OPINION — One of the most enduring security issues in South Asia has been rekindled by the recent border conflicts between the Taliban-led Afghanistan and Pakistan military regimes. Diplomatic efforts by Qatar and Turkey have resulted in a tenuous ceasefire after days of fierce fighting that claimed scores of lives on both sides, offering a little respite from the rising violence. However, talks for a lasting peace have since collapsed. The crisis reveals long-standing structural tensions along one of the most volatile frontiers in the world that have their roots in militant activity, historical enmity, and disputed sovereignty.

Escalation and Triggers of Conflict

Intense fighting broke out along several stretches of the 2,600-kilometer Afghanistan-Pakistan Durand line in early October 2025, especially close to Spin Boldak–Chaman and the Kurram tribal areas. Each side accused the other of starting the conflict. The Taliban-led government denounced Pakistan's retaliatory bombings as a violation of national sovereignty, while Pakistan asserted that militants connected to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) were conducting cross-Durand line attacks from Afghan territory. According to reports, Pakistani air raids in the provinces of Kandahar and Paktika killed dozens of civilians. Taliban members retaliated by attacking a number of Pakistani military installations, with the opposing side suffering heavy losses. Afghan traders are losing millions of dollars every day as a result of the conflict's rapid disruption of humanitarian and commercial routes, which led to the closure of important Durand line crossings.

This breakdown was not the first. Pakistan has long accused the Afghan Taliban of harbouring the TTP, a group committed to destroying Pakistan's government but philosophically linked with Kabul's leadership. The Taliban have refuted these claims, stating that Afghanistan forbids the use of its territory against other countries. However, the Durand Line, from the colonial era, continues to function as a political and geographic fault line, trapping both sides in a never-ending blame game.

The Doha-Istanbul Ceasefire Agreement

An emergency ceasefire agreement was reached on October 19, 2025, following nearly a week of fighting, thanks to intensive mediation by Qatar and Turkey. Both parties committed to immediately stopping offensive operations, prohibiting cross-Durand line attacks, and setting up systems for ensuring compliance under the agreement. To address implementation and verification procedures, a follow-up meeting was planned for October 25 in Istanbul. The deal was heralded as a diplomatic victory, particularly since Turkey and Qatar, who both have comparatively open lines of communication with the Taliban leadership, were instrumental in facilitating communication between two regimes which do not trust one another.

Khawaja Muhammad Asif, the defence minister for the Pakistani military dictatorship, underlined that Islamabad would evaluate the truce based on the Taliban's capacity to control the TTP. "This agreement will be broken by anything coming from Afghanistan," he cautioned. The Taliban's stated position that Afghanistan "will not allow its soil to be used against any country" was reaffirmed by Zabihullah Mujahid, the regime's spokesperson. Although these declarations show official dedication, they conceal more profound disparities in ability and perspective. The Taliban government sees the threat as a matter of border integrity and sovereignty, whereas Pakistan primarily sees it through the prism of counterterrorism. It will take more than diplomatic words to bridge different viewpoints.

Istanbul Talks

The follow-up talks in Istanbul — intended to turn the Doha truce into an enforceable framework—ended without a resolution after four days of negotiations. Reporting from multiple outlets indicates that mediators could not bridge the gap over concrete action against TTP networks allegedly operating from Taliban controlled soil and over how to verify any commitments. Pakistani regime’s officials briefed that Kabul was unwilling to accept binding steps to rein in or relocate the TTP; Afghan sources countered that the Taliban does not command or control the TTP and rejects responsibility for cross-Durand line attacks.

On the eve of, and during, the Istanbul round, Pakistan’s defence minister publicly warned that failure would risk “open war,” underscoring how narrow the window is for diplomacy if violence resumes along the frontier. While he acknowledged the ceasefire had broadly held for several days, he framed the talks’ success as contingent on Kabul’s verifiable curbs on the TTP. Reports say talks in Istanbul have restarted in another attempt for a deal.

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

Key unresolved issues

First, TTP-focused measures: Islamabad sought explicit commitments (dismantling safe havens, detentions/relocations, or handovers of wanted militants), while Kabul insists it won’t allow Afghan territory to be used against neighbours but resists operations that might trigger internal backlash or fracture ties with sympathetic factions. No binding text on TTP was agreed.

