use of its territory by such a group. And there have been numerous examples of U.S. military operations justified by this theory. Perhaps the most obvious was the operation inside Pakistan that killed Osama bin Laden. Many other drone attacks against al Qaeda targets in places like Yemen and Somalia are also examples. And almost all operations inside Syria prior to the fall of the Asad regime were based on this theory.

By implicitly endorsing the administration’s theory that the United States is acting against TdA pursuant to the international legal justification of self-defense, Republican legislators have opened the door to expanding attacks into Venezuelan territory. It is now predictable that the administration will invoke the unwilling or unable doctrine to justify attacks on alleged TdA base camps and operations in that country. But, unlike other invocations of that theory, it is equally predictable that the territorial state – Venezuela, will reject the U.S. legal justification for such action. This means Venezuela will treat any incursion into its territory as an act of aggression in violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, triggering its right of self-defense.

In theory, such a dispute over which state is and which state is not validly asserting the right of self-defense would be submitted to and resolved by the Security Council. But it is simply unrealistic to expect any Security Council action if U.S. attacks against TdA targets in Venezuela escalate to direct confrontation between Venezuela and the U.S. Instead, each side will argue it is acting with legal justification against the other side’s violation of international law.

What this means in more pragmatic terms is that there is a real likelihood a U.S. invocation of the unable or unwilling doctrine could quickly escalate into direct hostilities with the Venezuelan armed forces. At that point, we should expect the administration will treat any effort by Venezuela to interfere with our ‘self-defense’ operations as a distinct act of aggression, thereby justifying action to neuter Venezuela’s military capability.

It is, of course, impossible to predict exactly what the administration is planning vis a vis Venezuela. Perhaps this is all part of a pressure campaign intended to avert direct confrontation by persuading Maduro’s power base to abandon him. But the history of such tactics does not seem to support the expectation Maduro will depart peacefully, or that any resulting regime change will have the impact the Trump Administration might desire. One need only consider how dictators like Saddam Hussein and Manuel Noriega resisted such pressures and clung to power even when U.S. military action that they had no chance of withstanding became inevitable. Or perhaps the administration will bypass the ‘unable and unwilling’ approach and simply initiate direct action against Venezuela to topple Maduro based on an even more dubious claim of self-defense now that he has been designated part of another foreign terrorist organization.

One thing, however, is certain: the options for extending this military campaign to Venezuela are built upon the feeble foundation that the U.S. is legitimately exercising the right of self-defense against TdA. And now, because of an attack that triggered congressional scrutiny, the administration is in a stronger position politically than ever thanks to Republican legislators endorsing this theory of international legality.

The real issue that was at stake during those closed door hearings was never really whether a possible war crime occurred, although the deaths that have resulted from the ‘second strike’ (like all the deaths resulting from this campaign) are highly problematic. The real issue was and remains the inherent invalidity of a U.S. assertion of wartime legal authority and a congressional majority that seems all too willing acquiesce to an administration that seems willing to bend law to the point of breaking to advance its policy agenda.

Nicolas Maduro is a tyrant who has illegitimately clung to power contrary to the popular will of the Venezuelan people. His nefarious activities and anti-democratic rule justify U.S. efforts to force him out of power and enable restoration of genuine democracy in that country. What it does not justify is constructing a legal edifice built on an invalid foundation to justify going to war against Venezuela to achieve that goal. But now that the Trump administration has tested the political waters, that seems more likely than ever.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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EXPERT OPINION — Reports came out last week that claim the Chairman of Joint Staff, General Dan Caine, is preparing a new unified command plan (UCP) that will reorganize and consolidate the regional combatant commands. According to press reports, the proposal, which is to go to the Secretary and the President soon, would combine U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command under a new U.S. International Command. U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern Command would be combined as U.S. Americas Command. For now, the functional commands, U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Space Command, U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Transportation Command and U.S. Indo Pacific Command would remain the same.

If this happens, it would be the biggest command shake up in decades. However, to truly have the greatest effect, more needs to happen than just a reorganization and consolidation of combatant commands. The work to change and upgrade the combatant commands must be more consequential.

For this to happen, these commands must have all the tools at their disposal to develop military relationships and oversee operations in their regions. To be most effective, that means that their intelligence and their interagency arms must be bolstered.

On the intelligence side, Washington should push out the work to the combatant commands that the analysts, targeters and operators are doing in D.C. Before the early 2000s, the combatant commands hired their intelligence professionals through the services. In the early 2000s, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) took over the requirement to integrate all the combatant commands’ intelligence professionals and those professionals became DIA employees.

There has been great success with increased and more consistent training and more sophisticated intelligence work at the combatant commands. More defense intelligence enterprise professionals now have a first-hand understanding of providing support to military activities. However, there is much more work to do in this area. A vast majority of the Washington DIA employees do not have direct experience working with warfighters on tactical issues or have forgotten their experience in this area. There is also often a duplication of efforts on analysis, reporting, and collection between DIA headquarters and the combatant commands.

This all can be streamlined by pushing those DC-based professionals to the combatant commands. DIA headquarters should be small and highly focused on manning, training, equipping, and integrating. The analysts, operators and targeters should be working directly with the warfighters under the direction of the combatant commander or at the Pentagon directly for the Chairman, Joint Staff.

More specifically, DIA headquarters should provide the HR, the training programs, the data, and the technology for the rest of the DIA enterprise to support each combatant Commander and his warfighters directly.

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In the early 2010s, there was a discussion in policy circles about how to make combatant commands more effective. A key role for Combatant Command senior leaders is to develop relationships with military partners in their region. This will become more difficult as a Combatant Commander’s geographic outreach grows. Each Commander will need more tools and senior professionals to help develop those relationships. To assist in this and to underscore the need for interagency coordination, Combatant Commands should have dual leadership from the civilian sector and military.

Most regional commands now have a senior foreign policy advisor, usually at Ambassador rank, who advises the commander on foreign relations. This position needs to be enhanced to a true deputy position vice an advisor. At the same time, the combatant commands need senior representatives from major government departments such as the Department of Homeland Security, Treasury, Commerce, and FBI. This will enhance the U.S.’ ability to compete against our adversaries by offering tools to use with foreign governments that are integrated and coordinated across the U.S. government.

The time is right to make more consequential changes to a system that needs to modernize.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

OPINION — The Pentagon’s push to overhaul its slow, specification-driven procurement system is an overdue acknowledgment that our defense industrial base has become too narrow, too fragile, and too dependent on foreign supply chains. America’s defense establishment is finally waking up to a critical weakness that has metastasized in recent decades: we have drifted away from the industrial might that once formed the bedrock of our economy and allowed us to out-produce any adversary in the world.

While there are many warning signs, one symptom of the problem is unmistakably clear: the United States is not producing what it needs at the speed and scale modern conflict demands. Recent reporting shows the U.S. Army is still struggling to meet its 155mm artillery-shell production goals after years of effort. Across the spectrum—from advanced missile interceptors to something as basic as black powder—we are falling dangerously behind in both production capacity and supply-chain resilience. For now, these shortfalls are appearing in conflicts that don’t directly involve American troops, but the truth is that a major war will see the United States forced to ration materials and munitions, deploying untested prototypes on the battlefield while the defense industrial base races to catch up. We must act now to prevent this from happening.

If we are serious about winning the next war—or better yet, deter it—we must rethink both how we buy military equipment and weapons, and how fast we can make them. We don’t need another half measure or a fully government solution. Instead, the government should leverage the private sector to build a nationwide network of multifaceted, resilient manufacturing nodes that can surge production of everything from drones, vehicles, and body armor to medicine, munitions, and microelectronics in times of crisis, while sustaining production lines for commercial products in peacetime. The power of the U.S. economy can, and should, be leveraged to solve this problem.

This network of production centers, or campuses, would bring together startups and established manufacturers in the same ecosystem, enabling the kind of rapid prototyping, pilot production, and full-rate manufacturing the Pentagon is urgently seeking. Each of these campuses would be designed for flexibility, with modular production capabilities that can be rapidly upgraded, and shared heavy infrastructure such as test beds, utilities, and analytical systems. Furthermore, these facilities would be part of a connected national network, leveraging the regional strengths of each part of the country while avoiding the single points of failure commonly found in today’s highly concentrated manufacturing hubs.

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Today, the gap between a successful prototype and real-world production is often a chasm in the defense industrial base. Major firms are often tied up maintaining legacy systems while cash-strapped startups cannot afford to build compliant, capital-intensive factories without production contracts. These startups are often told that contracts won’t come until they prove they can manufacture at scale. So promising technologies stall in a chicken-or-egg limbo while delays snowball. The Pentagon’s renewed embrace of OTAs helps, but money alone won’t fix a physical bottleneck. We need places where cutting-edge firms can scale quickly, and affordably.

A national network of industrial campuses is designed to fill this gap. Under this model, companies wouldn’t pay construction costs up front; lease payments would begin only after they move in and start generating revenue. Layering into the model a certain number of shared facilities—initially funded by the Pentagon—would reduce risk, accelerate development, and dramatically shorten production timelines. Young companies gain room to grow. Established firms gain access to fresh innovation - and taxpayer dollars go further.

This is not a radical idea. It is an evolution of the model that once made America unstoppable. In World War II, factories across the economy—automotive, textile, consumer goods, and more—transformed to support the war effort. That surge capacity happened because the United States had an existing industrial ecosystem ready to mobilize. Today, we no longer have one.

Decades of offshoring, consolidation, and a fixation on short-term efficiency have left our industrial base brittle and full of holes. COVID-19 made that painfully clear when the world’s largest economy found itself dependent on foreign suppliers for PPE and basic supplies. Semiconductor shortages still slow defense and automotive lines. Meanwhile, our adversaries are turning basic industries into warfighting assets. Russian bakeries are producing drones and China is treating its manufacturing capabilities as a strategic weapon while in America, we’ve been treating our manufacturing base like an accounting exercise.

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The government must shift course. Manufacturing is a strategic asset—every bit as important as ships, planes, satellites, or submarines. Washington should fund shared industrial infrastructure, de-risk private investment, and let market forces drive efficiency.

The math is simple. In some cases, companies piloting these programs have delivered 4:1 to 25:1 returns on tax dollars, generating major gains for minimal government investments. With a defense budget exceeding $800 billion, the Pentagon can easily afford to invest a sliver of that—well under one percent—to send a clear, unambiguous demand signal to the private sector that America is rebuilding its industrial backbone, and doing it now.

History shows what happens when we do. Modest seed capital during World War II and the Apollo program unlocked massive private investment and generated hundreds of innovations that have come to define the modern age. These campuses would be more than factories—they would be hubs where manufacturers, universities, investors, and federal partners build self-sustaining ecosystems capable of accelerating innovation, fostering talent, and producing critical goods at scale. They would restore American industrial depth, innovation, and flexibility—our most reliable, most underestimated tools of deterrence.

America is racing into the next complex era of great-power competition with a defense industrial base limping along from the last era; one that is simply too small, too fragile, and too slow. We can invent extraordinary technologies, but what use are they sitting in a lab if we can’t produce them at scale? If that doesn’t change, the United States risks discovering—too late—that innovation without industrial power is a hollow advantage.

Rebuilding American manufacturing will be difficult. But the cost of inaction is far higher. A nation with a deep, flexible industrial base can surge production, absorb economic shocks, and outlast any adversary, on the battlefield and the home front. A nation without one is forced to ration weapons, delay deployments, and scramble to keep its supply chains functioning.

We can build this network now or we can wait for a crisis to expose, once again, how fragile our industrial base has become. In the next conflict, the world’s strongest military must be able to depend on its factories to keep up.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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OPINION — “Our [the Joint Chiefs of Staff] job is to present and my job with the Joint Chiefs and others is to present the range of [military] options that this President or any President should consider with all of the secondary and tertiary considerations that go into those options, so that a President can make whatever decision he wants to make -- and then we deliver.”

That was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine early in a 30-minute “fireside chat” with CNBC’s Morgan Brennan before an audience at the Reagan National Defense Forum on December 6, at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California.

I want to analyze Caine’s remarks, because they received almost no public coverage, and as Joint Chiefs Chairman, his stated views are worth recording – as were his predecessors’ during the first Trump administration.

Caine, who is extremely cautious in his public remarks, was originally asked by CNBC’s Brennan early in the chat, “How are you advising the President on Venezuela?” His first answer was, “Carefully,” which drew a laugh, but then he went on with the serious answer above.

I picked that opening quote because most senior military officers would have answered just that they gave options, but in my experience few would have added the part about “all of the secondary and tertiary considerations that go into those options.” In short, I believe what Caine said in giving military options to President Trump, was that he gave both the upsides and downsides of what could happen with each option.

In giving the above answer, Caine went on to say, “I wouldn't want to share any particular advice or options that we're giving, but we present a lot of them.”

Again I would point out that Caine carefully noted he would not spell out any “advice or option” he has given Trump, but the fact that so far the President has not yet followed through on his threat to attack ground targets in Venezuela may be because of the “secondary or tertiary considerations” Caine said would be the outcome associated with undertaking such overt actions.

The public reactions to the 25 narco-boat attacks with their 95 associated deaths has been bad enough. But they also raise questions about where Caine stood on that issue.

In fact, CNBC’s Brennan started the conversation with Caine asking his views about “these Caribbean strikes and the reporting around them.”

Caine diverted from the question saying he was struck by the “sort of loss of confidence in the American military by the American people and that's deeply concerning to me.” He then said he wanted to add one detail to what Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had earlier told the Reagan Forum about the boat strikes.

That detail, Caine said, was that it was his idea along with Adm. Frank (Mitch) Bradley, the operational commander who ordered the so-called second strike on September 2, “to go up and

share the information that we could share with the Congress.” The two gave classified briefings to leaders of the House and Senate Armed Services and Intelligence Committees, as well as military appropriators, on December 4, according to The New York Times.

Caine told the Reagan Forum they had done it “so that we could continue to sustain and scale that trust that we must earn every day from the American people through the Congress.”

Throughout the 30-minute conversation, Caine avoided talking about Trump administration policy, just two days after Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) had been released.

For example, when CNBC’s Brennan asked, “How do you see the alliance with Europe evolving?” – a controversial subject in the Trump NSS, Caine responded, “We don't do policy in the Joint Force. We execute those policies.”

Caine did recognize the NSS’s new policy emphasis on the Western Hemisphere.

“Protecting the homeland is not just a term that we say anymore. It's a real thing and homeland security is national security,” Caine said. “I won't get into the operational matters, but there's plenty of visible examples…on where we are going to protect our neighborhood and do that pursuant to the things that we're able to do to make sure America is a safe and secure country.”

Caine then added, “We have not, if you look back over the arc of our deployment history over the last few years, we haven't had a lot of American combat power in our own neighborhood. I suspect that's probably going to change. We'll see what we're ordered to do and of course we follow that guidance.”

But Caine did focus on traditional threats saying, “From a military perspective, military alone, our relationships are good in Europe, and I'll let my bosses talk about the policy there.”

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Caine was more open when it came to NATO. “Allies and partners are key and critical to us as we fight together,” Caine told the Reagan Forum. “NATO remains a key important ally for us. They are, I think, going to own European security both through NATO and bilaterally and individually. The military leaders that I talked to are encouraged by the defense spending that's happening inside their countries. I would say, and have said to them, the same narrative around their defense and national industrial bases as we try to scale European defense so Europe can own Europe.”

Caine added, “The SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe] over there, [U.S.] General [Alexus G.] Grynkewich, is carrying the same message through his EUCOM [U.S. European Command] hat. But that said, allies and partners remain a key part as laid out in the national security strategy.”

When it came to the fighting in Europe, Caine told the Reagan Forum, “I want to be pretty cautious about commenting on Ukraine because of the ongoing negotiations. And I'm mindful that anything that I say could get spun one way or the other. I think, for me, I believe that we always want to be striving for peace and what's happened in Europe there is a tragedy out on the Ukrainian front lines. So I'm going to be pretty cautious given the meetings that are going on.”

He did say, “What the Ukraine industrial base has done to create tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands of drones is extraordinary. Those are the kinds of entrepreneurial lessons that we want to take from that fight.”

Caine also talked of a military lesson from Ukraine.

“It's another case study in the importance of the ability to put air power over a battlefield,” he said. “And when you look at the fixed and frozen lines that we've seen out in Ukraine, it's an opportunity for us to learn about the importance of protecting the force on the ground. And having been one of those guys on the ground earlier in my life, I value greatly the ability to have an air force or some kind of capability that can come in there and put an adversary in a particular place of pain. We haven't seen that out there in Ukraine.”

