OPINION — “As we’ve said from the beginning, and in every statement, these highly effective strikes are specifically intended to be ‘lethal, kinetic strikes.’ The declared intent is to stop lethal drugs, destroy narco-boats, and kill the narco-terrorists who are poisoning the American people. Every trafficker we kill is affiliated with a Designated Terrorist Organization.”

That was part of a message from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth last Friday evening on the social platform X, commenting on an earlier Washington Post story that alleged Hegseth had verbally ordered defense officials to “kill everybody” traveling on a narco-trafficking boat September 2. That was the first of 21 boats struck and sunk since then by U.S. military units – actions which have killed 83 people.

According to last week’s Post story, that first September 2, missile strike hit a so-called narco-trafficking boat carrying 11 passengers, but left two survivors clinging to the wreckage. The Post story then reported for the first time that a second strike was ordered by Adm. Frank "Mitch" Bradley, who was at the time, head of Special Operations Command and was the commander in charge of the operation.

In his Friday message, apparently referring to The Post article, Hegseth wrote, “As usual, the fake news is delivering more fabricated, inflammatory, and derogatory reporting to discredit our incredible warriors fighting to protect the homeland.”

Hegseth went on to write that the attacks have been “lawful under both U.S. and international law, with all actions in compliance with the law of armed conflict,” positions already being criticized and questioned before last week’s Post story.

On Sunday, President Trump on Air Force One said, “He [Hegseth] said he did not say that [the order “kill everybody”], and I believe him, 100 percent.”

Yesterday, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt, said “Secretary Hegseth authorized Adm. Bradley to conduct these kinetic strikes,” and that “Adm. Bradley worked well within his authority and the law to ensure the boat was destroyed and the threat to the United States of America was eliminated.”

A good question is who was in the room when Adm. Bradley gave that order?

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The second strike issue has also put a spotlight on President Trump’s threat policy toward Venezuela and its leader, Nicolas Maduro.

I describe it as a threat policy because Trump’s been unclear whether he just wants Maduro out, or plans for the U.S. to take over Venezuela and install a new government in Caracas.

Since August, a possible U.S. invasion force has been built up in the Caribbean, and over the past weeks Marine, Navy and Air Force elements have carried out well-publicized military exercises. Trump last week threatened to attack Venezuelan land-based drug facilities, and he disclosed on Sunday, that he had spoken to Maduro.

Press reports claim Trump offered free passage if Maduro left Venezuela, but indications are that the latter did not accept the offer. A Trump-led White House meeting on Venezuela was scheduled for 5 p.m. yesterday with the President’s top national security aides.

Let’s pause for a moment.

President Trump has not yet explained his strategy, or the specific purpose or plan, for the built-up U.S. Caribbean military forces. He has talked about stopping drugs from entering the U.S., often claiming – with no proof – that each narco-boat destroyed saves 25,000 American lives.

It’s no real war on drugs in the U.S. since it has no domestic element, and even the foreign side is flawed as illustrated by Trump’s surprise pardon offer last Friday to former-Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández.

Based ironically on an investigation begun during Trump’s first administration, Hernandez was convicted and sentenced last year to 45 years in prison. Prosecutors described him as a “violent, multi-ton drug trafficker” who allegedly abused his political connections for personal and political gain and at least twice “helped arrange murders of drug trafficking rivals.”

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Meanwhile, up to now Congress has yet to hold a public hearing focused on the Caribbean buildup or the Venezuelan situation. However, this second-strike killing of the two September 2 survivors has brought new attention and concern to the legal questioning of the Trump administration’s killing of narco-traffickers.

Harvard Law School Professor Jack Goldsmith last Friday pointed out in his Executive Functions platform that the Defense Department’s own Law of War Manual says, “it is also prohibited to conduct hostilities on the basis that there shall be no survivors, or to threaten the adversary with the denial of quarter. This rule is based on both humanitarian and military considerations. This rule also applies during non-international armed conflict.”

Last Friday, Sens. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) and Jack Reed (D-R.I.), chairman and ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, released a joint statement saying their committee “is aware of recent news reports and the Department of Defense’s initial response regarding follow-on strikes on suspected narcotics vessels in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility.”

As a result, the two Senators said, “The Committee has directed inquiries to the Department and we will be conducting vigorous oversight to determine the facts related to these circumstances.”

Their notice comes on top of a letter sent November 24, to Attorney General Pam Bondi and Hegseth by Democratic Senators on the Armed Services Committee, seeking “expeditious declassification and public release of the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel’s [OLC] written opinion, dated September 5, 2025, concerning the domestic and international legal basis for recent military strikes of certain vessels near South America and the Caribbean, with appropriate redactions necessary to protect military personnel and sensitive intelligence matters.”

The 13 Senators pointed out, “Few decisions are more consequential for a democracy than the use of lethal force,” and noted as precedent that “after the United States carried out military strikes in Libya in 2011, and in Syria in 2018, the Department of Justice released the applicable OLC opinion justifying each operation.”

On Saturday, the House Armed Services Chairman and ranking Democrat. Reps. Mike Rogers (R-Ala.) and Adam Smith (D-Wash.), issued their own statement saying their committee is “committed to providing rigorous oversight of the Department of Defense’s military operations in the Caribbean,” and “we take seriously the reports of follow-on strikes on boats alleged to be ferrying narcotics in the SOUTHCOM region and are taking bipartisan action to gather a full accounting of the operation in question.”

With both Republican-chaired committees on record opening inquiries into the narco-boat attacks, and President Trump threatening new land attacks on Venezuela, it is not clear what happens next.

