EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — In recent years, the national conversation about disinformation has often focused on bot networks, foreign operatives, and algorithmic manipulation at industrial scale. Those concerns are valid, and I spent years inside CIA studying them with a level of urgency that matched the stakes. But an equally important story is playing out at the human level. It’s a story that requires us to look more closely at how our own instincts, emotions, and digital habits shape the spread of information.

This story reveals something both sobering and empowering: falsehood moves faster than truth not merely because of the technologies that transmit it, but because of the psychology that receives it. That insight is no longer just the intuition of intelligence officers or behavioral scientists. It is backed by hard data.

In 2018, MIT researchers Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral published a groundbreaking study in Science titled The Spread of True and False News Online. It remains one of the most comprehensive analyses ever conducted on how information travels across social platforms.

The team examined more than 126,000 stories shared by 3 million people over a ten-year period. Their findings were striking. False news traveled farther, faster, and more deeply than true news. In many cases, falsehood reached its first 1,500 viewers six times faster than factual reporting. The most viral false stories routinely reached between 1,000 and 100,000 people, whereas true stories rarely exceeded a thousand.

One of the most important revelations was that humans, not bots, drove the difference. People were more likely to share false news because the content felt fresh, surprising, emotionally charged, or identity-affirming in ways that factual news often does not. That human tendency is becoming a national security concern.

For years, psychologists have studied how novelty, emotion, and identity shape what we pay attention to and what we choose to share. The MIT researchers echoed this in their work, but a broader body of research across behavioral science reinforces the point.

People gravitate toward what feels unexpected. Novel information captures our attention more effectively than familiar facts, which means sensational or fabricated claims often win the first click.

Emotion adds a powerful accelerant. A 2017 study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences showed that messages evoking strong moral outrage travel through social networks more rapidly than neutral content. Fear, disgust, anger, and shock create a sense of urgency and a feeling that something must be shared quickly.

And identity plays a subtle, but significant role. Sharing something provocative can signal that we are well informed, particularly vigilant, or aligned with our community’s worldview. This makes falsehoods that flatter identity or affirm preexisting fears particularly powerful.

Taken together, these forces form what some have called the “human algorithm,” meaning a set of cognitive patterns that adversaries have learned to exploit with increasing sophistication.

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During my years leading digital innovation at CIA, we saw adversaries expand their strategy beyond penetrating networks to manipulating the people on those networks. They studied our attention patterns as closely as they once studied our perimeter defenses.

Foreign intelligence services and digital influence operators learned to seed narratives that evoke outrage, stoke division, or create the perception of insider knowledge. They understood that emotion could outpace verification, and that speed alone could make a falsehood feel believable through sheer familiarity.

In the current landscape, AI makes all of this easier and faster. Deepfake video, synthetic personas, and automated content generation allow small teams to produce large volumes of emotionally charged material at unprecedented scale. Recent assessments from Microsoft’s 2025 Digital Defense Report document how adversarial state actors (including China, Russia, and Iran) now rely heavily on AI-assisted influence operations designed to deepen polarization, erode trust, and destabilize public confidence in the U.S.

This tactic does not require the audience to believe a false story. Often, it simply aims to leave them unsure of what truth looks like. And that uncertainty itself is a strategic vulnerability.

If misguided emotions can accelerate falsehood, then a thoughtful and well-organized response can help ensure factual information arrives with greater clarity and speed.

One approach involves increasing what communication researchers sometimes call truth velocity, the act of getting accurate information into public circulation quickly, through trusted voices, and with language that resonates rather than lectures. This does not mean replicating the manipulative emotional triggers that fuel disinformation. It means delivering truth in ways that feel human, timely, and relevant.

Another approach involves small, practical interventions that reduce the impulse to share dubious content without thinking. Research by Gordon Pennycook and David Rand has shown that brief accuracy prompts (small moments that ask users to consider whether a headline seems true) meaningfully reduce the spread of false content. Similarly, cognitive scientist Stephan Lewandowsky has demonstrated the value of clear context, careful labeling, and straightforward corrections to counter the powerful pull of emotionally charged misinformation.

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Organizations can also help their teams understand how cognitive blind spots influence their perceptions. When people know how novelty, emotion, and identity shape their reactions, they become less susceptible to stories crafted to exploit those instincts. And when leaders encourage a culture of thoughtful engagement where colleagues pause before sharing, investigate the source, and notice when a story seems designed to provoke, it creates a ripple effect of more sound judgment.

In an environment where information moves at speed, even a brief moment of reflection can slow the spread of a damaging narrative.

A core part of this challenge involves reclaiming the mental space where discernment happens, what I refer to as Mind Sovereignty™. This concept is rooted in a simple practice: notice when a piece of information is trying to provoke an emotional reaction, and give yourself a moment to evaluate it instead.

Mind Sovereignty™ is not about retreating from the world or becoming disengaged. It is about navigating a noisy information ecosystem with clarity and steadiness, even when that ecosystem is designed to pull us off balance. It is about protecting our ability to think clearly before emotion rushes ahead of evidence.

This inner steadiness, in some ways, becomes a public good. It strengthens not just individuals, but the communities, organizations, and democratic systems they inhabit.

In the intelligence world, I always thought that truth was resilient, but it cannot defend itself. It relies on leaders, communicators, technologists, and more broadly, all of us, who choose to treat information with care and intention. Falsehood may enjoy the advantage of speed, but truth gains power through the quality of the minds that carry it.

As we develop new technologies and confront new threats, one question matters more than ever: how do we strengthen the human algorithm so that truth has a fighting chance?

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

The invasion of Georgia by Russia may have marked the first notable instance in which Moscow simultaneously employed conventional military operations, cyberattacks, and cognitive warfare in a military campaign. Of particular note for this article, Russia’s weaponized narratives before, during, and after the invasion constructed a false reality that attempted to influence—at the speed of global media—and with some success, how the West and a broader international audience understood what was happening in Georgia—and why it was happening—with the goal to manipulate Western views, decisions, and actions. Of the many lessons Russia learned in its invasion of Georgia in 2008, that may have been one of the most important.