Caine said, “One of the lessons out of Ukraine is going to be mass. And there's a lot of exchanges going on. And when I think about war fighting in the future, I see a lot of exchanges, both in the kinetic and non-kinetic space, that is probably unprecedented. So we're going to need a high-low mix that we've not seen before…but we are also going to need significantly more attritable [loseable] things that can create multiple simultaneous dilemmas for the commanders on another side of a fight than for us.”

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While the Trump NSS hardly mentioned China, Caine did.

“When we look at the rise of the Chinese military,” Caine said, “what our goal in the Joint Force is to create multiple simultaneous dilemmas for all of the adversaries around the world, so that they are very cautious and concerned about doing something that would bring any sense of threat to the American people.”

Caine went on, “I think China's competing on the global scale. I know that from the U.S. perspective we've got an economic relationship now that is looking positive and trending fine. We see China still creating a lot of combat capability and capacity at scale, and as the National Security Strategy says, we owe it to the nation to deliver a free Indo-Pacific and a free and safe and prosperous Indo-Pacific. So when I think about actions in the Pacific, mindful of the President's guidance, that's how we think about it.”

As for the Middle East, Caine called it still “critical,” and said, “It's still I think undecided. I carefully watch through the CENTCOM (U.S. Central Command) commander what's happening in Gaza. I remain as always concerned about what Iran's intentions are down there. These are conflicts that have been going on for a long, long, time. I'm hopeful for peace but need to be prepared for any number of eventualities there.”

As for here at home, Caine told the Reagan Forum, “What the American system, as it's been running for a long time now, is really good at is buying behind the technology development curve [emphasis added]. And what we need to do is get in front of the technology development curve. And that's going to require the best of the military, the best of the Congress, the best of the private sector, and the best of not just the defense industrial base, but the national industrial base.

Caine explained, “Back in my life, I ran a small mom and pop machine shop in Denton, Texas, that made parts for America's aerospace and defense industry. And I'll tell you that everybody needs to up their game here.”

He went on, “We have to change the culture inside the [Defense] Department. We have to change the culture inside companies. And I've been in both. So I can see both of these things. We have to create and sustain and maintain competitive forces out there in the market where we are driving innovation in our corporate structures and systems that are going to give better combat capability to the Joint Force.”

In addition, Caine said, “The military and the government need to be better buyers and we have to write better contracts. I am still on step one of my 12-step recovery process from selling to the government when I was a part-timer in the military. I think we have to find a way to share risk between us and the private sector.”

Caine was an unusual choice by President Trump, who had first met Caine back in December 2018 in Iraq. The President claimed during a 2019 political speech he had met an Army officer, “Razin Caine,” who had worn a MAGA hat, said he’d “kill for Trump,” and claimed in Iraq he could defeat the ISIS terrorist group in Syria “in less than four weeks,” three Trump statements Caine later denied in interviews and during his 2025 Senate confirmation hearing.

When I first wrote about Caine last March, I was drawn to the facts that beginning August 2005 he served a year as a White House Fellow at the Agriculture Department and later, from October 2006 to January 2008, was Policy Director for Counterterrorism and Strategy for President George W. Bush’s White House Homeland Security Council. Caine’s last military post before resigning from the Air Force in 2024 was three years as Associate Director for Military Affairs at the CIA.

However, at the Reagan Forum, Caine confessed, “I actually served at the Agency [CIA] twice. One is in my bio, one is not in my bio.” What’s that all about?

Caine clearly is a person the public needs to follow more closely.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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EXPERT OPINION / PERSPECTIVE — Eighty-five years ago, as the United States cautiously explored an expanded alliance with Great Britain, our own population was divided. London was already fighting for its very survival, standing alone after the fall of France; Washington was not yet fighting at all. Public opinion tilted toward isolationism, and President Roosevelt had to proceed slowly to avoid losing the support of both Congress and the U.S. public. Yet a year later, the Atlantic Charter was signed with Churchill, publicly declaring a shared stand against tyranny and an alliance that would stand for the rest of the century. But behind the scenes, the two leaders negotiated a deeper exchange: American weapons for British technology.

Through Lend-Lease, the United States sent destroyers and vital equipment to keep Britain in the fight against Nazi aggression. Less understood was what the U.S. quietly received in return: cutting-edge capabilities that would shape its own success once it entered the war. That historical moment holds lessons for today, with America again questioning its commitments abroad, and for the value of learning from a Ukrainian ally engaged in a war we are not fighting ourselves.

One of Britain’s most consequential contributions in 1940 was the technology behind “Chain Home,” an early, revolutionary radar network. A constellation of radio stations sent out beams whose returns revealed the direction, altitude, and approximate numbers of incoming Luftwaffe aircraft during the Battle of Britain. Integrated with human observers and command-and-control stations, the system allowed RAF leaders to deploy their limited squadrons with precision, conserving fuel, protecting pilots, and preserving the nation’s survival. As Churchill famously said of the RAF, “never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.”

That success was not only a triumph of courage but a triumph of rapid wartime innovation and operational learning. And it is exactly the kind of learning the United States must pursue now as Ukraine pioneers new modes of drone warfare against a technologically sophisticated adversary.

Drone warfare in Ukraine today is the chain home radar of our time. Today in Ukraine, that country “owes so much to so few”: drone warrior heroes fighting not only for their country, but for all of Europe and democracy. The drone operators and their innovation are helping Ukraine to stay in the war against overwhelming Russian numbers. The U.S. and other NATO allies have provided large weapons systems like HIMARS, ATACMS, Abrams tanks, and F-16s. All of these systems at one time were supposedly ruled out for Ukraine, only to be provided later. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s own drone industry and innovations have helped it to turn the tide of countless battles.

There has been frustration in the U.S., however, with the support. Many are asking: for all the weapons and funding we have provided to Ukraine, what are we getting back? Defending freedom and fighting Russian aggression for Europe and our allies should be enough for our arsenal of democracy. But it’s a fair question. It is understandable after 20 years of war that the American people want to know what else we are getting if the U.S. is to be so heavily engaged financially and militarily.

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One of the things we are learning, and can learn even more ahead, are incredible lessons about the battlefield for our future force. The Army War College has led a multi-year effort to help in a project called “Call to Action: Lessons for the Future Force”. Others in various military training and testing commands across all our services, and our allies, are doing the same.

There are many more lessons to be learned, and not enough resources are being put into the fight. For years, the U.S. embassy and government were limiting the number of official Americans and contractors allowed into the war zone to work with and learn from the Ukrainians. That should end for good, and we should be flooding our ally with experts ready to help, but also to learn. One of the areas we should be drawing a lot more lessons from is drone warfare.

The Russian military and its intelligence services have learned a lot about drone warfare in Ukraine. They have stood up an entire new service of their troops devoted to drone warfare, as well as a drone center called Rubikon, which is changing the battlefield. The Russians are also using drones in gray warfare against NATO countries, to probe their borders, weaknesses at airports, and other facilities across the continent in what has grown in recent months into a wave of drone incursions. This is hybrid warfare practiced by a country and its intelligence services that have a long history of doing so: testing reactions, looking for weak points, antagonizing the alliance to find soft spots, or partners willing to acquiesce to Russian aggression.

In turn, we in the NATO alliance and in the U.S. are slow to adapt. The United States needs to deploy more personnel, more resources, more engineers, and experts into Ukraine to learn all the desperately valuable lessons about the world’s first truly all-encompassing drone war. It is monumental both in scale and evolution. Just as the United States learned valuable lessons about radar, which saved countless American pilots and other lives throughout World War II, we need to learn these important lessons from the Ukrainians about drone warfare before we may find ourselves engaged in a conflict we are not prepared for.

There are three salient lessons for those who are studying the war and how it has evolved just in the past four years. These are areas the U.S. should focus more resources on. The first lesson that we need to study from the Ukrainians involves the electromagnetic space on the battlefield and electronic warfare (EW). American soldiers have never operated in a battle space so encumbered by all manner of electromagnetic jamming, as is taking place every day across the battlefields of Ukraine. Cyber operations, both enabling and disabling various systems, command and control, and what is called “PNT” or the precision navigational systems of all manner of weapons— all are being jammed and interfered with on an unprecedented scale in the EW space.

The second lesson we need to understand and learn from are the ingenious innovations and adaptations that the Ukrainians, in particular, have carried out with their drones. Ukraine stood up an entire industry to build millions of the very smallest type of drones designed to target an individual Russian soldier in a trench, to much larger mother drones to carry other drones, deliver supplies, and even carry out strategic strikes like those against Russian bombers at airfields, taking off from “conex” shipping containers. These are remarkable operations and feats that we can mine for lessons from our Ukrainian allies. We are well behind their innovation and acquisition curve.

Third and finally, the most important lesson we need to learn from the Ukrainians is how to fight a war where we might be out-manned and out-gunned. That is not something the American people could have imagined for nearly a century. But Russia’s aggression is stark and unprecedented. Add to it the prospect of a potential war with China over the Taiwan Strait looming, which the Chinese are preparing and training for, also at an unprecedented level. They and the North Koreans are sharing weapons’ components and helping Russia evade sanctions. And in the case of the latter, North Korean soldiers are dying for Russia on the battlefield. They are getting the know-how and learning the lessons from Russia.

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We are at a point where all of China’s conventional forces, with very few exceptions - on the land, sea, and air (save for nuclear forces)- outnumber the United States. China has a larger land army, a larger navy now by volume of surface vessels, and a Chinese Air Force that rivals our own and NATO’s airpower. Many will argue correctly that the Chinese do not have the experience of decades of combat, as our pilots do, nor the expertise of our sailors and soldiers on the ground. But as many famous generals have noted in history, “quantity has its own quality.” This is also a lesson from Ukraine, as overwhelming numbers of Russian troops are wearing down the front lines of Ukraine in the east. Overwhelming numbers of drones and artillery, as well as missile strikes combining in multi-vector attacks—all these are also making a significant impact on the battlefield.

We would be wise to engage with and learn more from our Ukrainian partners, just like the United States did 85 years ago from our British allies, before we were forced into war. It forged a “special relationship” that has stood for a century. We can hope for the same with our Ukrainian brothers and sisters fighting now against aggression in no less of a challenge to all of democracy than the Nazis were to Europe. Putin and his Chinese allies are out for world domination; make no mistake, we have to learn the lessons to prepare to fight and support our allies fighting again.

While we, supporters of Ukraine, hope this war will end soon, we also need to prepare for the next war. As Churchill said then, we should: “gather strength for the morning. For the morning will come. Brightly will it shine on the brave and true; kindly upon all who suffer for the cause; gloriously upon the tombs of heroes. Thus will shine the dawn.”

The dawn will come, but so will night again. We should learn from the Ukrainian heroes who have suffered through all the nights of this war, not doubt their commitment to freedom, nor our own obligation to support them.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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DEEP DIVE — On a Wednesday in November, with Chinese President Xi Jinping looking on, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) commissioned the 80,000-ton Fujian, the country’s third aircraft carrier and largest to date, in a ceremony that also featured its latest Navy stealth fighters, helicopters and command aircraft. A week later, China’s Ministry of Defense announced that the Sichuan, one of the world’s largest amphibious assault ships, had completed initial sea trials and would be ready for deployment next year. And last week, Shanghai is hosted “Marintec China,” the largest maritime conference in the world.

These are all signs of China’s continued rise as a maritime power and challenger to U.S. supremacy on the seas. And they have happened at a lightning-fast pace.

China now has “a world-class Navy,” retired Rear Admiral Mike Studeman, a former Commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence, told The Cipher Brief. “It's not, ‘Hey, we're going to achieve this in 2049.’ And it's just not in the numbers, it's in the quality. These ships are modern by any standard.”

The recently commissioned Fujian is the first Chinese carrier (and only the second in the world, after the U.S. Gerald R. Ford) to be equipped with electromagnetic catapults for launching aircraft. As for the new amphibious vessel, the Sichuan, experts have been impressed both by its sophistication and the fact that it was built in just over two years.

Top U.S. Navy officials are taking note. On an Asia-Pacific tour last month, Admiral Daryl Caudle, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, acknowledged the new carrier and assault ship and the overall “impressive” growth of China’s Navy.

“How they utilize those aircraft carriers globally is, of course, a concern of mine,” Adm. Caudle said in Japan. As for the Sichuan assault vessel, Adm. Caudle said, “We’ll watch that very closely and see what they’re going to do there. That’s a large ship, very capable.”

Experts say the recent milestones are the latest evidence of gains that have seen China’s Navy surpass the U.S. fleet in overall numbers while boosting the quality of its vessels as well.

“It's impressive,” former Rear Admiral, Mark Montgomery, told The Cipher Brief. “They're building a hundred merchant ships for every one we build, and two warships for every one we build. And they have quantitatively exceeded the size of our U.S. naval ship numbers.”

Montgomery was quick to add that China’s advances “don’t mean they have a more capable Navy” than the U.S. In terms of the quality of submarines and destroyers and carriers – “your choice, ship class after ship class,” as he put it – the U.S. remains without peer. But Montgomery and others say that China has rapidly narrowed the quality gap, and already changed the strategic equation for any potential conflict over the South China Sea or Taiwan.

China is “building a lot of ships, but the technological sophistication of those vessels has also significantly increased,” said Matthew Funaiole, Senior Fellow at the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). “They're really trying to compete with other countries – and they obviously have their sights set on the U.S. in terms of maritime dominance in the region.”

The Trump Administration issued an executive order in April to jumpstart the U.S. shipbuilding industry and restore “American maritime dominance,” but experts say the U.S. has work to do to match the urgency of the Chinese buildup.

“The shipbuilding capacity in China now dwarfs that of the United States,” Emmanouil Karatarakis wrote in a recent analysis for The Cipher Brief. Citing estimates that China's overall shipbuilding capability (armed and unarmed) is now hundreds of times larger than the U.S.'s, he added, “This imbalance has far-reaching implications for long-term strategy and wartime readiness.”

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China’s maritime rise

As with many elements of China’s rise as a global power, this one began in the early 1990s. At the time, China’s Navy was deployed primarily to guard its coastline – and while precise figures are hard to come by, estimates of its 1990 force range from 350-400 vessels, most of which were small patrol craft. Back then, the PLAN had no modern destroyers or submarines, and when China first put a carrier to water – in 2012 – it was a retrofitted Soviet vessel (the ship had actually been built in the 1980s, in the then-Soviet republic of Ukraine).

Today, China’s Navy boasts more than 1,000 vessels, including roughly 370 warships and submarines in what the Pentagon calls China’s “battle force” capability. The bulk of this rags-to-riches rise in maritime assets has come during the tenure of Xi Jinping.

“Xi Jinping has always been clear-eyed about the fact that a great power is a maritime power,” RADM Studeman said. “He personally understands that China, in order to be the leading power in the world, needs to have a maritime capability bar none. And that's the course they're on.”

Beijing has taken advantage of a booming commercial shipbuilding industry and the fact that – unlike in the U.S. – the civilian and military sectors in China are intertwined. Shipbuilding was included in the 10 core technologies in Beijing’s “Made in China 2025” industrial strategy, a blueprint for competing with global leaders in key industrial sectors.

A CSIS report offered staggering evidence of China’s maritime rise: the country’s share of global shipbuilding has jumped from 5% in 1999 to roughly 50%, while the U.S. now builds fewer than 1% of commercial ships globally. China’s largest state-owned shipbuilder built more commercial vessels by tonnage in 2024 than the entire U.S. shipbuilding industry had built since the end of World War II.

As for warships, China is now on track to have a 425-ship fleet by 2030, while the U.S. Navy currently has fewer than 300 deployable battle-force vessels – a total which experts worry may drop as aging ships are retired faster than new ones are put to water. “The growing size and sophistication of China’s Navy, combined with Beijing’s increasing assertiveness,” the CSIS report said, “poses major challenges to U.S. and allied military readiness and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.”

Strategic implications

Experts say there are two basic strategic aims behind China’s maritime growth: preparing for potential conflict in the region, and adding a critical element for the country’s projection of global power and influence.

For the latter goal, the Fujian adds a major “chess piece,” as RADM Studeman put it, helping the PLAN expand its growing “blue-water” capabilities and extend its reach well beyond China’s Southeast Asian neighbors.

“They have been going up into the Bering Sea and parts of the Arctic and Antarctic,” Studeman said. “And they've been able to expand their footprint and develop their capabilities in an evolutionary way, which has been remarkable to see.”

The new carrier group might also be used in a maritime blockade of Taiwan, global humanitarian missions, and show-of-force deployments far from China’s shores.

