Finnish firm seeks annual operating profits of €2.7 to €3.2 billion by 2028.

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Finnish firm seeks annual operating profits of €2.7 to €3.2 billion by 2028.

The post Nokia’s AI Gamble Targets 60% Profit Surge appeared first on TechRepublic.

The Federal Communications Commission is set this week to vote on reversing cybersecurity rules for telecommunications providers that were put forward following the sweeping “Salt Typhoon” hacks.

The FCC’s meeting on Thursday includes plans to consider an order to rescind a ruling and proposed rules published in the waning days of the Biden administration. The January ruling requires telecom operators to secure their networks under Section 105 of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act.

But current FCC Chairman Brendan Carr argues that ruling “exceeded the agency’s authority and did not present an effective or agile response to the relevant cybersecurity threats.”

The proposed order would rescind the January ruling and withdraw proposed cybersecurity rules for telecom operators.

Instead, the FCC “should instead continue to pursue an agile and collaborative approach to cybersecurity through federal-private partnerships that protect and secure communications networks and more targeted, legally sound rulemaking and enforcement,” according to a factsheet on the order of reconsideration.

‘Worst’ hack ever

The Salt Typhoon campaign was revealed in 2024. It involved penetrating hacks into U.S. telecom networks and others across the globe. The hackers were reportedly able to target the communications of political figures and government officials, including then-candidate Donald Trump and running mate JD Vance.

U.S. officials have said Chinese-government sponsored hackers are behind the campaign. Senate Intelligence Committee Ranking Member Mark Warner (D-Va.) has described it as “the worst telecommunications hack in our nation’s history.”

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency has since said the Salt Typhoon campaign overlapped with global threat activities targeting multiple sectors, including telecommunications, government, transportation, lodging, and military infrastructure networks.

“While these actors focus on large backbone routers of major telecommunications providers, as well as provider edge (PE) and customer edge (CE) routers, they also leverage compromised devices and trusted connections to pivot into other networks,” CISA wrote in a September advisory. “These actors often modify routers to maintain persistent, long-term access to networks.”

In rolling out the January rules, Biden administration officials argued they represented a “critical step to require U.S. telecoms to improve cybersecurity to meet today’s nation state threats, including those from China’s well-resourced and sophisticated offensive cyber program.”

However, the FCC’s current leadership says the rules misinterpreted the law and “unnecessarily raised and purported to resolve issues that were not appropriate for consideration in the absence of public input.” The FCC’s factsheet also references the commission’s “recent engagement with providers and their agreement to take extensive steps to protect national security interests.”

In an October letter to the FCC, lawyers representing several telecom associations argued that the January ruling “would significantly undermine” public-private partnerships. They argued that telecom providers had voluntarily collaborated with federal agencies to investigate Salt Typhoon and adopted stronger cybersecurity measures.

Warner and Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) are also pressing the Department of Homeland Security to release an unclassified 2022 report on security vulnerabilities in the U.S. telecom sector. They argue that by not releasing the report, DHS is undermining public debate over how to best secure telecom networks in the wake of Salt Typhoon.

“The Salt Typhoon compromise represents one of the most serious espionage campaigns against the communications of U.S. government leaders in history, and highlighted important gaps in our nation’s communications security – in some cases, with providers ignoring basic security precautions such as credential re-use across network appliances and failure to adopt multi-factor authentication for highly privileged network administrator accounts,” Warner and Wyden wrote in a recent letter to DHS and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Meanwhile, the House on Monday passed the “Strengthening Cyber Resilience Against State-Sponsored Threats Act.” The bill would establish a joint interagency task force to address China-linked cyber threats, including Salt Typhoon. The task force would be led by CISA, with involvement from the Justice Department, the FBI and several sector-risk management agencies.

The post FCC to vote on reversing cyber rules adopted after Salt Typhoon hack first appeared on Federal News Network.

DEEP DIVE — When Secret Service agents swept into an inconspicuous building near the United Nations General Assembly late last month, they weren’t tracking guns or explosives. Instead, they dismantled a clandestine telecommunications hub that investigators say was capable of crippling cellular networks and concealing hostile communications.

According to federal officials, the operation seized more than 300 devices tied to roughly 100,000 SIM cards — an arsenal of network-manipulating tools that could disrupt the cellular backbone of New York City at a moment of geopolitical tension. The discovery, officials stressed, was not just a one-off bust but a warning sign of a much broader national security vulnerability.

The devices were designed to create what experts call a “SIM farm,” an industrial-scale operation where hundreds or thousands of SIM cards can be manipulated simultaneously. These setups are typically associated with financial fraud or bulk messaging scams. Still, the Secret Service warned that they can also be used to flood telecom networks, disable cell towers, and obscure the origin of communications.

In the shadow of the UN, where global leaders convene and security tensions are high, the proximity of such a system raised immediate questions about intent, attribution, and preparedness.