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What Trump has done is put out statements on Truth Social such as the one last Saturday, “To all Airlines, Pilots, Drug Dealers, and Human Traffickers.” They are to “please consider THE AIRSPACE ABOVE AND SURROUNDING VENEZUELA TO BE CLOSED IN ITS ENTIRETY.” Most international commercial flights had been cancelled more than 10 days ago after the November 21, U.S. Federal Aviation Administration warning of the risks of flying over Venezuelan airspace,

What is all this Trump messaging supposed to mean? And is this a way a serious U.S. President should be conducting foreign policy?

As I and others have pointed out, there has been unease indicated within the Defense Department since these unprovoked killings began. In mid-October, SOUTHCOM Commander Adm. Alvin Holsey announced his early retirement on December 12 – little more than a year after he assumed the position. Holsey has yet to disclose his reasoning, but the New York Times reported that he had raised internal concerns about the attacks on the boats.

In November, NBC reported that a senior SOUTHCOM Judge Advocate General in August, before the strikes began, had raised whether they would be legal, and that he was later sidelined.

We also have had President Trump’s social media outbursts beginning November 20, against Sen. Mark Kelly (D-Ariz.) and five other Members of Congress, each of whom had served in the military or CIA, for their video reminding military personnel that they “can refuse illegal orders.” Trump at various times called what they had done “Seditious Behavior” that was “punishable by death.”

Hegseth, last Tuesday in a memo to the Navy Secretary John Phelan, described Kelly’s participation in the video as “Potentially Unlawful Conduct,” and asked for it to be reviewed for “consideration and disposition as you deem appropriate.” As a retired Navy officer, Kelly could be ordered back on active duty and face a court martial trial. But Hegseth, having apparently left it up to Phelan and the Navy to carry out, made it highly unlikely that anything more than an inquiry will ever take place.

While all these activities are taking place today, I want to also record a bit of history surrounding Operation Southern Spear, which Secretary Hegseth announced November 13, “as a new, formal military and surveillance campaign,” with a goal “to remove ‘narco-terrorists’ from the Western Hemisphere and secure the U.S. homeland from illicit drugs.”

In fact, Operation Southern Spear had its roots in the Biden administration and was officially announced by the U.S. Navy 4th Fleet on January 28, 2025, as “a heterogeneous mix of Robotic and Autonomous Systems to support the detection and monitoring of illicit trafficking while learning lessons for other theaters.” In a press release, the 4th Fleet said the operation was an evolution of the Navy’s previous operation dubbed Windward Stack, begun in 2023. It added, the results of Operation Southern Spear “will help determine combinations of unmanned vehicles and manned forces needed to provide coordinated maritime domain awareness and conduct counternarcotics operations.”

In a July 2, 2025, announcement, the Navy said SOUTHCOM and 4th Fleet have launched Operation Southern Spear which “will involve un-crewed surface vessels that can stay at sea for extended periods, small robotic interceptor boats, and vertical take-off and landing un-crewed air systems. These will combine with manned forces to help provide coordinated maritime domain awareness and conduct counternarcotics operations.”

I doubt that the originators of Operation Southern Spear foresaw it as a human killing program.

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That was Sen. Andy Kim (D-N.J.), last Wednesday, questioning Adm. Kevin E. Lunday during the latter’s confirmation hearing to be the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard last Wednesday before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Lunday answered, “Well, Senator, we're operating out there under our Coast Guard law enforcement authority as a law enforcement agency, a maritime law enforcement agency. And so that's not within our authority as a law enforcement agency during our Coast Guard operations under the Department of Homeland Security's authority.”

I begin with that exchange because to me, the heart of Lunday’s response – “that’s not within our authority as a law enforcement agency” – showed a senior military officer respecting the law under which he operates.

It also raises directly the question of under what law, or still-secret Justice Department interpretation of the law, is the Trump administration carrying out its destruction of alleged narco-trafficking boats and killing of crews – so far 21 boats and 83 dead crew members?

Before discussing, again, the legal issues surrounding the Trump administration’s military activity in the Caribbean, I want to lay out concerns about what the U.S. military is doing – beyond blowing up speed boats -- and how those actions, along with Venezuela’s reactions, could lead to a war no one wants.

On November 16, with the arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group, more than 15 percent of all deployed U.S. Navy warships are now positioned in the Caribbean Sea, a force greater than existed during the 1960s Cuban missile crisis. Remember, the earlier buildup included the USS Iwo Jima and its amphibious ready group with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) that has more than 2,200 Marines, MV-22 Ospreys, CH-53E helicopters, and landing craft.

Although U.S. Southern Command has said these forces are focused on counternarcotics efforts with regional partners, it has not commented or disclosed details on any other specific operations,

However, the New York Times reported Friday that “the U.S. Navy has routinely been positioning warships near Venezuela’s coast in locations far from the Caribbean’s main drug-smuggling routes, suggesting that the buildup is focused more on a pressure campaign against Venezuela than on the counternarcotics operation the Trump administration says it’s waging.”

At the same time, Air & Space Forces Magazine reported “multiple B-52H Stratofortress bombers [from Minot Air Force Base, N.D.] flew off the northern coast of South America on November 20,” on a “lengthy, nearly daylong flight, which a U.S. official said was a ‘presence patrol.’” At the same time that the B-52s were operating in the region, the U.S. also dispatched Navy F/A-18 Super Hornets from the Gerald R. Ford who then joined with a U.S. Air Force RC-135 Rivet Joint signals intelligence aircraft, the magazine reported.