“China wants to have the ability to operate globally,” Funaiole told The Cipher Brief. “I don’t think they want to do the same things the U.S. does, which is to have forward-positioned fleets all over the world. But they do want the ability to operate in different regions that are further and further away from the Chinese mainland, and you need to have a blue-water Navy in order to do that. It's the key to power projection.”

As far as a potential Taiwan conflict is concerned, the Sichuan – the newly-minted amphibious vessel, would be the more important “chess piece.” It’s an assault ship built to provide launch platforms for large combat drones, helicopters, and amphibious equipment, according to China’s Ministry of Defense.

“The carriers are less important for a Taiwan contingency than a lot of the other assets,” Funaiole said. “The amphibious ships are critical for that being successful.”

RADM Montgomery echoed the point, calling the new carrier group “a muscle flex and power projection,” while noting that the Sichuan and other assets would bring more concrete benefits in a regional conflict.

“The rest of their Navy [beyond the carrier group] isn't a muscle flex,” he said. “This is actually building a capability and capacity to push the United States farther and farther away from the area of crisis and contingency, whether in the East China Sea around the Senkaku [Islands] with Japan, in Taiwan, or in the South China Sea. The idea is to keep our Navy as far away as possible with a mix of missiles, aircraft, submarines, surface ships, all of that.” Those elements have been developed “at close to breakneck speed,” Montgomery said. “They've done a fantastic job of identifying, developing, resourcing and fielding a Navy air and missile force that places the US Navy and US Air Force at risk.”

U.S. Navy commanders have also warned that in the event of a Pacific war, China would be better equipped to replace lost ships – by virtue of geography and its more efficient shipbuilding. Taiwan war scenarios have shown that China would be able to absorb far heavier warship losses than the U.S.

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Can the U.S. turn the tide?

The White House’s April order, issued under the heading “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance,” marked a recognition of China’s rise and a high-profile effort to reverse the erosion of U.S. shipbuilding. As The Cipher Brief has reported, the order mandates a whole-of-government push to jump-start the domestic shipbuilding industry.

The order called for the creation of an “Office of Shipbuilding” within the National Security Council, and said that within 210 days, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs “shall submit a Maritime Action Plan (MAP) to the President…to achieve the policy set forth in this order.”

That 210-day deadline has passed (November 5 was the 210th day), and there has been no public announcement of such a plan. The White House did not respond to requests for comment.

RADM Studeman acknowledged that even in the best-case scenario, these goals would take years to achieve, but added that he was disappointed by a slow pace of progress since the order was signed.

“I expected to see more frankly,” he said. “I think that they're incredibly good ideas that were in that directive, and unless it's going on very quietly, I haven't seen enough progress in each of the areas.”

RADM Montgomery agreed.

“I know it's expectation management, but I'm disappointed,” he said, adding that he worries that future U.S. budgets may not provide the funds he believes are needed to kickstart the warship-building industry.

“China has modernized shipyards, as have Japan and Korea, who equally outpace us,” Montgomery said. “We do not have modernized shipyards for a number of reasons. We have not properly invested in that. Our labor costs are significantly higher, and that's particularly true in shipbuilding and defense manufacturing.”

He and others hold out hope that investments and expertise from Korea and Japan will help boost the U.S. output. The authors of the CSIS report urged a blend of punitive measures against China and long-term investments in U.S. and allied shipbuilding capacity. “U.S. Navy leaders have begun intensive outreach to allies like Japan and South Korea to support U.S. shipbuilding efforts,” the report stated, “an effort that President Trump has indicated he supports. However, much work remains to be done.”

“You need basically startup VC capital to get things going on it,” Funaiole said. “And it's not just the technical part or the physical infrastructure. We also have a lack of expertise and shipbuilding in this country. And so there also needs to be personnel training investments and exchange programs with other countries as well and specialization into new areas.”

Experts agree on this much: failure to address these issues risk damage to U.S. national security.

“As tensions rise,” the CSIS report said, “leaders in Beijing may calculate that China’s superior shipbuilding capacity would be a material benefit to outlasting adversaries in a protracted military conflict.”

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DEEP DIVE – Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky calls it “our most successful missile.” One expert says it’s "Ukraine’s strongest security guarantee.” And former CIA Director and Cipher Brief expert Gen. David Petraeus says it has the potential to be “a game changer” in the war against Russia.

They are talking about the FP-5 Flamingo, a ground-launched, subsonic, made-in-Ukraine cruise missile, built to hit targets deep in Russian territory.

Not since the first salvos of Russia’s 2022 invasion has Ukraine’s defense industry sounded so enthusiastic about a weapon manufactured on its soil. The successes of Ukrainian defense technology are well known; as The Cipher Brief reported last month, the country is now widely believed to have the world’s most innovative defense sector. Its drone technology in particular continues to earn rave reviews from experts and western defense companies alike.

But the Flamingo is something different – a missile with a reported range of 1800 miles and the ability to carry more than 2,000 pounds of munitions, meaning that in one strike it could cause greater damage than even a swarm of drones. Compared to the top-class American Tomahawk cruise missile, the Flamingo is believed to be less accurate but with a similar range and a much heavier payload. And because it is manufactured in Ukraine, the Flamingo can be launched against Russian targets without Western-imposed restrictions.

“The Flamingo may actually be a game changer,” Gen. Petraeus said at the Cipher Brief’s annual Threat Conference last month. “You add that capability to what Ukraine has already done,” he said, referring to the recent drone campaign against Russia’s oil sector, “and [the Flamingo] will extend this dramatically.”

Zelensky said last month that the Flamingos had carried out their first missions, including a three-missile attack on a Russian security base in northern Crimea. Last week, Ukraine’s General Staff said it had used Flamingos as part of a strike that targeted “several dozen” military and infrastructure sites inside Russia and in occupied Crimea.

The Flamingo’s manufacturer, the Ukrainian firm Fire Point, claims to be producing between 1-2 missiles per day, with plans to scale to 7 per day by year’s end, for a 2026 projected total of more than 2,500. "By December we’ll have many more of them,” Zelensky told reporters in August. “And by the end of December or in January–February, mass production should begin."

Experts say every one of those missiles will dwarf the power of a drone weapon.

“With the drone-strike campaign, you have the challenge that they mostly carry fairly small warheads,” John Hardie, Deputy Director of the Russia program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), told The Cipher Brief. “The damage is far less than you could do with a one-time warhead that’s carried by the Flamingo.”

All of which raises the question: Might the Flamingo change the course of the war?

How the Flamingo was born

Even by the lofty standards of Ukraine’s recent defense-tech achievements, the Flamingo’s origin story is an inspiring one. And it dates to the last days of the Cold War.

In the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, Ukraine agreed to give up not only its nuclear weapons but also its considerable arsenal of Kh-55 cruise missiles. And after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, while Zelensky and other Ukrainian leaders pressed constantly – and with mixed success – for western weaponry and security guarantees, they also began turbocharging their domestic defense industry.

“Ukrainians were authors of the Soviet space program and rocket program,” Oleksiy Goncharenko, a member of Ukraine’s Parliament, told The Cipher Brief. “When you have a lot of experience and when your people are smart enough, then the result is obvious. You have technologies which other countries respect.”

For more than three years, however, Ukraine remained largely dependent on Western countries for high-end, long-range strike capabilities. That led to the creation of a made-in-Ukraine cruise missile program.

The result is the FP-5 Flamingo, developed by Fire Point, a former casting agency that spun itself into a defense firm in the summer of 2022. In 2023, Fire Point produced its first FP-1 attack drones, ultimately turning out 200 FP-1s that year; this year the figure is expected to hit 20,000. Its cruise missile project has moved at a similar warp speed: in August, less than a year after it began work on the cruise missile, the company was showing off the prototype; soon after that, the first Flamingos were flying.

“We came up with it pretty fast,” Iryna Terekh, the company's 33-year-old Chief Technical Officer, told Politico. “It took less than nine months to develop it from an idea to its first successful tests on the battlefield.”

Terekh and other Ukrainian defense entrepreneurs speak often about how the Russian invasion has motivated their work – what Goncharenko calls “the unfortunate inspiration of war.” Terekh fled a Russian-occupied village near Kyiv in the early days of the war, and says her car still has a hole from a Russian bullet. She joined FirePoint as a partner in June 2023.

Ralph Goff, a former Senior Intelligence Executive at the CIA, calls the Flamingo production story “combat Darwinism at its best.”

“If the West isn't going to give them the long-range weaponry that they want to carry out their strategic attacks, they'll develop them themselves,” Goff told the October Cipher Brief conference. The Flamingo, he said, “is a serious piece of offensive weaponry.”

As for the missile’s unusual name, that traces to an in-house story at Fire Point, about the day when someone painted a solid rocket booster prototype pink, in a nod to the women involved in the male-dominated world of weapons production. Later, when the missiles were ready for testing, the company needed a bright color to help locate post-launch debris. Pink paint was available – and that led to the Flamingo moniker. The Pink has gone – missiles used in actual strikes are colored less conspicuously – but “Flamingo” stuck.

“You don’t need a scary name for a missile that can fly 3,000 kilometers," Terekh said. "The main goal is for a missile to be effective.”

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Reality check

If Fire Point’s claims are borne out, the Flamingo will have a reach and power on par with western cruise missiles, and an arsenal to match any European nation’s other than Russia.

Experts warn that behind that “If” lie multiple concerns – most of them due to the fact that there has been minimal independent verification of the company’s claims.

“In the defense industry, it’s easier to make statements than to actually implement them,” Ukrainian lawmaker Roman Kostenko said of the Flamingo’s potential, speaking to Radio NV last month.

One issue involves accuracy, which experts say Fire Point had to sacrifice to a degree in its push for a low-cost, fast-to-market weapon. In the Crimea strike, one missile reportedly landed some 100 meters from its target.

“Because it's low-cost, you kind of skimp on some of the more high-end features you might see in a more exquisite missile, guidance and accuracy being one of them,” Hardie said. “It's a relatively inaccurate missile at least by modern standards.” But he added that if the pace of manufacturing ultimately yields the high numbers Fire Point has promised, then “that tradeoff [high volume for accuracy] makes sense.”

Balazs Jarabik, a former European Union diplomat and analyst for RPolitik, has studied the Flamingo project since its early days. He doubts that Fire Point can reach its production goals.

“The Flamingo is real, but the production capacity is overstated, at least so far,” Jarabik told The Cipher Brief. He noted that an earlier Ukrainian-made missile, the Neptune, has yet to reach its promised scale, and that for all its defense-sector successes, Ukraine must contend with wartime supply-chain issues that would bedevil any weapons manufacturers. He and Hardie said that scaling to hundreds of Flamingos per month will require consistent supplies of everything from engines to warheads to electronics for guidance systems.

“I'm a little skeptical, but it's possible the Ukrainians will get there,” Hardie said, and Gen. Petraeus said that the Ukrainians “really need to double down” on the pace of the Flamingo manufacturing. “They're trying to get that into full production.”

Fire Point must do so while Russia targets Ukraine’s young defense companies as well as the country’s energy infrastructure. The latter is critical, given the defense sector’s high demand for energy. For one piece of the Flamingo supply chain, the company has already found a workaround: in September, Fire Point announced that Denmark had agreed to produce fuel for the Flamingo, effectively removing a key production facility from the war zone. The announcement provoked a warning from the Kremlin, which called the Danish plans “hostile.”

That response raises the question of Russian retaliation – a concern that has accompanied the delivery of virtually every new weapons system to the Ukrainian side. Some experts fear that any successful, high-impact Flamingo strike against Russia, carried out with help from Western intelligence – the destruction of a weapons factory deep in Russian territory, for example – would risk a NATO-Russia fight that the West has been desperate to avoid. Others doubt that Vladimir Putin has any interest – at least not in the current moment – in any escalation that might lead to conflict with the West.

“The Russians have been consistently more bark than bite,” Hardie said. “They know that attacking a NATO country in an overt military way – not the sort of gray-zone, below-the-threshold-of-war stuff they've been doing, but an overt military missile strike – that's an act of war. And Putin doesn't want any part of a direct conventional fight with the United States and NATO allies.”

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What to watch for

Even analysts who are skeptical about the Flamingo’s future note that it would take only a few successful strikes to inflict severe damage, and that if Fire Point can get anywhere close to its 2500-missile-per-year pledge for 2026, the battlefield impact could be profound. Beyond the Russian oil refineries and other energy facilities the Ukrainians have attacked lately, the Flamingo will put more military targets in range as well. The holy grail might be the joint Russia-Iran manufacturing facility in Tatarstan that is turning out the deadly Shahed drones, at a scale that the Ukrainians must envy.

Experts say that with hundreds of Flamingos at the ready, Ukraine might achieve what Jarabik refers to as “mass saturation,” an ability to bring a heavy and varied drone-and-missile threat to military and energy targets across all of European Russia.

“If you're Ukraine,” Hardie said, “you'd like to be able to combine these missiles and drones into a complex strike package much as the Russians are currently doing, and keep the Russian air defense on its toes.”

“The Flamingo is heavy, and it’s also relatively easy to shoot down,” Jarabik said. “And so they will need mass saturation – a lot of these missiles, but with drones or other weapons too, to get through to the targets. They're going to have to produce enough that they can have a sustained impact, …and I don't think we're going to be there anytime soon.”

Then Jarabik added: “All that said, you have to acknowledge Ukraine’s innovation and skill. And I think [the Flamingo] is a big thing. Absolutely.”

As for the accuracy concerns, Ukrainian officials noted that while one of the Flamingos fired at Crimea did miss its mark, the two others leveled a barracks and brought a “massive destructive power,” with craters measuring 15 meters in diameter.

No one is touting the Flamingo as a replacement for the array of Western missiles that have been delivered to Kyiv. The Ukrainians will still covet the German Taurus, and the British-French Storm Shadow/Scalp cruise missiles, which are more accurate, though they come with conditions attached to their use. The diversity and volume of weapons systems, experts say, are what could make a real difference. And the Flamingo adds a powerful new element to the Ukrainian arsenal.

“No one system or weapon is going to be the decisive game changer,” Hardie said. “I don't think there's any such thing as a wonder weapon. That being said, for a supporter of Ukraine, it's really encouraging to see Ukraine being able to move out on its own more in terms of long-range strike capabilities. They are taking these steps forward and really taking it to the Russians right now with this campaign against energy infrastructure. That's been impressive to see and I think it kind of augurs more to come. So if I were the Russians, I would be worried about that.”

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The core argument: if the U.S. wants to deter adversaries in today’s world of fast-moving threats that include gray-zone coercion, contested logistics and AI-enabled systems, it must accept more acquisition risk as a means to reduce operational risk later.

The Pentagon’s new plan pairs rhetorical urgency with specific structural changes. It proposes killing the legacy Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and replacing it with a tighter, more centralized alignment, pushing commercial-first solutions even if they deliver an “85% solution” initially and forcing a cultural shift across both DoD and industry toward speed, volume, and continuous iteration. The plan also signals tougher expectations for primes to invest private capital and for government to send longer demand signals. It’s a tall order.

Here’s a look at the key ideas:

• “Increase acquisition risk to decrease operational risk”: field good-enough capabilities faster, iterate in production, and stop chasing perfect specs that arrive too late.
• JCIDS → RRAB / MEIA / JAR: cancel the slow, document-heavy requirements process; stand up a Requirements & Resourcing Alignment Board (RRAB) to tie priorities to funds, a Mission Engineering & Integration Activity (MEIA) to co-design/experiment with industry early, and a Joint Acceleration Reserve (JAR) to bridge the “valley of death.”
• War-fighting Acquisition System & PAEs: rebrand and reorganize acquisition around Portfolio Acquisition Executives (PAEs) who have end-to-end authority to trade cost/schedule/performance for time-to-field, with embedded contracting and fixed delivery cycles.
• Modular Open Systems + multi-source: mandate modular architectures, maintain at least two qualified sources on critical components, and enable third-party integration to avoid vendor lock and accelerate upgrades.
• Commercial-first, 85% solution: accept non-perfect bids that meet the mission faster, then iterate software and components continuously.
• Wartime Production Unit (WPU): a deal-team model to negotiate across a contractor’s total DoD portfolio, create incentives for on-time delivery, and unlock surge capacity.
• Workforce & Culture shift: convert the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) into a “Warfighting Acquisition University,” lengthen leader tenures, and evaluate contracting/program teams on mission outcomes rather than compliance metrics.
• Foreign Military Sales realignment: move DSCA/DTSA under Acquisition & Sustainment to unify planning, contracting, and delivery so allies get kit faster without undercutting U.S. readiness.