Second, a verification and incident-prevention mechanism: negotiators discussed joint hotlines, third-party monitoring, or liaison teams stationed in cross-Durand line hubs to investigate incidents in real time. Talks stalled over scope, authority, and who would adjudicate disputes.

Third, the Durand Line: Pakistan has fenced large stretches and wants coordinated patrols and recognized crossing protocols; the Taliban does not formally recognize the Durand Line as an international boundary, making technical fixes politically sensitive. This gap persisted in Istanbul.

Fourth, trade and crossings: business lobbies on both sides pushed for a timetable to reopen Spin Boldak–Chaman and other checkpoints for normal commerce and humanitarian flows, but negotiators did not finalize sequencing (security steps first vs. parallel reopening).

Fifth, refugees and returns: Islamabad raised concerns around undocumented Afghans and cross-Durand line facilitation; Kabul pressed for humanitarian safeguards. No durable arrangement was announced.

Obstacles to Durable Peace

The structural issues threatening Afghanistan-Pakistan ties are still mostly unaddressed in spite of the truce. First, the ceasefire does not include militant organisations like the TTP. Their independence severely restricts the enforceability of the agreement. According to analysts, the Taliban are reluctant to use force to fight the TTP because of ethnic and ideological ties that make internal Afghan politics more difficult.

Second, monitoring is quite challenging because of the porous nature of the Durand-line. Pakistan has unilaterally fenced off significant portions of the Durand Line, whereas Afghanistan does not formally recognise it as an international border. Recurrent conflicts are exacerbated by this lack of mutual recognition, especially when it comes to security patrols and cross-Durand line trading.

Third, there is still an imbalance of interests. Attacks by militants coming from Afghanistan are the problem for Pakistan. Pakistan's repeated airstrikes and backing of anti-Taliban groups are the source of Kabul's resentment. Joint security coordination is hampered by these conflicting narratives.

Fourth, pressure from within both governments is increasing. While the Taliban in Afghanistan must strike a compromise between meeting external demands and preserving their credibility among nationalist and tribal factions, public annoyance in Pakistan has increased due to an increase in attacks on security forces. Internal resentment could result from any impression of giving in.

Last but not least, the economic aspect introduces another level of complication. Afghanistan relies significantly on cross-border trade through Pakistan for imports and transit to global markets. Significant financial losses and humanitarian difficulties have resulted from the bridge closures. Unless trade flows restart fully, the truce will have limited practical effects.

Need a daily dose of reality on national and global security issues? Subscriber to The Cipher Brief’s Nightcap newsletter, delivering expert insights on today’s events – right to your inbox. Sign up for free today.

The Strategic and Regional Implications

There are wider ramifications for South and Central Asia from the crisis and the resulting truce.

Stability and militancy in the region: Should the truce fail, transnational militant networks, such as IS-K and al-Qaida elements, may gain more confidence. Resuming hostilities might destabilise the entire region, as these organisations flourish in uncontrolled border areas.

Taliban governance: The truce also serves as a litmus test for the Taliban's ability to govern. Global opinions of its legitimacy as a ruling power will be influenced by its capacity to maintain territorial control, interact diplomatically, and quell militant groups.

Realignments in diplomacy: The participation of Qatar and Turkey demonstrates how regional diplomacy is changing. Both nations have established themselves as go-betweens that can interact with the Taliban government without granting official recognition. Their mediation highlights a changing power dynamic in South Asia, where non-Western actors are having a greater impact on resolving disputes.

Economic and humanitarian impact: The conflict's humanitarian effects go beyond its security implications. Food and medical supplies have been disrupted by the closing of the Cross-Durand line, and the situation for displaced people on both sides of the frontier is getting worse. Maintaining peace will depend on reopening trade channels and making sure help is delivered.