“All the aircraft, including the fighters, switched on their transponders for parts of the mission, making them visible [to Venezuelan radar] on flight tracking data,” according to the magazine.

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From November 16 through November 21, elements of the Marine Corps 22nd MEU along with Trinidad and Tobago Defense Forces held joint training exercises in both urban and rural environments across Trinidad and Tobago, which is just seven miles away from the Venezuelan shoreline. Operations took place during daytime and after dark, and some incorporated 22nd MEU helicopters.

Last Saturday, Trinidad and Tobago Acting Foreign Affairs Minister Barry Padarath said that joint military training with Washington will continue. “We have said, very clearly, that part of our mandate from the nation has been to restore peace and security,” Padarath said, “and therefore we are partnering with the United States and continuing these joint efforts.”

All these past activities, plus President Trump’s threats, have caused Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro to mobilize some 200,000 soldiers. With the announcement that the Gerald R. Ford was deploying to the Caribbean, Venezuelan Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López raised the military alert levels in the country, according to El Pais newspaper. That meant, the newspaper wrote, “placing the entire country’s military arsenal on full operational readiness, as well as the massive deployment of land, air, naval, riverine, and missile assets; weapons systems; military units; the Bolivarian Militia; Citizen Security Organs; and the Comprehensive Defense Commands.”

Last week, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced Monday’s U.S. State Department designation of Cartel de Los Soles, the Venezuelan criminal group Trump claims Maduro controls, as a “foreign terrorist organization (FTO).” Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said, “It gives more tools to our department to give options to the President,” and “nothing is off the table, but nothing is automatically on the table either.”

Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and opponent of the attacks on alleged narco-trafficking boats, told Sunday’s CBS’ Face the Nation, “I think by doing this [naming Venezuela an FTO] they're pretending as if we are at war. They're pretending as if they've gotten some imprimatur to do what they want. When you have war, the rules of engagement are lessened.”

Looking at the political implications, Sen. Paul added, “I think once there's an invasion of Venezuela, or if they decide to re-up the subsidies and the gifts to Ukraine, I think you'll see a splintering and a fracturing of the movement that has supported the President, because I think a lot of people, including myself, were attracted to the President because of his reticence to get us involved in foreign wars.”

A CBS poll released Sunday showed just one in five Americans had heard a lot about the U.S. Caribbean military buildup, but of that knowledgeable group, 70 percent opposed going to war with Venezuela in the first place. In addition, 75 percent said Trump needed Congress’ approval before taking action in Venezuela, including just over half of Republicans.

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As for the legal side, Sen. Paul said, attacking boats “is really going against the rule of law in the way in which we interact with people on the high seas, and it has no precedent.”

At Wednesday’s hearing, Adm. Lunday gave the following explanation of how the Coast Guard legally carries out its non-lethal interdiction operations under maritime and U.S. laws.

“In the Eastern Pacific or the Caribbean or other locations, but principally in those areas,” Adm. Lunday explained, “we normally receive information. It could be from a surveillance aircraft or other means that there is a suspected drug smuggling boat that is headed north and then we will interdict that boat. We use an armed helicopter to disable the boat [by firing at their outboard engines] and then we will go aboard, seize the boat, and typically take a representative or take the samples, the cocaine that's on the boat if we can recover it. We'll destroy the boat as a hazard to navigation. Then we'll take the detainees who were operating the boat and we'll process them and…then arrest and then seek to prosecute.”

Lunday made clear “the helicopter interdiction tactical squadron which are…very specialized crews that do this work and they are trained and they're effective at disabling the engines. The time they would use lethal force was if they were fired upon from the drug smuggling boat under our mode of operating as a law enforcement agency.”

Near the end of last Wednesday’s hearing, Sen. Ben Ray Lujan (D-N.M.) asked Lunday, “Admiral, yes or no. Does the US Coast Guard have a role in these military strikes on vessels in the Caribbean or Pacific?”

Lunday responded, “Senator, thank you for the question. So, under our Coast Guard Maritime Law Enforcement Authority, we're not involved in the Department of War’s operations that you're describing. That's under the Department of War.”

Asked by Sen. Lujan if he had been to meetings about the strikes on vessels, Lunday replied he had “not been involved in meetings regarding those military activities specifically,” and later added, “I have not had a conversation with Secretary Hegseth about these strikes. No, Senator.”

Sen. Lujan closed by saying to the non-present Pete Hegseth: “Mr. Secretary, if you're out there, if you're listening to this…If you've ignored the Admiral, give him a holler, pull him in, have a good conversation, and learn from this wise person.”

That’s not a bad idea.

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OPINION / FINE PRINT — “We have asked the Mexican government to also step up their involvement in stopping these cartels and stopping the huge amount of drugs that are coming across. If the Mexican navy saw a group of American fishermen that they thought were suspicious of potentially moving drugs and they moved in to kill the 15 American citizens without contacting you, without going through any normal procedures, would you be okay with that?...What we do in combat there is reciprocity, and we are concerned about what other militaries will do to us because we have opened the door on this.”

The was Sen. Elissa Slotkin (D-Mich.) speaking back on September 18, during a Senate Armed Services Committee confirmation hearing for Derrick M. Anderson to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Platte B. Moring III to be the Defense Department Inspector General.

Three days earlier, the U.S. had carried out the second of its attacks on speedboats it said were trafficking drugs in the Caribbean that were destined for the U.S. killing three individuals. The first such attack, on September 1, killed 11 occupants.