Why this matters now

Adversaries are iterating faster, supply chains are brittle, and the U.S. military’s ability to produce and sustain at volume - will decide deterrence credibility. The proposal promises measurable gains in lead times, throughput, and availability, but it also raises hard questions about safety, governance, industry incentives, and the talent pipeline.

In the sections that follow, we pressure-test these claims with former commanders and acquisition leaders: how to set guardrails around “good-enough,” where the new risks are and the impact on the industry.

Cipher Brief Executive Editor Brad Christian spoke with General Phil Breedlove (Ret.), Lt. General Mike Groen (Ret) and Silicon Valley Entrepreneur and Stanford Professor Steve Blank, who has recently published a Department of War Program Executive Office directory to help companies better navigate the complicated system for selling to government.

Christian: What was your reaction to last week’s announcement that we heard from the secretary?

General Philip M. Breedlove

Gen. Breedlove retired as the Commander, Supreme Allied Command, Europe, SHAPE, Belgium and Headquarters, U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany.  He also served as Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force; and Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff.

General Breedlove: There are things that I really am looking forward to, and there are some things that are a bit worrisome, the way they were rolled out. But you never really know what's going to happen until you start seeing it in action and the changes to the rules for how we do our acquisition.

But make no mistake, our acquisition system to date is moribund. It's horrible. We laugh now about this “Valley of Death” between when something is created in the laboratory and when it gets to the field, six, seven, eight years or more sometimes. And people who are at war and doing this very differently, they're doing it in weeks, sometimes days, but not years. So we definitely have to change.

Part of the reason our acquisition system is so slow is because in our past, maybe even decades and decades ago, people took advantage of the system and they made money in a bad or almost illegal way. And so lawmakers do what lawmakers do, and technocrats and bureaucrats do what they do, and they created layers and layers of oversight to try to protect against some of those bad acts that happened decades ago. And the result is an acquisition system that is completely unresponsive to the needs of the warfighter. And I'm glad that we're starting to change it.

Lt. Gen. Michael Groen (US Marine Corps, Ret.)

Lt. Gen. Groen served over 36 years in the U.S. military, culminating his career as the senior executive for AI in the Department.  Groen also served in the National Security Agency overseeing Computer Network Operations, and as the Director of Joint Staff Intelligence, working closely with the Chairman and Senior Leaders across the Department.

Lt. Gen. Groen: My immediate reaction, like everybody else, when somebody uses the word acquisition, you kind of cringe a little bit. And immediately you get the vent of, it takes too long, it's too expensive, the processes don't work, the people in the processes don't know what they're doing, the long litany of usual complaints. And most of them are actually true. What we have currently, I would articulate, is an unaccountable bureaucracy. It's a professional bureaucracy. They know the process. They build the process. They work the process. But the process doesn't necessarily meet our real war fighting objectives. And I think that is probably the most important thing here.

We'll talk about drones and technology and all these other things, but I think at its core, you actually do have to have a process for this. And just getting the credit cards out and buying stuff at Best Buy doesn't work either, right? So, I think it's a requirement for us. You can't just say, well, we're just gonna blow up all the rules and let people do whatever they want. Because as soon as you do that, you're gonna realize that if we didn't have a system, we wouldn't be able to do all these other things. How do you get to integration? How do you get to common standards? How do you get to the things that actually make weapon systems work effectively and with the caliber of ammunition that they use and the system that produces that and all of the other components? So it's easy, and I've done it probably more than anybody else, to just rant about the acquisition process.

But if you didn't have an acquisition process, you would need to invent one. So, our challenge really today is, okay, the one we have for a lot of reasons is not going to be the one that we will need tomorrow. It does okay on band-aids and making munitions for today. But it is certainly not a kind of process that enables war fighting flow. So I think we are very much at a transformation point, not just in the fact that the way we want to do acquisition must change, but more importantly, the way we do everything, the way we fight must change. And so naturally we have really an incredible opportunity. Let's build the system that enables the kind of fast moving, rapid innovation that we will want on the battlefield: AI driven, data driven. We know what the future looks like. Let's actually build to that and not let unaccountable bureaucracies get in the way.

Steve Blank

Steve Blank is an adjunct professor at Stanford and co-founder of the Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. His book, The Four Steps to the Epiphany is credited with launching the Lean Startup movement. He created the curriculum for the National Science Foundation Innovation Corps. At Stanford, he co-created the Department of Defense Hacking for Defense and Department of State Hacking for Diplomacy curriculums. He is co-author of The Startup Owner's Manual.

Blank: It was mind blowing - not because anything the Secretary said was new; they are things that people who are interested in acquisition reform have been asking for the last 10 years. But it was put in a single package and was clearly done by the infusion of people who have actually run large businesses and were used to all the language of organizations that already know how to deliver with speed and urgency.

The part that didn't get said is essentially the Department of War wants to adopt startup innovation techniques of lean iteration, pivots, incremental releases, good enough delivery, and that gets you what the Secretary asked for, which was speed of delivery. But all those are things that we lived with in Silicon Valley for the last 50 years, and it wasn't until we had people who worked outside of buildings with no windows inside the Pentagon to understand that those techniques could actually be applied. And it required blowing up the existing system. And they did that spectacularly well. Very few holes in those proposals.

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Christian: A central piece of the plan as it was explained on Friday is the idea of eliminating the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, which has long been criticized for some of the slow processes and the overly bureaucratic results that we have. The new approach seeks to centralize procurement and funding under the DOD senior leadership. Are you comfortable that this is the right approach?

General Breedlove: So this is one of those, like I opened up with, some good, some bad. There are elements of JCIDS that I think we should hold on to. We shouldn't throw the whole thing out with the bath water. But there are a lot of elements of JCIDS that we need to get rid of.

Much like the rules we just talked about that were created because of people and bad acts for acquisition, the same sort of thing has happened in the process of moving an idea from the lab to the field in that now there are layers and layers of people who can hold up the process or say no. And when they do that, it adds time, schedule delays, more testing, and much more money to the program. And these people bear zero responsibility for their actions. The people that end up getting blamed for the delays and increased costs are the services or the primes. And the people that have this authority now but hold no responsibility for what they do, we've got to get rid of them. We have to ensure that people who have decision authority are held accountable for what they do, to the point of maybe even not charging this off to primes or to the folks who are developing these things. If someone else is out there slowing things down and they don't have to worry about it because they're not accountable to it, we're not in a good place.

Lt. Gen. Groen: One issue is there isn’t a cadre of professionals in DOD leadership that will be able to take this mission on full time. If you consider a broad sweep of what we build and acquire and how we do that, how we innovate, they will just run out of hours in the day and minds to engage in order to build a replacement for what we have today.

The impulse to change the way we do things is the right impulse. Our impulse to be disciplined about the way we go about things, that's also correct. So it's not enough to say “let’s blow it all up, we don't need any rules”. We actually do need rules. Regulation actually is an enabler. It helps you flow. It lets you know how things can be done. That's a really powerful thing.

The problem is with humans involved, there is always a tendency to distort a process through petty bureaucracies, tribalism, ignorance and bad temper. It is really important for leaders to actually lead in this space and create accountability for the people that are actually working. What we have today is a derivative of it. We don't need too many history lessons here, but this is like General Motors in the 1960s, where we started to really do modern industrial design at scale. So if you understand where we’ve come from, you can see how important things like industrial processes and quality checks.

In a digital environment, a transformational environment that is driven by artificial intelligence and data availability, all the notes change. The music changes. And you still need a process for things like money so you can pay people to build things. But we're not building things on a conveyor belt anymore. We're building code. We're building code that changes by the hour. We're building code that builds its own code. This is where we are. So you can't do that in a completely undisciplined way, that says “have at it team and we'll see what we get at the end of the process”. What we’re doing here is too important.

Christian: Part of the new approach will involve increasing acquisition risk, to decrease operational risk with a focus on increased use of commercial solutions and of even fielding 85 % solutions. Where's the red line that you would want as a commander before fielding an 85% solution?

Gen. Breedlove: This is a concept which is extremely hard to criticize. But we have to be pretty serious here because you're saying increasing acquisition risk to decrease operational risk. Well, if the product isn't operational yet and we have increased the purchasing and acquisition risk, and in between that costs us the life of a soldier, sailor, airman, marine or guardian, we have messed it up. So the rules are there for a reason. I completely understand. I absolutely, 100% agree with the fact that we've got to start taking more risk, but we can't do that in a way that is reckless and puts the lives of our troops on the line.

And an example where I think this concept is working well is Ukraine. They get a new drone that is designed to get past a certain capability of the Russian defenses. And why should we do a two-year testing on that thing? If the testing is to fire it into Russia where it's not going to kill any friendlies and see what happens, let's fire it into Russia and get the testing done on the battlefield, where we're less concerned with what happens. So there are ways to shorten and to change the way that we do tests and other things on the acquisition side that gets us faster to the operational side. And if we can do that, again, without raising the risk to our troops, let's go for it. And we're seeing that done well by the Ukrainians, and to some degree by the Israelis.

Lt. Gen. Groen: The first thing that pops in my mind is- What does an 85 % solution look like? What is 85% of a truck? What is 85% of a battleship or a carrier? Pick your system. If you're just doing software, you can do a lot of things in software, but still, software that's 15 % buggy and doesn't work, because you've chosen 85%, that's almost like going right back to the industrial age process flow for code. And I think that the real magic here at its core is transforming the way we do our war fighting. We need new thinking about how to integrate capabilities and new thinking about how to build artificial intelligence modalities and then the systems.

Warfare is changing under our feet right now. Ukraine and drones, I accept that example, but it's so much more than that. We need a complete transformation in the way we understand the enemy, the way we understand our mission, the way we can use autonomy to integrate with humans, the way that we can build robotics, the way that we can now start what I like to call putting the mind of a commander on a pedestal by taking all the data environment and revealing that to a commander and everybody else who is working with the commander so that you have common situational awareness.

The opportunity here is enormous to transform our war fighting to the same degree we're transforming our industries. And you see the transformation every day when you drive through DC or Austin or San Francisco. Transformation is real and it's driving our economy today. What we haven't done is purposefully mapped out how we're going to drive our war fighting capability through this technology. And this is so important because we have to have a plan for how we build operational workflows. Where do we build those? Who builds those? And so I think moving from monitoring a process of manufacturing to really considering war fighting as the core element that the technology springs from.

Christian: Obviously the Pentagon procurement system that we have today is a product of decades of bureaucracy and rules. Are you hopeful that you're going to be able to see the kind of change in the rapid timeline that they've laid forth here?

Blank: Number one, this is a pretty extensive reorganization. Right now the Department of War is siloed between requirements and system centers for testing and prototyping and acquisition, which was the acquisition with a small A with the PEOs and program managers, and then it went to contracts and then it went to sustainment, et cetera. Those were silos. Now we're putting it all underneath a single portfolio acquisition executive. So, instead of making their offices 10,000 people, it's actually a matrix organization, much like a combatant command is. Most of those people will stay in their existing orgs but now be tasked to work on specific portfolios. And instead, the portfolios will no longer be arranged by weapon system. They're going to be arranged, for example, by war fighting concepts or technology concepts, et cetera.

That said, boy, try moving an elephant and making it dance. And at the same time, they recognized - this was one of the genius parts - people won't just get a memo and know what to do. Historically, they've depended on the Defense Acquisition University, which taught them, contracting officers and the rest, how to work with the 5,000 pages of the DFAR and FAR, Federal Acquisition, Defense Acquisition Regulations. One of the unnoticed things was they basically told the Defense Acquisition University, stop teaching that today. You now need to teach people this new methodology. That's not going to happen by telepathy. First of all, we need to train the trainers, then we need to train all the people who've grown up in their career following the paperwork.

So, I predict six months or a year of chaos and confusion. And probably, there's always in a large scale reorganization saboteurs who are angry that their cheese has been moved or worse, their authority has been diminished or the head count went somewhere else. This is going to be no different except maybe at a bigger scale.

In the end, if we pull this off, and I'll explain the only possible reason not to do this, the country will be much better for it. The other obstacle will be if you're on the board of directors and the exec staff of a prime, you're going to go through the 12 stages of denial and grief and whatever because I don't know how many times both Feinberg and Hegseth made it clear that the primes weren't delivering and they weren't investing in the things the country needed and they got used to the system and we were kind of mutually dependent on a broken system - and that's over. Well, you're not going to let your stockholders say you just went home and packed up. Obviously, it's pretty clear that appealing to the Pentagon isn't going to work, but Congress is “coin operated”. This is now going to be a race of lobbying cash from the primes versus lobbying cash for the first time from private equity and venture capital. So it's going to be, who has the biggest pile of cash to influence Congress and the executive branch to keep these rules in place or modify them?

Remember what a disaster this is if you're an existing large company selling to the DOD. It says number one, we're going to buy commercial off the shelf. Number two, we're going to buy commercial off the shelf and then modify it. If and only if either one and two work, we do some bespoke contracting with the existing organization. It's never happened before. Pretty clear, pretty direct. So, the easy thing would be for primes to change their business model. But my prediction is they're going to double and triple down the amount of lobbying and dollars spent.

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Christian: Secretary Hegseth also had some words of warning to the major U.S. defense contractors, the primes, to speed up weapons development and production, invest their own capital to increase capacity, or risk becoming obsolete. This is a relatively complicated issue for these companies. What are your thoughts on this?

General Breedlove: I think that our senior leaders, maybe to include the Secretary of War and others, have sort of allowed the verbiage around this topic to get a little loosey goosey. What happened in the past was that some primes used money out of existing contracts to create excess capacity that then saved them money the next time they had to build new equipment. And our government, Congress and others got tired of that and wrote laws that limit how much money you can spend out of existing contracts to create excess capacity. And the way I understand the laws, most of them are zero. If we pay you to build 100 B-21s and you create a line that could do 120, you're going to jail or you're going to court. And so I think that there's some imprecise language running around and we need to give some of this time to sort out when the dust settles to understand what they're really asking of the primes, because they are limited on one side, fiducially and fiscally, and they're limited on the other side by laws and sometimes regulations that have been created by the regulatory agencies to correct past [behaviors].

I applaud the ideas and the initiative that the Secretary laid out. But to the defense of the primes, they're going to need some regulatory or legal relief to be able to do most of the things being talked about under the new plan. They just can't snap their fingers and say, OK, we're going to do this because then they'll end up in court.

Christian: It's not going to be an overnight process to reboot the Pentagon's procurement system. The Department of Defense is the largest single organization within the US Government. The amount of products and services that flow through that system is enormous. You've clearly laid out the tremendous opportunity that exists to rebuild the system. What are you most worried about? What's the biggest risk that can impede progress as the Pentagon starts this journey?

Lt. Gen. Groen: Tribalism. Tribalism will sink us. We are so horrifically tribal that we can't think like an extended entity. We can't think like a singular organism that is really effective through data and our systems flowing together. Tribalism kills that. And I see it every day. I'm not in the Pentagon every day anymore, but I see it: the tribalism among services, the tribalism among components of services and the tribalism within the department. And all of that tribalism is an afterglow of our industrial might in the 1960s. Now is the time for thinkers that are wearing a uniform, it's not about buying stuff without asking. It's about thinking through the flow that you want to achieve and then building the capabilities that you need to do that. It's a mindset thing, but that’s all about what transformation is. The form changes. And so when we transform, we transform ourselves into this place where we leave that tribalism behind because we have integrated effectiveness.

Working with broad autonomy is gonna help us think that way. I think that there's a broader awareness of what the technology is able to do and how it will facilitate. We just have to be careful to make sure that that's not the end state. Technology is not the end state. It's humans, war fighters who are winning on the battlefield because they understand and they can make the right calls. That's what we're after. And so all of the stuff about acquisition and the rules and why people don't follow the rules and why is it so tribal that we can't get anything to be, I think all of that merits some dynamite, but it also merits some thinking about how do we better integrate our thinking and flows and how do we do that on the battlefield?

Christian: How much of a risk is the next administration coming in and potentially changing everything? And then in particular, if you're one of those big primes, are you baking that into your long-term planning that this might shift in a measurable way in the future? Or do you think these changes are going to be something that is so overwhelmingly positive that future administrations have to stick with it?

Blank: Well, if you were asking me this three years ago, I would have said, well, you should get all this done now because it's going to be flipped back in three years. What's changed now is the amount of capital available for startups, scale-ups, and private equity firms that can match or overpower the lobbying efforts of the primes. So as I said, both the executive branch and Congress are coin operated, even more so now than ever. And for the first time ever, the insurgents have as much or more coin than the incumbents. That's what's going to change this game.

