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Today β€” 11 December 2025IT Security

The Best Red Teaming Tools of 2026: What You Need to Know

11 December 2025 at 11:36

As AI-generated threats continue to rise, more organisations are turning to red teamingΒ toΒ turnΒ the tide.Β Nothing provides a better understanding of your securityΒ postureΒ likeΒ letting a red team loose on your environmentΒ to simulate a real-world attack.Β 

Here is a list of some of the top red teaming toolsΒ you’llΒ find in 2026β€”along with whatΒ you’llΒ need to know to make your choice.Β Β 

Cobalt StrikeΒ (Fortra)Β Β 

Cobalt StrikeΒ is one of the most widely used red teaming tools in cybersecurity today. As one engineer noted, β€œIt was the product that changed the industry” as its insights spurred the development of Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR).Β Now,Β nearly aΒ decade and a half later, it continues to be the professional’s choiceΒ and is estimated to be in use by 60% of red teamers out there.Β Β 

StrengthsΒ 

  • Vetted Exploits:Β One ofΒ Cobalt Strike’sΒ key advantages is its interoperability. By integrating closely with Core Impact,Β it offers users full access to Core Impact’sΒ library ofΒ core certified exploits, whichΒ isΒ widelyΒ trustedΒ byΒ security expertsΒ over potentially risky open-source options.Β Β 
  • Malleable C2:Β Traffic can be made to resemble legitimate apps (by altering URLs, headers, payload formatting, etc.), aΒ mature and well-documented technique.Β 
  • IntegratedΒ Workflow:Β BundlesΒ payload generation, post-exploitationΒ features, a team server for collaboration, and a single operator workflowβ€”instead ofΒ making teams cobbleΒ together separate OSS components.Β 
  • Superior Support:Β Commercial licensing comes with professional support; vendor maintenance, documentation, andΒ live help. For teams that want compatibility with corporate tooling and predictableΒ updates, this isΒ key.Β Β 
  • Mature Solution with Repeatable Results:Β Polished GUIs,Β established C2 features,Β team collaboration workflows,Β andΒ vettedΒ exploitsΒ mean repeatable, credible results.Β Β 

LimitationsΒ 

  • Commercial Licensing:Β Commercial pricing can be high for smaller teams.Β 
  • Legal Considerations: Cobalt Strike can only be used in authorised engagements.Β 

Watch Now:Β See Cobalt Strike explained in two minutes:Β https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9BUxptcYZCkΒ 

MythicΒ 

Mythic is an open-source, modular command-and-control (C2) framework perfect for creating customised β€œagents” across Windows, macOS, and Linux targets. Β 

StrengthsΒ 

  • Highly Extensible:Β New features easily added orΒ modifiedΒ without an extensive overhaul. Every feature runs as a containerized microservice.Β 
  • Fully Customisable:Β Used for openness, flexibility, and the ability to research and craft new payloads.Β 
  • Development and Research:Β ManyΒ useΒ Mythic for research, educational, and development purposes as it provides full control and zeroΒ licensingΒ costs.Β Β 

LimitationsΒ 

  • Requires Orchestration:Β Container orchestration, agent configuration,Β and more administrative effort than commercial tools areΒ required.Β 
  • Steep Learning Curve:Β Without a β€œturnkey” setup or a single-vendor installer, operators must be experienced toΒ get Mythic up and running.Β 

AdaptixC2Β Β 

AdaptixC2 is aΒ fairly newΒ open-source red teaming tool that entered the market in January 2025. It offers flexibility, a modular architecture, andΒ worksΒ across multiple operating systems.Β With no licensing costs, it is good for labs and bespoke engagements.Β 

StrengthsΒ 

  • Cross-Platform Support:Β It offers support for Windows, Linux, and macOS agents.Β 
  • β€œExtenders” and Plug-Ins:Β Add inΒ additionalΒ capabilitiesΒ like lateral movement, credential harvesting, and custom payloads.Β 
  • Modifiable and Open-Source:Β Great for emulating bespoke adversaries as it is deeply customisable and easily expanded. Β 