Because the jobs both Anderson and Moring were up for would involve them dealing with the Trump administration’s new policy of attacking alleged narco-trafficking boats in international waters, Sen. Slotkin and other Senators raised questions at this hearing that are highly relevant today as these deadly Trump administration attacks have continued in the Caribbean and since Tuesday began in the eastern Pacific.

So far, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has reported nine such attacks resulting in the deaths of 37 individuals.

As I will explore below, last month, Armed Services Committee Chairman Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) at the close of this hearing made a pledge that remains unfulfilled – in effect to hold oversight hearings on the attacks.

Before that happened, Sen. Slotkin made clear, “I have no problem with these groups being designated foreign terrorist organizations. Fentanyl is killing just as many people, if not more, as any terrorist group we have ever seen. But I do have a problem with the lack of transparency and potential violations of international law.”

The Senator then pointed out, “The U.S. government has a way of interdicting ships. You know this. The U.S. Coast Guard uses patrol boats and helicopters. They are able to shoot out a motor and disable the vehicle, board it, and then indict all those people, grab all those people. Show everyone all the drugs that they have secured.”

As I wrote in my column three days ago, the U.S. Coast Guard announced October 14 that it has seized more than 100,000 pounds of cocaine in the eastern Pacific Ocean since launching Operation Pacific Viper in early August, averaging over 1,600 pounds interdicted daily. These drug seizures, and the apprehension of 86 individuals suspected of narco-trafficking, were the result of 34 interdictions since early August.

I also pointed out in that column, that on the day after the Coast Guard release of the success of Operation Pacific Viper, during an Oval Office press conference President Trump said that Coast Guard interdiction “had been ineffective” for 30 years because “they have faster boats.”

As Sen. Slotkin noted above, and I mentioned in my column, the Coast Guard has helicopter-mounted special long-range rifles that can hit and disable the engines mounted at the rear of narco-trafficker speedboats.

While Trump and Hegseth have publicized videos each time a boat has been blown up, I agree with Sen. Slotkin who at the September 18 hearing said, “I would love it if the Trump administration showed us the full video from that encounter, showed us that these men did not have their hands up, that they were not waving a white flag, that they were not turning around and getting out of there, and then show us the drugs. The President said that there were all kinds of drugs that were in that ship. Show it. Show us the video that he is apparently alluding to.”

Hegseth did show what he said were packages of drugs floating on the water after yesterday’s eastern Pacific action, but then the drugs appeared to have been blown up.

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Sen. Tim Kaine (D-Va.) followed Slotkin and brought up a series of questions he and 24 other Democratic or Independent Senators had sent to the White House on September 10, and had not received answers. In fact, they have not yet received an answer.

The questions are worth reviewing: “Give us the evidence that these boats were carrying drugs. Tell us who was on the boats. Tell us what your legal authority was to take a military strike that had not been authorized by Congress? The question that I really want to know is why did you decide to attack rather than interdict? If you interdict a drug boat you get evidence. You seize the drugs but you also get evidence by having access to people and often it is that evidence that leads you to be able to go after the kingpins and the real, you know, muscle behind these operators.”

Kaine added, “If you attack a boat and destroy it makes an impact, but you do not get the evidence. It may actually be counter-productive in fighting narco trafficking.”

As I noted above, when Chairman Wicker closed the September 18 hearing, he said, “The questions about what happened in the Caribbean [and now eastern Pacific] are going to have to be answered. This committee has congressional oversight responsibility.”

Earlier, Sens. Wicker and Slotkin had an exchange about what might occur at any future oversight hearing.

Chairman Wicker reminded Slotkin that “each witness has answered in the affirmative to this question, ‘do you agree to provide records, documents, electronic communications in a timely manner when requested by this committee, et cetera.’ So that is on the record.”

Sen. Slotkin asked, “Do you understand that as video? Just to clarify for me, Chairman.”

Chairman Wicker responded, “Documents, records. I think each witness has answered in the affirmative there…and they will be obligated to follow that.”

“Great,” Sen. Slotkin said at one point, “I look forward to the video.”

I think we all do.

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DEEP DIVE — U.S. military forces this week carried out yet another strike on a vessel in Caribbean waters off Venezuela, marking the sixth such lethal operation since September. For the first time, two survivors were rescued and taken into U.S. custody aboard a navy ship.

President Trump also confirmed that he has authorized covert CIA operations inside Venezuela, dramatically broadening the theater of confrontation. Meanwhile, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro appealed to the U.N. Security Council, demanding the body denounce the strikes as violations of sovereign rights — a motion the U.S. is poised to veto.

These actions are the latest installments in a mounting campaign the U.S. launched in early September, signaling a shift from isolated interdictions into sustained military pressure.

On September 2, U.S. forces struck a vessel in international waters, killing 11 people, and claimed that it belonged to the Tren de Aragua gang and was laden with narcotics. Just over a week later, Washington unveiled an extensive naval deployment comprised of eight warships, a submarine and thousands of troops and launched a second attack against another alleged smuggling vessel, sending a clear message that the operation is systematic rather than episodic.

Then, in early October, the administration formally alerted Congress that the United States was in “armed conflict” with regional drug cartels, and promptly followed with another strike off Venezuela’s coast, killing four.

What began as maritime interdictions has evolved into a strategic escalation — combining naval power, aerial presence, covert action, and legal redefinition of cartels — in what appears to be an intensifying, long-term confrontation.

Ryan Berg, director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, tells The Cipher Brief the strikes “represent a paradigm shift in how the United States conducts counternarcotics.”