If this sounds similar to Russia’s actions against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022; it should. This strategic approach of using persuasive and weaponized narratives is grounded in Russian “Active Measures” and “Reflexive Control”.

Active Measures: Russian actions, most of which are covert and deniable, to achieve its foreign policy objectives through the use of political coercion, espionage, sabotage, assassination, media manipulation, ambiguous forces, and propaganda.

Reflexive Control: Actions by Russia to influence and shape an adversary’s decisions so that the adversary voluntarily makes choices that favor Russia.

These two elements of Russian doctrine embrace cognitive warfare as a comprehensive strategy and the blurring of lines between peace and war to target civilians, military leaders, and policy makers. As evidenced in Georgia, Russia’s goal is to also sustain long-term cognitive impact, or cognitive occupation, according to the Institute of Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI), even after fighting ends so that a target state’s people, government, and institutions unconsciously align with Russian interests. “Cognitive occupation”, or the calculated persistent and long-term presence and effects of cognitive warfare on people, institutions, policies, and decision-making, is also a threat to the U.S.

Russia’s use of weaponized narratives has played a foundational role in Russia’s long-standing attempts to subjugate Ukraine and blunt U.S and Western interference. Narratives that criminalize, delegitimize, and “Nazify” Ukraine’s leaders, claim that Russian is protecting vulnerable populations within Ukraine, point to U.S. and Western interference as forcing Russia’s hand, and provide even a thin rationale for illegally annexing territories are now recognized as textbook Russian strategy.

Those narratives and Russia’s use of broader cognitive warfare tools have evolved as conditions change to now include negotiations, and remain in use today against Ukraine, but also against the U.S., NATO, and in fact a global audience. Russia’s intent is to deceive, confuse, fracture, intimidate, and to manipulate decisions that favor Russia both on the ground in Ukraine and in negotiations. Feigned cooperation with the West as well as distractions and delays—while Russia is simultaneously attempting to seize more territory in Ukraine and conducting gray zone attacks in Europe to fracture and weaken NATO support for Ukraine—is part of that same strategy.

This isn’t a new topic—in fact, much has been written by analysts and think tanks on Russia’s use of narratives in its war on Ukraine and the persuasive power of narratives. This article argues that there are five broad Kremlin narratives aimed squarely at the West, and the West’s lack of an effective counter-narrative strategy is inadvertently allowing these narratives to weaken Western resolve toward Ukraine and ceding control of the information space to Russia.

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These are the five broad narratives that Russia is employing today, all of which you will recognize.

1. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was justified—The West/NATO/Ukraine is the root cause of the war in Ukraine

This narrative has been well documented in Russian foreign ministry statements, Russia media, and Vladimir Putin speeches beginning with the Crimea crisis. It is similar to Russian tactics during its 2008 invasion of Georgia. Topics on “protecting Russian speakers,” “de-Nazification,” and “forced into war by the West” feature in almost all Russian communications leading up the invasion of Ukraine and after, particularly Putin’s speech that launched the invasion.

Although the “strategic declassification” by the U.S. in 2022 of Russia’s plan to invade Ukraine helped undermine the legitimacy of these narratives, Russia’s persistence in pushing this narrative extended its influence. Russia has used this narrative to attempt to cast itself more as a victim of U.S. and NATO expansion or even as a reluctant actor in Ukraine.

Most in the West generally dismiss this narrative, but it is still influential within Russia and with pro-Russian voices around the world. It has resonance in the Global South and is amplified by China. It will be difficult to displace globally as it exploits historical grievances and anti-Western sentiments and is still discussed in some Western policy debates.

2. Putin wants peace—but pressure on Russia will collapse talks

This is a constant theme in Kremlin messaging, beginning in 2014, and particularly pronounced from late 2021 onward as Russia massed troops near Ukraine. Russia often stated that it was only seeking negotiations and security guarantees and that pressure from the U.S. and the West would undermine potential talks.

The narrative has particularly manifested itself in the approach to the negotiations. Putin established redlines early as negotiations approached, and the U.S. team offered concessions to get Putin to the table, to test his commitment to real negotiations and a ceasefire, and to prevent him from walking away. Putin instead offered to stop fighting and freeze battle lines if Ukraine turned over all the territory in its Donetsk and Luhansk regions that remains in Kyiv’s hands. Putin basked in the warm reception in Alaska but continued to resist making any concessions or move toward a ceasefire.

This narrative appears to be weakening in influence today, in part because of Putin’s maximalist demands, delaying tactics, and very visible resistance to a ceasefire and concessions.

3. Ukraine will have to give up territory—Ukraine’s intransigence prolongs the war

This has become one of the more normalized, and I think potentially persuasive, narratives employed by Russia, and it is often presented as the “only reasonable solution” to the war in Ukraine. Russia began demanding territorial concessions in 2014, with greater intensity in 2022, when Russia raised Ukraine’s “inevitable” need to cede land for peace. Within months of the invasion, discussions began to appear in some Western media about “difficult compromises” facing Ukraine. Over time, this narrative managed to replace “Russia must withdraw its forces”, demonstrating the influence of narratives in countering geopolitical realities.

Ukraine finds itself in an odd place. There must be a term that describes how an invading aggressor (Russia) is not asked to give up illegally-seized territory because of the perception that it is irreversibly entrenched in its negotiating position, while the defending country under attack (Ukraine) is asked to concede more, to give up more, merely because it is more cooperative.

Of course, this also reflects the power imbalance and the perceptions of strength and weakness in the negotiations. The U.S. does not believe it can compel Putin to make concessions—even the most obvious ones, like withdrawing from Ukraine or paying reparations—so it doesn’t demand them or put them on the negotiating table. Conversely, the U.S. believes it can persuade Ukraine to make concessions because Ukraine needs U.S. support, so it expresses more expectations for Ukraine, including to sacrifice its national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

This narrative is rising in influence. War fatigue, Russian intransigence, the perception of a lack of real options, and the desire for a settlement are increasing the discussions for “realistic outcomes.” If this narrative prevails, it could result in an outcome that directly rewards Putin's aggression and signals to global authoritarians that invasion is a viable long-term strategy

4. Ukraine joining NATO is off the table—Russia must be involved in security guarantees

Russia has been long opposed NATO membership for Ukraine. Going back to the 2008 Bucharest Summit, Moscow has strongly stated that Ukraine joining NATO aspirations was unacceptable. This intensified after 2014 and this became a core Russian talking point after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, including the stated requirement of the involvement of Russia in any future security arrangements. Today, Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov have explicitly advanced this narrative since the first phases of negotiation, particularly when discussing alternatives to NATO membership for Ukraine.