LimitationsΒ 

  • Less Mature:Β Being newer on the market means fewer β€œout of the box” modules and less battle-tested experience.Β Β 
  • Less Standardised and Established: Integrating with other red-team ecosystems (toolchains, training, reporting workflows) may require more customisation.Β 

SliverΒ 

Developed byΒ BishopΒ Fox, Sliver is an open-source adversary emulation platform that implants β€œslivers” (malicious binaries)Β across many architectures and supports multiple transport options.Β 

StrengthsΒ 

  • Staged andΒ StagelessΒ Payloads:Β Sliver delivers both staged andΒ stagelessΒ payloadsΒ to launch both larger, immediate-impact attacks and smaller, size-constricted ones.Β 
  • Flexible Transport Options:Β Offers native support for DNS, HTTP(S),Β mTLS,Β WireGuardΒ and custom transports for varied emulation of egress patterns.Β Β 
  • Dynamic Code Generation:Β Reduces static detections (when configured properly) with per-binary keys and compile-time options to change fingerprints.Β Β 

LimitationsΒ 

  • No Commercial SLA:Β Teams need to invest in their own internal support, testing, hardening, andΒ expertise.Β Β 
  • Payload Size:Β Some users report the need to reduce forensic artefacts.Β Β 

HavocΒ Β 

Havoc has rapidly gained traction in the red teaming community as one of the few open-sourceΒ C2 tools toΒ be designed withΒ operator UX in mind.Β Β 

StrengthsΒ 

  • Fully Customisable: Teams can extend,Β modify, and audit the framework (again, good for research, education, and customΒ engagements).Β Β 
  • Fast Set Up:Β Documentation, tutorials, and YouTube walk-throughs shorten the learning curve, along with active community engagement.Β 
  • Approachable UX:Β A GUI-driven framework smooths set up and providesΒ a more polished, modern user experience comparable to commercial-grade tools.Β 

LimitationsΒ 

  • Younger Ecosystem:Β Less battle-tested than older, more established red teaming tools; capabilities may evolve unevenly.Β 
  • Operational Hardening Required:Β To achieveΒ enterprise-grade OPSEC, internalΒ investmentΒ isΒ required: cleaning proxies,Β testing against EDR/XDR stacks,Β hardening listeners.Β Β Β 

Outflank Security Tooling (OST)Β Β 

Outflank Security Tooling, or OST, is a collection of advanced red teaming toolsΒ made β€œby red teamers, for red teamers.” This broad, evasive toolsetΒ emulates real-world attacksΒ by simulating APTΒ techniques, bypassing defences, and providing high-end offensiveΒ security.Β 

StrengthsΒ 

  • Expert Maintained:Β OST is continuously updated by the hackers and experts that use itΒ themselves, making it well-suited for mature and sensitiveΒ targetΒ environments.Β 
  • Full Kill Chain Coverage:Β GetΒ advanced tools to break the attack chain at any stage. Small teams can punch above their weight with shortcuts for hard stages like EDR evasion, initial access, and OPSEC-safe lateral movement.Β 
  • UniqueΒ IndustryΒ Advantage:Β OST features techniques not yet weaponized or even published by other teams, giving organisations a unique advantage over other tools and attackers. Β 

LimitationsΒ 

  • Vetted Audience:Β Because of its powerful capabilities, Outflank Security Tooling is not a tool for the masses. Instead, it is available only to a vettedΒ community of responsible buyers and red team professionals because of itsΒ real-world attack potential.Β 
  • OS-Specific Evasion:Β Evasion techniques are carefully crafted to work with certain operating systems and configurations, just likeΒ anΒ attackers’ techniques. ThisΒ means that an exploit designed for a Windows 11 endpoint may not work on Windows 10.Β 

Kali LinuxΒ 

Maintained by Offensive Security, Kali Linux is a Debian-based Linux construction used for red teaming, pen testing, and digital forensics. Rather than a specialised red teaming tool, it is a complete operating system and toolkit. Β 