“Previously, the United States would board and search vessels and make arrests. Driving much of this paradigm shift is the foreign terrorist designations on more than a dozen organizations,” he continued. “The administration wants to send the message that this is not just a rhetorical shift, but that this is a shift with meaning. We deal with terrorists differently than we deal with criminals.”

From Quiet Waters to Strategic Theater

For decades, the Caribbean was viewed in Washington as a quiet, if troubled, backyard, important for migration and commerce, but hardly central to global competition. That calculation has changed. Today, the region is framed as a frontline of American power, where the U.S. confronts a convergence of transnational threats — from drug trafficking and irregular migration to external influence from China, Russia, and Iran — that unfold just off its own shores.

Michael Shifter, adjunct professor at Georgetown University and former president of the Inter-American Dialogue, tells The Cipher Brief that the strikes “will have a critical impact on the Caribbean security situation.”

“For the first time since the Panama invasion in 1989, the U.S. has carried out combat operations against assets allegedly connected to a Latin American government,” he noted. “That the strikes were conducted without regard to international law has unnerved other regional governments and made them wonder if they might be the next target.”

For much of the post-Cold War era, the Caribbean was not a primary theater for U.S. grand strategy. Policymakers often focused on the Middle East, Asia, and Europe, leaving the islands and waterways between Florida and South America to languish in relative neglect. The U.S. presence was episodic and reactive — providing disaster relief after hurricanes, conducting occasional counternarcotics patrols, and offering modest development aid.

But adversaries were not idle. China deepened infrastructure investments, secured port access, and trained regional military officers in its academies. Russia provided defense diplomacy, intelligence cooperation, and symbolic shows of force. Iran, though less prominent, found opportunity through Venezuela and proxy networks. These activities chipped away at U.S. primacy, testing whether Washington’s absence created a strategic vacuum.

“The presence of the expanded array of U.S. surveillance assets, cruisers, destroyers, amphibious ships, F-35 fighters, and other forces, in conjunction with the demonstrated use of force and reported planning for strikes inside Venezuela, are visibly driving panicked reactions by the Maduro regime,” Evan Ellis, research professor of Latin American studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, tells The Cipher Brief. “This demonstrates that the U.S. is willing to go beyond traditional law enforcement interception protocols to use lethal force against suspected drug boats.”

A Renewed U.S. Deterrent Strategy

The Trump administration has reframed narcotics networks as “narco terrorists,” a label that blurs the line between law enforcement and national defense. This allows for military strikes against what once would have been considered criminal targets. The Venezuelan boat destroyed on September 2 is the most vivid example yet, and it sparked immediate backlash from governments in Caracas, Bogotá, and across the Caribbean.

Venezuela condemned the strike as a violation of sovereignty, with Nicolás Maduro mobilizing civilian militias and promising to defend territorial waters. Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro went further, calling for international investigations into U.S. officials for what he termed unlawful killings. Fishermen in Trinidad and Tobago expressed concern about being caught in the crossfire, as expanded naval patrols threatened their livelihoods and heightened the risks to civilian vessels.

From Washington’s perspective, these costs are tolerable compared to the benefits of deterrence. Deploying advanced assets — such as F-35 fighters to Puerto Rico — signals that the U.S. views the region as strategically vital. The administration is also seeking to highlight the deterrent value of its strikes, suggesting they could disrupt smuggling operations and complicate adversaries’ strategic planning.

Still, questions loom about legality and proportionality.

“Unilateral U.S. military operations in Latin America have a long and often unhappy history,” Shifter said. “They remain extremely sensitive and touch a nerve in the region.”

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The Policy Evolution: From Reactive to Strategic

The idea of a sustained U.S. Caribbean policy, however, is not new. The 2020 U.S. Strategy for Engagement in the Caribbean outlined plans for expanded diplomacy, development, and security cooperation. Yet progress was limited by competing priorities and budget shortfalls.

What has changed in 2025 is the scale and framing of U.S. involvement. Rather than treating the Caribbean as an ancillary focus of counternarcotics or disaster relief, the Trump administration now casts it as a frontline of national defense. The deployment of warships and high-tech aircraft, the aggressive legal redefinition of cartels, and the diplomatic outreach led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio all point to an institutional pivot.

Congress is also being drawn into the mix. The reintroduced Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Authorization Act would allocate $88 million annually through 2029 for security cooperation. The measure reflects recognition that sustained resources, not episodic funding, are necessary to compete with external powers.

Risks, Imperatives, and What Comes Next

The road ahead carries both promise and peril. On the opportunity side, elevating the Caribbean to a strategic priority acknowledges geographic fact: the region sits on America’s doorstep, with busy sea lanes and chokepoints that have often been overlooked in U.S. defense planning. A credible deterrent posture, paired with investments in governance and development, could help steady fragile environments and blunt the appeal of rival powers.

Yet the risks of escalation are considerable. Misidentifying a civilian vessel, overreaching in the use of force, or neglecting consultation with regional partners could provoke backlash that undermines U.S. legitimacy.

“It is doubtful that the U.S. strikes will be effective in stopping the flow of narcotics,” Shifter cautioned. “Traffickers will adapt, alter their routes and try to minimize risks. Retaliation by criminal groups cannot be ruled out.”

Ellis warned of another danger: the aftermath of regime change in Venezuela.

“The biggest risks of such an operation would be whether Maduro could be captured alive. The other risk is that, in the absence of a more enduring U.S. force, the legitimate government of Edmundo González would not be able to establish order and control over the military,” he pointed out. “A post-Maduro Venezuela could degenerate into a free-for-all between criminal factions, guerrilla groups, sindicatos, and pranes — with Cuban and Russian elements fueling instability.”