The question of NATO membership for Ukraine has also been debated within Western policy circles for years. Discussions of possible security guarantees involving Russia surged in early 2022 as policymakers sought alternatives to NATO membership. Russia’s insistence on being part of those security guarantees continues to complicate these discussions.

It is fair to say that this narrative continues to be influential. A hold on Ukraine’s NATO prospects is essentially U.S. and NATO policy for now. Russia continues to strongly state the requirement for its involvement in future security guarantees—essentially a Russian veto on the implementation of those guarantees—as essential to any agreements.

5. A Russian victory is inevitable—Ukraine can never win

This is less about a single speech and more about a recurring theme in Russian state media and propaganda since the bleak outlook at the beginning of the war when it looked like Ukraine could fall within days or even hours. Russian propaganda of “unstoppable” Russian forces contrasted with Ukrainian weakness and futility was a persistent theme. Some Western analysts and so-called experts also predicted a quick Russian victory. Russian propaganda about the strength and power of its forces had effectively influenced a global audience.

I believe it is fair to say that a theme of Russian invincibility and inevitable victory regardless of actions by Ukraine and the West can and has undermined some support to Ukraine. It can create a defeatist attitude and risk aversion in some Capitals. It may also cause some countries to question the value of continued investment in Ukraine. Many nefarious actions and statements by Putin, including his own deliberately-crafted strong-man image, are meant to support this narrative.

Today, this narrative is far less credible than in 2022 from a battlefield perspective. Ukraine, with the support of the U.S. and NATO, shattered the myth of Russian battlefield dominance. However, this narrative has shifted to Russia’s ability to use political maneuvering, manipulation of the negotiations, bypassing of sanctions, support by China, and exploiting division within the West to achieve its goals. This narrative still influences many in the West and has the potential to undermine negotiations to the favor of Moscow.

These five narratives gain strength and persistent influence when repeated throughout traditional and social media. They are significantly enabled by Russia media and its proxies. They are also strengthened when discussed or even supported by U.S. and Western public officials. I have not heard official in the West having a real discussion about Nazis in Ukraine, but there have certainly been numerous discussions about a NATO role in Russia’s invasion, the “need” for Ukraine to give up territory, the challenges of Ukraine joining NATO, and if Ukraine can win at all even with U.S and NATO support.

I am not implying that U.S. and Western officials are intentionally using Russian narratives, but the alignment of Russian narratives with views already held by some in the West extend the life and influence of these narratives.

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Although these Kremlin narratives have been somewhat successful, particularly when used in unison, they are also somewhat fragile because they are false and not anchored in reality. If we compare a narrative to a flame, a narrative needs oxygen to grow and spread; without that oxygen, narratives can weaken and lose relevance.

Oxygen for narratives come from their continued use in social and traditional media, in legitimate public discourse, and by legitimate public figures. These narratives are also persistent and persuasive when they are unopposed by equally persuasive and persistent narratives. For example, narratives, such as “Ukraine will have to give up territory” or “Ukraine joining NATO if off the table”, which are based on the evolving positions of the involved parties will remain persistent and legitimate with continued use and in the absence of alternative narratives.

Let’s look at the five narratives that can undercut and replace the Kremlin’s five false and manipulative narratives. These five new narratives don’t require complex explanations. They are principled, grounded in facts and international law, speak directly to sovereignty and territorial integrity for all nations, and are based on a commitment to accountability and to deny reward to authoritarian invaders. We’ve heard them all before: yet as Kremlin narratives have spread, these have faded from prominence and influence.

1. The invasion of Ukraine was an illegal and unprovoked military action by Russia.

This narrative grounds the conflict in international law and strips away Russian efforts to justify its invasion. It’s a reminder that Russia alone is the “root cause” of the war in Ukraine.

2. Russia must withdraw all forces that invaded Ukraine in 2022 and pay reparations to Ukraine. Crimea remains sovereign Ukraine territory illegally occupied by Russia.

This narrative addresses accountability of Russia’s actions and undermines Russian efforts to normalize its presence in Ukraine. Further, it puts pressure on Russia to explain why it isn’t withdrawing from Ukraine instead of Ukraine explaining why it should not give up territory to an invader. It is also a strong statement that invasion and occupation by aggressive authoritarians will not be rewarded.

3. Ukraine is a free, independent, and sovereign state. A decision to join NATO is a decision between Ukraine and NATO.

This narrative reinforces the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and autonomy of nations, including Ukraine. It undermines any efforts by Russia to undermine the legitimacy of Ukraine as a nation and to control discussions over Ukraine’s future.

4. Russia is attempting to delay and undermine the negotiations. It must come to the negotiating table willing to make concessions or face consequences.

This puts the burden squarely where it belongs—on Russia—to engage in meaningful negotiations to end its occupation of Ukraine and the war, or face real and sustained consequences. This narrative is strengthened by US and NATO publicly planning and implementing measures, such as energy and banking sanctions, secondary sanctions, redirection of seized assets to Ukraine, expulsion of Russian diplomats, and other persuasive actions directed at Russia.

5. The U.S and NATO stand together to support Ukraine.

This narrative emphasizes the unity and shared commitment to the security of Ukraine that Russia has worked so hard to undermine. It is also a signal that Putin’s efforts to charm America and increase its gray warfare on Europe has failed. It is strengthened by an increase in arms and sustained support to Ukraine by the U.S. and NATO as a strong signal of unity to Russia.