So yes, of course, a Democratic administration or another Republican one might have a different opinion. But in this case, we're talking about piles of money flooding the streets in Washington to try to change the game. Think about who are now sitting in the cabinet. And other places have commercial experience for the first time ever at scale, inside the executive branch for sure and inside the Department of War which changes the nature of the conversation and as we're seeing the types of things they're recommending.

Again, it wasn't that people didn't recognize this before. It was kind of hard to explain this to people who had never run a business or who have been career successful. I've said for years, we had world class organizations, world class people for a world that no longer existed. And finally, we have people who understand what that world should be like because they've been operating in it. Secretary Feinberg has been writing checks of tens of billions of dollars- buying an aircraft carrier, okay, he’s written those kinds of checks before. Tell me who else ever had that position.

And again, it's not that the DOW should run like a corporation or startup, but having that experience sets a bar for what you know is possible for doing extraordinary things. It's what this country knew how to do in World War II and during the Cold War, and we just kind of lost it when Robert McNamara, an ex-chief financial officer of Ford, put in the first version of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBE) in 1962. We've been operating on that system for 63 years, or some variance of it. Basically, he imposed a chief financial officer's kind of strategy on budgeting and planning, which made sense at the time. It stopped making sense about 15 years ago, but no one inside the building knew what to do differently. That's changed.

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Yet the Russian army continues to engage in desperate efforts to regain limited territory to the west. British intelligence estimates that since the start of 2025 Russia has suffered 332,000 casualties, the highest loss rate since the invasion. Russia has made only marginal gains, which Putin trumpets as victories as he throws more men and equipment into the Ukraine meatgrinder.

Of course, Putin cannot afford to admit failure, but it nonetheless seems as if he actually believes his strategy is succeeding. Why?

The answer lies in the perverse incentives of Russian command and control (C2), which conceal the weaknesses of Russian FS. Russian C2 is concentrated in one civilian with no military training (Putin), and his small circle of advisers.

Putin’s leadership discourages innovation by field officers and welcomes blind obedience. Bad news from field officers of all ranks is punished with demotion or arrest. Good news is rewarded with promotion. As a result, field officers routinely lie about their failures in hopes of promotion and reassignment. There is almost no active search for information by headquarters to correct misinformation sent by field officers.

Russian force structures are notoriously corrupt—a corruption that is expected and tolerated, but also can be an excuse for punishment. Officers steal from their units by exaggerating the size of the unit and pocketing the unused pay. Hence, many Russian units are severely understaffed. Soldiers steal from their units by selling weapons, ammunition, and fuel, leaving their units under-equipped. The vast majority of battle-hardened soldiers are long gone, as are military trainers, who were all sent to the front lines. New Russian recruits are untrained and unaware of the risks they face.

Russia's C2 and FS Problems from the Start of the Invasion

A brief review makes it clear that C2 and FS problems have bedeviled the Russian invasion from the start of the 2022 invasion. Planning for the invasion ignored standard military doctrine, which emphasizes that successful invasions require sufficient scale, speed, and force. The considerable literature on the force differentials needed for an invasion, including Soviet doctrine, agrees on the classic rule that a frontal assault requires a 3:1 force ratio to compensate for the higher casualties suffered by the invaders.

Effective command and control are also essential for the success of an invasion. This includes accurate intelligence about enemy forces, freedom for field officers to improvise as needed, rapid field intelligence upward to inform tactics and strategy as the invasion proceeds, and quick top-down decisions in response to field intelligence.

The 2022 invasion violated all these requirements. In order to conceal its intentions and achieve an operational surprise, the planning of the invasion was limited to a very small group led by Putin. Not even Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, was included in this group. The Russian field commanders on the ground in Belarus for military exercises had no idea that they would be leading an invasion. The success of this secrecy came at a high cost: there was no opportunity for critiquing the invasion plan and no consideration of fall-back strategies.

Russian intelligence about the Ukraine’s response was based entirely on faulty assumptions that a high-speed invasion would demoralize the Ukrainian military, the Russian military would easily defeat the Ukrainian military on the battlefield, the top Ukrainian leaders would be quickly captured and executed, and that the vast majority of Ukrainians would either welcome the Russian invaders or remain passive.

The 3:1 force differential rule should have required an invasion of 590,000 Russian, given that the Russians knew the Ukrainian military had 196,600 active-duty personnel. Instead, the Russians planned an invasion of 190,000 personnel, actually smaller than the combined Ukrainian armed forces. Even worse, instead of massing its invasion force at one point to achieve a breakthrough, the Russians decided to attack on six different axes: from the Black Sea in the southeast, from Crimea in the south, from Donbas in the east, from Belgorod in the northeast (towards Kharkiv), from Kursk in the northeast (towards Kyiv), and from Gomel, Belarus, in the north (towards Kyiv).

All the Russian invasion routes faced unexpected problems, but the flaws in Russian C2 and FS can be illustrated by the fate of Russia’s most promising attack, coming from Gomel, Belarus, and aimed at Kyiv. This included an airborne assault on Antonov airport, in the Kyiv suburb of Hostumel. The Ukrainians had not expected an attack from Belarus and were unprepared for both the land invasion and the airborne assault.

Why did these attacks fail? Russian secrecy about the invasion had left the Russian ground forces in Belarus completely unprepared. They were informed of their roles in the invasion only 24 hours before the invasion. As a result, they lacked ammunition, fuel, food, and communications. They did not anticipate heavy fighting. Mud forced their armor to use the few roads, causing traffic jams. They encountered entire towns that were not on their maps, requiring them to stop and ask civilians where they were. Residents reported the Russian positions to Ukrainian authorities.

The Ukrainians acted swiftly to confront the Russian assault from Gomel, which was approaching the outskirts of Kyiv. They committed most of their available special forces and special units of other security units, called up all their reserve units, and mobilized the cadets and staff of their military academies into new battalions, supported by two brigades of artillery and one mechanized brigade. Even so, the Russians had a 12:1 troop advantage on the Gomel axis. On 27 February, their advance units were able to capture the suburb of Bucha, just west of Kyiv.

However, the phone calls from residents from towns in the Russian path permitted Ukrainian artillery to target the Russian columns. The Ukrainian forces knew the territory well, giving them a huge tactical advantage, and they were able to assault the slow-moving Russian columns almost at will, causing panic, abandonment of equipment, and blockage of the roads. As the Russian columns stopped moving, their losses multiplied. The Russian advance units that had reached Bucha were short on fuel, ammunition, and manpower. They assumed defensive positions, waiting for reinforcements that never arrived.

In the battle for Antonov airport on the edge of Kyiv, the Russians used helicopters and elite airborne troops. These troops were to capture and execute the Ukrainian leadership. But the Ukrainians surrounded the airport with heavy armor, pounding the Russians. They were able to capture the airport, driving the Russians into the surrounding woods. While the Russians were able to recapture the airport after a couple of days, the Ukrainians had time to destroy the runways, making impossible the landing of reinforcements and preventing the Russians from capturing the Ukrainian leadership.

On March 16th the Ukrainian government announced a counteroffensive in the Kyiv region, and by the end of March, Russian ground forces were retreating north from the Bucha area. By April 2nd the entire Kyiv oblast was back in Ukrainian hands, including the area bordering Belarus.

What was the Russian response to this humiliating defeat? Those Russian generals who were not killed, were mostly cashiered or arrested, as were many of the colonels. The disaster resulted largely from Putin’s leadership, but the defeated units took the blame. This added to the incentive for officers to lie about failure and pretend achievement.

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The First Stalemate

The war has continued through various phases. The second phase, from early April through the end of August, 2022, was marked by active fighting along front lines, with heavy Russian losses, but was a relative stalemate in terms of territorial gains by either side.

The Second Ukrainian Offensive

The third phase began on September 6, 2022, when Ukrainian troops attacked the Kharkiv front near the Russian border. On September 9, Ukrainian mechanized units broke through. Ukrainian forces raced north and east. The cities of Kupiansk and Izium fell to the Ukrainians on 10 September. By the next day the Russian forces north of Kharkiv had retreated over the border, leaving all of the Kharkiv Oblast under Ukrainian control. Pressing on to the east, Ukrainian forces on 12 September crossed the Siverskyi Donets, and on 1 October the Ukrainians recaptured Lyman, a major railway hub, and took as prisoners an estimated 5,000 Russian troops.

As Russian forces rushed to the northeast front, Ukraine launched its counteroffensive in the Kherson region on October 2. By 9 October Ukrainian forces had retaken 1,170 square kilometers of territory, pressing on toward the Dnieper River and the city of Kherson. On 11 November, Kherson was occupied by the Ukrainians.

The Second Stalemate

The second period of stalemate dates from 12 November 2022 until the present. During this three-year period, the war has seen the introduction of drone warfare on a massive scale, first by Ukraine and then by Russia. As a result of the drone warfare, the entire conflict has changed in character. Drones have made assaults by armored vehicles so costly that the war has reverted to trench warfare reminiscent of World War I. Drones now account for two-thirds or more of front-line casualties in the war.

Ukraine’s government discarded Soviet-era regulations to provide tax breaks and profit incentives to independent Ukrainian drone producers, authorizing the Ukrainian military to contract with them. These independent companies have made good use of Ukraine’s large cadre of skilled aeronautical engineers and information technology specialists. About 200 of these companies are officially recognized to receive military contracts, and as many as 300 other groups manufacture drones and donate them directly to military units. However, financial resources remain a limiting factor.

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Russia has rapidly developed its own drone capacity. Moreover, Russia has the resources to outproduce Ukraine, even if its drones are less sophisticated. Russian drone production is limited less by finances than by the search for microchips, smuggled from the west or bought from China. Russia also has ballistic and airborne missile systems that are hard for Ukraine to bring down. Russia has been using massive barrages of drones and missiles to demoralize Ukraine. But this effort is counterproductive. Bombings anger enemy populations and stiffen resistance, as shown in WWII by the Blitz of London and Allied carpet bombings of Germany. Russian barrages may have strained Ukraine’s economy, but they have not lessened resistance.

While the drone/missile war is well known, Ukraine’s other defense industry growth is less known. Ukraine now produces more artillery shells than all of NATO’s 32 members and Europe. Since 2022, domestic production of armored personnel carriers has increased by 400 percent, artillery by 200 percent, ammunition by 150 percent, and anti-tank weapons by 100 percent. By 2025, a single Ukrainian factory was producing 20 Bohdana howitzers each month, similar in specifications to the French Caesar. Ukrainian defense companies deliver howitzers in 60 days for $2.5 million compared to a several-year wait and a cost of $4.3 million in the West.

Russia has had to develop a new tactical approach for the active fronts. Groups of two or three soldiers are forced (by firing squads) to run towards Ukrainian lines and if they live, conceal themselves to fight later. Specialized units such as snipers, artillery spotters, or drone operators try to identify and target the sources of firing at these individuals. Then larger assault units move forward to capture territory. However, these assault units are now poorly trained, and their equipment is obsolete armor or more often simply cars, vans, and motorcycles, often heavily camouflaged. Ukrainian spotter drones are waiting for these assaults, and once the Russian vehicles are in motion and supported by Russian artillery, Ukrainian drones blow up both the vehicles and the artillery. On a typical day in autumn 2025, the Russians were losing 1,000 soldiers, 10 armored units, 25 artillery barrels, and 100 vehicles. By offering increasingly high incentives, Russia was recruiting 30,000 soldiers a month, barely enough to cover losses.

Russian electronic warfare has improved dramatically, with a focus on disrupting Ukrainian drones. As a result, Ukrainian forces are now losing about 10,000 drones per month. Russian air defenses also have improved, reducing the ability of Ukrainian fighter jets to attack. Russian engineers have been effective in designing and building defensive trenchworks, minefields, and tank traps in areas they control.

However, Ukraine air defenses have also improved. Russian airplanes now must launch airborne missiles from Russian territory, with a considerable loss of accuracy. Russian ground to ground ballistic missiles are hard to bring down, but also lack accuracy.

Faced with the hardening of Russian front lines, Ukrainian forces are focused on inflicting high Russian casualties, rather than attacking themselves. The exception occurs when the Ukrainians decide to roll back a Russian salient to prevent it from being hardened. The massive Russian missile and drone attacks deep in Ukraine have required the Ukrainians to invest heavily in missile and drone defenses of all types, which have something like a 90% success rate. Nonetheless, Ukraine suffers considerable damage. This serves as a constant reminder to Ukrainians of what is at stake.

Conclusion

Putin’s war in Ukraine has provided him with a rationale for stifling dissent in Russia, redirecting vast resources to turn Russia’s economy to military production, sponsoring efforts to overturn governments that support Ukraine, and preparing for additional invasions that will re-establish the Russian empire and cement his legacy as a modern Stalin.

In spite of all this, Putin is still losing the war in Ukraine. That conflict is chewing up men and equipment at an unsustainable rate. Moreover, it has been a strategic disaster. The war strengthened Ukrainian nationalism. It energized the European members of NATO and caused Finland and Sweden to join NATO, which doubled the length of NATO’s frontier with Russia. It destroyed the myth of Russian military superiority. It ended Russian natural gas exports to the European Union, which had been carefully cultivated for decades. It led to the emigration of more than half a million of Russia’s best and brightest.

Most NATO countries are now rearming and expanding their militaries. The E.U. countries combined gross domestic income EU GDP of $19.4 trillion in 2024 added to the UK GDP of $3.6 trillion totaled over 23 trillion dollars, whereas the gross domestic income of the Russian Federation RF GDP in 2024 was 2.1 trillion. Over the long run, Russia cannot compete with Western Europe. Europe can afford to support Ukraine’s economy and war effort while European countries ramp up their defense industries and military infrastructure. Putin will eventually lose not only his Ukraine War, but also his dream of a new Russian empire.

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DEEP DIVE – A drone weapon heads behind enemy lines, on a mission to kill troops and destroy equipment. To its left and right are a dozen other armed drones, and as the mission unfolds they compare notes – on enemy positions, the success or failure of their strikes, and their next tactical moves. There are no humans involved – other than the people who programmed the drones and launched them on their way.

It may sound like a wild premise, but swarms of drone weapons that use artificial intelligence to “think” for themselves are no longer a subject for science fiction; they are in the advanced stages of testing and in one instance at least – according to a recent report – they are already operational.

The Wall Street Journal reports that Ukraine has begun deploying AI–powered drone swarms in combat – using software developed by the Ukrainian company Swarmer. Battlefield units have used the system more than 100 times, according to the report, in deployments of between three to eight drones at a time against Russian positions.

“The technology is upon us,” Rear Admiral (Ret.) Mike Studeman, who served as Commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence, told The Cipher Brief. “There are many miles to go in terms of the most sophisticated swarm abilities, but there are plenty of reasons to fear even where we are today.”

Not long ago, the mere existence of drone weapons was a battlefield game-changer; this latest paradigm shift involves entire units of drones that carry out operations with humans almost entirely out of the loop.

“If there were a battle to go down today, some of the first engagements might be with unmanned systems,” Studeman said. “The most central engagements would involve a lot of them. The race is on.”

It’s a “race” both in terms of offensive “swarm” capabilities and the technologies to counter them.

“It's an absolute game-changer for any campaign,” Joey Gagnard, a former senior Army Chief Warrant Officer, told The Cipher Brief. “It’s a force multiplier for special operations forces or for any military element. Now it becomes incumbent on the defender to figure out a way to down all of those drones, while not also hurting his own capabilities.”

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What’s in a “swarm”?

Experts define drone swarms as coordinated systems of at least three drones that act autonomously and with “swarm intelligence,” mirroring the behavior of birds or insects when they travel in groups. An effective drone swarm will use artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning to navigate obstacles and communicate changes in the environment to other drones in the group.

Experts draw a distinction between swarms in number only, and those with the ability to operate in dynamic conditions. A 2022 test in China, in which dozens of drones navigated their way through a bamboo forest, demonstrated the difference. The drones were able to move in and around the forest (you can watch the video here), but there was nothing more than the bamboo stalks to stop them – no defense systems, no one shooting at them.

“So we have the components in place such as microchips and microprocessors, we have battlefield experimentation and battlefield data that can enable these groups and swarms to operate,” Samuel Bendett, an adviser to the CNA’s Strategy, Policy, Plans and Programs Center, told The Cipher Brief. “But none of it has really come together yet to form a full picture from that mosaic that would spell a swarm.”

The biggest challenge lies in the dynamism of a battlefield. A static environment – say a military base or airfield, or a bamboo forest – will be easier for a drone swarm to navigate than a moving force. “If something changes, is the swarm intelligent enough to adapt and then attack?” Bendett asked. “How is it going to adapt and attack if there are changes?”

