❌

Normal view

There are new articles available, click to refresh the page.
Before yesterdayMain stream

The New Rules of Cyber Resilience in an AI-Driven Threat Landscape

23 January 2026 at 11:03

For years, cybersecurity strategy revolved around a simple goal: keep attackers out. That mindset no longer matches reality. Today’s threat landscape assumes compromise. Adversaries do not just encrypt data and demand payment. They exfiltrate it, resell it, reuse it, and weaponize it long after the initial breach. As we look toward 2026, cyber resilience, not..

The post The New Rules of Cyber Resilience in an AI-Driven Threat Landscape appeared first on Security Boulevard.

From Incident to Insight: How Forensic Recovery Drives Adaptive Cyber Resilience

23 January 2026 at 10:07
=

When ransomware cripples a business’s systems or stealthy malware slips past defenses, the first instinct is to get everything back online as quickly as possible. That urgency is understandable β€” Cybersecurity Ventures estimates ransomware damage costs $156 million per day. But businesses cannot let speed overshadow the more pressing need to understand exactly what happened,..

The post From Incident to Insight: How Forensic Recovery Drives Adaptive Cyber Resilience appeared first on Security Boulevard.

The Zero Risk Trap: How to Ditch Perfection and Prioritize Real Cyber Resilience

20 January 2026 at 14:10

In Star Trek, the Kobayashi Maru simulation is an unwinnable test faced by Starfleet cadet captains. The only way to β€œwin” is to accept that you can’t. It’s a test of character β€”Β forcing cadet captains to choose between impossible options and live with the consequences. In many ways, our roles as cybersecurity leaders is the..

The post The Zero Risk Trap: How to Ditch Perfection and Prioritize Real Cyber Resilience appeared first on Security Boulevard.

Engaging Cisco Talos Incident Response is just the beginning

20 January 2026 at 08:00
Cisco Talos Incident Response Retainer provides expert, proactive, and reactive cybersecurity support to quickly contain threats and strengthen defenses.

Cyber Risk Trends for 2026: Building Resilience, Not Just Defenses

6 January 2026 at 09:45

We can’t outpace the adversary by trying to stop every attack, but we can outlast them by engineering systems and culture to take a punch and try to quickly rebound.

The post Cyber Risk Trends for 2026: Building Resilience, Not Just Defenses appeared first on SecurityWeek.

Why your organization needs a Cisco Talos Incident Response Retainer

6 January 2026 at 08:00
Every day, new ransomware and data breaches dominate the headlines, reminding us that it’s a matter of when, not if, your organization may be next. Having a well-prepared response plan and a team of forensic professionals ready to act at a moment’s notice can mean a world of difference between swift incident recovery or a […]

Building U.S. Drone Dominance Brick by Brick

4 January 2026 at 16:38

OPINION β€” One of the things I loved about LEGO as a child was the ability to mix and match an endless amount of parts to create unique builds. Children (and some adults) gather around a bin of parts to create something new. Imagine being asked: β€œBuild 10 houses in 30 minutes.” Everyone would come up with unique designs using various parts. Now, imagine a constraint: β€œYou may only use red, 2x4, 2x2, and 1x2 bricks, white windows and doors, and it all has to fit on a green 32x32 baseplate.” Quickly, the limited supply causes a frantic scramble.

This scenario mirrors the recent call by the Department of War to field 300,000 drones over two years. The conflict in Ukraine exposed the U.S.'s lack of preparedness to equip forces with Purpose Built Attritable Systems (PBAS) at the scale of its peer competitors. Further, manufacturers are restricted by the requirement for critical components to be NDAA / BlueUAS compliant and, as of December 22nd, even more restrictions which demand non-critical components be U.S.-manufactured. The defense industrial base is struggling to meet unprecedented demand.

While numerous startups and giants have stepped up, the U.S. supply chain cannot sustain the required pace. Existing suppliers’ manufacturing capabilities are quickly surpassed as companies scramble to design, build, and market the requested systems.

sUAS are fundamentally basic, consisting of a flight controller (FC), electronic speed controller (ESC), motors, propellers, camera, radio/video transmitters, receivers, and a frame. The main problem is the availability of parts and, more critically, sub-components needed to make them. Manufacturers are all reaching into the same scarce β€œbin,” forcing suppliers to seek materials with increased vigor.