These replacement narratives simply need oxygen—in public discourse, global media, and statements by Western public figures about Ukraine, Russia, and the negotiations, particularly from the U.S. negotiating team. Now is the time to use these narratives—persistently and in unison—to replace the Kremlin’s false and manipulative narratives and to undermine the hold Putin wants to have on the discussions on Ukraine and the negotiations. Displacing entrenched narratives isn’t easy, particularly in parts of the world where Russian influence is high, but repetitive use of these narratives by U.S. and Western officials can begin to erode the Kremlin’s narratives and send strong signals to Russia itself.

Finally, it is clear that the U.S. is dissatisfied with the pace and outcomes to date of the negotiations. This is, in part, because we have been losing the battle in the information and influence space to these Russian narratives. The goal of Russian “reflexive control” is to persuade Russia’s adversaries to make decisions voluntarily that support Russia. Russia’s weaponized narratives play a role in achieving that outcome. It is certainly not too late to change the course of the dialogue and the negotiations in a way that favors the U.S., Ukraine, and our allies. Putin believes he is in control and can dictate the outcome. Advancing these narratives will show him that he’s wrong.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

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EXPERT PERSPECTIVE -- In the middle of the night, with no witnesses, a single ship flagged out of Hong Kong drags its anchor across the Baltic Sea. In silence, it severs a vital gas pipeline and the digital cables that link northern capitals. By morning, millions lose connectivity, financial transactions stall, and energy grids flicker on the edge.

The culprit vanishes behind flags of convenience, leaving blame circulating in diplomatic circles while Moscow and others look on, exploiting maritime ambiguity and the vulnerabilities of Europe's lifelines.

Meanwhile, in Warsaw and Vilnius, shoppers flee as flames engulf two of the largest city malls. Investigators soon discover the arsonists are teenagers recruited online, guided by encrypted messages, and paid by actors connected to hostile state agencies. The chaos sows fear, erodes social trust, and sends shockwaves through European communities—proxy sabotage that destabilizes societies while providing plausible deniability to those orchestrating the acts.

Thousands of kilometers away, Chinese dredgers and coast guard vessels silently transform disputed reefs into fortified islands in the South China Sea. With no declaration of war and no pitched battles, new airstrips and bases appear, steadily shifting maritime boundaries and economic interests. Each construction project redraws the strategic realities of an entire region, forcing neighbors and distant powers alike to reckon with incremental, shadowy coercion and efforts to change the status quo.

In early 2024, Chinese state-sponsored hackers, known as "Volt Typhoon," penetrated U.S data repositories and embedded themselves deep within the control systems of U.S. critical infrastructure, including communication networks, energy grids, and water treatment facilities.

Then-FBI Director Christopher Wray described it as a pre-positioning of capabilities by China that can be turned on whenever Beijing wanted - wreaking havoc and causing real-world harm to American citizens and communities. China has denied any connection to these attacks on U.S. sovereignty.

And just weeks ago, around 20 Russian drones violated Poland’s airspace. Russia’s denials were predictable and since then, Russian drones and jets have violated airspace in Romania, Estonia, and over the Baltic Sea.

Were these threats, tests of capability and resolve, provocations, or demonstrations—or maybe all of the above? Just as NATO will develop a set of lessons-learned for future incursions, it’s also likely that Russia learned from these episodes and will recalibrate future incursions.

Threaded almost invisibly through all of these gray zone activities, and countless others like them, is cognitive warfare—a persistent tool of our adversaries. It is an assault on cognition. The information and decision spaces are flooded with weaponized narratives, AI-powered disinformation, synthetic realities, and the coercive use of redlines and intimidation.

The goal is clear—deceive, change how we see the world, fracture societies, destroy faith in institutions and partnerships, erode trust, challenge and replace knowledge and belief, coerce and intimidate; and perhaps most importantly; undermine decision autonomy. It is here, in the crowded intersection of AI; cyber; traditional tools such as narratives and storytelling; and cognition; that today’s most urgent battles are fought.

These are all operations in the gray zone. We all use somewhat different terms for this, but let me share the definition of the gray zone that I think works well.

The gray zone is the geopolitical space between peace and war where adversaries work to advance their own national interests while attacking and undermining the interests of their adversaries and setting the conditions for a future war without triggering a military response.

We might refer to attacks in the gray zone as gray warfare. It is the domain of ambiguity, deniability, and incremental aggression calculated to limit deterrence and discourage persuasive response.

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Today, it is the space where global competition, particularly great power competition, is playing out.

Why are we seeing more gray zone activity today?

First, great power competition is intensifying. This includes great powers, middle powers, and impacts almost every other nation. Almost every nation has a role to play, even if involuntary: competitor, ally and supporter, enabler, spoiler, surrogate, or innocent bystander and victim. Like the African proverb says, “When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers.”

But great powers will go to great lengths to avoid 21^st Century superpower conflict, primarily because of the fear of unintended losses and damage to national power that could take decades to recover. The catastrophic damage to nations and militaries from WWII are distant—but still vivid—reminders of the impact of a war of great powers.

Today, just look at the unprecedented loss of national power by Russia in indirect superpower conflict. Superpower conflict has consequences. Given these strategic considerations, the gray zone and gray warfare provide an effective strategic alternative to conventional war. Our adversaries have calculated that there are more gains than risks in the gray zone, and that any risks they do face are acceptable.

Second, technology levels the playing field, creating new opportunities for gray zone attacks. Cyberattacks, even those that are disrupted, lead to more effective cyber capabilities by our adversaries. AI-driven cognitive warfare now delivers persuasive content with unprecedented global access and immediacy. Small kinetic drones can be wielded by state and non-state actors to pose both kinetic and cognitive threats. Technology also enables adversaries to conceal their operations and increase non-attribution. Even simple technologies have the potential to generate strategic effects in the gray zone.

Third, surrogates and proxies offer expanded reach, ambiguity, and impact

Little Green Men, hired criminals, ghost ships, unknown assassins and saboteurs, and shadowy companies that help evade sanctions blur attribution, providing bad actors with a veneer of deniability while increasing their reach, impact, and lethality. On a broader scale, Houthi attacks on global shipping and North Korean soldiers fighting Ukraine elevate the effects of this ambiguous warfare to a higher level. This trend is likely to intensify in the future.