Berg, by contrast, argued that regional cooperation has been robust.

“What has been great to see is the regional support for the United States’ deployment. Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana have been vocally supportive,” he said. “The Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, and Argentina have all declared the Tren de Aragua to be a foreign terrorist organization in the last month. Countries in the region appear open to a different approach, and some are even synchronizing their approaches with the United States on counternarcotics.”

The strike that killed 11 people was both a tactical hit on a trafficking network and a symbolic declaration of intent. What follows will decide whether this marks the start of a durable doctrine — or an overreach that produces more instability than it resolves.

“More consistent presence in the region will be key to ensuring that the United States can secure its interests,” Berg added.

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DEEP DIVE — U.S. military forces this week carried out yet another strike on a vessel in Caribbean waters off Venezuela, marking the sixth such lethal operation since September. For the first time, two survivors were rescued and taken into U.S. custody aboard a navy ship.

President Trump also confirmed that he has authorized covert CIA operations inside Venezuela, dramatically broadening the theater of confrontation. Meanwhile, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro appealed to the U.N. Security Council, demanding the body denounce the strikes as violations of sovereign rights — a motion the U.S. is poised to veto.

These actions are the latest installments in a mounting campaign the U.S. launched in early September, signaling a shift from isolated interdictions into sustained military pressure.

On September 2, U.S. forces struck a vessel in international waters, killing 11 people, and claimed that it belonged to the Tren de Aragua gang and was laden with narcotics. Just over a week later, Washington unveiled an extensive naval deployment comprised of eight warships, a submarine and thousands of troops and launched a second attack against another alleged smuggling vessel, sending a clear message that the operation is systematic rather than episodic.

Then, in early October, the administration formally alerted Congress that the United States was in “armed conflict” with regional drug cartels, and promptly followed with another strike off Venezuela’s coast, killing four.

What began as maritime interdictions has evolved into a strategic escalation — combining naval power, aerial presence, covert action, and legal redefinition of cartels — in what appears to be an intensifying, long-term confrontation.

Ryan Berg, director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, tells The Cipher Brief the strikes “represent a paradigm shift in how the United States conducts counternarcotics.”

“Previously, the United States would board and search vessels and make arrests. Driving much of this paradigm shift is the foreign terrorist designations on more than a dozen organizations,” he continued. “The administration wants to send the message that this is not just a rhetorical shift, but that this is a shift with meaning. We deal with terrorists differently than we deal with criminals.”

From Quiet Waters to Strategic Theater

For decades, the Caribbean was viewed in Washington as a quiet, if troubled, backyard, important for migration and commerce, but hardly central to global competition. That calculation has changed. Today, the region is framed as a frontline of American power, where the U.S. confronts a convergence of transnational threats — from drug trafficking and irregular migration to external influence from China, Russia, and Iran — that unfold just off its own shores.

Michael Shifter, adjunct professor at Georgetown University and former president of the Inter-American Dialogue, tells The Cipher Brief that the strikes “will have a critical impact on the Caribbean security situation.”

“For the first time since the Panama invasion in 1989, the U.S. has carried out combat operations against assets allegedly connected to a Latin American government,” he noted. “That the strikes were conducted without regard to international law has unnerved other regional governments and made them wonder if they might be the next target.”

For much of the post-Cold War era, the Caribbean was not a primary theater for U.S. grand strategy. Policymakers often focused on the Middle East, Asia, and Europe, leaving the islands and waterways between Florida and South America to languish in relative neglect. The U.S. presence was episodic and reactive — providing disaster relief after hurricanes, conducting occasional counternarcotics patrols, and offering modest development aid.

But adversaries were not idle. China deepened infrastructure investments, secured port access, and trained regional military officers in its academies. Russia provided defense diplomacy, intelligence cooperation, and symbolic shows of force. Iran, though less prominent, found opportunity through Venezuela and proxy networks. These activities chipped away at U.S. primacy, testing whether Washington’s absence created a strategic vacuum.

“The presence of the expanded array of U.S. surveillance assets, cruisers, destroyers, amphibious ships, F-35 fighters, and other forces, in conjunction with the demonstrated use of force and reported planning for strikes inside Venezuela, are visibly driving panicked reactions by the Maduro regime,” Evan Ellis, research professor of Latin American studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, tells The Cipher Brief. “This demonstrates that the U.S. is willing to go beyond traditional law enforcement interception protocols to use lethal force against suspected drug boats.”

A Renewed U.S. Deterrent Strategy

The Trump administration has reframed narcotics networks as “narco terrorists,” a label that blurs the line between law enforcement and national defense. This allows for military strikes against what once would have been considered criminal targets. The Venezuelan boat destroyed on September 2 is the most vivid example yet, and it sparked immediate backlash from governments in Caracas, Bogotá, and across the Caribbean.

Venezuela condemned the strike as a violation of sovereignty, with Nicolás Maduro mobilizing civilian militias and promising to defend territorial waters. Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro went further, calling for international investigations into U.S. officials for what he termed unlawful killings. Fishermen in Trinidad and Tobago expressed concern about being caught in the crossfire, as expanded naval patrols threatened their livelihoods and heightened the risks to civilian vessels.

From Washington’s perspective, these costs are tolerable compared to the benefits of deterrence. Deploying advanced assets — such as F-35 fighters to Puerto Rico — signals that the U.S. views the region as strategically vital. The administration is also seeking to highlight the deterrent value of its strikes, suggesting they could disrupt smuggling operations and complicate adversaries’ strategic planning.