Even Ukraine’s complex June drone strike, dubbed "Spider Web", which deployed more than 100 first-person-view (FPV) drones against Russian air bases, still relied heavily on human direction.

For a swarm to operate successfully, Bendett said, “there needs to be secure communication between members; they need to pass data to each other about their state of being, about their flight to target, about the conditions that affect their flight to target, about any movements or changes on the ground or with a target, obviously communication with ground control stations and those that launched them and so on.”

Studeman noted that in a fluid combat situation, “you have all sorts of other challenges that exist, including somebody who wants to jam you, using a high-power laser or microwave weapons, and you're encountering all sorts of things that maybe were not planned for at launch, may not actually be in the software parameters of the drones.” For complex operational scenarios, he said that true swarms are “probably a bridge too far today,” but he and other experts stressed that the battlefield application is coming soon.

Dr. Stacie Pettyjohn, Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, envisions scenarios in which drones in a swarm display “command and control” capabilities, “not only acting on their own, but coordinating their behavior, without any human involved, with a bunch of other drones.”

In such an operation, “the swarm as a whole makes decisions about how to modify its operations in the best way to achieve its objective,” Pettyjohn told The Cipher Brief. “Another drone might take its place, or the collective might decide that they realized there were air defenses in place and they needed to flush those out and actually send a wave of them to attack the air defenses, force them to engage a few of the targets, which would then create a gap that the others could exploit to hit their actual objective.”

Gagnard said that drone swarms will soon be doing the work of dozens – perhaps hundreds – of drone operators.

“Instead of one guy piloting one drone for a limited duration and being able to go through the entire targeting cycle, you would have a whole swarm of drones doing all of those mission functions simultaneously,” he said. “You’ll have drones conducting reconnaissance, tagging off to other drones that are going to conduct strikes or one-way attacks, tagging off to other drones that are going to do logistics. So they would make decisions on their own, and operate freely on their own, based on the stimulus and the feedback that they're getting in the environment.”

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Coming soon

Whether true AI-driven drone swarms hit the battlefield next month, next year, or three years from now, this much is clear: the technology is already part of the planning for nearly every advanced military, and as a result, it’s a booming business. Everyone, it seems, is training and experimenting with swarm technology – beginning on the battlefield where drone innovation is most apparent.

“Both Russians and Ukrainians are really busy trying to develop swarm technologies,” Bendett said, and both sides are benefiting from outside help – the Russian military from China, the Ukrainians from the U.S. and Europe – to obtain the microprocessors and microelectronics that enable their operations.

Other militaries and defense tech companies have watched the Ukraine theater and entered the drone-swarm “race.”

In the U.S., the Pentagon’s Replicator initiative to fast-track innovation includes multiple drone swarm projects. The Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) has awarded contracts to Anduril Industries, L3Harris Technologies, and Swarm Aero to produce prototype software for drone swarms. The contracts are part of the DoD’s “Autonomous Collaborative Teaming” (ACT) program, which seeks “automated coordination of swarms of hundreds or thousands of uncrewed assets,” according to the DIU. Meanwhile, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has been testing swarms for years, and says that by 2027, the U.S. could deploy swarms of as many as 1,000 armed drones. The DoD has also mandated the creation of dedicated drone testing ranges to support live swarm exercises.

The U.S. hardly has a monopoly in the field, even in the West. One of NATO’s newest members, Sweden, is fast-tracking drone-swarm development, in what Defense Minister Pål Jonson said was a response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine. In January, the Swedish Armed Forces unveiled a drone swarm program, developed by defense giant Saab, that would allow soldiers to control 100 drone weapons simultaneously. Elsewhere in Europe, the German drone manufacturer Quantum Systems has conducted tests on AI-controlled drones with the German military; Britain’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) has awarded contracts for “Mixed Multi-Domain Swarms”; the Dutch Research Council has funded an exploration of drone swarm technology; and Hungarian researchers reported the design of a 100‑drone swarm operating without a central controller—based on algorithms inspired by flocking behavior in animals.

Countering the swarms

Every military innovation – from gunpowder to the tank to the stealth bomber – prompts efforts to counter it, and AI-driven drone swarms are no exception.

“We're going to have to be as good on the defense as we are on the offense for how we use drones,” Studeman said. Asked about U.S. counter-drone efforts, he cited partnerships between the Pentagon and the private sector and said, “I think we're moving as fast as we can.”

If the world needed a reminder of the need for counter-drone capabilities, it got a stark one in July from Robert Brovdi, Ukraine’s newly appointed drone boss, who told NATO commanders that his crews could turn a NATO base into “another Pearl Harbor” in 15 minutes, without coming closer than 10km (6 miles). “I’m not saying this to scare anyone,” Brovdi said, “only to point out that these technologies are now so accessible and cheap.”

He went on to warn NATO: you are unprepared.

“I don’t know of a single NATO country capable of defending its cities if faced with 200-300 Shaheds (drones) every day, seven days a week,” Brovdi told the LANDEURO conference. “Your national security urgently requires a strategic reassessment.”

Bendett agreed, citing Brovdi’s warning as well as the damage Hamas inflicted with drones against Israeli forces in the early days of the 2023 Israel incursion into Gaza. “So the question,” Bendett said, “is what would it take for us to realize that we are facing the same threat and what would it take for our military to make these appropriate changes?”

As a starting point, he said that U.S. military facilities will need to guard against what he called the “Ukraine-type threat” of small groups using multiple drones to go after targets. “They only have to be used once, and you only have to be successful once,” Bendett said. “I know the U.S. military is learning, and internalizing these lessons, and people are trying to understand what kind of threats they're facing. Is it happening fast enough?”

The U.S. military has worked for at least three years on counter-swarm defense – mostly involving high-energy lasers and high-power microwave (HPM) systems.

Recently the head of the Army's Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO) announced a competition for high-energy laser weapon systems focused on countering drone swarms. The RCCTO has already built several directed energy prototypes; this would be a higher-level weapon, and hopefully one that would move from prototype to operational system.

“We have to continue to work harder,” Lt. Gen. Robert Rasch, the RCCTO director, said at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium in August. “We have to continue to work with industry to develop our directed-energy platforms and focus on the areas of reliability.”

Among other American swarm-defense projects: The Air Force’s THOR, an HPM directed energy weapon, and the Leonidas HPM system, developed by Epirus and fielded with the U.S. Army, both of which emit electromagnetic pulses capable of disabling multiple drones simultaneously.

On August 26, the Leonidas system defeated a swarm of 49 quadcopter drones in a test conducted at an Indiana National Guard base. Axios reported that “suddenly, all 49 — like a flock of stricken birds — crashed into a grassy field.” Their circuits had been overwhelmed by the system’s electromagnetic waves.

Epirus’s CEO, Andy Lowery, says Leonidas creates an “electronic dead zone” that disables anything that carries computer chips.

“It works for drones, which are like flying computers,” Lowery told Defense One. “It will stop a Tesla in its tracks, it’ll stop a boat motor in its tracks, anything with a computer inside of it.”

Other NATO members are working on counter-swarm technology as well. The German startup Alpine Eagle has developed a system known as Sentinel – a platform that deploys drone swarms against other drone swarms. Sentinel has been tested by the German Armed Forces and in Ukraine against FPV (first-person view) drone threats; Poland has deployed SKYctrl, which sends drones to collide in “non-explosive” fashion with other drones; and the British U.K. Ministry of Defense said recently that its “Radiofrequency Directed Energy Weapon,” mounted on a truck chassis, had successfully “defeated” swarms of drones. Far from Europe, India's Bhargavastra, developed by Solar Defence & Aerospace, used unguided rockets to eradicate swarms of drones at close range.

“The more sophisticated, latest versions are the ones that can actually interfere with the commands inside the unmanned drones,” Studeman said. “This smart neutralization, through a kind of electronic interference that goes after the actual logic and the commands of the UAS unmanned aerial system itself, shows you where this is going.”

All that said, some experts worry that the U.S. military isn’t adequately prepared for the drone-swarm threat.

“The U.S. is not ready,” Pettyjohn said. “It has begun to procure some defenses that were specifically made to counter small drones…and that's good. But you really need these layered defenses, where you have cost-effective interceptors.” She and other experts say that for all the tests and pledges, the U.S. has yet to show that it has an effective multi-layered defense against potential swarm attacks.

“High-powered microwaves are the one emerging technology that the U.S. Army has fielded a few prototypes that hold the promise of actually being able to knock out a true swarm,” she said. “The challenge is it requires a lot of energy. It's a very short-range weapon, so it's like your final force field. You need those longer layers of kinetic and EW interceptors to try to thin out the herd. And you have to figure out how to use the high-power microwave in a way that doesn't fry the electronics of US military equipment that it's trying to defend.”

Gagnard agrees that more work needs to be done.

“I'd say we have weapon systems that can defeat drones on a small scale,” he said, “but on a large scale, right now the aggressor is going to have the decisive advantage if they're incorporating this swarm technology into their repertoire.”

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China’s drone-swarm advantage

Military experts – including the head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command – have said that the opening salvos in any Pacific war would almost certainly involve cutting edge drone-swarm technologies. And last November, China unveiled a potentially devastating tool in the drone-swarm ecosystem. Experts called it a "drone mothership."

The Jiu Tian, introduced at the Zhuhai Air Show, China’s biggest aerospace trade fair, is an 11-ton aircraft billed as the world’s largest drone carrier. It is itself a drone, an enormous one, operating without a crew. According to several reports, the Jiu Tian can carry as many as 100 smaller UAVs more than 4,000 miles and unleash them against a target. Essentially, it’s a delivery vehicle for a drone swarm.

“China is going like gangbusters right now” in the drone space, Studeman said. “They have the manufacturing capability. They've built thousands of armed drones, and they’ve built the equivalent of motherships, where the intent is to throw lethal capability forward.”

As The Cipher Brief reported earlier this year, China’s military is in the throes of an innovation and manufacturing boom in drone weaponry to prepare Beijing for a potential war over Taiwan. China already produces some 70% of the world’s commercial drones – and is building a rapidly growing AI industry.

“They have the production, they have large inventory and now they also have the AI,” Dr. Michael Raska, a professor at the Military Transformation Programme at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told The Cipher Brief. “With all these combined, they have been experiencing a leap forward in the quality and quantity of all the drones across the different domains.”

China also has more than 3,000 manufacturers producing anti-drone equipment. In 2024, Beijing issued 205 procurement notices related to counter-drone technology; the figure was 122 in 2023, and only 87 in 2022.

“Our manufacturing is weaker than the Chinese manufacturing in this regard, and scale matters,” Studeman said. “Even with simpler technology. If somebody puts more robots on the front lines, we've got a problem, Houston.”

”This is definitely one area where China has an upper hand with the numbers,” Bendett said. “If Ukraine and Russia can manufacture millions (of drone weapons), then China can manufacture tens of millions, maybe hundreds of millions of UAVs.”

It’s not a stretch, Bendett said, to imagine China launching, in the early hours or days of a conflict over Taiwan, “10,000 mid-range UAVs at a suspected American carrier battle group east of Taiwan. Do we have enough to defend against that group?” he asked. “What do we have in our arsenal?”

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The terror threat

Beyond the military applications for drone swarms, there are important civilian uses. Disaster relief, search and rescue missions, and fighting wildfires are often mentioned, given the ability of drone swarms to map affected areas and conduct support operations in dangerous conditions.

Then there are the nightmare applications – primarily, the fear that as the ease and accessibility of drone-swarm technology grows, so will the odds that it will land in the hands of terrorists.

In March 2025, the U.S. conducted a war game that envisioned multiple drone attacks against U.S. military facilities. The exercise, which involved more than 100 participants from 30 agencies, uncovered deficiencies in response and highlighted the need for coordination among federal, state, and local authorities. A lack of clear rules of engagement across nearly 500 U.S. military installations was identified as a major concern.

Experts also worry about attacks on non-military sites – which as a rule are far less well defended.

“They could be at different sporting events or other large gatherings,” Pettyjohn said. “Obviously, as with any form of terrorism, you're not going to be able to protect people everywhere, but there needs to be a lot more counter-drone defenses for the homeland to prevent terrorist attacks from succeeding in really critical locations, either in terms of infrastructure or where there are large numbers of people.”

“American infrastructure is very vulnerable,” Gagnard said. “We don't have solid defenses that are institutionalized, that are in use everywhere, and American infrastructure is a prime target for that type of attack.”

He added that drone technology – and lax U.S. laws – could allow a would-be terrorist to conduct reconnaissance on a target without being noticed. “In America, we have a relatively free sky,” he said. “You could fly drones all day long over certain things and never really raise anyone's radar.”

In the nightmare scenario for a drone-swarm terror attack, Gagnard said, the target would be assessed, the swarms well “briefed,” and – depending on the target – defenses might be porous.

“You wouldn't need very smart drones in order to do that,” he said. A drone swarm attack, he said, “could be very successful in America.”

Gagnard, who serves as a senior advisor at the Institute for Critical Infrastructure Technology, has argued for a “national counter-drone doctrine.”

“How are we going to counter drones? What's acceptable, what isn't acceptable? And then we need some sort of unified command. Someone needs to determine exactly how we're going to counter drones.”

Several experts cited Ukraine’s June Spider Web operation as a reason for concern – given how deeply it penetrated Russian territory, even without using the AI tools that might produce a “thinking” drone swarm.

“We should really, really worry” about a drone-swarm terror attack, Bendett said, “because if anything, the Spider Web operation showed that a well-organized effort that is enabled by commercial technologies can be devastating against an unprepared target.”

David Ochmanek, Senior International Defense Researcher at RAND, said that the U.S. has been “a little slow to recognize the magnitude of the threat” of drone attacks, in part because Americans are so far from Russia and Ukraine, where the drone-war realities play out on a daily basis.

“We've seen how clever adversaries can smuggle these kinds of capabilities,” Ochmanek told The Cipher Brief. “So we shouldn't be lulled into a false sense of security that our oceans will protect us, even from attacks by fairly short range. The Houthis have shown us that they can launch these things. One can imagine an enemy loading them onto ships off our coast that would be indistinguishable from merchant ships, and launching from there.”

While this year’s White House executive order for a “Golden Dome” mandated a defense against all air threats, the order specifically referenced sophisticated missiles – not swarms of inexpensive drones.

Pettyjohn and other experts said that for domestic drone-swarm defense, the preference will be for non-kinetic systems – microwaves, lasers and so forth – to avoid shoot-downs that result in explosions or damage from falling debris. “In the homeland, there are a lot more restrictions on how you can take down foreign objects in the sky,” she said. “The FAA gets involved, Homeland Security, local authorities – the U.S. needs to work through all of these issues and figure out bureaucratically how it would respond and what the policies and procedures are that are in place.”

Studeman raised another concern – that drone swarms would be particularly effective if tasked with pursuing an individual.

“You think about protection of senior principals in government – a president, prime minister and on down,” he said. “There could be a swarm of drones coming to simply do one thing: keep pounding until just one penetrates while one principal leader is exposed.”

It’s a collection of worrisome scenarios, few of which can be dealt with by even the most sophisticated “Golden Dome” defense – which of course is years if not decades away.

As Pettyjohn put it, “there is no easy fix to this challenge.”

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OPINION — Last week’s Fourth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party witnessed a purge of China’s senior military leaders, culminating in over two years of the removal of senior military officials once loyal to President Xi Jinping.

The last two defense ministers – Wei Feng he and Li Shangfu – were removed in October 2023 and June 2024. And now, He Wei Dong, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) was expelled from the Party and Military for “serious violations of Party discipline.” Admiral Miao Hua, Director of the CMC’s Political Work Department (responsible for the political/ideological work in the military) was removed from the CMC in June 2025 and later officially expelled.

The list goes on and on: Lin Xiangyang, Former Commander of the Eastern Theatre Command; Wang Houbin, Former Commander of the PLA Rocket Force; Wang Chunning, Former Commander of the People’s Armed Police. These are just three of eight or nine senior military officers purged in October 2025.

Purges of senior officials are not new to China. On July 1, 1989, Zhao Ziyang was removed as the Party’s General Secretary -- and Vice Chairman of the CMC -- for supporting the students during the June 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations, and on July 1, 1987, Hu Yaobang was removed as the Party’s General Secretary for supporting the students who were demanding more democracy. Deng Xiaoping accused Mr. Hu, a former protégé of his, of “bourgeoise liberalization.”

And in 1971, Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and his wife, Ye Qun, planned the assassination of Chairman Mao Zedong, to replace Mao as the supreme leader. The plot was discovered and Lin Biao died in an airplane crash as he was fleeing for his life.