The Road Ahead

The establishment of cooperative verification systems, a quantifiable decline in militant attacks, and the resumption of trade are important markers to keep an eye on. If any party breaks the agreement, the area can quickly revert to hostilities. It will be a careful balancing act for Pakistan to keep pressure on the Taliban without inciting escalation. The ability of the Taliban to control militant organisations while maintaining internal unity and sovereignty will be put to the test in Afghanistan. Supporting monitoring, communication, and de-escalation procedures is essential for regional partners, especially Qatar and Turkey, to continue their mediation efforts beyond symbolic diplomacy. As of October 28, the Istanbul process has adjourned without a deal, leaving these markers unmet and the ceasefire’s durability uncertain until verifiable steps are negotiated.

In the end, the ceasefire between Afghanistan and Pakistan serves as an example of the potential and vulnerability of regional diplomacy in a post-Western security context. In addition to bilateral discussions, broad regional collaboration tackling the interconnected problems of militancy, Durand-line governance, and economic interdependence will be necessary for a lasting peace. The willingness of both regimes to turn promises into tangible, verifiable action will determine whether this armistice develops into long-lasting stability or just serves as another brief break in a lengthy history of antagonism.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

The recent clashes underscore a simple truth: kinetic escalation along a porous frontier is a multiplier. Airstrikes, artillery duels, and intermittent border closures do not remain local nuisances. They force displacement, interrupt trade and humanitarian access, and create openings for transnational violent actors to regroup and expand. At the same time, high-level diplomatic gestures, like India’s reception of a Taliban foreign minister—help normalize engagement without demanding verifiable commitments from Kabul on terrorism, human rights, or governance. The result is a dangerous two-track dynamic: escalation on the ground and normalization in the capitals.

A brief history of the rivalry on Afghan soil

Pakistan’s footprint in Afghanistan is old and deep. From the anti-Soviet jihad to the 1990s civil war, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) cultivated proxies, trained fighters in madrassas and camps, and hosted Taliban decision-making bodies in Quetta, Peshawar, and Miramshah. By the time I led Signals Intelligence at NDS, the material flows, explosives, trainers, and fighters—were a familiar pattern. As U.S. forces drew down after 2014, Islamabad’s public posture shifted; in private and in some diplomatic forums, Pakistan presented the Taliban as a political reality to be accommodated. That accommodation was always transactional, however, and it produced deep leverage inside Afghanistan—from provincial commanders to elements inside Kabul.

India’s engagement followed a different logic but with equally transactional ends. Delhi invested heavily in infrastructure, education and development—roads, power projects, scholarships that sent Afghans to Indian universities. Those investments built goodwill and administrative capacity. But India also positioned itself as a counterweight to Pakistan. New Delhi’s network of consulates, including two on Pakistan’s border, provided both soft-power reach and strategic insight. My colleagues and I at NDS were aware that New Delhi’s intelligence service (RAW) cultivated contacts in border provinces and maintained links that could be used against Pakistan. At the time the Afghan republic rationalized these partnerships: the enemy of our enemy was a useful ally. That pragmatic logic blinded us to a harsher reality—India’s support for Afghan institutions was, ultimately, calibrated to New Delhi’s competitive needs, not an unconditional commitment to the Republic’s survival.

Two anecdotes illustrate the corrosive effect of external rivalry on Afghan sovereignty. First, while intercepting communications as head of Signals Intelligence I once heard General Dostum pleading on the phone with Pakistan’s ambassador—an exchange that revealed how quickly even vocal opponents could seek patronage. Second, a private meeting with the RAW station chief in Kabul—held months before the Republic collapsed—left me with a hollow certainty: Indian intelligence was preparing contingency plans for the Republic’s fall rather than mobilizing to prevent it. Those were not betrayals born of malice but of strategic realism: both Delhi and Islamabad were optimizing for their own survival and leverage.

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

Why this rivalry matters now

Three features make the current moment particularly risky.

First, even when attacks originate with state-adjacent actors inside Afghanistan, their effects are interstate: whether Islamabad acknowledges strikes in Kandahar or Taliban-aligned groups carry out violence, the result is cross-border harm — civilians killed, infrastructure damaged, and humanitarian access disrupted.