Motors, for instance, require neodymium and copper. The majority of motor production occurs outside of the U.S., where technology is mature, labor costs are lower, and the supply chain exists. However, the sUAS industry accounts for less than 8% of neodymium consumption in the U.S. Returning to the LEGO analogy, if a child asks for more 1x1 red bricks to make houses, LEGO, which (in this scenario) makes over 90% of its money on other parts, has little incentive to retool for large-scale 1x1 brick production.

Similarly, most FC and ESC boards are produced in Taiwan. While this was permissible under the original NDAA and BlueUAS frameworks, the new requirement for U.S. production necessitates standing up domestic manufacturing, likely to ensure production continues in the event that trade with Taiwan is disrupted. However, standing up U.S. companies, sourcing materials, hiring labor, and developing technology all create significant costs that are passed to the consumer. Since PBAS systems must remain attritable (affordable enough to be lost in combat), a higher cost per unit will force warfighters to be more judicious.

What national security news are you missing today? Get full access to your own national security daily brief by upgrading to Subscriber+Member status.

Given the intense demand and additional domestic constraints, how can the U.S. remain competitive? There are a few ways.

Incentivize existing global manufacturers to stand up U.S.-based manufacturing. Companies with existing technology, design, manufacturing, and supply chains should be incentivized to establish domestic production of like products.

Encourage raw material companies to invest upstream. Critical material mining companies (e.g., for lithium and neodymium) currently lack incentive to ensure stable, consistent supply to manufacturers. Encouraging investment upstream offers supply chain guarantees for domestic manufacturing and additional revenue for investors.

Establish a β€œstrategic reserve” of raw materials. The U.S. maintains strategic oil and gas reserves. For future conflicts, a strategic reserve of critical sUAS materials is vital given the global stranglehold countries like China have on the market to enable rapid manufacturing scale-up even if trade is disrupted.

Increase throughput of BlueUAS and NDAA compliant components from outside the U.S. Maintaining U.S. connectivity to the global sUAS marketplace is important. While the restrictions are righteous, isolating U.S. production strains the raw material supply chain, causes allies to follow suit, and increases the overall cost per unit, reducing attritability. The U.S. should use the BlueUAS framework, with increased throughput, to identify compliant vendors across a wide section of allies and trade partners.

Expedite current NDAA compliant components manufactured overseas through BlueUAS processes. As manufacturing shifts to the U.S., the U.S. could provide β€˜provisional’ BlueUAS certifications with limited durations to cover companies during the transition.

Sign up for the Cyber Initiatives Group Sunday newsletter, delivering expert-level insights on the cyber and tech stories of the day – directly to your inbox. Sign up for the CIG newsletter today.


Without a temporary easement or an adequate transitional period, the U.S. drone market is likely to shift abruptly. Many companies cannot afford to stand up U.S. production, or the cost of compliance would render their price points untenable. This situation would likely result in defense giants acquiring the IP/technology from smaller companies at a steep discount, leveraging their supply networks, lobbying, and significant capital advantage to continue development and manufacturing under their umbrella, returning the U.S. defense ecosystem to its former exclusive state, prior to the recent tranche of reforms.

The U.S. is at a critical inflection point in its quest for American Drone Dominance. The foundation it establishes will define its final strength and resilience. Care must be taken to avoid supply chain degradation, continue providing affordable solutions for the warfighter, and remain flexible and responsive in future crises. Incentivizing domestic production without isolation will ensure the U.S. has all the pieces it needs to build successfully, brick by brick.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Who's reading this? 500K+ dedicated national security professionals. Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because national security is everyone’s business.

The Hidden Leverage of Digital Chokepoints

6 October 2025 at 10:59

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE β€” When we think about the arteries of global power, images of oil pipelines or shipping lanes often come to mind. They are visible, tangible, and easy to picture on a map. The digital world has its own arteries, equally vital but far less visible: undersea cables, satellites, and semiconductor supply chains. These systems allow our economies to function, our militaries to coordinate, and our societies to remain connected.