Fourth, it is important to address the direct impacts of Russia’s war on Ukraine on an increase in gray zone attacks. Russia’s significant loss of national power and limited battlefield gains have created pressure on the Kremlin to reassert relevance, project power, and potentially punish antagonists. This dynamic almost certainly means a continued escalation of gray zone activities targeting Europe and aimed at destabilizing the continent. Many experts believe the Baltics and the Balkans may be particularly vulnerable.

That Russian gray bullseye is crowded—the U.S. is also a traditional target, and more Russia activity to undermine and weaken the U.S. is coming, despite Putin’s offers of renewed diplomatic and economic cooperation.

Finally, there are more gray zone attacks because real deterrence and persuasive responses to gray attacks are challenging, and our adversaries know it. In other words, gray zone attacks in most cases are relatively low cost, often effective, provide a level of deniability, and frustrate efforts at deterrence and response.

Our adversaries have calculated that they can hide behind ambiguity and deniability to violate sovereignty, ignore national laws and international norms, and engage in activities such as political coercion, sabotage, and even assassinations without triggering an armed response.

This “no limits” approach exploits the openness, legal norms, and ethical standards of democratic societies, making coordinated, timely, and effective response more difficult.

So, what can we do?

The most important outcome of our actions is to change the risk calculation of our adversaries. Gray zone attacks that go unanswered reward our adversaries and reinforce the idea that there are more gains than risk in the gray zone and encourage more attacks. Further, our adversaries calculate, often accurately, that our reasonable concerns for avoiding escalation will lead to indecision, weak responses, or the acceptance of false choices.

We need improved and shared gray zone intelligence to see through the fog of disinformation, synthetic realities, false risks and threats, and an overload of information by our adversaries to understand what is taking place in the gray zone. This not only strengthens our operations to counter gray zone attacks but it helps our citizens, communities, and countries to understand, recognize, reject, and remain resilient in the face of gray zone attacks.

We have to employ “strategic daylighting” to expose and put into context the gray zone activity by our adversaries—stripping away deniability and laying bare nefarious and illegal actions—knowing that our adversaries will go to great lengths to conceal, defend, and attack our efforts to expose their activities.

We have to speak frankly and convincingly to our adversaries and of course, we have to back up our words with persuasive action. Empty warnings and rhetoric will fall short. Changing the risk calculation of our adversaries means real consequences across a broad spectrum—public, diplomatic, economic, legal, informational, or even kinetic. It means a strategy on how to respond - not just a series of hasty responses. Real deterrence will result from planning and strategy; not decisions in the moment based on immediate circumstances.

Finally, we need to think of deterrence and response as a team sport - an “Article 5 mindset.” Our adversaries will seek to divide and isolate. Collective, unified action and resolve can form a powerful deterrent.

Of course, none of this is new. All of us need a solid understanding of the problems and the likely best solutions and implementation remains the greatest challenge.

We can go a long way with a good strategy, good partners, and resolve which seems like a reasonable place to start.

This Cipher Brief expert perspective by Dave Pitts is adapted from a speech he recently delivered in Sarajevo. Comments have been lightly edited for clarity. All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are my own and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in my remarks should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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U.S. focus on IW and its subset, cognitive warfare, has been erratic. The U.S. struggles with adapting its plans to the use of cognitive warfare while our leaders have consistently called for more expertise for this type of warfare. In 1962, President Kennedy challenged West Point graduates to understand: "another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin, that would require a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, forces which are too unconventional to be called conventional forces…" Over twenty years later, in 1987, Congress passed the Nunn-Cohen Amendment that established Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Defense Department’s Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) office. Another twenty years later, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that DoD needed “to display a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that which we possess in conventional combat.”

After twenty years of best practices of IW in the counter terrorism area, the 2020 Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy emphasized the need to institutionalize irregular warfare “as a core competency with sufficient, enduring capabilities to advance national security objectives across the spectrum of competition and conflict.” In December 2022, a RAND commentary pointed out that the U.S. military failed to master IW above the tactical level. I submit, we have failed because we have focused on technology at the expense of expertise and creativity, and that we need to balance technology with developing a workforce that thinks in a way that is different from the engineers and scientists that create our weapons and collection systems.

Adversaries Ahead of Us

IW and especially cognitive warfare is high risk and by definition uses manipulative practices to obtain results. Some policy leaders are hesitant to use this approach to develop influence strategies which has resulted in the slow development of tools and strategies to counter our adversaries. U.S. adversaries are experts at IW and do not have many of the political, legal, or oversight hurdles that U.S. IW specialists have.

Chinese military writings highlight the PRC’s use of what we would call IW in the three warfares. This involves using public opinion, legal warfare, and psychological operations to spread positive views of China and influence foreign governments in ways favorable to China. General Wang Haijiang, commander of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) Western Theatre Command, wrote in an official People’s Republic of China (PRC) newspaper that the Ukraine war has produced a new era of hybrid warfare, intertwining “political warfare, financial warfare, technological warfare, cyber warfare, and cognitive warfare.” The PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative and Digital Silk Road are prime examples of using economic coercion as irregular warfare. Their Confucius Centers underscore how they are trying to influence foreign populations through language and cultural training.

Russia uses IW to attempt to ensure the battle is won before military operations begin and to enhance its conventional forces. Russia calls this hybrid war and we saw this with the use of “little green men” going into Crimea in 2014 and the use of the paramilitary Wagner forces around the world. Russia also has waged a disinformation campaign against the U.S. on digital platforms and even conducted assassinations and sabotage on foreign soil as ways to mold the battle space toward their goals.

What Is Needed

U.S. architects of IW seem to primarily focus on oversight structures and budget, and less on how to develop an enduring capability.