Many of the recently purged generals, including He Weidong and Admiral Miao Hua, worked in the 31st Group Army stationed in Fujian Province during the 1970s and 80s. This region is the front line for any potential military operation against Taiwan. In fact, He Weidong later served as commander of the Eastern Theatre Command from 2019 to 2022, the unit responsible for operations concerning Taiwan.

General He was a member of the Communist Party’s Politburo and Vice Chairman of the CMC, the third highest-ranking military official in China. His professional prominence was also due to his association with Xi Jinping, but in October 2025, General He and eight others senior military officers were expelled from the Communist Party and the military. They in fact were referred for criminal prosecution on charges of corruption and “serious violations of discipline and law.”

General He and the other purged generals all had connections to Fujian and the former Eastern Theatre Command commander Lin Xiangyang and Navy Admiral Miao Hua. It would be fair to assume that these senior military officers disagreed with some of Mr. Xi’s policies toward Taiwan.

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Given the importance of Taiwan for Mr. Xi and the Communist Party, a disagreement with seniors in the military over Taiwan could develop into an issue that affects the inner workings of the Party. Mr. Xi has consistently refused to renounce the use of force to bring Taiwan under its control and continues to conduct military exercises near Taiwan. Mr. Xi maintains, however, that “peaceful reunification” is preferable but reserves the option of using force, particularly in response to “external forces” or “separatist activities” in Taiwan.

Hopefully, Mr. Xi will pursue a policy of peaceful reunification with Taiwan and immediately halt military exercises and related activities to intimidate Taiwan.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joseph DeTrani was first published in The Washington Times

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DEEP DIVE – Often lost in the Trump administration's on-again, off-again offer to deliver Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine is the proposed deal that would see Kyiv supply military technology to Washington, rather than the other way around. It’s a potential military and political boon to Ukraine, and a reflection of the remarkable speed and quality of Ukraine’s defense-sector innovation.

“Ukraine now has technologies that have been proven to be effective against a peer adversary – namely Russia,” Samuel Bendett, a Russia expert at the Center for Naval Analyses Russia Studies Program, told The Cipher Brief. “These are not just concepts. These are not just prototypes. These are actual proven, battlefield-tested technologies. And they are in demand.”

President Volodymyr Zelensky first proposed what he called the “mega-drone deal” with the U.S. in July, calling it a “win-win” arrangement under which the U.S. would gain Ukraine’s battlefield‑tested drones and technology, and his country would get a new stream of American military aid. The Tomahawks were to have been part of the deal, but while the Oct. 17 Trump-Zelensky White House meeting appeared to close the door on that possibility, Zelensky said he had held talks on the broader deal with U.S. officials and leaders of Raytheon and Lockheed Martin.

Back in Kyiv, Zelensky said he had made the case that the war has provided an unparalleled testing ground for Ukraine’s arsenal of new drone weapons. “The U.S. has a large industry,” he said, “yet the industry itself says: ‘We don’t have your practice today, and undoubtedly your drones are the best today’.”

Defense tech and security experts have raved for years about the scope and speed of Ukraine's defense innovation. At last week’s Cipher Brief 2025 Threat Conference, former CIA Director Gen. David Petraeus spoke of the “staggering” scale of Ukraine’s drone production, and a gap between Ukraine’s pace of innovation and U.S. defense preparedness.

“We're not responding rapidly enough to that in the United States,” Gen. Petraeus said. “Keep in mind we're manufacturing maybe 300,000-400,000 drones in the United States. The Ukrainians alone are manufacturing 3.5 million.”

Zelensky’s challenge now is to leverage that success to get his “mega-drone deal” done – and to turn his country from a recipient of U.S. military aid to a defense industry trading partner of Washington’s.

The Ukrainian Edge

In the three and a half years since Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine has vaulted to the top tiers of global defense technology innovation – a warp-speed evolution from what Ukrainian member of parliament Oleksiy Goncharenko called “garage-scale” to “battlefield-scale” production of sophisticated, cutting-edge weaponry. An October Jamestown Foundation report says Ukraine now has "the world's most innovative defense sector."

The country’s greatest successes have come with drone weaponry. In the immediate aftermath of Russia’s February 2022 invasion, Ukraine welcomed deliveries of Turkish Bayraktar drones – what some called the saviour of Ukraine’s initial resistance – but from the start, the country’s tech and defense sectors went to work to boost their own UAV production.

“Drone factories cropped up in every garage across Ukraine once people started realizing the utility of drones and how important they would be,” Retired Chief Warrant Officer Joey Gagnard told The Cipher Brief conference.

Today the made-in-Ukraine arsenal features the FPV (“first person view”) attack drones, long-range strike UAVs, and an array of interceptor and underwater drones. On Oct. 22, Ukraine’s Security Service unveiled a new generation of “Sea Baby” naval drones that can travel nearly 1,000 miles and carry 4,000 pounds of cargo.

Goncharenko believes it was the underwater drones that first captured broad attention in the West, following sea-drone attacks that damaged or destroyed nearly a dozen Russian ships.

“It was an absolutely new chapter in maritime warfare and there was a lot of interest,” Goncharenko told The Cipher Brief. “It was clear that no other nation has this, and when you have something new and really effective, others will be interested.”

Certainly the U.S. is interested. In June, the White House issued an Executive Order aimed at boosting the American drone sector, and Secretary of the Army Dan Driscoll has spoken often of the need for the U.S. to learn from the Ukrainian experience.

“When you look at Ukraine and how the battle is being fought, it is no longer sufficient to have a long procurement process that takes two and a half years to get the first prototype, two more years to get it at scale, and then four years to get it in the hands of soldiers,” Driscoll told The War On the Rocks podcast. “Those eight years, contrasted with the two weeks right now that drones are being updated in Ukraine, have made it an imperative that either we do this now or we do it in the first six months of a conflict when American soldiers are losing their lives.”

Driscoll and others have highlighted Ukraine’s June “Spider Web” operation in which 117 FPV drones damaged more than 40 fighter jets at five Russian bases. “At a cost of a mere tens of thousands of dollars,” Driscoll said, “Ukraine inflicted billions in damage, potentially setting back Russia’s bomber capabilities for years.”

Beyond the weapons themselves, Western defense officials have taken note of Ukraine’s “Brave1,” a platform that encourages innovation and includes a digital procurement system under which frontline commanders can offer feedback on weaponry, and order drones directly from manufacturers, with delivery in as little as a week. That would be a stunningly fast rate of response for any military.

“Ukraine has created a very fast innovation cycle and one which I think is different from the typical approach both in the U.S. and other NATO countries” Andrew Radin, a Senior Political Analyst at RAND, told The Cipher Brief. “That quick-turn, decentralized approach is quite different and one that I think U.S. leaders are learning from. There's clearly an idea to draw inspiration from Ukrainian practices.”

According to several reports, senior U.S. military officers in Europe have studied the Brave1 system, which lists hundreds of Ukrainian drone weapons for sale. Ukrainian repair shops also provide rapid emergency help, keeping battlefield systems operational — another capability U.S. officials are hoping to replicate.

“We’re going to have to be more agile,” Randy George, the Army Chief of Staff, said in June. “Drones are going to constantly change…We’re going to need a lot more agility in how we buy things.”

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Anatomy of a deal

The essence of the proposed “mega-drone deal” is simple – an exchange that brings high-demand weapons and technology to both sides.

The U.S. would acquire a range of Ukrainian drone weaponry — low‑cost “attritable” systems (i.e. drones that are expendable without great financial loss); cutting-edge counter-drone technologies; and above all, systems that have been tested and proven in ways that cannot possibly be replicated in the U.S.

“Ukraine has resources and education that the U.S. and other partners have not had,” Radin said. “And Ukraine, because of its wartime incentives, is pursuing products for the immediate current technology and challenges that they're facing, whereas Western industry and Western MODs [ministries of defense] have been trying to think forward and predict how we operate.”

“All the technology and weaponry that Ukraine brings to the table is combat proven, and that’s not something that can be said for a lot of American systems,” Bendett said. “The U.S. defense sector is very adaptable, but we don’t have that sense of urgency. Our back is not against the wall.”

Among the benefits for Ukraine are help in scaling its drone production, greater profits for its growing defense industries, and a more reliable supply of American air-defense and long-range weaponry. And – perhaps as important as anything — the less tangible benefit of a long-term defense partnership with the U.S.

“This deal is not just military, it’s political, because Ukraine needs U.S. support,” Bendett said. “You’re not just buying a weapon or a system. You’re buying political will, you’re buying alliances.”

“Every piece of our cooperation with the United States is valuable because for us, cooperation with the United States means building a relationship,” Goncharenko said. “We need this cooperation. So for us it's absolutely win-win.”

Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials have put the potential value of the U.S.-Ukraine defense trade in the tens of billions of dollars. In early October, a delegation led by Ukraine’s Deputy Defense Minister Serhii Boyev traveled to the U.S. to work out “technical” implementation details, and by the time of Zelensky’s visit, the two sides were said to be “finalizing a framework.” But officials on both sides have said it may take several months to bring a deal across the finish line.

Among details and questions to settle: Whether the U.S. would buy existing weapons or license Ukrainian designs — and if the latter, would the drones be manufactured in a joint partnership with Ukrainians? There is precedent for such partnerships; on Oct. 20, AIRO and the Ukrainian defense company Bullet announced a joint venture for the production of high-speed interceptor drones. Any U.S. purchase of existing Ukrainian drones would require vetting for any Chinese‑origin components, to satisfy U.S. export‑control protocols.

Meanwhile, the overall relationship – and President Trump’s own vagaries – hang over any potential arrangement. In the last month alone, the administration has swung repeatedly from seemingly pro-Ukraine views (i.e., the proposed Tomahawk delivery) to greater sympathy for Moscow (the proposed Budapest summit between Trump and Vladimir Putin) and back again. Among the Ukrainian hopes is that the drone-tech-for weapons deal would offer some insulation, the next time the pendulum of U.S. policy swings back towards Moscow.

“The drones are one of the ‘cards’ we do have,” Goncharenko said, a reference to the disastrous Feb. 28 Oval Office meeting at which Trump castigated Zelensky and told him, “You don’t have any cards.” He added that while he never doubted the skill levels in his country’s high-tech sector, he also could never have fathomed that Ukraine might one day produce weaponry that the U.S. would wish to buy.

“I couldn't imagine that Ukrainian defense technologies will be one of the most prominent on the planet. All of this was quite unimaginable,” Goncharenko said. And then he added, with a smile, “I think now Trump would not say you don't have any cards. We don't have many cards, but we do have some.”

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OPINION — “Currently, the administration is waging a secret war against a secret list of unnamed groups that they will not tell us about. There have been four lethal strikes against [alleged Venezuelan narco-trafficking] boats in the Caribbean. The administration wrote us [the U.S. Senate] a letter…about what they were doing in September. They said they considered themselves to be in a ‘non-international armed conflict’ -- that means a war -- against a secret list of ‘designated terrorist organizations.’ I received a briefing last week on the administration’s strikes in the Caribbean. During that briefing, Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, from both sides of the aisle, asked a Senate-confirmed official whether the Department of Defense could produce a list of the organizations that are now considered terrorists by the United States. They said they could not provide that list.”

That was Sen. Elissa Slotkin (D-Mich.), speaking on the Senate floor last Wednesday during the debate on a War Powers resolution that would have blocked U.S. military strikes in the Caribbean. It lost 48-to-51.

Slotkin, a former CIA analyst who also served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, gave a clear analysis of the several steps the Trump administration has taken that could eventually lead this country to a situation which, as Slotkin put it, “creates an excuse [for President Trump] to unilaterally use the military inside our cities, similar to the way he used them in the Caribbean.”

Other Senators provided additional information about today’s current extraordinary situation, which I will discuss below, but it was Sen. Slotkin who put it in the clearest context.

First, she established her own credentials, saying, “I am a CIA officer. I am a former Pentagon official. I did three tours in Iraq – armed -- alongside the military. I participated in the targeting of terrorist groups. I actually have no real problem going against [drug] cartels, given what they have done in their inserting drugs in our community and with the death of so many Americans. But as a nation, I think we should have as a basic principle that you can’t have a secret list of terrorist organizations that the American public and, certainly, the U.S. Congress don’t get to even know the names of.”

She referred back to the 2001 Global War on Terror saying it was, “kind of my era,” and spoke about how new foreign terrorist organizations were declared to Congress and then “our intelligence community, the military, and law enforcement would spin up to go after information about that group and prosecute -- you know, target against that group.”

Slotkin went on to explain how the Trump administration had late last month expanded the terrorist threat to include individuals and groups in this country.

Speaking about Trump’s September 22, Executive Order, “Designating Antifa As A Domestic Terrorist Organization,” Slotkin said the administration was “going to, again, make secret lists of ‘terrorist groups’ inside the United States and send the full force of the U.S. Government against those terrorist organizations. They are not telling anyone the name of these organizations, but they are authorizing law enforcement and the intelligence community to double down and come up with that list.”

This is a problem, Sen. Slotkin said, “because the Trump administration in that document [the Executive Order] defined ‘terrorist organization’ or ‘domestic terrorism’ incredibly broadly. It suggests that any group that talks about anti-Christian values, views they don’t like on migration or race, differing views on the role of the family, religion, or morality could all be grounds for labeling an organization ‘domestic terrorists.’’’

In fact, the reference to anti-Christian values appeared in a little-publicized follow-up to the September 22 Executive Order -- a September 25, National Security Presidential Memorandum/NSPM-7. An NSPM is a presidential directive that specifies and communicates national security policy to executive departments and agencies.

Citing “the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America,” and signed by Donald J. Trump, NSPM-7 gives directions to the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Homeland Security as well as the Attorney General on “Countering Domestic Terrorism and Organized Political Violence.”

Building on the assassination of Charlie Kirk and attempts against Trump and others, NSPM-7 unites “this pattern of violent and terroristic activities under the umbrella of self-described ‘anti-fascism,’” or Antifa. NSPM-7 goes on to say, “Common threads animating this violent conduct include anti-Americanism, anti-capitalism, and anti-Christianity; support for the overthrow of the United States Government; extremism on migration, race, and gender; and hostility towards those who hold traditional American views on family, religion, and morality.”

NSPM-7 gives responsibility to the National Joint Terrorism Task Force and its local offices (JTTFs) to “coordinate and supervise a comprehensive national strategy to investigate, prosecute, and disrupt entities and individuals engaged in acts of political violence and intimidation designed to suppress lawful political activity or obstruct the rule of law.” In addition, JTTFs are to investigate “institutional and individual funders, and officers and employees of organizations, that are responsible for, sponsor, or otherwise aid and abet the principal actors engaging in” the above criminal conduct.

In addition, NSPM-7 says that the Attorney General “may recommend that any group or entity whose members are engaged in activities meeting the definition of ‘domestic terrorism’…merits designation as a ‘domestic terrorist organization.’ The Attorney General shall submit a list of any such groups or entities to the President through the Assistant to the President and Homeland Security Advisor [Stephen Miller].”

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In her Senate speech, Sen. Slotkin continued, “If this administration is not telling us who is on their secret designated terrorist list for groups in the Caribbean, they are definitely not going to tell us who is on their list of domestic terrorist organizations.”

Finally, Sen. Slotkin spoke out about her future fear -- that President Trump may claim in some American city “if the violence has gotten to a level of an insurrection, it means that the U.S. military can now be used [under the Insurrection Act] as law enforcement in our cities. It means the U.S. military can raid; they can arrest; they can detain. You can easily see a world where the President of the United States labels protest groups ‘terrorists,’ doesn’t tell anyone, and creates an excuse to unilaterally use the military inside our cities, similar to the way he used them in the Caribbean.”

I agree Trump is headed in that direction, and past and present members of the military must also be aware of what’s going on.

Meanwhile other Senators during last Wednesday’s debate raised other issues needing public consideration.

For example, Sen. Adam Schiff (D-Calif.) said, “There is no question that drug traffickers, criminal gangs, and other criminal enterprises engage in horrific and violent acts. Murder is murder, whether committed by a human trafficker, a drug trafficker, or a member of al Qaeda. But there are fundamental differences in their motivation, which legally distinguishes a drug trafficker from a terrorist. It is common knowledge that a drug trafficker’s purpose is financial enrichment, while the definition of a ‘terrorist’ is a person who uses violence or the threat of violence to instill widespread fear to achieve a political or ideological goal.’’