We rarely stop to consider how very fragile they are. A fiber-optic cable lying quietly on the seabed, a satellite orbiting high above, or a single Dutch firm making the machines that build the world’s most advanced chips? Each represents a potential point of failure. And when one of them falters, whether by accident or design, the consequences ripple instantly across the globe. What makes this even more concerning is that adversaries understand their potential value. They have studied the geography of our digital world with the same intensity that past powers studied maritime routes. Increasingly, they are testing ways to hold these chokepoints at risk, not in open war, but in the murky space called the gray zone.

Consider the seabed. Nearly all intercontinental internet traffic runs not through satellites, as many imagine, but along the ocean floor. The β€œcloud” is, in truth, anchored to the seabed. These cables are resilient in some respects, yet highly vulnerable in others. Russia has long deployed specialized vessels (such as the Yantar) to loiter near critical routes, mapping them and raising concerns about sabotage. The People’s Republic of China has taken subtler approaches. On several occasions, cables linking Taiwan’s outlying islands have been cut by Chinese vessels in incidents they described as accidental. Taipei viewed them, by contrast, as deliberate acts of pressure that left communities offline for weeks.

Nature has been no less disruptive. A volcanic eruption severed Tonga’s only international cable in 2022, cutting off connectivity entirely. A landslide off CΓ΄te d’Ivoire in 2024 damaged four cables at once, leaving more than a dozen African states scrambling to restore service. These episodes remind us that chokepoints need not be destroyed to reveal their importance.

For China, the issue is a strategic one. Through its Digital Silk Road initiative, Beijing has financed and built cables across Asia, Africa, and Europe. Chinese firms now sit at landing stations and repair depots. In times of peace these investments look like connectivity. In times of crisis, they can become instruments of leverage or coercion.

Sign up for the Cyber Initiatives Group Sunday newsletter, delivering expert-level insights on the cyber and tech stories of the day – directly to your inbox. Sign up for the CIG newsletter today.

The same logic applies in orbit. Satellites and global navigation systems act as the nervous system of modern life. They time banking transactions, guide aircraft, and support military operations. Disrupting them unsettles the rhythms of daily existence. Russia previewed this dynamic in 2022 when it launched a cyberattack against the Viasat KA-SAT network on the first day of its invasion of Ukraine. Thousands of modems across Europe went dark, cutting off critical communications. More routinely, Russian jamming and spoofing around Kaliningrad and Moscow have disoriented navigation systems, with civilian pilots suddenly reporting the loss of GPS mid-flight.

China has created its own path through BeiDou, a rival to GPS that is already woven into infrastructure and commerce across large swaths of the world. Countries adopting BeiDou for civilian uses also create dependencies that, in a crisis, could become channels of influence. China’s so-called inspector satellites, capable of shadowing Western systems in orbit, serve as a reminder that the domain is contested and difficult to police. Jamming, spoofing, or orbital surveillance are rarely attributable in real time. They can be dismissed as interference or technical glitches even when deliberate. That ambiguity is precisely what makes them effective tools of gray-zone leverage.

Vulnerability also extends to the factories that produce the silicon chips powering the digital age. No chokepoint illustrates fragility more starkly than semiconductors. Advanced chips are the foundation of artificial intelligence, modern weapons systems, consumer electronics, modern automobiles, and more. Yet their production is concentrated in very few hands. One company in Taiwan manufactures most of the world’s leading-edge chips. A single Dutch firm produces the extreme ultraviolet lithography machines needed to make them. And China has demonstrated repeatedly how control over upstream minerals can be wielded as leverage. Restrictions on gallium, germanium, and graphite have caused immediate price spikes and sent Western companies scrambling for alternatives.

The global chip shortage during the pandemic provided a glimpse of how disruption can have cascading impacts. Automotive plants shut down, electronics prices soared, and entire supply chains stalled. That was the result of market forces. In a geopolitical crisis, disruption would be intentional, targeted, and likely more devastating.