StrengthsΒ 

  • Preinstalled Security Tools:Β Kali Linux ships with 600+ preinstalled security tools (from John the Ripper toΒ BurpΒ SuiteΒ to Wireshark).Β 
  • Free and Open Source:Β Users canΒ modify, inspect, and rebuild it. No licensingΒ or usage fees.Β Β 
  • Open to Integration:Β Kali Linux serves as the foundation for red teaming tools, integrating with frameworks like Sliver and Havoc (C2 operators) to act as host.Β 

LimitationsΒ 

  • Not a C2 Framework:Β While Kali Linux supports C2 frameworks, it is an environmentβ€”not a post-exploitation or C2Β platformΒ in its own right.Β 
  • Inconsistent Tool Maturity:Β Tools can overlap, lead to inefficiencies, or (in the case of older tools)Β be buggy, outdated, or redundant.Β Β 

Matrix TableΒ 

ToolΒ  OverviewΒ  Use CaseΒ 
Cobalt StrikeΒ  Commercial, professional-grade red teaming and post-exploitation platform used by ~60% of red teams worldwide.Β  Professional, repeatable red teaming engagementsΒ 
MythicΒ  Open-source, modular C2 framework for research and custom agent creation.Β  Highly modular, customizable, cross-platform agent devΒ 
AdaptixC2Β  New (2025) open-source C2 platform emphasizing modularity and cross-platform operation.Β  Highly modular, customizable, cross-platform agent devΒ 
Sliver (BishopFox)Β  Open-source adversary emulation framework for red teaming with multi-transport implants (β€œslivers”).Β  Open-source research and adversary emulationΒ 
HavocΒ  Open-source GUI-based C2 framework designed for usability and community collaboration.Β  Modern GUI-driven open C2 alternativeΒ 
Outflank Security Tooling (OST)Β 

Β 

Β 

Β 

High-end offensive security red teaming toolkit createdΒ β€œby red teamingΒ expertsΒ forΒ red teaming experts.”  Advanced APT simulations and evasive tactics forΒ mature, sensitive target environments.Β 
Kali LinuxΒ  Debian-based Linux distro for penetration testing, digital forensics, and redΒ teaming;Β acts as a tool platform.Β  Training and general-purposeΒ pentestingΒ 

Β 

Conclusion:Β CommercialΒ vs Open-SourceΒ 

Ultimately, theΒ choice between commercial red teaming tools and open-source optionsΒ depends on where youΒ areΒ willing to sacrifice.Β 

AsΒ SANSΒ notes, β€œBalance the cost against the potentialΒ ROI. Open-source tools…may be cost-effective and community-driven, while commercial tools…often come withΒ aΒ additionalΒ capabilities and a curated database. This typically includes the latestΒ threatΒ intelligence, attack vectors, newΒ campaignsΒ and overall support.” 

Whether your organisation is looking for a cost-friendly option or a mature, licensed solution, there is a red teaming vendor that can fit your needs in 2026. Β 

FAQ:

What is a red team?Β 

AΒ redΒ team is a group of ethical hackers that play the part of adversaries in simulating a real-world cyberattack for the purpose of testing an organization’s cybersecurity defences. They play a key role inΒ offensive security.Β 

Β 

What is the difference between a red team and a blue team?Β 

A red team attacks; a blue team defends. Though they play opposite roles in red team engagements, all are on the same side: improving the cybersecurity posture of the target organisation. Β 

This is why teams shouldΒ prioritise blue team successΒ overΒ redΒ team wins.Β Β 

Watch this explainer video for more:Β https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E3ZMAipJvaoΒ 

Β 

How is red teaming different from penetration testing?
Pen testingΒ searches forΒ and cataloguesΒ vulnerabilities, specifically.Β Β Red teamingΒ leverages advanced and creative ways to breach an organisation, from social engineering to APTs and beyond. It is broader, less predictable, and tests everything from the tool stack to the response capabilities of the blue team.

Β 

What is the goal of a red team exercise?

The goal of a red team exercise is to uncover ways in which threat actors could leverage internal weaknesses, misconfigurations, and oversights – along with technical exploits and expertise – to access an organisation’s internal network, services, or applications and disrupt operations, exfiltrate data, and otherwise inflict harm. Β 

Β 

How do you get legal/ethical approval to run a red team?Β 

The red team engagement needs to be authorised and approved by the organisation and key stakeholders. Basic steps include:Β 

  • Scope and Justification:Β Define whatΒ you’reΒ testing and whyΒ 
  • Sign-Off:Β Approval from legal,Β risk/compliance,Β SOC/security, IT/network operations, HR (if phishing), C-Suite sponsorΒ 
  • Rules of Engagement (RoE):Β Defines technical boundaries, allowed techniques, and things like safe words and kill switches.Β 

Β 

What kind of tools do red teams use?Β Β 

Red teams typically use command-and-control (C2)Β platformsΒ to run red team engagements. TheseΒ frameworksΒ can be commercial-grade or open-sourced, andΒ include tools such as:Β 

  • Beacons/Agents/SliversΒ 
  • Adversary Emulation PlatformsΒ 
  • Exploit FrameworksΒ 
  • Lateral-Movement ToolsΒ 
  • Payload Builders/Obfuscators/PackersΒ 
  • Transport and Tunneling ToolsΒ 
  • ReconnaissanceΒ and Scanning Tools (Shodan,Β theHarvester)Β 
  • Social Engineering and Phishing Toolkits (Social Engineering Toolkit (SET))Β 
  • Network/Application Testing Tools (Wireshark, Burp Suite)Β 
  • Physical Tools (RFID cloners, lock-pick sets)Β 
  • Command Libraries/Scripts/ AutomationΒ 

Cobalt Strike was one of the first public red team C2 frameworks and is a favouriteΒ in the red teaming community.Β Β 

What’sΒ a purple teamΒ exerciseΒ and should we do one?Β 

AΒ purple teamΒ exercise brings red teams and blue teams together in a collaborative security assessment. The focus is on bringingΒ both skillsets to the table for the purpose of learning, teaching, and improvingβ€”not β€œwinning.”  

AΒ purple team mindsetΒ recognizes red and blue as theΒ same team – with theΒ ultimate goalΒ of beating attackers – andΒ fosters engagementsΒ that act asΒ an open-communication training opportunity.Β Β 

The post The Best Red Teaming Tools of 2026: What You Need to Know appeared first on IT Security Guru.

2026 API and AI Security Predictions: What Experts Expect in the Year Ahead

11 December 2025 at 09:54

This is a predictions blog. We know, we know; everyone does them, and they can get a bit same-y. Chances are, you’re already bored with reading them. So, we’ve decided to do things a little bit differently this year.Β  Instead of bombarding you with just our own predictions, we’ve decided to cast the net far [...]

The post 2026 API and AI Security Predictions: What Experts Expect in the Year Ahead appeared first on Wallarm.

The post 2026 API and AI Security Predictions: What Experts Expect in the Year Ahead appeared first on Security Boulevard.

CyberVolk Returns | Flawed VolkLocker Brings New Features With Growing Pains

11 December 2025 at 09:00

CyberVolk is a pro-Russia hacktivist persona we first documented in late 2024, tracking its use of multiple ransomware tools to conduct attacks aligned with Russian government interests. After seemingly lying dormant for most of 2025 due to Telegram enforcement actions, the group returned in August with a new RaaS offering called VolkLocker (aka CyberVolk 2.x).

In this post, we examine the functionality of VolkLocker, including its Telegram-based automation, encryption mechanisms, and affiliate features. Our analysis reveals an operation struggling with the challenges of expansion: taking one step forward with sophisticated Telegram automation, and one step backward with payloads that retain test artifacts enabling victim self-recovery.

Technical Details

VolkLocker payloads are written in Golang, with versions supporting both Linux and Windows. Base builds are shipped without obfuscation, and RaaS operators are encouraged to use UPX for packing rather than being offered native crypting or packing features as is common with many other RaaS offerings.

Operators building new VolkLocker payloads must provide a bitcoin address, Telegram bot token ID, Telegram chat ID, encryption deadline, desired file extension, and self-destruct options.

Required options for CyberVolk builds
Required options for CyberVolk builds

Upon launch, the ransomware checks its execution context and attempts privilege escalation if needed. Escalation uses the β€œms-settings” UAC bypass technique (T1548.002), hijacking the HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command registry key to execute with elevated privileges.

UAC Bypass pseudocode for CyberVolk’s Ransomware

The malware performs environmental discovery and system enumeration, including process enumeration for virtual environment detection and hardware-based identification.

VM sandbox detection in CyberVolk's Ransomware
VM sandbox detection in CyberVolk’s Ransomware

VolkLocker checks the local MAC address against known virtualization vendor prefixes. Registry locations associated with VirtualBox and VMware are also queried.

MAC Prefix Vendor
00:05:69 VMware, Inc.
00:0C:29 VMware, Inc.
00:1C:14 VMware, Inc.
00:50:56 VMware, Inc.
08:00:27 Oracle Corporation (VirtualBox)
0A:00:27 Oracle Corporation (VirtualBox)
VM Detection in CyberVolk
VM Detection in CyberVolk

Once initialized, the ransomware enumerates all available drives (A: through Z:) and determines which files to encrypt based on exclusion lists for specific paths and extensions configured in the VolkLocker code.

Exclude Paths and Extensions in VolkLocker
Exclude Paths and Extensions in VolkLocker

Encryption Mechanism

VolkLocker uses AES-256 in GCM mode (Galois/Counter Mode) for file encryption. When the ransomware identifies a target file, it initializes an encryption engine using a 32-byte master key decoded from a 64-character hex string embedded in the binary.

For each file, the malware generates a random 12-byte nonce for the initialization vector using Golang’s crypto/rand package. The file is encrypted using the GCM Seal operation, which prepends the 12-byte nonce to the ciphertext and appends a 16-byte authentication tag. The original file is marked for deletion, and the encrypted file receives a custom extension (e.g., .locked, .cvolk).

Critical Design Flaw | Plaintext Key Backup

VolkLocker does not generate encryption keys dynamically. Instead, master keys are hardcoded as hex strings within the binaries. The same master key encrypts all files on a victim system.

Critically, this master key is also written to a plaintext file in the %TEMP% folder, creating a trivial decryption pathway for victims who discover it.

This design flaw exists in the backupMasterKey() function, which executes during initialization and performs the following:

  • Constructs a file path at %TEMP%\system_backup.key (typically C:\Users\\AppData\Local\Temp\system_backup.key)
  • Writes a plaintext file containing the victim’s unique identifier, the complete master encryption key, and the attacker’s Bitcoin address
  • Applies Windows Hidden and System file attributes to obscure the file from casual directory listings
  • The file format is:
    User: CV<16 hex characters>
    Key: <64 hex characters - THE MASTER KEY>
    BTC: <attacker's bitcoin address>
    

Since the ransomware never deletes this backup key file, victims could attempt file recovery by extracting the necessary values from the file.

Decryption triggered via backed-up key file
Decryption triggered via backed-up key file

The plaintext key backup likely represents a test artifact inadvertently shipped in production builds. CyberVolk operators may be unaware that affiliates are deploying builds with the backupMasterKey() function still embedded. Given that VolkLocker is a relatively new service, the presence of what appears to be debug functionality in live deployments suggests that the operation is struggling to maintain quality control while aggressively recruiting lesser-skilled affiliates.

System Lockdown & Persistence Features

VolkLocker modifies multiple registry keys to inhibit system recovery and analysis:

reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender" /v DisableAntiSpyware /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System" /v DisableTaskMgr /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System" /v DisableTaskMgr /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System" /v DisableRegistryTools /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System" /v DisableRegistryTools /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

reg add "HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v DisableCMD /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f

reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v DisableCMD /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f

reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer" /v NoRun /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer" /v NoClose /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer" /v NoDrives /t REG_DWORD /d 4 /f

In addition, Windows Defender is targeted for termination via PowerShell:

powershell -Command "Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true"
sc config WinDefend start= disabled
net stop WinDefend /y

The malware also terminates processes associated with common analysis tools via taskkill.exe:

  • processhacker.exe
  • procexp.exe
  • procexp64.exe
  • taskmgr.exe

VolkLocker creates multiple identical copies of itself in various system locations to establish persistence:

    %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\cvolk.exe
    %PUBLIC%\Documents\svchost.exe
    %SYSTEMDRIVE%\ProgramData\Microsoft\Network\wlanext.exe
    %TEMP%\WindowsUpdate.exe

Ransom Note and Countdown Timer

VolkLocker’s ransom note is a dynamic HTML application. The file cybervolk_ransom.html is written to %TEMP% and launched both after encryption completes and upon system startup. The ransom note displays a countdown timer with a default duration of 48 hours. The duration of the timer can be configured by the RaaS operators.

CyberVolk (2025) Ransom note HTML
CyberVolk (2025) Ransom note HTML

The JavaScript-based countdown timer is purely cosmetic. When it reaches zero, the triggerDestruction() function displays a shake animation and the message β€œπŸ’€ SYSTEM DESTROYED πŸ’€.”

However, a separate enforcement timer operates independently of the browser-based display.

Timer for System Corruption and Destruction in CyberVolk
Timer for System Corruption and Destruction in CyberVolk

This enforcement timer is synchronized with the system clock using Golang’s time.After() function. When it expires, it calls the SystemCorruptor() and DestroySystem() functions. The same destructive routine triggers if an incorrect decryption key is provided more than the configured maxAttempts value. The default is three times.

File & Backup Destruction Mechanism

During system destruction, VolkLocker deletes the following folders from the user profile:

  • Documents
  • Desktop
  • Downloads
  • Pictures

The malware also deletes Volume Shadow Copies:

vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet

Finally, VolkLocker triggers a BSOD (Blue Screen of Death) after a 10-second delay by calling NtRaiseHardError() with a specific status code.

BSOD Triggering in CyberVolk Ransomware
BSOD Triggering in CyberVolk Ransomware

Telegram Integration

All aspects of the CyberVolk RaaS are managed through Telegram. Prospective customers and operational queries are directed to the main bot (CyberVolk_Kbot).

CyberVolk
CyberVolk β€œV2” Bot

VolkLocker payloads include built-in Telegram automation for command and control. This aligns with CyberVolk’s operational model, where all communication, purchasing, and support occur through Telegram, a model the actors see as a β€œmarket differentiator”.

The default Telegram C2 supports the following commands:

/broadcast Message all infected victims
/decrypt Initiate file decryption
/help Display command list
/list List all active victims
/send Message specific victim IDs
/start Show administrative panel
/status Get victim system information

The Telegram C2 is customizable. Some CyberVolk operators have published examples that include additional capabilities, such as keylogging control.

Customized CyberVolk RaaS Telegram Interface (including RAT & keylogging commands)
Customized CyberVolk RaaS Telegram Interface (including RAT & keylogging commands)

The telegramReporter() function alerts operators upon new infections, similar to Telegram-enabled infostealers. When a host is infected, basic system information and a screenshot are sent to the configured Telegram chat.

System Information sent to Telegram in CyberVolk's ransomware
System Information sent to Telegram in CyberVolk’s ransomware

Expanded Services and Pricing

CyberVolk has expanded beyond ransomware. In November 2025, operators began advertising standalone RAT and keylogger tools, with the following advertised pricing model:

  • RaaS (single OS): $800-$1,100 USD
  • RaaS (Linux + