On Monday, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said he plans to integrate Elon Musk's AI tool, Grok, into Pentagon networks later this month. During remarks at the SpaceX headquarters in Texas reported by The Guardian, Hegseth said the integration would place "the world's leading AI models on every unclassified and classified network throughout our department."
The announcement comes weeks after Grok drew international backlash for generating sexualized images of women and children, although the Department of Defense has not released official documentation confirming Hegseth's announced timeline or implementation details.
During the same appearance, Hegseth rolled out what he called an "AI acceleration strategy" for the Department of Defense. The strategy, he said, will "unleash experimentation, eliminate bureaucratic barriers, focus on investments, and demonstrate the execution approach needed to ensure we lead in military AI and that it grows more dominant into the future."
A government watchdog found that the Defense Department has never formally evaluated telework and remote work programs against agency goals. DoD officials, however, reported “perceived” benefits and challenges. The Government Accountability Office said without formal evaluation of these programs, DoD cannot determine whether these programs help meet agency goals. While defense officials told GAO that their use of these flexibilities improved productivity, efficiency, and recruitment and retention, some officials said that telework reduced opportunities for collaboration and information sharing and decreased morale. The watchdog also found that the data on the number of teleworkers and remote workers DoD previously reported is likely inaccurate.
The Defense Department is putting additional safeguards around the research it funds. The Pentagon is telling the military services and defense agencies to review fundamental research awards to ensure there is no foreign influence, intellectual property theft or any other form of exploitation that could threaten the security and economic interests of the country. A new memo from Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Emil Michael establishes additional oversight requirements to protect government funded research. Along with the reviews of awards, DoD will establish a department-wide Fundamental Research Risk Review Repository to improve information collection and sharing across all components. It also will develop automated vetting and continuous monitoring capabilities to help detect and mitigate foreign influence risks.
The Labor Department recovered more than a quarter billion dollars in back wages for American workers last year. That’s the most money the department’s Wage and Hour Division has recovered in a single year since 2019. Those back wages went out to nearly 177,000 employees. On average, that's more than $1,400 per employee. The department has launched new tools aimed at helping employers stay informed of their obligations.
The Air and Space Forces are "aggressively" implementing Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s acquisition reforms. The services are replacing program executive offices with new organizations called portfolio acquisition executives. The Air Force has already redesignated five program executive offices as portfolio acquisition executives, including those overseeing Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) and Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (NC3). Meanwhile, the Space Force has designated its first tranche of mission areas to be overseen by portfolio acquisition executives, including space access and space based sensing and targeting.
Cohesity became the 22nd company to sign up for an enterprise software deal under GSA’s OneGov program. Under the agreement, GSA said agencies can buy Cohesity’s cybersecurity data protection and replication tools at a discount of more than 72% off the company's GSA schedule price. Agencies also have access to other Cohesity offerings, such as its FedShield tool bundle at discounted prices. The prices are good through September 2027. GSA’s contract with Cohesity is the third OneGov deal with a cybersecurity firm since December.
Clearer numbers on the federal workforce are coming into view from the Office of Personnel Management. A new OPM website contains a far more detailed and modernized view on the federal workforce, compared with its predecessor, FedScope. The new platform also reaffirms the significant reshaping the federal workforce experienced over the last year. OPM’s numbers reveal a major drop in workforce size, a decline in federal union representation and far fewer telework hours.
The Federal Bureau of Prisons is offering retention bonuses to correctional officers and other frontline positions, in an effort to address staffing challenges. The size of the pay incentive depends on the employee’s position and the staffing level at their facility. The retention bonuses will take effect in February, and will be reviewed annually, according to the agency. But federal union officials are urging a more permanent pay fix for the BOP, which has faced years of significant understaffing.
The Social Security Administration is rolling out nationwide systems in the coming months that will impact how the agency triages its workload to employees. Someone applying for SSA benefits in California could soon be speaking to an employee in Maine. The agency is rolling out systems in March that will allow employees to tackle a nationwide inventory of cases. SSA employees say they’re used to processing claims submitted locally and that these changes could make their work much more complicated. The agency lost about 7,000 employees through voluntary incentives last year.
EXPERT OPINION — Reports came out last week that claim the Chairman of Joint Staff, General Dan Caine, is preparing a new unified command plan (UCP) that will reorganize and consolidate the regional combatant commands. According to press reports, the proposal, which is to go to the Secretary and the President soon, would combine U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command under a new U.S. International Command. U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern Command would be combined as U.S. Americas Command. For now, the functional commands, U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Space Command, U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Transportation Command and U.S. Indo Pacific Command would remain the same.
If this happens, it would be the biggest command shake up in decades. However, to truly have the greatest effect, more needs to happen than just a reorganization and consolidation of combatant commands. The work to change and upgrade the combatant commands must be more consequential.
For this to happen, these commands must have all the tools at their disposal to develop military relationships and oversee operations in their regions. To be most effective, that means that their intelligence and their interagency arms must be bolstered.
On the intelligence side, Washington should push out the work to the combatant commands that the analysts, targeters and operators are doing in D.C. Before the early 2000s, the combatant commands hired their intelligence professionals through the services. In the early 2000s, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) took over the requirement to integrate all the combatant commands’ intelligence professionals and those professionals became DIA employees.
There has been great success with increased and more consistent training and more sophisticated intelligence work at the combatant commands. More defense intelligence enterprise professionals now have a first-hand understanding of providing support to military activities. However, there is much more work to do in this area. A vast majority of the Washington DIA employees do not have direct experience working with warfighters on tactical issues or have forgotten their experience in this area. There is also often a duplication of efforts on analysis, reporting, and collection between DIA headquarters and the combatant commands.
This all can be streamlined by pushing those DC-based professionals to the combatant commands. DIA headquarters should be small and highly focused on manning, training, equipping, and integrating. The analysts, operators and targeters should be working directly with the warfighters under the direction of the combatant commander or at the Pentagon directly for the Chairman, Joint Staff.