Second, diplomatic gestures without conditionality distort incentives. India’s public reset—receiving a Taliban foreign minister—grants political space to a movement whose internal policies remain deeply repressive. If major regional powers normalize ties without demanding verifiable changes, they risk entrenching a governance model that enables radicalization and denies basic rights, particularly for women and minorities.

Third, Afghans pay the price. External competition saps Afghan agency. Political elites are incentivized to cultivate foreign patrons rather than build domestic coalitions. Former security personnel, civil servants and vulnerable communities are either abandoned or become leverage for outside actors. The human cost—displacement, loss of livelihoods, shrinking civic space—is the clearest metric of failure.

A three-part policy approach: sovereignty, de-escalation, and conditional engagement

If Washington and its partners are serious about stability in South and Central Asia, they should adopt a compact focused on three priorities.

Prevent Afghanistan from becoming the battlefield. The U.S. should lead a regional security initiative—narrow in scope but backed by monitoring and consequence mechanisms—bringing together India, Pakistan, Iran, China, and key Central Asian states. The initiative would pledge non-use of Afghan territory for hostile proxy activity, create impartial border monitoring mechanisms, and establish rapid-response channels to defuse incidents before they spiral.

Push India and Pakistan back to bilateral dialogue. The most durable way to remove Afghan soil from the rivalry is to reduce the rivalry itself. Washington should use calibrated incentives and diplomatic leverage to get Delhi and Islamabad into issue-specific talks—starting with confidence-building measures on border management, refugee handling, counter-narcotics cooperation, and a hotline for counterterrorism incidents. These are pragmatic, tradeable commitments that build reciprocity without demanding grand concessions.

Condition engagement with Kabul on verifiable benchmarks. Engagement with the de facto authorities will continue for humanitarian and security reasons—but it must not reward predation. Bilateral ties should be tied to transparent, public benchmarks: demonstrable counter-terrorism cooperation, protections for civilian populations (especially women and minorities), and steps to prevent Afghan soil from being used by transnational violent actors. Parallel support must be scaled for civil society, independent media, and the Afghan diaspora—networks that preserve the political capital needed for a future inclusive order.

Need a daily dose of reality on national and global security issues? Subscriber to The Cipher Brief’s Nightcap newsletter, delivering expert insights on today’s events – right to your inbox. Sign up for free today.

Realism with consequences

Some will argue that Delhi’s and Islamabad’s actions are driven by existential fears and that external pressure has limited purchase. That is true. But realism also recognizes that incentives, reputational costs, and monitoring can alter strategic calculations. The goal is not to force idealism but to make proxy strategies less profitable—politically, economically and reputationally—than cooperation.

Conclusion

The recent ceasefire and high-profile diplomatic activity are warnings more than signals of resolution. Afghanistan’s sovereignty must not be treated as negotiable currency in a broader regional rivalry. If the international community fails to act, Afghans will continue to suffer as their country becomes the chessboard for others’ strategies. The path forward is straightforward, if politically difficult: prevent kinetic escalation, push India and Pakistan toward practical dialogue, and condition engagement with Kabul on measurable protections for Afghan people. For the sake of Afghanistan—and for regional security—that is the responsible, pragmatic choice.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

OPINION — There has been an argument suggesting that the international community—particularly the United States—should engage with the Taliban to hold them accountable and ensure they do not return to the same path they followed before 9/11: providing safe sanctuaries to Al Qaeda and other international terrorist groups. Advocates of such a policy often assume that the United States had no engagement with the Taliban prior to 9/11. This assumption is misleading. In reality, the U.S. had established both direct and indirect communication channels with the Taliban years before the attacks.

A declassified U.S. State Department document detailing these interactions shows that the Department alone conducted more than 30 in-person meetings with the Taliban in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Germany, and the United States. Notably, just two days after the U.S. missile strikes on Khost Province in response to the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, a phone call was arranged between the Director for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh in the Bureau of South Asian Affairs and Mullah Omar. During that conversation, Mullah Omar insisted that negotiations should continue through U.S. and Afghan embassies in Pakistan, underscoring his preference for sustained diplomatic engagement despite tensions.