Still, questions loom about legality and proportionality.

“Unilateral U.S. military operations in Latin America have a long and often unhappy history,” Shifter said. “They remain extremely sensitive and touch a nerve in the region.”

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The Policy Evolution: From Reactive to Strategic

The idea of a sustained U.S. Caribbean policy, however, is not new. The 2020 U.S. Strategy for Engagement in the Caribbean outlined plans for expanded diplomacy, development, and security cooperation. Yet progress was limited by competing priorities and budget shortfalls.

What has changed in 2025 is the scale and framing of U.S. involvement. Rather than treating the Caribbean as an ancillary focus of counternarcotics or disaster relief, the Trump administration now casts it as a frontline of national defense. The deployment of warships and high-tech aircraft, the aggressive legal redefinition of cartels, and the diplomatic outreach led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio all point to an institutional pivot.

Congress is also being drawn into the mix. The reintroduced Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Authorization Act would allocate $88 million annually through 2029 for security cooperation. The measure reflects recognition that sustained resources, not episodic funding, are necessary to compete with external powers.

Risks, Imperatives, and What Comes Next

The road ahead carries both promise and peril. On the opportunity side, elevating the Caribbean to a strategic priority acknowledges geographic fact: the region sits on America’s doorstep, with busy sea lanes and chokepoints that have often been overlooked in U.S. defense planning. A credible deterrent posture, paired with investments in governance and development, could help steady fragile environments and blunt the appeal of rival powers.

Yet the risks of escalation are considerable. Misidentifying a civilian vessel, overreaching in the use of force, or neglecting consultation with regional partners could provoke backlash that undermines U.S. legitimacy.

“It is doubtful that the U.S. strikes will be effective in stopping the flow of narcotics,” Shifter cautioned. “Traffickers will adapt, alter their routes and try to minimize risks. Retaliation by criminal groups cannot be ruled out.”

Ellis warned of another danger: the aftermath of regime change in Venezuela.

“The biggest risks of such an operation would be whether Maduro could be captured alive. The other risk is that, in the absence of a more enduring U.S. force, the legitimate government of Edmundo González would not be able to establish order and control over the military,” he pointed out. “A post-Maduro Venezuela could degenerate into a free-for-all between criminal factions, guerrilla groups, sindicatos, and pranes — with Cuban and Russian elements fueling instability.”

Berg, by contrast, argued that regional cooperation has been robust.

“What has been great to see is the regional support for the United States’ deployment. Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana have been vocally supportive,” he said. “The Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, and Argentina have all declared the Tren de Aragua to be a foreign terrorist organization in the last month. Countries in the region appear open to a different approach, and some are even synchronizing their approaches with the United States on counternarcotics.”

The strike that killed 11 people was both a tactical hit on a trafficking network and a symbolic declaration of intent. What follows will decide whether this marks the start of a durable doctrine — or an overreach that produces more instability than it resolves.

“More consistent presence in the region will be key to ensuring that the United States can secure its interests,” Berg added.

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OPINION — “Extraordinarily violent drug trafficking cartels that the United States has designated as terrorist organizations have wrought devastating consequences on American communities for decades, causing the deaths of tens of thousands of United States citizens each year and threatening our national security and foreign policy interests both at home and abroad…In the face of the inability or unwillingness of some states in the region [the Western Hemisphere] to address the continuing threat…we have now reached a critical point where we must meet this threat to our citizens and our most vital national interests with United States military force in self-defense. Accordingly, at my direction, on September 2, 2025, United States forces struck a vessel [a Venezuelan speedboat] at a location beyond the territorial seas of any nation that was assessed to be affiliated with a designated terrorist organization and to be engaged in illicit drug trafficking activities.”

Those are excerpts from a September 4, 2025, letter to Congress from President Trump under the 1973 War Powers Resolution which requires a report within 48 hours after U.S. military forces undertake an action “into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation,” without Congress having previously adopted a declaration of war.

Other requirements of such a letter are the “circumstances necessitating” U.S. armed forces; the “constitutional and legislative authority” for their use, and the “estimated scope and duration of the hostilities.”

I will discuss the first two requirements below, but as to the last, Trump makes clear he sees no end to this self-declared war on drug cartels by saying, “It is not possible at this time to know the full scope and duration of military operations that will be necessary. United States forces remain postured to carry out further operations.”

I should note here that back in January 2024, with the presidential campaign getting underway, The New York Times reported that Trump’s political campaign had released a video titled “President Donald J. Trump Declares War on Cartels,” and Trump promised to “deploy all necessary military assets, including the U.S. Navy” to impose a full naval embargo on the cartels and to “designate the major cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.”

On January 20, 2025, immediately after his inauguration, Trump signed an Executive Order (EO) that created “a process by which certain international cartels [such as Tren de Aragua (TdA) and La Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13)] and other organizations will be designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” The EO said further that TdA and MS-13 “present an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. I hereby declare a national emergency, under IEEPA [International Emergency Economic Powers Act], to deal with those threats.”

Having taken those actions, Trump expanded his anti-drug cartel war to include last month doubling up to $50 million the reward for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of Nicolás Maduro for violating U.S. narcotics laws. Maduro, as head of the Cartel of the Suns, was first indicted on federal charges of narco-terrorism and conspiracy to import cocaine in 2020, during former President Trump's first term. The initial reward was $15 million. It was increased to up to $25 million during the last days of the Biden administration when Maduro assumed a third term as Venezuela’s president despite evidence that he had lost the previous presidential election.