More specifically, DIA headquarters should provide the HR, the training programs, the data, and the technology for the rest of the DIA enterprise to support each combatant Commander and his warfighters directly.
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In the early 2010s, there was a discussion in policy circles about how to make combatant commands more effective. A key role for Combatant Command senior leaders is to develop relationships with military partners in their region. This will become more difficult as a Combatant Commander’s geographic outreach grows. Each Commander will need more tools and senior professionals to help develop those relationships. To assist in this and to underscore the need for interagency coordination, Combatant Commands should have dual leadership from the civilian sector and military.
Most regional commands now have a senior foreign policy advisor, usually at Ambassador rank, who advises the commander on foreign relations. This position needs to be enhanced to a true deputy position vice an advisor. At the same time, the combatant commands need senior representatives from major government departments such as the Department of Homeland Security, Treasury, Commerce, and FBI. This will enhance the U.S.’ ability to compete against our adversaries by offering tools to use with foreign governments that are integrated and coordinated across the U.S. government.
The time is right to make more consequential changes to a system that needs to modernize.
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OPINION — The Pentagon’s push to overhaul its slow, specification-driven procurement system is an overdue acknowledgment that our defense industrial base has become too narrow, too fragile, and too dependent on foreign supply chains. America’s defense establishment is finally waking up to a critical weakness that has metastasized in recent decades: we have drifted away from the industrial might that once formed the bedrock of our economy and allowed us to out-produce any adversary in the world.
While there are many warning signs, one symptom of the problem is unmistakably clear: the United States is not producing what it needs at the speed and scale modern conflict demands. Recent reporting shows the U.S. Army is still struggling to meet its 155mm artillery-shell production goals after years of effort. Across the spectrum—from advanced missile interceptors to something as basic as black powder—we are falling dangerously behind in both production capacity and supply-chain resilience. For now, these shortfalls are appearing in conflicts that don’t directly involve American troops, but the truth is that a major war will see the United States forced to ration materials and munitions, deploying untested prototypes on the battlefield while the defense industrial base races to catch up. We must act now to prevent this from happening.
If we are serious about winning the next war—or better yet, deter it—we must rethink both how we buy military equipment and weapons, and how fast we can make them. We don’t need another half measure or a fully government solution. Instead, the government should leverage the private sector to build a nationwide network of multifaceted, resilient manufacturing nodes that can surge production of everything from drones, vehicles, and body armor to medicine, munitions, and microelectronics in times of crisis, while sustaining production lines for commercial products in peacetime. The power of the U.S. economy can, and should, be leveraged to solve this problem.
This network of production centers, or campuses, would bring together startups and established manufacturers in the same ecosystem, enabling the kind of rapid prototyping, pilot production, and full-rate manufacturing the Pentagon is urgently seeking. Each of these campuses would be designed for flexibility, with modular production capabilities that can be rapidly upgraded, and shared heavy infrastructure such as test beds, utilities, and analytical systems. Furthermore, these facilities would be part of a connected national network, leveraging the regional strengths of each part of the country while avoiding the single points of failure commonly found in today’s highly concentrated manufacturing hubs.
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Today, the gap between a successful prototype and real-world production is often a chasm in the defense industrial base. Major firms are often tied up maintaining legacy systems while cash-strapped startups cannot afford to build compliant, capital-intensive factories without production contracts. These startups are often told that contracts won’t come until they prove they can manufacture at scale. So promising technologies stall in a chicken-or-egg limbo while delays snowball. The Pentagon’s renewed embrace of OTAs helps, but money alone won’t fix a physical bottleneck. We need places where cutting-edge firms can scale quickly, and affordably.
A national network of industrial campuses is designed to fill this gap. Under this model, companies wouldn’t pay construction costs up front; lease payments would begin only after they move in and start generating revenue. Layering into the model a certain number of shared facilities—initially funded by the Pentagon—would reduce risk, accelerate development, and dramatically shorten production timelines. Young companies gain room to grow. Established firms gain access to fresh innovation - and taxpayer dollars go further.
This is not a radical idea. It is an evolution of the model that once made America unstoppable. In World War II, factories across the economy—automotive, textile, consumer goods, and more—transformed to support the war effort. That surge capacity happened because the United States had an existing industrial ecosystem ready to mobilize. Today, we no longer have one.
Decades of offshoring, consolidation, and a fixation on short-term efficiency have left our industrial base brittle and full of holes. COVID-19 made that painfully clear when the world’s largest economy found itself dependent on foreign suppliers for PPE and basic supplies. Semiconductor shortages still slow defense and automotive lines. Meanwhile, our adversaries are turning basic industries into warfighting assets. Russian bakeries are producing drones and China is treating its manufacturing capabilities as a strategic weapon while in America, we’ve been treating our manufacturing base like an accounting exercise.
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The government must shift course. Manufacturing is a strategic asset—every bit as important as ships, planes, satellites, or submarines. Washington should fund shared industrial infrastructure, de-risk private investment, and let market forces drive efficiency.
The math is simple. In some cases, companies piloting these programs have delivered 4:1 to 25:1 returns on tax dollars, generating major gains for minimal government investments. With a defense budget exceeding $800 billion, the Pentagon can easily afford to invest a sliver of that—well under one percent—to send a clear, unambiguous demand signal to the private sector that America is rebuilding its industrial backbone, and doing it now.
History shows what happens when we do. Modest seed capital during World War II and the Apollo program unlocked massive private investment and generated hundreds of innovations that have come to define the modern age. These campuses would be more than factories—they would be hubs where manufacturers, universities, investors, and federal partners build self-sustaining ecosystems capable of accelerating innovation, fostering talent, and producing critical goods at scale. They would restore American industrial depth, innovation, and flexibility—our most reliable, most underestimated tools of deterrence.
America is racing into the next complex era of great-power competition with a defense industrial base limping along from the last era; one that is simply too small, too fragile, and too slow. We can invent extraordinary technologies, but what use are they sitting in a lab if we can’t produce them at scale? If that doesn’t change, the United States risks discovering—too late—that innovation without industrial power is a hollow advantage.