Schiff raised another point related to the current situation. He said, “Other governments are using the label ‘terrorist’ to defame and criminalize social activists, political opponents, and journalists who engage in peaceful dissent. This is common practice in Iran, Russia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, where dissidents are imprisoned and even executed for being so-called ‘terrorists.’’’

In a challenge to Republicans, Sen. Tim Kaine (D-Va.) said, “If my [GOP] colleagues, as they have stated, believe we should be at war in the Caribbean or at war with nations in the Americas or with the narco-traffickers, they have had the ability the entire time to bring a resolution before us and have that debate in front of the American public. I have a feeling that debate would produce some positive votes if it were limited enough, but to allow a President to do it by secret, without Congress having the guts to have the debate and vote about whether the war is worthwhile, is contrary to everything this country stands for.”

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Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.) raised a broader issue. “The notion that we can bomb our way out of a drug trafficking crisis is not a strategy,” Reed said, “it is wishful thinking. Using the U.S. military to conduct unchecked strikes in the Caribbean risks destabilizing the region, provoking confrontation with neighboring governments, and drawing our forces into yet another open-ended conflict without a clear mission or exit strategy.”

Reed continued, “Conflict in the Caribbean or with Venezuela is entirely avoidable, but the risk that we stumble into war because of one man’s impulsive decision-making has never been higher. Our troops deserve better—much better.”

President Trump has been after Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro since 2018, including a failed, White House-driven, 2019 regime-change attempt to restore democracy in that country by replacing Maduro with opposition leader Juan Guaidó. John Bolton, National Security Advisor at the time, said in his book, The Room Where It Happened, that Trump assured Guaidó that he (Trump) would, in Bolton’s words, “pull off Maduro’s overthrow.”

Who knows what Trump is saying privately today about Maduro and planning for Venezuela?

But the Caribbean activities are but a sideshow to what the Trump administration has quietly underway in this country.

Again I refer to Sen. Slotkin’s words on the Senate floor last Wednesday: “The President is looking for an excuse to send the U.S. military into our streets, to deploy the U.S. military against his own people, to prompt confrontation, and to hope that confrontation justifies even more military force and military control. This is a well-worn authoritarian playbook. It is one that quite literally the United States of America was founded on rejecting -- the idea that British soldiers, when they occupied American cities, abused American citizens to the point where Americans turned against them.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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OPINION — “The [Defense] Department [DoD] will continue to defend the nation and conduct ongoing military operations. It will continue activities funded with any available budgetary resources that have not lapsed (e.g., funds made available in Pub. L. 119-21), as well as excepted activities such as those necessary for the safety of human life and the protection of property. Significant activities that will continue during a lapse are summarized in this planning guidance document. Activities that are determined not to be excepted, and which cannot be performed by utilizing military personnel in place of furloughed civilian personnel, will be suspended when appropriated funds are no longer available. The Secretary of War may, at any time, determine that additional activities shall be treated as excepted.”

That is a quote from the DoD’s September 2025 Contingency Plan Guidance For Continuation Of Operations In The Absence Of Available Appropriations, issued “For Planning Purposes Only - Do Not Implement Until Direction from the Deputy Secretary of War or his Designee.”

This document, it states, “provides guidance for identifying those missions and functions of the Department of War (DoW) that may continue to be carried out in the absence of available appropriations.”

I must point out, because it’s the reason I’m writing this column, that the Public Law referred to above, Pub. L. 119-21, is none other than the so-called One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), passed by Congress July 3, and signed by President Trump into law on July 4.

A bit of history: The OBBBA was designed by the Republicans to enact all of Trump’s second-term tax and spending policies in a giant, 1,100-page piece of legislation. The Congressional Budget Office said the measure would result in a decrease in direct spending of $1.1 trillion, but also a decrease in revenues of $4.5 trillion, increasing the U.S. deficit by $3.4 trillion over the 2025-to-2034 period.

To get the OBBBA passed, the Trump White House and Republicans in Congress used the fiscal 2025 budget reconciliation process, which allowed them to avoid the 60-vote Senate filibuster. With universal Democratic opposition, it passed the House by a 218-to-214 vote, and the Senate by a 51-to-50 margin, with Vice President J.D. Vance casting the tiebreaking vote.

As I wrote last June, the OBBBA was “extending Trump’s 2017 tax cuts and reducing Medicaid spending – [and] also contains authorization and appropriation for an additional $150 billion for fiscal 2025 defense spending.”

That additional $150 billion for defense spending, because it was considered part of 2025 appropriations, is available to be spent during the current shutdown and through 2029, according to the terms of the OBBBA.

Credit for anticipating the need to put that $150 billion in the 2025 reconciliation measure, and not in the fiscal 2026 budget request, must be shared by Director of the Office of Management and Budget Russell Vought, White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller, and Republican members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. Late last April, without much publicity, the Hill Republicans added the $150 billion to the OBBBA reconciliation bill with White House support.

They also added another $170 billion for the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies that I will discuss below.

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Back in June, I wrote that the Congress in the reconciliation bill called for the Defense Secretary “to deliver to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees within 60 days of the bill passing Congress” a plan detailing how the added $150 billion appropriated to DoD would be spent. Whether Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth did or not is unclear.

However, DoD’s September 2025 Contingency Plan Guidance said, “As of September 2025, the [Defense] Department considers efforts to the support the following among its highest priorities: Operations to secure the U.S. Southern Border; Middle East operations; Golden Dome for America; Depot Maintenance; Shipbuilding; Critical Munitions.”

No surprise, that section adds, “As in every case, efforts supporting these activities may occur during a lapse when resourced with funds that remain available -- to include those provided in Pub. L. 119-21,” the OBBBA.

It turns out, the OBBBA had a section entitled, “Improving Department of Defense Border Support and Counter-Drug Missions.” That section provided an additional $1 billion for fiscal 2025 to be used “for the deployment of military personnel in support of border operations, operations and maintenance activities in support of border operations, counter-narcotics and counter-transnational criminal organization mission support.”

The need for U.S. southern border money for DoD was obvious. But back in July, who publicly was thinking of using DoD assets for “counter-narcotics and counter-transnational criminal organization mission support?” It was not until late August that the public learned of a U.S. Navy buildup in the southern Caribbean to combat drug trafficking, and the first so-called Venezuelan narco-boat was destroyed September 2.

Yet back in early June, it appears, the Trump administration sought and got Congress to approve fiscal 2025 funds to finance what have become these current Caribbean counter-narcotics military operations in the OBBBA. And the same words, “counter-narcotic and counter-transnational criminal organization” were used to describe the targets in justification letters sent the Congress after narco-boat destructions.

Three other of the “highest priority” elements mentioned in the DoD’s September 2025 Contingency Plan Guidance were also singled out in the OBBBA for allocation of funds from the extra $150 billion added to fiscal 2025 defense spending.

A section entitled “Enhancement of Department of Defense Resources for Shipbuilding” was allocated $29 billion. This included $750 million for additional supplier development across the naval shipbuilding industrial base; $500 million for advanced manufacturing techniques in the shipbuilding industrial base; $500 million for additional dry-dock capability; and $450 million for additional maritime industrial workforce development programs.

Another section for Trump’s Golden Dome missile defense program entitled “Enhancement of Department of Defense Resources for Integrated Air and Missile Defense,” was allocated $25 billion. This included $7.2 billion for the development, procurement, and integration of military space-based sensors; $5.6 billion for development of space-based and boost phase intercept capabilities; $2.55 billion for the development, procurement, and integration of military missile defense capabilities; and $2.2 billion for acceleration of hypersonic defense systems.

A third section of the OBBBA entitled “Enhancement of Department of Defense Resources for Munitions and Defense Supply Chain Resiliency,” also got $25 billion. This included $5 billion for investments in critical minerals supply chains; another $2 billion for additional activities to improve the U.S. stockpile of critical minerals; $1 billion for the creation of next-generation automated munitions production factories; $688 million for the development, production, and integration of long-range multi-service cruise missiles; and $300 million for the production of Army medium-range ballistic missiles.

As I mentioned above, there was another $170 billion for the Department of Homeland Security added to OBBBA and it is money available to be spent during the shutdown.

For example, there was $46.5 billion for elements for the new border infrastructure and border wall system; $45 billion for single adult alien detention capacity and family residential center capacity; and $6.2 billion for procurement and integration of new inspection equipment to combat the entry or exit of illicit narcotics at ports of entry and along the southwest, northern, and maritime borders.

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On the personnel side, there was $4.1 billion to hire and train additional Border Patrol agents, Office of Field Operations officers, Air and Marine agents, rehired annuitants, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection field support personnel; and another $2.1 billion to provide recruitment bonuses, performance awards, or annual retention bonuses to eligible Border Patrol agents, Office of Field Operations officers, and Air and Marine agents.

Another OBBBA provision provided $10 billion “to remain available until September 30, 2029, for reimbursement of costs incurred in undertaking activities in support of the Department of Homeland Security’s mission to safeguard the borders of the United States.”

Three other items need no explanation.

In the OBBBA there was $625 million for security and other costs related to the 2026 FIFA [Soccer] World Cup, and $1 billion for security, planning, and other costs related to the 2028 Olympics.

Finally, there was $300 million included for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to reimburse state or local law enforcement personnel “for protection activities directly and demonstrably associated with any [non-governmental] residence of the President.” That would cover, at a minimum, Mar-A-Lago in Florida, Bedminster Golf Club in New Jersey and Trump Tower in New York. According to one news story, Trump during his first four years in office traveled to his properties nearly 550 times.

Under this OBBBA provision, the reimbursement would be available only for costs that a state or local agency incurred or incurs on or after July 1, 2024; demonstrated to the FEMA Administrator as being in excess of typical law enforcement operation costs; and was directly attributable to Presidential protection requested by the U.S. Secret Service.

One has to admit that Trump and key members of his staff clearly did some advance planning when they put together the OBBBA – maybe they even foresaw a government shutdown.

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Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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OPINION — Russian drones are forcing airports to close and fighter jets are breaching NATO airspace – clear signals of Moscow’s widening hybrid campaign. The cost imbalance is stark, with Europe spending hundreds of thousands to destroy drones worth a fraction of that. Emboldened by this asymmetry, Vladimir Putin is escalating with growing confidence, betting that the West will stop short of real retribution, like giving Ukraine long-range missiles to destroy his drone factories.

Russia began its escalation on Sept. 9 by sending drones into Polish airspace, followed by an incursion into Romania. Days later, a Russian fighter jet breached Estonian airspace. In recent weeks, drones have been shutting down airports in Denmark and Norway.

Moscow is intensifying its hybrid warfare campaign against Europe in the hope of pressuring governments into concessions. At the same time, Putin depends on a state of constant confrontation to sustain his regime.

Months of U.S. diplomacy with Moscow under the Trump administration have also achieved little. President Donald Trump insists he is always “two weeks” away from a decision, but the Kremlin calculates it can outlast Ukraine on the battlefield, fracture European unity, and sap American interest. Russia remains defiant, refusing meaningful negotiations.

As Le Monde observed, Russian diplomacy follows familiar Soviet patterns: table maximalist demands, stage symbolic talks, issue threats, then offer only token concessions. George Kennan, the American diplomat who defined early Cold War strategy, once noted that the Soviets “will ask for the moon, demand the moon, and accept nothing less.”

John Sullivan, U.S. ambassador to Moscow from 2020 to 2022, echoed the same view, describing Russian negotiations as “maximalist demands, surrender nothing, paranoia to the nth degree.” Europe must strip away all false illusions that the war will end anytime soon.

Any sort of peace agreement that resembles the Budapest Memorandum or Minsk agreements will surely bring a much bigger war to Europe in the future. And the Trump administration has shown itself to be an unreliable ally. But that’s not necessarily a bad thing, if Europe can take advantage and scale its own capabilities and European defense firms.

At the same time, Washington’s own priorities are shifting. According to POLITICO, The Pentagon’s new draft defense strategy places homeland and Western Hemisphere security above countering China or Russia.

To Trump’s credit, in just a few months he has pushed Europe to take the Russian threat more seriously than some capitals managed in three years of full-scale war. Germany, the continent’s largest economy, had announced sweeping ambitions to rebuild its military after the invasion. But once it became clear that Ukraine would not collapse, Berlin grew complacent, and much of its investment drive – including the much-touted €100 billion “special fund” – faltered.

However, Washington’s retreat also presents Europe with a chance to take greater ownership of its security and lessen its reliance on the United States. In our new Henry Jackson Society report, European Defence Autonomy: Identifying Key Companies and Projects to Replace U.S. Capabilities, my co-author Mykola Kuzmin and I argue that Europe now has a strategic opportunity to leverage its own European defense sector to prepare for a future war with Russia if it comes to that. It is better to be prepared than left scrambling when the moment of crisis arrives.

Europe cannot afford to rely on the U.S. for its core defense capabilities – nor on the whims of individuals like Elon Musk, shown by his restricting of Starlink access in Ukraine in Kherson and occupied-Crimea. Starlink’s unrivaled 8,000-satellite constellation highlights Europe’s dependence, with alternatives like Eutelsat OneWeb far smaller and prohibitively expensive. At the same time, Russia is developing a $5 billion satellite internet system called Rassvet, intended as an alternative to Starlink, with plans to launch nearly 300 satellites by 2030.

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This technological push comes alongside its aggressive use of drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. Russia has been overwhelming Ukrainian cities with nightly drone attacks and has flown over 530 surveillance drones across Germany this year to monitor Western arms shipments, including near Bundeswehr bases. Yet German forces cannot shoot them down due to legal limits.

If Moscow is already doing this with its hybrid war, the scale of a full-scale war will be far greater. The economics of war are quickly being transformed in Ukraine. That is why Europe must invest in low-cost drone interceptors and other scalable technologies. Relying on million-dollar American Patriot interceptor missiles for every drone attack is simply unsustainable.

Russia and China have a booming drone-alliance and the Axis of Evil is helping one another grow technologically. Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela are all gaining technologically through cooperation with one another.

Deborah Fairlamb, co-founder of Green Flag Ventures, a venture capital fund for Ukrainian startups said, “Chinese components continue to be found in downed Russian drones, and a number of Chinese nationals have been documented alongside Russian troops – indicating that tactical and technological lessons are being shared between Russia, China, and North Korea.”

The continent also has a booming defense tech sector, and I have embedded with frontline units using European technologies like the Vector drone. As the Financial Times noted, “Europe now boasts three defence start-ups with a ‘unicorn’ valuation of more than €1bn: drone makers Helsing, Quantum Systems, and Tekever.”

Lyuba Shipovich, CEO of Dignitas Ukraine highlighted that Estonia has multiple companies now working on robotics. “We don’t have many of their systems here because they’re expensive, but some are comparable to Ukrainian designs,” said Shipovich.

Estonia-based Milrem Robotics has found success in Ukraine, and its THeMIS unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) is being used on the front. Milrem’s THeMIS UGVs are proving their worth in Ukraine – so much so that Russia offered a bounty for capturing them intact.

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Crucially, Europe has Ukraine on its side, which is now a global drone superpower. “What does carry undeniable value for the West, however, is the experience and insight of Ukrainian engineers,” said Vitaliy Goncharuk, CEO of A19Lab and former Chairman of the Artificial Intelligence Committee of Ukraine.

But Kyiv urgently needs more funding to scale weapons production, and Europe should focus on fully integrating Ukraine into its broader defense sector. The tempo of war is accelerating, with innovation cycles now measured in mere weeks and months. As one European diplomat put it: “The speed of innovation is so quick: It’s a six-week cycle and then it’s obsolete.”

The war is now a technological race and Ukrainian engineers are at the forefront. Oleksandra Ustinova, a Ukrainian member of parliament said, “Ukraine has developed technologies under real battlefield conditions that the rest of the world will want in the next five years.”

In fact, Kyiv has the capacity to produce millions of drones, but money remains the limiting factor. “Ukraine can produce 8–10 million FPVs annually but can only afford to buy about 4.5 million in 2025,” said Serhii Kuzan, chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center and former Ministry of Defense adviser. “Scaling requires European and international investment, via direct funding or joint ventures.”

Together with Ukraine, Europe can become an AI superpower and prepare for the future of automated warfare. It is Kyiv that is now educating the Europeans on how to build a “drone wall” to defend itself. But technology alone won’t decide the war, as will power is needed. The larger geopolitical stakes remain clear for the European alliance.

When Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014 and the world failed to stop the seizure of Crimea, it fractured the international order that had held for decades. The longer Moscow wages its current war and if it secures any permanent gains, the more emboldened it will become. Russia sees itself as an empire, and empires expand. Europe must prepare accordingly, ready to fight alone if necessary.

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