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

None of these vulnerabilities exist in isolation. Together, they form part of a broader and comprehensive strategy, particularly for China, where digital infrastructure has become a deliberate instrument of national power. Through the Digital Silk Road, through export controls on critical minerals, through investments in semiconductor capacity, through an ambitious national AI strategy, and BeiDou’s global adoption, Beijing is systematically building positions of leverage.

Is this preparation for an open assault on global systems? Maybe not, but it is a strategy designed for options in the gray zone. By holding digital chokepoints at risk, China can complicate allied decision-making and cast doubt on the reliability of critical systems, thereby slowing or obstructing responses at moments when speed is decisive. The ambiguity of each incident – whether it appears to be an accident, a policy choice, or something more calculated – becomes a tool of coercion.

The reality is that these risks cannot be eliminated. The very efficiency of the digital age depends on concentration. A single company leads in chipmaking, a limited set of satellites provides global timing, and relatively few cables carry the world’s data vast distances across the open ocean. Efficiency brings tremendous capability, but it also brings fragility. And fragility invites exploitation.

The counterweight must be resilience. That means redundant routes and suppliers, pre-positioned repair capacity, diversified supply chains, hardened infrastructure, and rehearsed recovery plans. The point is to recover and regain capacity as quickly as possible. To do so requires deeper public-private partnerships and closer coordination among allies, since no nation can protect these domains on its own. Resilience is not a one-time investment but a cultural shift. A culture that assumes disruption will come, prepares for it, and ensures that no single outage or shortage can paralyze us.

History offers some perspective. Nations once fought to control straits, canals, and oil fields. They still do so today, but increasingly our chokepoints are digital, hidden from sight yet just as consequential. Whoever shapes them, shapes the balance of global power.

Global stability today depends on foundations that are often invisible. Fiber-optic cables under the sea, satellites crossing the skies, and factories producing chips with microscopic precision form the backbone of our digital age. They showcase human ingenuity while highlighting profound vulnerabilities. Recognizing the duality of innovation’s promise alongside its fragility may be the most important step toward protecting what matters most in the digital age. And, yes, we must defend these technologies. But it’s about something bigger. It’s about ensuring that the digital world we depend on remains a source of strength, and not a lever of coercion.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

Innovator Spotlight: Darwinium

By: Gary
8 September 2025 at 15:12

The Digital Battlefield: How AI is Reshaping Cybersecurity and Fraud Prevention Crocodiles aren’t the only predators lurking in the shadows anymore. Today’s most dangerous hunters wear digital camouflage, wielding artificial...

The post Innovator Spotlight: Darwinium appeared first on Cyber Defense Magazine.

Innovator Spotlight: NetBrain

By: Gary
3 September 2025 at 16:28

Network Visibility: The Silent Guardian of Cybersecurity Network complexity is killing enterprise security teams. Buried under mountains of configuration data, manual processes, and endless troubleshooting, cybersecurity professionals are drowning in...

The post Innovator Spotlight: NetBrain appeared first on Cyber Defense Magazine.

Black Hat USA 2025 – AI, Innovation, and the Power of the Cybersecurity Community

By: Gary
13 August 2025 at 14:07

By Gary Miliefsky, Publisher of Cyber Defense Magazine Black Hat, the cybersecurity industry’s most established and in-depth security event series, has once again proven why it remains the go-to gathering...

The post Black Hat USA 2025 – AI, Innovation, and the Power of the Cybersecurity Community appeared first on Cyber Defense Magazine.

Everyone Wants to Build a Cyber Range: Should You?

24 January 2023 at 08:00

In the last few years, IBM X-Force has seen an unprecedented increase in requests to build cyber ranges. By cyber ranges, we mean facilities or online spaces that enable team training and exercises of cyberattack responses. Companies understand the need to drill their plans based on real-world conditions and using real tools, attacks and procedures.

What’s driving this increased demand? The increase in remote and hybrid work models emerging from the COVID-19 pandemic has elevated the priority to collaborate and train together as a team with the goal of being prepared for potential incidents.

Another force driving demand for cyber ranges is the rapid growth of high-profile attacks with seven-figure loss events and the public disclosure of attacks, impacting reputation and financial results. Damaging attacks, like data breaches and ransomware, have cemented the criticality of effective incident response to prevent worst-case outcomes and rapidly contain eventual ones.

Once you decide that your cybersecurity team and other actors in your cyberattack response protocols need to practice together, the economics for a dedicated cyber range is compelling. An organization can train many more employees more quickly through a dedicated cyber range.

But before you pull the trigger and order a cyber range, you should make a full evaluation of the pros and cons. The primary con, of course, is that a dedicated cyber range might be oversized for the organization’s long-term needs. You might not use it enough to justify the costs of building and operating an actual range. Alternatively, you might prefer to run cyberattack exercises remotely to more closely simulate the real work environment of your teams.

This post will provide a primer on conducting a graduated cyber range evaluation and help set up processes to think through what type of drilling grounds might be best suited for your team.

Why Build a Cyber Range? Mandatory Training, Certifications and Compliance

The most compelling reason for building a cyber range is that it is one of the best ways to improve the coordination and experience level of your team. Experience and practice enhance teamwork and provide the necessary background for smart decision-making during a real cyberattack. Cyber ranges are one of the best ways to run real attack scenarios and immerse the team in a live response exercise.

An additional reason to have access to a cyber range is that many compliance certifications and insurance policies cite mandatory cyber training of various degrees. These are driven by mandates and compliance standards established by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). With these requirements in place, organizations are compelled to free up budgets for relevant cyber training.

There are different ways to fulfill these training requirements. Per their role in the company, employees can be required to undergo certifications by organizations such as the SANS Institute. Training mandates can also be fulfilled by micro-certifications and online coursework using remote learning and certification platforms, such as Coursera. The decision to avail a company of a cyber range does not always mean building one in-house.

Learn more

A Cyber Training Progression in Stages: From Self-Study to Fully Operational Cyber Ranges

In talking with our customers, we offer them multiple options for cyber range setups, and we advise them to carry out the implementation in stages. Each stage is appropriate for a different level of commitment, activity and desire for a fully immersive cyber range experience.

Stage 1: Self-Training, Certifications and Labs

Stage 1 is blocking and tackling, the bare minimum for competent cybersecurity training. This provides the basics required for continuing education and fulfilling cyber training requirements. Stage 1 can include:

  • SANS training course in desired areas of expertise
  • Completion of Coursera online self-paced or Massive Open Online Course classes with requisite certification of completion
  • Specific class focus, such as reverse engineering malware or network forensics to explain how attackers traverse networks without being detected, etc.

An added part to Stage 1 is holding hands-on labs where participants complete tasks or simulate blue team or red team activities. The labs should focus on outcomes and metrics as much as they focus on completion. Participants should understand whether they are able to efficiently and effectively find indicators of compromise and mitigate attacks, as well as map the primary tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) associated with those attack simulations.

Stage 2: Team and Wider-Scale Corporate Exercises

In Stage 2, the more mature companies can escalate to coordinated group exercises that are planned and follow a curriculum. This requires dedicated compute infrastructure or hardware (some organizations choose to do it all from their existing workstations). In these exercises, all stakeholders take the lessons they have learned and bring them together to orchestrate a coordinated response. You may choose to have red teams attempt to infiltrate and go up against blue teams and involve threat intelligence teams and other security staff in the company’s security operations center.

If you want to make this stage a more immersive and realistic experience, you may also choose to include other teams, such as marketing. Bringing in operational technology (OT) teams at this stage is strongly suggested. Many of the most recent ransomware attacks have targeted not just laptops and other IT devices but also OT devices.

Business leaders tend to benefit strongly from witnessing and experiencing immersive coordinated exercises. Giving them insights into what other teams are experiencing and how they need to respond provides invaluable context that comes into play during an actual crisis. The most advanced team cyber response exercises can involve dozens or hundreds of team members and last several days.

Stage 3: The Collaborative Cyber Range With Vendors, Customers and Partners

Coordinating responses for your organization is a great start. But what about those around you β€” your customers, vendors and partners? The nature of your digital infrastructure, the ubiquitous connection to application programming interfaces, the proliferation of connected devices and the varying types of connections make it critical to coordinate an attack response with your closest third parties.