Rebuilding American manufacturing will be difficult. But the cost of inaction is far higher. A nation with a deep, flexible industrial base can surge production, absorb economic shocks, and outlast any adversary, on the battlefield and the home front. A nation without one is forced to ration weapons, delay deployments, and scramble to keep its supply chains functioning.
We can build this network now or we can wait for a crisis to expose, once again, how fragile our industrial base has become. In the next conflict, the world’s strongest military must be able to depend on its factories to keep up.
The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.
Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.
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OPINION — “Our [the Joint Chiefs of Staff] job is to present and my job with the Joint Chiefs and others is to present the range of [military] options that this President or any President should consider with all of the secondary and tertiary considerations that go into those options, so that a President can make whatever decision he wants to make -- and then we deliver.”
That was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine early in a 30-minute “fireside chat” with CNBC’s Morgan Brennan before an audience at the Reagan National Defense Forum on December 6, at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California.
I want to analyze Caine’s remarks, because they received almost no public coverage, and as Joint Chiefs Chairman, his stated views are worth recording – as were his predecessors’ during the first Trump administration.
Caine, who is extremely cautious in his public remarks, was originally asked by CNBC’s Brennan early in the chat, “How are you advising the President on Venezuela?” His first answer was, “Carefully,” which drew a laugh, but then he went on with the serious answer above.
I picked that opening quote because most senior military officers would have answered just that they gave options, but in my experience few would have added the part about “all of the secondary and tertiary considerations that go into those options.” In short, I believe what Caine said in giving military options to President Trump, was that he gave both the upsides and downsides of what could happen with each option.
In giving the above answer, Caine went on to say, “I wouldn't want to share any particular advice or options that we're giving, but we present a lot of them.”
Again I would point out that Caine carefully noted he would not spell out any “advice or option” he has given Trump, but the fact that so far the President has not yet followed through on his threat to attack ground targets in Venezuela may be because of the “secondary or tertiary considerations” Caine said would be the outcome associated with undertaking such overt actions.
The public reactions to the 25 narco-boat attacks with their 95 associated deaths has been bad enough. But they also raise questions about where Caine stood on that issue.
In fact, CNBC’s Brennan started the conversation with Caine asking his views about “these Caribbean strikes and the reporting around them.”
Caine diverted from the question saying he was struck by the “sort of loss of confidence in the American military by the American people and that's deeply concerning to me.” He then said he wanted to add one detail to what Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had earlier told the Reagan Forum about the boat strikes.
That detail, Caine said, was that it was his idea along with Adm. Frank (Mitch) Bradley, the operational commander who ordered the so-called second strike on September 2, “to go up and
share the information that we could share with the Congress.” The two gave classified briefings to leaders of the House and Senate Armed Services and Intelligence Committees, as well as military appropriators, on December 4, according to The New York Times.
Caine told the Reagan Forum they had done it “so that we could continue to sustain and scale that trust that we must earn every day from the American people through the Congress.”
Throughout the 30-minute conversation, Caine avoided talking about Trump administration policy, just two days after Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy(NSS) had been released.
For example, when CNBC’s Brennan asked, “How do you see the alliance with Europe evolving?” – a controversial subject in the Trump NSS, Caine responded, “We don't do policy in the Joint Force. We execute those policies.”
Caine did recognize the NSS’s new policy emphasis on the Western Hemisphere.
“Protecting the homeland is not just a term that we say anymore. It's a real thing and homeland security is national security,” Caine said. “I won't get into the operational matters, but there's plenty of visible examples…on where we are going to protect our neighborhood and do that pursuant to the things that we're able to do to make sure America is a safe and secure country.”
Caine then added, “We have not, if you look back over the arc of our deployment history over the last few years, we haven't had a lot of American combat power in our own neighborhood. I suspect that's probably going to change. We'll see what we're ordered to do and of course we follow that guidance.”
But Caine did focus on traditional threats saying, “From a military perspective, military alone, our relationships are good in Europe, and I'll let my bosses talk about the policy there.”
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Caine was more open when it came to NATO. “Allies and partners are key and critical to us as we fight together,” Caine told the Reagan Forum. “NATO remains a key important ally for us. They are, I think, going to own European security both through NATO and bilaterally and individually. The military leaders that I talked to are encouraged by the defense spending that's happening inside their countries. I would say, and have said to them, the same narrative around their defense and national industrial bases as we try to scale European defense so Europe can own Europe.”
Caine added, “The SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe] over there, [U.S.] General [Alexus G.] Grynkewich, is carrying the same message through his EUCOM [U.S. European Command] hat. But that said, allies and partners remain a key part as laid out in the national security strategy.”
When it came to the fighting in Europe, Caine told the Reagan Forum, “I want to be pretty cautious about commenting on Ukraine because of the ongoing negotiations. And I'm mindful that anything that I say could get spun one way or the other. I think, for me, I believe that we always want to be striving for peace and what's happened in Europe there is a tragedy out on the Ukrainian front lines. So I'm going to be pretty cautious given the meetings that are going on.”
He did say, “What the Ukraine industrial base has done to create tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands of drones is extraordinary. Those are the kinds of entrepreneurial lessons that we want to take from that fight.”
“It's another case study in the importance of the ability to put air power over a battlefield,” he said. “And when you look at the fixed and frozen lines that we've seen out in Ukraine, it's an opportunity for us to learn about the importance of protecting the force on the ground. And having been one of those guys on the ground earlier in my life, I value greatly the ability to have an air force or some kind of capability that can come in there and put an adversary in a particular place of pain. We haven't seen that out there in Ukraine.”
Caine said, “One of the lessons out of Ukraine is going to be mass. And there's a lot of exchanges going on. And when I think about war fighting in the future, I see a lot of exchanges, both in the kinetic and non-kinetic space, that is probably unprecedented. So we're going to need a high-low mix that we've not seen before…but we are also going to need significantly more attritable [loseable] things that can create multiple simultaneous dilemmas for the commanders on another side of a fight than for us.”