Through the counterterrorism fight, the U.S. learned how to use on-the-ground specialists, develop relationships at tribal levels, and understand cultures to influence the population. The U.S. has the tools and the lessons learned that would enable a more level playing field against its adversaries, but it is not putting enough emphasis on cognitive warfare. A key to the way forward is to develop SOF personnel and commensurate intelligence professionals to support the SOF community who understand the people, the geography, and the societies they are trying to influence and affect. We then must go further and reward creativity and cunning in developing cognitive warfare strategies.

The Department of Defense and the intelligence community have flirted with the need for expertise in the human domain or social cultural sphere for years. The Department of Defense put millions of dollars into socio cultural work in the 2015-time frame. This focus went away as we started concentrating more on near peer competition. Instead, we focused on technology, better weapons and more complex collection platforms as a way to compete with these adversaries. We even looked to cut Human Intelligence (HUMINT) to move toward what some call a lower risk approach to collection—using technology instead of humans.

SOF personnel are considered the military’s most creative members. They are chosen for their ability to adapt, blend in, and think outside the box. This ingenuity needs to be encouraged. We need a mindful balancing of oversight without stifling that uniqueness that makes IW so successful. While some of this creativity may come naturally, we need to ensure that we put in place training that speaks to inventiveness, that pulls out these members’ ability to think through the impossible. Focused military classes across the services must build on latest practices for underscoring creativity and out of the box thinking. This entrepreneurial approach is not typically rewarded in a military that is focused on planning, rehearsals, and more planning.

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Focusing on Intelligence and Irregular Warfare

An important part of the equation for irregular warfare is intelligence. This foundation for irregular warfare work is often left out in the examination of what is needed for the U.S. to move IW forward. In the SOF world, operators and intelligence professionals overlap more than in any other military space. Intelligence officers who support IW need to have the same creative mindset as the operators. They also need to be experts in their regional areas—just like the SOF personnel.

The intelligence community’s approach to personnel over the past twenty or so years works against support for IW. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the intelligence community has moved from an expertise-based system to one that is more focused on processes. We used to have deep experts on all aspects of the adversary—analysts or collectors who had spent years focused on knowing everything about one foreign leader or one aspect of a country’s industry and with a deep knowledge of the language and culture of that country. With many more adversaries and with collection platforms that are much more expensive than those developed in the early days of the intelligence community, we cannot afford the detailed expert of yore anymore. The current premise is that if you know the processes for writing a good analytical piece or for being a good case officer, the community can plug and play you in any context. This means, we have put a premium on process while neglecting expertise. As with all things—we need to balance these two important aspects of intelligence work.

To truly understand and use IW, we need to develop expert regional analysts and human intelligence personnel. Those individuals who understand the human domain that they are studying. We need to understand how the enemy thinks to be able to provide that precision to the operator. This insight comes only after years of studying the adversary. We need to reward those experts and celebrate them just as much as we do the adaptable plug and play analyst or human intelligence personnel. Individuals who speak and understand the nuances of the languages of our adversaries, who understand the cultures and patterns of life are the SOF member’s best tool for advancing competition in IW. Developing this workforce must be a first thought, not an afterthought in the development of our irregular warfare doctrine.

CIA Director William Casey testified before Congress in 1981:

“The wrong picture is not worth a thousand words. No photo, no electronic impulse can substitute for direct on the scene knowledge of the key factors in a given country or region. No matter how spectacular a photo may be it cannot reveal enough about plans, intentions, internal political dynamics, economics, etc. Technical collection is of little help in the most difficult problem of all—political intentions. This is where clandestine human intelligence can make a difference.”

Not only are analytical experts important in support of IW but so are HUMINT experts. We have focused on technology to fill intelligence gaps to the detriment of human intelligence. The Defense Intelligence enterprise has looked for ways to cut its HUMINT capability when we should be increasing our use of HUMINT collection and HUMINT enabled intelligence activities. In 2020, Defense One reported on a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) plan to cut U.S. defense attaches in several West African countries and downgrade the ranks of others in eight countries. Many advocate for taking humans out of the loop as much as possible. The theory is that this lowers the risk for human capture or leaks. As any regional expert will tell you, while satellites and drones can provide an incredible amount of intelligence from pictures to bits of conversation, what they cannot provide is the context for those pictures or snippets of conversation. As Director Casey inferred, it is only the expert who has lived on the ground, among the people he/she is reporting on who can truly grasp nuances, understanding local contexts, allegiances, and sentiments.

While it is important to continue to upgrade technology and have specialists who fly drones and perform other data functions, those functions must be fused with human understanding of the adversary and the terrain. While algorithms can sift through vast amounts of data, human operatives and analysts ensure the contextual relevance of this data. Technologies cannot report on the nuances of feelings and emotions. The regional experts equip SOF operators with the nuanced understanding required to navigate the complexities that make up the “prior to bang” playing field. This expertise married with cunning and creativity will give us the tools we need to combat our adversary in the cognitive warfare domain.

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Conclusion

The need for contextual, human-centric understanding for being able to develop plans and operations for cognitive warfare that can compete with our adversaries and keep us from a kinetic fight is paramount. Those who try to make warfare or intelligence into a science miss the truth, that to be proficient in either, art is a must. We need expertise to be able to decipher the stories, motives, and aspirations that make cognitive warfare unique. Regional intelligence experts discern the patterns, motives and vulnerabilities of adversaries; key needs for developing IW campaigns and for influencing individuals and societies. We need seasoned human intelligence personnel, targeters, and analysts who are experts on the adversary to be able to do this. We also need to develop and reward creativity, which is a must for this world.

We also have to be upfront and acknowledge the need to manipulate our adversaries. U.S. decision makers must concede that to win the next war, cognitive warfare is a must and it is essential for these leaders to take calculated risks to mount those campaigns to influence and manipulate.

The cost of cognitive warfare is but a rounding error when compared to the development of new technical intelligence collection platforms and the platforms’ massive infrastructures. This rounding error is a key lynchpin for irregular warfare and irregular warfare is our most likely avenue for avoiding a kinetic war. Human operatives, out of the box thinking, and expert analysts and human intelligence personnel are the needed bridges that connect data into actionable insights to allow our SOF community to practice the type of irregular warfare we have proven historically that the U.S..S. can provide and must provide to counter our adversaries and win the cognitive war we are currently experiencing.

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EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — In 1943, a body washed up on a beach in Huelva, Spain. It was the body of a Royal Marine officer, Major William Martin. Martin was carrying papers, cuffed to his wrist in a briefcase, suggesting that the Allies would invade Greece and Sardinia, not Sicily. Spain was officially neutral, but a few Spanish officials sympathetic to the Nazis allowed German agents to discreetly photograph the documents before Spain quietly passed the documents to the British. Those British officials appeared to be in a state of panic over the lost briefcase.

Would this opportunistic espionage expose a critical Allied operation? In reality, Major William Martin never existed. The body was that of Glyndwr (“Glendure”) Michael, a Welsh drifter who died from consuming rat poison. You probably recognize this as Operation Mincemeat. British intelligence developed this incredible ruse, with American approval, and painstakingly developed a plan for the body to wash up near Huelva Spain and provided background and a personal story for Michael that allowed the body to pass convincingly as a Royal Martine officer who perished at sea while delivering sensitive documents.

The Germans took the bait. Convinced by this fabricated narrative, Hitler diverted significant forces away from Sicily. When the Allies landed in Sicily, they encountered far less resistance than expected, saving countless lives and accelerating the collapse of Axis defenses in southern Europe.

Beyond innovation and sheer audacity, this was a master class in story-telling, in knowing the pressures facing the target audience (Hitler), in creating a believable altered reality, in understanding how information moved through Nazi circles and among those who enabled them and, most importantly, in persuading our adversaries to make consequential decisions that advanced our interests over theirs. It was cognitive warfare on the offense, it represented a cognitive advantage during a perilous period, and it remains a reminder of the timeless power of cognitive persuasion.

History has many other examples of where commanders and leaders have stepped beyond traditional thinking and conventional operations into the information and cognitive space to confuse our adversaries, to win the day, and, at times, to change history.

Is this important today? Let us put cognitive warfare in strategic perspective.

First, great power competition is intensifying and the stakes are high.

The U.S is now facing the most significant global challenges than at any time in our history. We face more capable peer adversaries, more aspiring regional nations, and more proxy threats than ever before. The global environment is more uncertain than ever, and our place in it is not guaranteed. If we are to remain the global leader, we’ll have to be ready for today’s and tomorrow’s rapidly evolving competition and warfare. We must look to prioritize and commonly orient our Nation’s capabilities toward actively maneuvering and gaining advantage across the cognitive landscape to help ensure our security interests, and to actively deny any adversary their own advantage.

Second, great powers will go to great lengths to avoid direct military engagement that could have catastrophic consequences. Russia has lost the equivalent of what would be one of the world’s largest militaries and it has experienced a massive reduction in national power in the war with Ukraine. We also know the examples from WWII when nations and great militaries were defeated and even decimated as a result of great power conflict.

China has advocated winning without fighting for decades, and it still does. Khrushchev famously said “We will take American without firing a shot. We do not have to invade the U.S. We will destroy you from within.” Putin is a believer and practitioner in that approach.

Their approaches are not a mystery. Our adversaries have telegraphed how they plan to attack us, and to defeat us, without direct military engagement.

Third, given those considerations, our adversaries are increasingly relying on operations in the gray zone, or gray warfare, to advance their national interests and to take steps to undermine and weaken the United States, without risking a superpower conflict. They have prioritized their resources, decisions, and actions toward this end.

China and Russia, and even Iran and North Korea, believe there are more gains than risks in the gray zone, and any risks they do face are manageable, so we should expect them to expand their activities. If we solely maintain an unblinking stare at the conventional military capabilities of our adversaries, we might miss the real war already well underway in the gray zone.

Finally—cognitive warfare stands as the most prevalent and consequential activity our adversaries conduct in the gray zone.

This is not your grandfather’s Cold War disinformation. This is an assault on cognition, powered by advanced technology and enabled by an information environment that provides camouflage, infrastructure, and operational resources for our adversaries. Ultimately, cognitive warfare is a contest for truth and knowledge—a struggle to shape perception, control understanding, and influence both the decision-making process and its outcomes.

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Never before in history have individuals, organizations, societies, and nations faced such a sustained assault on our ability to make our own decisions—our autonomy to think, decide, and act in our own best interests. From our adversaries’ perspective, controlling perceptions, manufacturing realities, steering decision-making, intimidation as persuasion, decision fatigue, and manufactured false choices make for persuasive and effective strategy.

In this global information landscape, where technology levels the playing field, any individual or group, and state or non-state actors can reach global audiences almost immediately. Thousands of internet sites, fake users, fabricated organizations, bots, and willing surrogates, managed by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, wage cognitive warfare against the U.S., our allies, and our partners at unprecedented scale and velocity. Artificial intelligence now serves as a force multiplier—amplifying reach, supercharging deception, automating the manipulation of public opinion, and constricting time in the information maneuver space.

As individuals and groups within America, this is everything from how we see the world, how we vote, how we invest, whom and what we trust, which policies we support or oppose, and who we believe are our friends and partners—locally, regionally, and globally.

For national security leaders, policymakers, and corporate and military decision-makers, our adversaries seek to influence consequential decisions on issues like Ukraine, Taiwan, trade, military posture, supply chains, alliances, participation in international organizations, technology development, and a host of other issues that could tip the balance in our adversaries’ favor.

For China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, this is integrated national strategy where the instruments of national power—government, private sector, and surrogates—are combined to achieve strategic impact. Further, the willingness of our adversaries to defy international law; challenge economic interests, and violate the sovereignty and laws of every country including the U.S.; engage in bribery, political coercion, sabotage, and assassinations—essentially a “no limits” approach” to cognitive warfare—gives them considerable leverage—made more effective by our lack of focused emphasis on recognizing, prioritizing and taking action to mass and commonly orient our great national strengths.

If we are to make consequential decisions with confidence, we must have high certainty in the information we receive, value, and share. In the cognitive domain, truth is a strategic asset—precious, powerful, and fragile. To endure, it must be shielded from the relentless assault of manipulation, coercion, and altered realities initiated by our adversaries to shape the strategic landscape and create influence attack vectors intended to undermine and disable our ability to do the same.

Churchill recognized both the strategic value and fragile nature of truth in a time of conflict. He famously said, “In wartime, the truth [is] so precious that it should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.” The lesson is clear. Today, just as in 1943, we must seize and defend the cognitive advantage if we are to navigate these equally perilous times.

What do we need to do to achieve a cognitive advantage?

- First, we need to reassert a strong U.S. national narrative.

In the cognitive domain, our national narrative is both sword and shield. It projects power, influence, and advances our interests. It tells the story of our values, our history, our aspirations, our view of the world, and our resolve and is reinforced by actions and deeds. Our military and economic strength and our global leaderships are strong parts of this narrative. It supports confidence in our actions, our institutions, and our commitments. It also counters adversary narratives and actions that seek to undermine America within our own borders and across the world. We all know today that our national narrative is being questioned by some at home and abroad. Regardless of how we see the political environment, we must articulate and advance a strong seamless U.S. national narrative as foundational to a cognitive advantage. We must take this on.

- Second, we need to empower our master storytellers.

Our master storytellers are not just communicators; they are architects of persuasion. We all know this; we read, we watch movies, and we listen. Facts are fleeting, but stories remain with us—they shape how we feel which in turn drives how we behave. In the cognitive domain, well-crafted stories—including those tailored to navigate today’s hyper-technical environment and chaotic information environment—shape threat perceptions, influence our perception of reality, sustain resolve, and can tip the balance in competition or conflict.

Adversaries recognize the power of narrative and weaponize it; even the truth is more persuasive when it is delivered as part of a compelling story. History proves the advantage: in cognitive warfare, facts alone rarely shift outcomes—compelling narratives and persuasive storytelling do. As in 1943, our edge will be defined by those who can craft and deliver the stories that influence minds and shape events. Yes, we need our master storytellers as much today as we did in 1943.

- Third, we need to see and understand our adversaries’ capabilities and intentions in the cognitive domain—where perception, knowledge, and decision-making are contested. Our adversaries, of course, go to great lengths to mask and conceal their activities. It is time for cognitive intelligence—intelligence in and about the cognitive domain and our ability to reliably understand how, where, and why adversaries seek to shape our thinking and decisions—to emerge as a priority.

- Fourth, we need a sustain a technological edge in AI, Cognitive Science, Cyber, and other technologies that force our adversaries to go on the defensive. China in particular is working to take that advantage from us by its own means but also by stealing U.S. data, technologies, and intellectual property to use against us. We must safeguard the extraordinary capabilities of U.S. technologies—including those small, bold startups—that not only provide a critical national security advantage but are also relentlessly targeted by our adversaries.

- Fifth—and critically important—we need to plan, organize and drive designed strategies and actions across our governmental institutions, international partners, and private sector at the intersections of shared security interests to defend against adversary tactics that target our economic, military, infrastructure, informational and Cyber pillars of security each fueled by human perception, reasoning, and effective decision-making. If you remember anything from this article, please remember this. As a priority, we need a strategy and a commitment to play offense in a quiet but relentless manner that confuses our adversaries, shatters their confidence, and forces them—not us—to deal with the uncertainties of cognitive warfare.

- Finally, if all of this is to work, we need to harness the incredible intellectual power, critical thinking, and collaboration among government, private sector, academia, and in many cases, our allies. We need to work at the nexus of shared interests. In this collaboration; we need leaders; not to overly prescribe or to build bureaucracy, but to inspire, convene, add clarity of purpose, and to enable the incredible capability this community offers. We must use the power to convene to commonly inform and set conditions for mutually beneficial action and outcomes, and to help close the relationship seams used by our adversaries as attack vectors.

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For our leaders, a reminder that when relegated to small tasks and small thinking, influence operations in the cognitive domain will achieve small results. This is a time for vision, for big thoughts, innovation, and audacity. With those attributes, and thinking back to the remarkable achievements of 1943, today’s operations in the cognitive domain can and will do remarkable things.

Those elements, we believe, are the foundation of a cognitive advantage. If we are successful, it means we have a sustained ability to protect our decision-making autonomy at all levels; we preserve domestic and allied social cohesion; we retain global influence, credibility and narrative power; we expose and undermine adversary efforts at cognitive warfare; and we achieve U.S. objectives without resulting in direct conflict. Challenging?—Yes. Attainable?—Certainly.

A final word. Last June, Dave Pitts visited Normandy for the 80^th Anniversary of D-Day—which was our last conventional war of great powers. It was a war that resulted in a devastating loss of human life and unprecedented destruction. Omaha Beach, the Drop Zones around St. Mere Eglise, and the American Cemetery were vivid reminders. That war established the U.S as a global superpower and established a world order that has lasted 80 years. It also enshrined in history the “Greatest Generation.”

Today, authoritarian rule is on the rise, national sovereignty around the world is being undermined, and the global order as we know it is under attack. Once again, our preeminence, leadership, and resolve are being challenged. Let’s be clear, the next war—a quieter war, a gray war—is already underway. The outcome of that war will be as consequential as conventional war.

Cognitive warfare may very well be the defining contest of this era—a generational challenge—given the threats it poses to U.S. national security, our place and influence in the world, and our commitment to our own self-determination. If you are a professional in this space—government, private sector, academia, and ally—this is clearly your time.

Today, we are surrounded by threats, but we are also surrounded by opportunities, by extraordinary expertise, and by willing partners. The challenges ahead are formidable, but so are our experiences and capabilities as a nation. The incredible resolve, sacrifice, and refusal to fail—hallmarks of the Greatest Generation—are woven into the fabric of America and will continue to serve us well. Securing our future now demands leadership, collaboration, a bias for action, and adaptability—the hallmarks of this generation. We have what it takes.

Yes, confidence is clearly justified—but we must just as clearly match that confidence with decisive action. Time is not on our side as others have already decided to prioritize cognitive related strategies. It is time to take a bold step forward in the cognitive domain and to seize the cognitive advantage.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

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