It’s easy to understand the criticality of an orchestrated response. The world has become more and more connected; the digital links among vendors, customers and partners have grown. An organization can have hundreds of third-party connections at a time. This has increased the attack surface and made supply chain attacks a preferred tactic with cyber criminals and nation-state actors alike. Supply chain attacks can be hard to detect because they come through a trusted intermediary. They are also a general-purpose exploit for securing future access, traversing networks and expanding horizontally inside an organization.

With awareness of third-party risk management, software supply chain risk growing and attacks in this realm more complex than ever, we are seeing customers asking to take their cyber readiness and exercises to the ecosystem level.

More than a concept to eventually consider, we actually see some companies demanding this participation as a condition of a partnership or becoming a key vendor. Chief information security officers (CISOs) and risk teams want to see beyond the attestations of SOC2 or ISO 2700 and test out the actual capabilities and readiness of their core partners and vendors.

For example, if an organization uses a bank that employs a payment processor that subsequently uses a clearinghouse, all three are tightly knit and have likely established some playbooks on how to work together, how to identify where the chain of interactions encounters a problem or when a breach has occurred. Ultimately, they should know how to contain and stop a cyberattack involving one or more of the three entities. Proactively establishing a risk-aware working relationship and identifying and introducing specific risks for each stakeholder can facilitate a more robust, comprehensive and rapid response in case of an attack. Often this is the point of bringing several parties into the collaborative exercise: to set up the procedures and norms for a collaborative response that’s agile and precise.

Keeping Your Training and Range Lively With Fresh Content and Context

A key part of why we believe organizations are seeking to build their own cyber ranges is the rapid acceleration of attack types and the extent of attacks. Threats that used to emerge over the course of months now emerge in weeks or days. CISOs and risk management leaders recognize this and understand that there are two key ways to address this shift:

  • Increase the frequency of exercises
  • Improve the content of exercises to keep things fresh over time

With cyber ranges, we can use both static, curriculum-driven content for stage 1 exercises and push evolving content with industry context for those moving to more elaborate exercises. We typically insert lessons and exercises based on attacks that may be happening concurrently with the exercise itself.

Ideally, you want your range to allow for customizable content that can be modified on the fly. This allows a company with a cyber range to load up an exercise on a major attack days after the attack is revealed. That capability makes cyber ranges more relevant and valuable because it enables organizations to speed up their security metabolism and learn faster.

Conclusion: Are You Ready for a Dedicated Cyber Range?

Before you get to the point of thinking about a dedicated cyber range, we highly recommend you work through stage 1 and stage 2 capabilities. At a minimum, you should run a cyber range exercise as a one-off to see how it works for your team and your organization. Most crucially, consider what the utilization rate of your cyber range will be when planning. Ideally, it should be in use most of the time to maximize your investment. Think through whether this is viable for your team and your enterprise before pulling the trigger. As a mitigating factor, think through whether you can use your dedicated cyber range as a pop-up or quick-start cyber operations command center in case of emergency.

After you feel comfortable with the idea of a cyber range and have confirmed its value, consider the positives and negatives of the three types of cyber ranges or outsourcing exercises to a trusted vendor.

  • Dedicated on-premise ranges are more expensive to build and maintain but can help teams create in-person chemistry. This has become a more viable option in the past year as more workforces are convening in person again.
  • Creating an entirely virtual cyber range prior to the pandemic was not something many organizations were considering. Virtual versions are cheaper to stand up and upgrade and offer more flexibility. However, for some organizations, face-to-face interactions are important.
  • A number of customers have come to us requesting hybrid versions with both virtual and in-person components. Hybrid models are flexible and can extend to vendors and partners but are also the more expensive installations.

Having a cyber range at the ready is a fabulous foundation for upping your security metabolism and readiness. Follow a rigorous decision-making process to ensure you get the right kind for your organization and needs. To learn whether a cyber range is right for your organization and how to set up a cyber range program, talk to IBM X-Force Cyber Range Consulting here.

Want to hear directly from the experts? Register for the webinar, Tips and Best Practices for Cyber Ranges: How Your Organization Can Train as First Responders in the Face of an Attack.

The post Everyone Wants to Build a Cyber Range: Should You? appeared first on Security Intelligence.

❌
❌