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While the Trump NSS hardly mentioned China, Caine did.
“When we look at the rise of the Chinese military,” Caine said, “what our goal in the Joint Force is to create multiple simultaneous dilemmas for all of the adversaries around the world, so that they are very cautious and concerned about doing something that would bring any sense of threat to the American people.”
Caine went on, “I think China's competing on the global scale. I know that from the U.S. perspective we've got an economic relationship now that is looking positive and trending fine. We see China still creating a lot of combat capability and capacity at scale, and as the National Security Strategy says, we owe it to the nation to deliver a free Indo-Pacific and a free and safe and prosperous Indo-Pacific. So when I think about actions in the Pacific, mindful of the President's guidance, that's how we think about it.”
As for the Middle East, Caine called it still “critical,” and said, “It's still I think undecided. I carefully watch through the CENTCOM (U.S. Central Command) commander what's happening in Gaza. I remain as always concerned about what Iran's intentions are down there. These are conflicts that have been going on for a long, long, time. I'm hopeful for peace but need to be prepared for any number of eventualities there.”
As for here at home, Caine told the Reagan Forum, “What the American system, as it's been running for a long time now, is really good at is buying behindthe technology development curve [emphasis added].And what we need to do is get in front of the technology development curve. And that's going to require the best of the military, the best of the Congress, the best of the private sector, and the best of not just the defense industrial base, but the national industrial base.
Caine explained, “Back in my life, I ran a small mom and pop machine shop in Denton, Texas, that made parts for America's aerospace and defense industry. And I'll tell you that everybody needs to up their game here.”
He went on, “We have to change the culture inside the [Defense] Department. We have to change the culture inside companies. And I've been in both. So I can see both of these things. We have to create and sustain and maintain competitive forces out there in the market where we are driving innovation in our corporate structures and systems that are going to give better combat capability to the Joint Force.”
In addition, Caine said, “The military and the government need to be better buyers and we have to write better contracts. I am still on step one of my 12-step recovery process from selling to the government when I was a part-timer in the military. I think we have to find a way to share risk between us and the private sector.”
Caine was an unusual choice by President Trump, who had first met Caine back in December 2018 in Iraq. The President claimed during a 2019 political speech he had met an Army officer, “Razin Caine,” who had worn a MAGA hat, said he’d “kill for Trump,” and claimed in Iraq he could defeat the ISIS terrorist group in Syria “in less than four weeks,” three Trump statements Caine later denied in interviews and during his 2025 Senate confirmation hearing.
When I first wrote about Caine last March, I was drawn to the facts that beginning August 2005 he served a year as a White House Fellow at the Agriculture Department and later, from October 2006 to January 2008, was Policy Director for Counterterrorism and Strategy for President George W. Bush’s White House Homeland Security Council. Caine’s last military post before resigning from the Air Force in 2024 was three years as Associate Director for Military Affairs at the CIA.
However, at the Reagan Forum, Caine confessed, “I actually served at the Agency [CIA] twice. One is in my bio, one is not in my bio.” What’s that all about?
Caine clearly is a person the public needs to follow more closely.
The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.
Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.
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OPINION — “The [Defense] Secretary [Pete Hegseth] sent nonpublic DoD information [on March 15 at 11:44 EDT] identifying the quantity and strike times of manned U.S. aircraft over hostile [Houthi] territory [in Yemen] over an unapproved, unsecure network [Signal] approximately 2 to 4 hours before the execution of those [U.S. aircraft] strikes. Using a personal cell phone to conduct official business and send nonpublic DoD information through Signal risks potential compromise of sensitive DoD information, which could cause harm to DoD personnel and mission objectives.”
Another finding was “We [Office of the DoD IG] concluded that the [Defense] Secretary [Hegseth] sent sensitive nonpublic, DoD operational information that he determined did not require classification over Signal on his personal cell phone. Although EO 13526 [Executive Order on Classified National Security Information] grants the [Defense] Secretary the authority to determine the proper level of classification of DoD information, we concluded that the Secretary’s actions did not comply with DoDI 8170.01 [DoD Policy for social media accounts] which prohibits using a personal device for official business and sending nonpublic information over a non-approved commercially available messaging application.”
So in that first finding the DoD IG found Hegseth’s message potentially endangered U.S. military members and their mission, and in the second finding the DoD IG said the Defense Secretary had violated DoD policy.
On Wednesday evening, after public release of the DoD IG report, Hegseth on X messaged, “No classified information. Total exoneration. Case closed. Houthis bombed into submission. Thank you for your attention to this IG report.” At roughly the same time, Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell in a statement said: “Total exoneration of Secretary Hegseth and proves what we all knew – no classified information was shared. The matter is resolved and the case is closed.”
Of course the DoD IG report is the opposite of “total exoneration,” and by no means should the case be closed. In fact, this entire matter should have been an illustration to the Trump administration that it cannot get away with lying about serious matters, but nonetheless they have continued to try.
The history of this DoD IG report shows that Hegseth and others in the Trump administration even failed to cooperate in the IG’s investigation.
For example, the DoD IG report said frankly, “The Secretary declined to be interviewed for this evaluation.” Hegseth did, after four months, supply to the IG Office a July 25, one-page, five paragraph statement. In it, Hegseth used two paragraphs to defend the questioned details in his March 15, Signal chat message, arguing at one point the information was “either not classified, or that I could safely declassify [it].”
Meanwhile, there were other times of non-cooperation. The DOD IG report said, “We requested a copy of the Secretary’s communications on Signal on or about March 15. According to a senior official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Secretary declined to provide us direct access to his personal cell phone.”
At another point, when the DoD IG was trying to get a full transcript of the March 15, Signal chat, it found that OSD had a consolidated version it received from the White House Counsel’s Office, but the request for a copy was declined “because it was not a DoD-created record.”
The DOD IG report, itself, originated from a request back on March 26, by Sens, Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) and Jack Reed (D-R.I.), the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
The two Senators were reacting to two articles dated March 24, and March 26, on The Atlantic website written by Editor Jeffrey Goldberg, who had described that somehow then-National Security Advisor Mike Waltz had made Goldberg part of a Signal chat group of senior Trump administration officials named the Houthi PC small group. The chat group included Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary Hegseth, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency John Ratcliffe, and Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard.
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Goldberg’s March 24, Atlantic article alleged that on March 15, the Signal chat group received from Hegseth sensitive war plans about the U.S. air strikes before they took place on Yemen that day. The Atlantic initially chose not to print those war plan details because potentially they contained classified information. Although the White House initially said the story seemed authentic, Hegseth initially said, “Nobody was texting war plans, and that’s all I have to say about that."
By the next day, the Trump administration had settled on their response. Appearing on March 25 before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, CIA Director Ratcliffe said, “The Secretary of Defense is the original classification authority, and my understanding is that his comments are that any information that he shared was not classified.” DNI Gabbard, appearing with Ratcliffe, echoed him saying, “There were no classified or intelligence equities that were included in that chat group at any time.”
After the denials, The Atlantic on March 26, then published Goldberg’s subsequent article which contained Hegseth’s pre-strike details. They gave the scheduled March 15 time of the first F-18 launch package; the time the first strike F-18s should reach “Target Terrorist;” the time of launch of MQ-9 strike drones; the time launch of second F-18 package; the time “when first bombs will definitely drop,” and the time when F-18 2nd package strike begins; and the time when the first sea-based Tomahawk missiles launched.
Although Hegseth claimed, “there were no details that would endanger our troops or the mission,” anyone who knew where the F-18s were based, their time of departure and the expected time bombs were to be dropped in Yemen might have been be able to determine the targets.
The DoD IG report concluded, “If this information had fallen into the hands of U.S. adversaries, Houthi forces might have been able to counter U.S. forces or reposition personnel and assets to avoid planned U.S. strikes. Even though these events did not ultimately occur, the Secretary’s actions created a risk to operational security that could have resulted in failed U.S. mission objectives and potential harm to U.S. pilots.”
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Another issue raised by the DOD IG report is that Hegseth was involved in other Signal chat groups into which he could have put additional classified information.
For example, the DOD IG reported, “One of the officials we spoke with stated that the Secretary posted the same sensitive operational information concerning the March 15, Houthi attack plans on the ‘Defense Team Huddle’ group chat.” That was a chat group Hegseth established from his personal and professional inner circle in January 2025, before his confirmation as defense secretary, and included Hegseth’s wife, Jennifer, who is a former Fox News producer.
The New York Times reported the Defense Team Huddle chat group also included Hegseth’s younger brother, Phil Hegseth, who has since become a senior adviser to the Defense Secretary and a DoD liaison officer to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Other OSD officials told DoD IG investigators there are “multiple additional Signal group chats in which the Secretary allegedly participated to conduct official DoD business and transmit nonpublic DoD information,” according to the IG report. “Two officials stated that they were part of several group chats, and one of them stated that the Secretary and others used the chats to coordinate meetings, respond to media inquiries, or alert staff to check their official email accounts.”
That was another reason, the report said, “why we [DoD IG] requested copies of messages from these other Signal group chats, as well as access to the Secretary’s personal cell phone,” which so far have been unsuccessful.
I must conclude this article by saying that much credit goes to the DoD IG office, and Acting DoD IG Steven A. Stebbins. They did an admirable job on this inquiry given the lack of cooperation from their top bosses to this inquiry. They showed the professionalism looked for and needed in federal government employees.
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DEEP DIVE — The Pentagon is waging war against its own acquisition bureaucracy. In a sweeping speech on Friday, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth described the “adversary”, not as a foreign power but as a process: decades-old requirements and procurement rules that reward paperwork over outcomes.
The core argument: if the U.S. wants to deter adversaries in today’s world of fast-moving threats that include gray-zone coercion, contested logistics and AI-enabled systems, it must accept more acquisition risk as a means to reduce operational risk later.
The Pentagon’s new plan pairs rhetorical urgency with specific structural changes. It proposes killing the legacy Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and replacing it with a tighter, more centralized alignment, pushing commercial-first solutions even if they deliver an “85% solution” initially and forcing a cultural shift across both DoD and industry toward speed, volume, and continuous iteration. The plan also signals tougher expectations for primes to invest private capital and for government to send longer demand signals. It’s a tall order.
Here’s a look at the key ideas:
“Increase acquisition risk to decrease operational risk”: field good-enough capabilities faster, iterate in production, and stop chasing perfect specs that arrive too late.
JCIDS → RRAB / MEIA / JAR: cancel the slow, document-heavy requirements process; stand up a Requirements & Resourcing Alignment Board (RRAB) to tie priorities to funds, a Mission Engineering & Integration Activity (MEIA) to co-design/experiment with industry early, and a Joint Acceleration Reserve (JAR) to bridge the “valley of death.”
War-fighting Acquisition System & PAEs: rebrand and reorganize acquisition around Portfolio Acquisition Executives (PAEs) who have end-to-end authority to trade cost/schedule/performance for time-to-field, with embedded contracting and fixed delivery cycles.
Modular Open Systems + multi-source: mandate modular architectures, maintain at least two qualified sources on critical components, and enable third-party integration to avoid vendor lock and accelerate upgrades.
Commercial-first, 85% solution: accept non-perfect bids that meet the mission faster, then iterate software and components continuously.
Wartime Production Unit (WPU): a deal-team model to negotiate across a contractor’s total DoD portfolio, create incentives for on-time delivery, and unlock surge capacity.
Workforce & Culture shift: convert the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) into a “Warfighting Acquisition University,” lengthen leader tenures, and evaluate contracting/program teams on mission outcomes rather than compliance metrics.
Foreign Military Sales realignment: move DSCA/DTSA under Acquisition & Sustainment to unify planning, contracting, and delivery so allies get kit faster without undercutting U.S. readiness.