“(SIM farms) could jam cell and text services, block emergency calls, target first responders with fake messages, spread disinformation, or steal login codes,” Jake Braun, Executive Director of the Cyber Policy Initiative at the University of Chicago and former White House Acting Principal Deputy National Cyber Director, tells The Cipher Brief. “In short, they could cripple communications just when they’re needed most.”

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How SIM Farms Work

At their core, SIM farms exploit the fundamental architecture of mobile networks. Each SIM card represents a unique identity on the global communications grid. By cycling through SIMs at high speed, operators can generate massive volumes of calls, texts, or data requests that overwhelm cellular infrastructure. Such floods can mimic the effects of a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, except the assault comes through legitimate carrier channels rather than obvious malicious traffic.

“SIM farms are essentially racks of modems that cycle through thousands of SIM cards,” Dave Chronister, CEO of Parameter Security, tells The Cipher Brief. “Operators constantly swap SIM cards and device identifiers so traffic appears spread out rather than coming from a single source.”

That makes them extremely difficult to detect.

“They can mimic legitimate business texts and calls, hide behind residential internet connections, or scatter equipment across ordinary locations so there’s no single, obvious signal to flag,” Chronister continued. “Because SIM farms make it hard to tie a number back to a real person, they’re useful to drug cartels, human-trafficking rings and other organized crime, and the same concealment features could also be attractive to terrorists.”

That ability to blend in, experts highlight, is what makes SIM farms more than just a criminal nuisance.

While SIM farms may initially be used for financial fraud, their architecture can be easily repurposed for coordinated cyber-physical attacks. That dual-use nature makes them especially appealing to both transnational criminal groups and state-backed intelligence services.

Who Might Be Behind It?

The Secret Service, however, has not publicly attributed the network near the UN to any specific individual or entity. Investigators are weighing several possibilities: a transnational fraud ring exploiting the chaos of UN week to run large-scale scams, or a more concerning scenario where a state-backed group positioned the SIM farm as a contingency tool for disrupting communications in New York.

Officials noted that the operation’s sophistication suggested it was not a low-level criminal endeavor. The hardware was capable of sustained operations against multiple carriers, and its sheer scale — 100,000 SIM cards — far exceeded the typical scale of fraud schemes. That raised the specter of hostile governments probing U.S. vulnerabilities ahead of potential hybrid conflict scenarios.

Analysts note that Russia, China, and Iran have all been implicated in blending criminal infrastructure with state-directed cyber operations. Yet, these setups serve both criminals and nation-states, and attribution requires more details than are publicly available.

“Criminal groups use SIM farms to make money with scams and spam,” said Braun. “State actors can use them on a bigger scale to spy, spread disinformation, or disrupt communications — and sometimes they piggyback on criminal networks.”

One source in the U.S. intelligence community, who spoke on background, described that overlap as “hybrid infrastructure by design.”

“It can sit dormant as a criminal enterprise for years until a foreign government needs it. That’s what makes it so insidious,” the source tells The Cipher Brief.

From Chronister’s purview, the “likely explanation is that it’s a sophisticated criminal enterprise.”

“SIM-farm infrastructure is commonly run for profit and can be rented or resold. However, the criminal ecosystem is fluid: nation-states, terrorist groups, or hybrid actors can and do co-opt criminal capabilities when it suits them, and some state-linked groups cultivate close ties with criminal networks,” he said.

The Broader National Security Blind Spot

The incident during the United Nations General Assembly also underscores a growing blind spot in U.S. protective intelligence: telecommunications networks as contested terrain. For decades, federal resources have focused heavily on cybersecurity, counterterrorism, and physical threats. At the same time, the connective tissue of modern communications has often been treated as a commercial domain, monitored by carriers rather than security agencies.

The Midtown bust suggests that assumption no longer holds. The Secret Service itself framed the incident as a wake-up call.

“The potential for disruption to our country’s telecommunications posed by this network of devices cannot be overstated,” stated U.S. Secret Service Director Sean Curran. “The U.S. Secret Service’s protective mission is all about prevention, and this investigation makes it clear to potential bad actors that imminent threats to our protectees will be immediately investigated, tracked down and dismantled.”

However, experts warn that U.S. defenses remain fragmented. Carriers focus on fraud prevention, intelligence agencies monitor foreign adversaries, and law enforcement investigates domestic crime. The seams between those missions are precisely where SIM farms thrive.

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Hybrid Warfare and the Next Front Line

The rise of SIM farms reflects the evolution of hybrid warfare, where the boundary between criminal activity and state action blurs, and adversaries exploit commercial infrastructure as a means of attack. Just as ransomware gangs can moonlight as proxies for hostile intelligence services, telecom fraud networks may double as latent disruption tools for foreign adversaries.

Additionally, the threat mirrors patterns observed abroad. In Ukraine, officials have reported Russian operations targeting cellular networks to disrupt battlefield communications and sow panic among civilians. In parts of Africa and Southeast Asia, SIM farms have been linked to both organized crime syndicates and intelligence-linked influence campaigns.

That same playbook, experts caution, could be devastating if applied in the heart of a global city.

“If activated during a crisis, such networks could flood phone lines, including 911 and embassy hotlines, to sow confusion and delay coordination. They can also blast fake alerts or disinformation to trigger panic or misdirect first responders, making it much harder for authorities to manage an already volatile situation,” Chronister said. “Because these setups are relatively cheap and scalable, they are an inexpensive but effective way to complicate emergency response, government decision-making, and even protective details.”

Looking Ahead

The dismantling of the clandestine telecom network in New York may have prevented an imminent crisis, but experts caution that it is unlikely to be the last of its kind. SIM farms are inexpensive to set up, scalable across borders, and often hidden in plain sight. They represent a convergence of cyber, criminal, and national security threats that the U.S. is only beginning to treat as a unified challenge.

When it comes to what needs to be done next, Braun emphasized the importance of “improving information sharing between carriers and government, investing in better tools to spot hidden farms, and moving away from SMS for sensitive logins.”

“Treat SIM farms as a national security threat, not just telecom fraud. Limit access to SIM farm hardware and punish abuse. Help smaller carriers strengthen defenses,” he continued. “And streamline legal steps so takedowns happen faster.”

Chronister acknowledged that while “carriers are much better than they were five or ten years ago, as they’ve invested in spam filtering and fraud analytics, attackers can still get through when they rotate SIMs quickly, use eSIM provisioning, or spread activity across jurisdictions.”

“Law enforcement and intelligence have powerful tools, but legal, technical, and cross-border constraints mean detection often outpaces confident attribution and rapid takedown. Make it harder to buy and cycle through SIMs in bulk and strengthen identity verification for phone numbers,” he added. “Require faster, real-time information-sharing between carriers and government during traffic spikes, improve authentication for public alerts, and run regular stress-tests and red-team exercises against telecom infrastructure. Finally, build joint takedown and mutual-assistance arrangements with allies so attackers can’t simply reconstitute operations in another country.”

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Newly released documents show U.S. immigration authorities have used a secretive cell phone snooping technology hundreds of times across the U.S. in the past three years.

The documents, obtained through a public records lawsuit by the American Civil Liberties Union and seen by TechCrunch, show that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) deployed cell site simulators — known as stingrays — at least 466 times between 2017 and 2019, which led to dozens of arrests and apprehensions. Previously obtained figures showed ICE used stingrays more than 1,885 times over a four-year period between 2013 and 2017.

The documents say that stingrays were not deployed for civil immigration investigations, like removals or deportations.

Although the numbers offer a rare insight into how often ICE uses this secretive and controversial technology, the documents don’t say how many Americans also had their phones inadvertently ensnared by these surveillance devices.

“We are all harmed by government practices that violate the Constitution and undermine civil liberties,” said Alexia Ramirez, a fellow with the ACLU’s Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project. “ICE’s use of cell site simulators affects all people, regardless of their immigration status.”

“When cell site simulators search for an individual, they necessarily also sweep in sensitive, private information about innocent bystanders,” said Ramirez. “This is part of the reason courts have said there are serious Fourth Amendment concerns with this technology.”

A letter from Harris Corp., which builds cell site simulators — known as “stingrays,” describing the non-disclosure terms for its Crossbow cell site simulator. (Source: ACLU)

Stingrays impersonate cell towers and capture the calls, messages, location and in some cases data of every cell phone in their range. Developed by Harris Corp., stingrays are sold exclusively to law enforcement. But their purchase and use are covered under strict non-disclosure agreements that prevent police from discussing how the technology works. These agreements are notoriously prohibitive; prosecutors have dropped court cases rather than disclose details about the stingrays.

The newly released documents are heavily redacted and offer little more about what we know of how stingrays work. One document did, however, reveal for the first time the existence of Harris’ most recent stingray, Crossbow. An email from 2012 refers to Crossbow as the “latest, most technologically up-to-date version of a Stingray system.”

But the civil liberties group said its public records lawsuit is not over. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which was also named in the suit, has not yet turned over any documents sought by the ACLU, despite spending $2.5 million on buying at least 33 stingrays, according to a 2016 congressional oversight report.

“We are deeply skeptical of CBP’s assertion that they do not possess records about cell site simulators,” said Ramirez. “Given public information, the agency’s claim just doesn’t pass the sniff test.”

CBP has until June 12 to respond to the ACLU’s latest motion.

When reached, a spokesperson for CBP was unable to comment by our deadline. ICE did not respond to a request for comment.

ICE used ‘stingray’ cell phone snooping tech hundreds of times since 2017 by Zack Whittaker originally published on TechCrunch