At this time, the U.S. does not recognize Maduro as the rightful president of Venezuela.

It is against that background – Trump’s self-declared war against Western Hemisphere drug cartels and Maduro’s running Venezuela – that the U.S. last month began deploying a Navy force to the Caribbean near Venezuela. By early this month it included three Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers — the USS Sampson, USS Jason Dunham, and USS Gravely — which are designed to counter threats from the air, land, sea and even undersea simultaneously. Both the Sampson and Gravely have a Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment to deal with intercepted drug situations, according to Navy releases.

However, by late August, the Pentagon had also deployed an offensive force that appears to have more than halting possible drug shipments in mind.

Arriving in the area was the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group, including the USS Iwo Jima equipped with AV-8B Harrier attack aircraft and the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, with 2,200 Marines. Additionally there were two amphibious transport dock ships, the USS San Antonio and the USS Fort Lauderdale, plus several Navy P-8 surveillance planes and one attack submarine in the region.

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It was with that significant Navy force in the area that on September 2, Trump announced on Truth Social: “Earlier this morning, on my Orders, U.S. Military Forces conducted a kinetic strike against positively identified Tren de Aragua Narco terrorists.” Trump said the strike “occurred while the terrorists were at sea in International waters transporting illegal narcotics, heading to the United States. The strike resulted in 11 terrorists killed in action.”

The New York Times reported the next day that “a senior U.S. official said a Special Operations aircraft — either an attack helicopter or an MQ-9 Reaper drone — carried out the attack on Tuesday morning against a four-engine speedboat loaded with drugs.”

At a briefing for congressional staffers September 9, Pentagon officials acknowledged that the boat had turned around after spotting a military aircraft, and the boat was headed back toward shore when it was sunk.

Other than these limited details, and the widely-seen Pentagon black-and-white video, neither the White House nor the Pentagon have released additional details on the event.

Exiled Venezuelan journalists reported that the destroyed boat and eight of its dead occupants were from the small Venezuelan fishing village of San Juan de Unare in a poor and crime-ridden section of Venezuela’s northwestern coast. Three of the dead were allegedly from nearby Guiria.

According to Latin American news reports, more than 20 years ago, San Juan de Unare became a transit point for drugs, and back on September 1, not one but three boats set out headed east for Trinidad and Tobago (T and T) [not to the U.S.], a key Caribbean transit hub for the international drug trade. It was normal for boats from San Juan de Unare to travel in flotillas, with the logic that some will manage to reach their destination. In this case, the boat hit was a faster speedboat, equipped with four engines of 200 horsepower each.

One more thing worth noting from the Latin press is that the normal crew for similar drug boats would have been three or four, and for that reason the additional passengers could have been men who were either escaping the Maduro regime or had found jobs in Trinidad and were on round trip rides.

These are elements to consider as we remember the U.S. military killed all 11 speedboat passengers outright, without the normal at sea stoppage and searching for drugs as usually done in such circumstances.

That was the case last Saturday when Venezuelan government announced on Saturday that a U.S. destroyer [the USS Jason Dunham] intercepted, boarded and occupied a Venezuelan tuna fishing vessel for eight hours in the waters of the South American country's Special Economic Zone on Friday.

There are many issues to be dealt with about the September 2 incident and Caribbean military buildup. Last Wednesday, 25 Democratic Senators sent a letter to President Trump telling him, “Classifying a clear law enforcement mission as counterterrorism does not confer legal authority to target and kill civilians.”

In turn, they asked 10 questions starting with: “Please clarify the legal and substantive basis for targeting and killing civilians suspected of being affiliated with a designated entity. Please also provide a copy of all legal assessments conducted by the White House, Department of Justice, Department of Defense, or any other entity prior to the strike.’

Another question was: “As noted above, in your September 4th War Powers Report to Congress, you note the ‘potential for further such actions.’ However, you do not specify in that report, nor have you specified elsewhere, any legal authority to take military action to target and kill civilians, including those suspected of committing crimes. What is your legal authority to conduct lethal military operations against civilians at sea, within Venezuela or within other Latin American countries?”

The Senators asked for answers by September 17. Let’s see if they get any answers at all.

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Meanwhile, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, in a September 10, interview on the USS Iwo Jima with Fox correspondent Rachel Campos-Duffy said, when asked about this U.S. Caribbean buildup, “We’re going to seek peace through strength. We’re going to put America first. It’s our hemisphere. It’s our homeland, but we are not going to sit back and watch the American people be threatened. We are not going to sit back and watch the American people be poisoned. We’re not going to see people be trafficked, see violent groups exist within our country.”

Hegseth then added, “That’s why you see mass deportations. That’s why you’re seeing criminality being locked down. That’s why our border is being locked down. This [the U.S. military force in the Caribbean] is an extension of that. This is an understanding of exactly how America should project power.”

Although Pentagon officials apparently have not yet shared such details on the September 2 strike with Congress, Hegseth claimed to Campos-Duffy, “I watched the strike live. We knew exactly who it was; exactly what they were doing; exactly where they were going; what they were involved in.”

Hegseth’s words do not replace the need for public disclosure of the facts behind such claims, nor does his rhetoric answer the Democratic Senators’ questions about the constitutional and legal justifications for what’s been going on.

This is all the more true with Trump’s announcement on September 15 that the U.S. military struck another boat allegedly carrying drugs from Venezuela. Trump said three people aboard were killed. A video included in Trump’s announcement shows that the boat, which had only two engines, was not moving when it was blown up. This strike further adds to the questions surrounding this issue.

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