Why this matters now
Adversaries are iterating faster, supply chains are brittle, and the U.S. military’s ability to produce and sustain at volume - will decide deterrence credibility. The proposal promises measurable gains in lead times, throughput, and availability, but it also raises hard questions about safety, governance, industry incentives, and the talent pipeline.
In the sections that follow, we pressure-test these claims with former commanders and acquisition leaders: how to set guardrails around “good-enough,” where the new risks are and the impact on the industry.
Cipher Brief Executive Editor Brad Christian spoke with General Phil Breedlove (Ret.), Lt. General Mike Groen (Ret) and Silicon Valley Entrepreneur and Stanford Professor Steve Blank, who has recently published a Department of War Program Executive Office directory to help companies better navigate the complicated system for selling to government.
Christian: What was your reaction to last week’s announcement that we heard from the secretary?
Gen. Breedlove retired as the Commander, Supreme Allied Command, Europe, SHAPE, Belgium and Headquarters, U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany. He also served as Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force; and Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff.
General Breedlove: There are things that I really am looking forward to, and there are some things that are a bit worrisome, the way they were rolled out. But you never really know what's going to happen until you start seeing it in action and the changes to the rules for how we do our acquisition.
But make no mistake, our acquisition system to date is moribund. It's horrible. We laugh now about this “Valley of Death” between when something is created in the laboratory and when it gets to the field, six, seven, eight years or more sometimes. And people who are at war and doing this very differently, they're doing it in weeks, sometimes days, but not years. So we definitely have to change.
Part of the reason our acquisition system is so slow is because in our past, maybe even decades and decades ago, people took advantage of the system and they made money in a bad or almost illegal way. And so lawmakers do what lawmakers do, and technocrats and bureaucrats do what they do, and they created layers and layers of oversight to try to protect against some of those bad acts that happened decades ago. And the result is an acquisition system that is completely unresponsive to the needs of the warfighter. And I'm glad that we're starting to change it.
Lt. Gen. Groen served over 36 years in the U.S. military, culminating his career as the senior executive for AI in the Department. Groen also served in the National Security Agency overseeing Computer Network Operations, and as the Director of Joint Staff Intelligence, working closely with the Chairman and Senior Leaders across the Department.
Lt. Gen. Groen:My immediate reaction, like everybody else, when somebody uses the word acquisition, you kind of cringe a little bit. And immediately you get the vent of, it takes too long, it's too expensive, the processes don't work, the people in the processes don't know what they're doing, the long litany of usual complaints. And most of them are actually true. What we have currently, I would articulate, is an unaccountable bureaucracy. It's a professional bureaucracy. They know the process. They build the process. They work the process. But the process doesn't necessarily meet our real war fighting objectives. And I think that is probably the most important thing here.
We'll talk about drones and technology and all these other things, but I think at its core, you actually do have to have a process for this. And just getting the credit cards out and buying stuff at Best Buy doesn't work either, right? So, I think it's a requirement for us. You can't just say, well, we're just gonna blow up all the rules and let people do whatever they want. Because as soon as you do that, you're gonna realize that if we didn't have a system, we wouldn't be able to do all these other things. How do you get to integration? How do you get to common standards? How do you get to the things that actually make weapon systems work effectively and with the caliber of ammunition that they use and the system that produces that and all of the other components? So it's easy, and I've done it probably more than anybody else, to just rant about the acquisition process.
But if you didn't have an acquisition process, you would need to invent one. So, our challenge really today is, okay, the one we have for a lot of reasons is not going to be the one that we will need tomorrow. It does okay on band-aids and making munitions for today. But it is certainly not a kind of process that enables war fighting flow. So I think we are very much at a transformation point, not just in the fact that the way we want to do acquisition must change, but more importantly, the way we do everything, the way we fight must change. And so naturally we have really an incredible opportunity. Let's build the system that enables the kind of fast moving, rapid innovation that we will want on the battlefield: AI driven, data driven. We know what the future looks like. Let's actually build to that and not let unaccountable bureaucracies get in the way.
Steve Blank is an adjunct professor at Stanford and co-founder of the Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. His book, The Four Steps to the Epiphany is credited with launching the Lean Startup movement. He created the curriculum for the National Science Foundation Innovation Corps. At Stanford, he co-created the Department of Defense Hacking for Defense and Department of State Hacking for Diplomacy curriculums. He is co-author of The Startup Owner's Manual.
Blank: It was mind blowing - not because anything the Secretary said was new; they are things that people who are interested in acquisition reform have been asking for the last 10 years. But it was put in a single package and was clearly done by the infusion of people who have actually run large businesses and were used to all the language of organizations that already know how to deliver with speed and urgency.
The part that didn't get said is essentially the Department of War wants to adopt startup innovation techniques of lean iteration, pivots, incremental releases, good enough delivery, and that gets you what the Secretary asked for, which was speed of delivery. But all those are things that we lived with in Silicon Valley for the last 50 years, and it wasn't until we had people who worked outside of buildings with no windows inside the Pentagon to understand that those techniques could actually be applied. And it required blowing up the existing system. And they did that spectacularly well. Very few holes in those proposals.
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Christian: A central piece of the plan as it was explained on Friday is the idea of eliminating the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, which has long been criticized for some of the slow processes and the overly bureaucratic results that we have. The new approach seeks to centralize procurement and funding under the DOD senior leadership. Are you comfortable that this is the right approach?
General Breedlove: So this is one of those, like I opened up with, some good, some bad. There are elements of JCIDS that I think we should hold on to. We shouldn't throw the whole thing out with the bath water. But there are a lot of elements of JCIDS that we need to get rid of.
Much like the rules we just talked about that were created because of people and bad acts for acquisition, the same sort of thing has happened in the process of moving an idea from the lab to the field in that now there are layers and layers of people who can hold up the process or say no. And when they do that, it adds time, schedule delays, more testing, and much more money to the program. And these people bear zero responsibility for their actions. The people that end up getting blamed for the delays and increased costs are the services or the primes. And the people that have this authority now but hold no responsibility for what they do, we've got to get rid of them. We have to ensure that people who have decision authority are held accountable for what they do, to the point of maybe even not charging this off to primes or to the folks who are developing these things. If someone else is out there slowing things down and they don't have to worry about it because they're not accountable to it, we're not in a good place.
Lt. Gen. Groen: One issue is there isn’t a cadre of professionals in DOD leadership that will be able to take this mission on full time. If you consider a broad sweep of what we build and acquire and how we do that, how we innovate, they will just run out of hours in the day and minds to engage in order to build a replacement for what we have today.
The impulse to change the way we do things is the right impulse. Our impulse to be disciplined about the way we go about things, that's also correct. So it's not enough to say “let’s blow it all up, we don't need any rules”. We actually do need rules. Regulation actually is an enabler. It helps you flow. It lets you know how things can be done. That's a really powerful thing.
The problem is with humans involved, there is always a tendency to distort a process through petty bureaucracies, tribalism, ignorance and bad temper. It is really important for leaders to actually lead in this space and create accountability for the people that are actually working. What we have today is a derivative of it. We don't need too many history lessons here, but this is like General Motors in the 1960s, where we started to really do modern industrial design at scale. So if you understand where we’ve come from, you can see how important things like industrial processes and quality checks.
In a digital environment, a transformational environment that is driven by artificial intelligence and data availability, all the notes change. The music changes. And you still need a process for things like money so you can pay people to build things. But we're not building things on a conveyor belt anymore. We're building code. We're building code that changes by the hour. We're building code that builds its own code. This is where we are. So you can't do that in a completely undisciplined way, that says “have at it team and we'll see what we get at the end of the process”. What we’re doing here is too important.
Christian: Part of the new approach will involve increasing acquisition risk, to decrease operational risk with a focus on increased use of commercial solutions and of even fielding 85 % solutions. Where's the red line that you would want as a commander before fielding an 85% solution?
Gen. Breedlove: This is a concept which is extremely hard to criticize. But we have to be pretty serious here because you're saying increasing acquisition risk to decrease operational risk. Well, if the product isn't operational yet and we have increased the purchasing and acquisition risk, and in between that costs us the life of a soldier, sailor, airman, marine or guardian, we have messed it up. So the rules are there for a reason. I completely understand. I absolutely, 100% agree with the fact that we've got to start taking more risk, but we can't do that in a way that is reckless and puts the lives of our troops on the line.
And an example where I think this concept is working well is Ukraine. They get a new drone that is designed to get past a certain capability of the Russian defenses. And why should we do a two-year testing on that thing? If the testing is to fire it into Russia where it's not going to kill any friendlies and see what happens, let's fire it into Russia and get the testing done on the battlefield, where we're less concerned with what happens. So there are ways to shorten and to change the way that we do tests and other things on the acquisition side that gets us faster to the operational side. And if we can do that, again, without raising the risk to our troops, let's go for it. And we're seeing that done well by the Ukrainians, and to some degree by the Israelis.
Lt. Gen. Groen: The first thing that pops in my mind is- What does an 85 % solution look like? What is 85% of a truck? What is 85% of a battleship or a carrier? Pick your system. If you're just doing software, you can do a lot of things in software, but still, software that's 15 % buggy and doesn't work, because you've chosen 85%, that's almost like going right back to the industrial age process flow for code. And I think that the real magic here at its core is transforming the way we do our war fighting. We need new thinking about how to integrate capabilities and new thinking about how to build artificial intelligence modalities and then the systems.
Warfare is changing under our feet right now. Ukraine and drones, I accept that example, but it's so much more than that. We need a complete transformation in the way we understand the enemy, the way we understand our mission, the way we can use autonomy to integrate with humans, the way that we can build robotics, the way that we can now start what I like to call putting the mind of a commander on a pedestal by taking all the data environment and revealing that to a commander and everybody else who is working with the commander so that you have common situational awareness.
The opportunity here is enormous to transform our war fighting to the same degree we're transforming our industries. And you see the transformation every day when you drive through DC or Austin or San Francisco. Transformation is real and it's driving our economy today. What we haven't done is purposefully mapped out how we're going to drive our war fighting capability through this technology. And this is so important because we have to have a plan for how we build operational workflows. Where do we build those? Who builds those? And so I think moving from monitoring a process of manufacturing to really considering war fighting as the core element that the technology springs from.
Christian: Obviously the Pentagon procurement system that we have today is a product of decades of bureaucracy and rules. Are you hopeful that you're going to be able to see the kind of change in the rapid timeline that they've laid forth here?
Blank: Number one, this is a pretty extensive reorganization. Right now the Department of War is siloed between requirements and system centers for testing and prototyping and acquisition, which was the acquisition with a small A with the PEOs and program managers, and then it went to contracts and then it went to sustainment, et cetera. Those were silos. Now we're putting it all underneath a single portfolio acquisition executive. So, instead of making their offices 10,000 people, it's actually a matrix organization, much like a combatant command is. Most of those people will stay in their existing orgs but now be tasked to work on specific portfolios. And instead, the portfolios will no longer be arranged by weapon system. They're going to be arranged, for example, by war fighting concepts or technology concepts, et cetera.
That said, boy, try moving an elephant and making it dance. And at the same time, they recognized - this was one of the genius parts - people won't just get a memo and know what to do. Historically, they've depended on the Defense Acquisition University, which taught them, contracting officers and the rest, how to work with the 5,000 pages of the DFAR and FAR, Federal Acquisition, Defense Acquisition Regulations. One of the unnoticed things was they basically told the Defense Acquisition University, stop teaching that today. You now need to teach people this new methodology. That's not going to happen by telepathy. First of all, we need to train the trainers, then we need to train all the people who've grown up in their career following the paperwork.
So, I predict six months or a year of chaos and confusion. And probably, there's always in a large scale reorganization saboteurs who are angry that their cheese has been moved or worse, their authority has been diminished or the head count went somewhere else. This is going to be no different except maybe at a bigger scale.
In the end, if we pull this off, and I'll explain the only possible reason not to do this, the country will be much better for it. The other obstacle will be if you're on the board of directors and the exec staff of a prime, you're going to go through the 12 stages of denial and grief and whatever because I don't know how many times both Feinberg and Hegseth made it clear that the primes weren't delivering and they weren't investing in the things the country needed and they got used to the system and we were kind of mutually dependent on a broken system - and that's over. Well, you're not going to let your stockholders say you just went home and packed up. Obviously, it's pretty clear that appealing to the Pentagon isn't going to work, but Congress is “coin operated”. This is now going to be a race of lobbying cash from the primes versus lobbying cash for the first time from private equity and venture capital. So it's going to be, who has the biggest pile of cash to influence Congress and the executive branch to keep these rules in place or modify them?
Remember what a disaster this is if you're an existing large company selling to the DOD. It says number one, we're going to buy commercial off the shelf. Number two, we're going to buy commercial off the shelf and then modify it. If and only if either one and two work, we do some bespoke contracting with the existing organization. It's never happened before. Pretty clear, pretty direct. So, the easy thing would be for primes to change their business model. But my prediction is they're going to double and triple down the amount of lobbying and dollars spent.
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Christian: Secretary Hegseth also had some words of warning to the major U.S. defense contractors, the primes, to speed up weapons development and production, invest their own capital to increase capacity, or risk becoming obsolete. This is a relatively complicated issue for these companies. What are your thoughts on this?
General Breedlove: I think that our senior leaders, maybe to include the Secretary of War and others, have sort of allowed the verbiage around this topic to get a little loosey goosey. What happened in the past was that some primes used money out of existing contracts to create excess capacity that then saved them money the next time they had to build new equipment. And our government, Congress and others got tired of that and wrote laws that limit how much money you can spend out of existing contracts to create excess capacity. And the way I understand the laws, most of them are zero. If we pay you to build 100 B-21s and you create a line that could do 120, you're going to jail or you're going to court. And so I think that there's some imprecise language running around and we need to give some of this time to sort out when the dust settles to understand what they're really asking of the primes, because they are limited on one side, fiducially and fiscally, and they're limited on the other side by laws and sometimes regulations that have been created by the regulatory agencies to correct past [behaviors].
I applaud the ideas and the initiative that the Secretary laid out. But to the defense of the primes, they're going to need some regulatory or legal relief to be able to do most of the things being talked about under the new plan. They just can't snap their fingers and say, OK, we're going to do this because then they'll end up in court.
Christian: It's not going to be an overnight process to reboot the Pentagon's procurement system. The Department of Defense is the largest single organization within the US Government. The amount of products and services that flow through that system is enormous. You've clearly laid out the tremendous opportunity that exists to rebuild the system. What are you most worried about? What's the biggest risk that can impede progress as the Pentagon starts this journey?
Lt. Gen. Groen: Tribalism. Tribalism will sink us. We are so horrifically tribal that we can't think like an extended entity. We can't think like a singular organism that is really effective through data and our systems flowing together. Tribalism kills that. And I see it every day. I'm not in the Pentagon every day anymore, but I see it: the tribalism among services, the tribalism among components of services and the tribalism within the department. And all of that tribalism is an afterglow of our industrial might in the 1960s. Now is the time for thinkers that are wearing a uniform, it's not about buying stuff without asking. It's about thinking through the flow that you want to achieve and then building the capabilities that you need to do that. It's a mindset thing, but that’s all about what transformation is. The form changes. And so when we transform, we transform ourselves into this place where we leave that tribalism behind because we have integrated effectiveness.
Working with broad autonomy is gonna help us think that way. I think that there's a broader awareness of what the technology is able to do and how it will facilitate. We just have to be careful to make sure that that's not the end state. Technology is not the end state. It's humans, war fighters who are winning on the battlefield because they understand and they can make the right calls. That's what we're after. And so all of the stuff about acquisition and the rules and why people don't follow the rules and why is it so tribal that we can't get anything to be, I think all of that merits some dynamite, but it also merits some thinking about how do we better integrate our thinking and flows and how do we do that on the battlefield?
Christian: How much of a risk is the next administration coming in and potentially changing everything? And then in particular, if you're one of those big primes, are you baking that into your long-term planning that this might shift in a measurable way in the future? Or do you think these changes are going to be something that is so overwhelmingly positive that future administrations have to stick with it?
Blank: Well, if you were asking me this three years ago, I would have said, well, you should get all this done now because it's going to be flipped back in three years. What's changed now is the amount of capital available for startups, scale-ups, and private equity firms that can match or overpower the lobbying efforts of the primes. So as I said, both the executive branch and Congress are coin operated, even more so now than ever. And for the first time ever, the insurgents have as much or more coin than the incumbents. That's what's going to change this game.
So yes, of course, a Democratic administration or another Republican one might have a different opinion. But in this case, we're talking about piles of money flooding the streets in Washington to try to change the game. Think about who are now sitting in the cabinet. And other places have commercial experience for the first time ever at scale, inside the executive branch for sure and inside the Department of War which changes the nature of the conversation and as we're seeing the types of things they're recommending.
Again, it wasn't that people didn't recognize this before. It was kind of hard to explain this to people who had never run a business or who have been career successful. I've said for years, we had world class organizations, world class people for a world that no longer existed. And finally, we have people who understand what that world should be like because they've been operating in it. Secretary Feinberg has been writing checks of tens of billions of dollars- buying an aircraft carrier, okay, he’s written those kinds of checks before. Tell me who else ever had that position.
And again, it's not that the DOW should run like a corporation or startup, but having that experience sets a bar for what you know is possible for doing extraordinary things. It's what this country knew how to do in World War II and during the Cold War, and we just kind of lost it when Robert McNamara, an ex-chief financial officer of Ford, put in the first version of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBE) in 1962. We've been operating on that system for 63 years, or some variance of it. Basically, he imposed a chief financial officer's kind of strategy on budgeting and planning, which made sense at the time. It stopped making sense about 15 years ago, but no one inside the building knew what to do differently. That's changed.
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