The declassified document highlights a meeting on September 18, 1996, when the Political Officer of the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan met with Mullah Jalil, then the Taliban’s liaison with the ISI and later appointed as the group’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. This meeting took place just days before the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul. In it, Mullah Jalil explicitly stated that “the Taliban do not support terrorism and would not provide refuge to bin Laden.” What unfolded after the fall of Kabul to the Taliban, however, directly contradicted that assurance. Moreover, another record in the same document notes a meeting on January 16, 1997, during which, in response to a U.S. request to inspect two terrorist training camps in Afghanistan’s eastern provinces, Mullah Jalil agreed and emphasized that “the Taliban supported the U.S. on counterterrorism and counternarcotics issues.” Yet, despite this commitment, the Taliban never granted permission for the U.S. to visit those camps.

A review of this and other declassified documents concerning U.S. “diplomatic” engagement with the Taliban reveals a consistent pattern: the Taliban never adopted a definitive stance on surrendering Osama bin Laden or formally renouncing terrorism. Instead, they prolonged negotiations, repeatedly offering new “opportunities” to maintain U.S. engagement without making substantive concessions. At the same time, the United States missed several opportunities between 1996 and 2001 to act on intelligence that could have curtailed bin Laden’s operations.

One recurring theme in those talks was the Taliban’s insistence that restrictions had been placed on bin Laden, supposedly preventing him from threatening U.S. national security. Recent reports suggest the Taliban are employing a similar tactic today—though with updated language and rationale. In meetings with U.S. officials between 2021 and 2022, Taliban representatives portrayed themselves as taking “efforts against terrorism.” This narrative was so misleading that one member of the international community described Afghanistan as “a retirement home for terrorists”—implying that the Taliban’s strategy was not to oppose Al Qaeda, but rather to shield its members by providing them with safe haven, financial support, and a quiet life away from the frontlines of global terrorism.

In reality, the situation in Afghanistan is deeply distressing for anyone who, in any capacity, was involved in the two decades of the Global War on Terror or in broader efforts to advance peace and security worldwide. What makes it even more troubling is the familiar pattern: just as in the pre-9/11 years, the Taliban continue to present themselves as partners in managing terrorism while in reality offering sanctuary and space for terrorist groups —including Al Qaeda—to endure and pursue their efforts for global terrorism.

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

Al Qaeda’s Operational Command

Al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan today is multilayered and extensive. They can no longer be regarded as merely a non-Afghan jihadist group that chose to remain in the country after the Mujahideen began losing territory to the Taliban in the 1990s. Instead, they are now considered an in-group rather than outsiders, largely because Al Qaeda fought alongside the Taliban against the ANDSF and NATO forces for nearly two decades. The Taliban’s return to power is viewed by Al Qaeda as a joint victory, further solidifying their bond.

As a result, Al Qaeda no longer maintains the degree of operational distance from the Taliban that it did prior to 9/11. A telling example came in July 2022, when Ayman al-Zawahiri was located in a guesthouse just a few miles from Afghanistan’s Presidential Palace in Kabul, where he was killed in a U.S. counterterrorism operation. His presence in a major city, without significant security precautions, was unprecedented and demonstrates the depth of Al Qaeda’s trust and confidence in the Taliban.

Developments since al-Zawahiri’s death indicate that, contrary to some predictions, his killing did not create a rift between the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Instead, it underscored the resilience of their partnership. The Taliban adjusted certain aspects of their security architecture—such as tightening safehouse protocols and limiting the movement of senior figures—but these measures were largely shaped by Al Qaeda’s own advice and operational expertise. For its part, Al Qaeda internalized the lesson that even within an environment of unprecedented sanctuary, complacency could prove fatal. Rather than distancing itself from the Taliban, the group recalibrated its security posture, adopting more disciplined precautions for its senior leadership while maintaining its close integration with Taliban structures.

Far from weakening the relationship, the incident created a new opening for Al Qaeda to increase its leverage within the Taliban. By portraying itself as the more experienced actor in counter-surveillance and operational security, Al Qaeda positioned itself to interfere more directly in Taliban decision-making processes, particularly those related to security reforms and intelligence practices. In this way, al-Zawahiri’s death became not a point of rupture, but an opportunity for Al Qaeda to deepen its influence over the Taliban’s internal structures. This development allowed Al Qaeda to operate with even greater freedom.

To effectively facilitate its operations in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda restructured its organizational framework in late 2022, drawing on both its historical practices and the lessons learned from two decades of conflict. The reports suggested that at the center of this effort was the appointment of a new Emir (leader) for Afghanistan, currently based in Kandahar, who frequently travels to key provinces such as Kabul, Khost, Nangarhar, and Balkh. The Emir acts as the vital conduit between Al Qaeda’s senior leadership and its provincial operatives, ensuring cohesion across dispersed units and maintaining alignment with the group’s broader strategic objectives.

Under his supervision, Al Qaeda has organized relatively small operational cells of 15–25 individuals in each province. These cells are deliberately kept small to reduce exposure while maintaining flexibility and resilience. Despite their size, they serve highly specialized functions—ranging from managing logistics for training camps and operating safehouses and guesthouses to facilitating covert communications and conducting counterintelligence operations. The UN Security Council Monitoring Team’s 35th report corroborates the existence of Al Qaeda training camps, safehouses, and guesthouses inside Afghanistan as well. Counterintelligence activities of Al Qaeda are particularly crucial, enabling the group to monitor potential infiltrators, detect hostile intelligence efforts, and safeguard its networks from compromise. This decentralized yet disciplined structure not only provides Al Qaeda with a durable operational footprint but also creates a scalable framework for future expansion, allowing the organization to draw on local recruits and foreign fighters whenever conditions permit.

The Emir’s role extends beyond coordinating provincial operations to managing the clandestine movement and integration of operatives. Through a network of facilitators and couriers, he oversees the discreet transfer of personnel across Afghanistan’s borders—primarily from Pakistan and Iran, and occasionally via Central Asia. Recruits are often moved in small groups to avoid detection, temporarily sheltered in safehouses, and then integrated into Al Qaeda’s Afghan structure through vetting, indoctrination, and training. This careful orchestration ensures that even if individual cells are compromised, the broader network remains intact and adaptable. By guaranteeing secure transit routes and embedding fighters into operational units, the Emir plays a pivotal role in Al Qaeda’s survival, regeneration, and deepening partnership with the Taliban, whose security structures provide essential cover.

In mid-2024, Mohammed Salahuddin Zeidan—better known as Saif al-Adl and serving as Al Qaeda’s operational leader—characterized Afghanistan as Dar al-Hijra, the “Land of Emigration,” in an essay intended to rally support for the cause of Gaza. He described Afghanistan as a refuge where Muslims from around the world could migrate to safeguard their faith and consolidate strength in preparation for striking their enemies. In the essay, Saif al-Adl urged Muslims globally to come to Afghanistan “to gain training, experience, and knowledge before undertaking attacks against” Israel and the Western world. This statement was not only a call to arms but also a public signal of what Al Qaeda expects from the Taliban and the territory under their control. The Taliban, for their part, did nothing to refute the call; instead, they launched a campaign to attract more “tourists” from around the world to Afghanistan, thereby reinforcing Al Qaeda’s narrative rather than undermining it. Undoubtedly, the absence of strategic counterterrorism capabilities on the ground, the Taliban’s complicity with Al Qaeda, and the country’s difficult terrain together make Afghanistan the safest place on the planet for Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups to consolidate, regroup, and expand.

Need a daily dose of reality on national and global security issues? Subscriber to The Cipher Brief’s Nightcap newsletter, delivering expert insights on today’s events – right to your inbox. Sign up for free today.

Al Qaeda’s Revenue Hub

Al Qaeda is also seeking to generate revenue for its activities in Afghanistan. To this end, the group established a second command-and-control hub in Panjshir Province, distinct from its primary base in Kandahar. Unlike the Kandahar structure, which focuses on operational coordination, the Panjshir hub is tasked with attracting investment in mining projects across Panjshir, Sar-e Pul, Takhar, Badakhshan, and other northern provinces with the goal of boosting Al Qaeda’s financial resources. Recently, the Press Office of the Taliban’s governor in Panjshir, Mawlawi Mohammad Agha Hakim—himself known to hold allegiance to Al Qaeda—reported that he had received a delegation of Ulema and investors from the Middle East, including representatives from Yemen, Palestine, Iraq, Bahrain, and Qatar. According to the governor’s office, the delegation expressed interest in investing in Panjshir. Particularly notable was the presence of Abdullah al-Zindani, head of the Yemeni Ulema Shura and son of Abdul Majid al-Zindani. The elder al-Zindani, now deceased, was widely recognized as the spiritual mentor of Osama bin Laden and a key figure in running Al Qaeda’s recruitment and training camps. The participation of his son in such a delegation underscores the enduring transnational networks that continue to sustain Al Qaeda’s presence and ambitions in Afghanistan.

Interestingly, photos of Abdullah al-Zindani and other members of the delegation visiting Panjshir were widely published in the media. The very next day, however, the spokesperson for Governor Mohammad Agha Hakim released a statement declaring that the Taliban governor had banned the media from publishing photos or videos of his meetings. This sequence of events suggests that the initial coverage of the delegation’s visit was the result of an internal lapse. Once the images were already in circulation, the subsequent ban appeared less like a preventive measure and more like a belated attempt at damage control—an effort that was ultimately futile, as the photos had already reached a wide audience.

Most senior appointments in Panjshir Province have reportedly been made at the recommendation of Al Qaeda, reflecting the group’s influence within the Taliban’s administrative structure. Mawlawi Hakim Agha, the current Taliban governor of Panjshir, previously held a prominent position within Al Qaeda’s command structure in Afghanistan—his placement as governor underscoring the Valley’s strategic importance to the network. Similarly, Mullah Musafer, commander of the Taliban’s Panjshir Bridage, stands out as another critical figure who has formally pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda. Long regarded as one of the group’s most elusive and influential operatives in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Musafer was implicated by the National Directorate of Security (NDS) in several high-profile attacks, including the January 2017 terrorist assault in Kandahar that killed five UAE diplomats, the provincial deputy governor, and an Afghan diplomat. He is not the only Al Qaeda operative embedded within the Taliban administration, but Musafer remains one of the most significant given his dual role in directing military operations and facilitating illicit mining activities that generate substantial revenue for Al Qaeda. An unpublished report by a risk assessment firm, shared among Western diplomats, indicates that Al Qaeda profits tens of millions of dollars from mines in Badakhshan and Takhar.

Al Qaeda has enormously capitalized on the Taliban in Afghanistan to strengthen its networks of recruitment, operations, and financing. Since December 2021, an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 jihadi madrasas have been established across the country, operating outside the supervision of the Taliban’s Ministry of Education. Oversight instead falls under a newly created body—the General Directorate of Jihadi Madrasas and Orphanages in Kandahar—which centralizes control of these institutions. Reports indicate that the curriculum was designed by an Al Qaeda team, embedding the group’s ideological agenda into the educational system. Furthermore, applicants to these madrasas are subjected to special security clearance procedures, ensuring ideological conformity and minimizing infiltration, thus tightening Al Qaeda’s hold over the next generation of militants. As a result, Al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan continues to pose a serious and enduring threat—not just to Afghanistan and its neighbors, but to global security at large.

Conclusion

The Taliban’s return to power has not altered the fundamental dynamics between them and Al Qaeda; rather, it has deepened them. The history of U.S.–Taliban negotiations before 9/11 reveals a clear pattern of deception, one that persists in today’s engagements. Al Qaeda is no longer an external guest in Afghanistan—it is an entrenched partner, strategically embedded within Taliban structures and empowered by a permissive environment that enables training, recruitment, and financing. From exploiting illicit mining and cultivating transnational investor networks to indoctrinating a new generation through tens of thousands of jihadi madrasas, Al Qaeda is rebuilding its infrastructure with the Taliban’s active complicity. Far from being a “retirement home for terrorists,” Afghanistan under the Taliban has become the safest and most sustainable base for Al Qaeda’s global ambitions since the pre-9/11 era. Unless this trajectory is confronted with clarity and resolve, the international community risks witnessing the regeneration of a threat with consequences that extend well beyond Afghanistan’s borders.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief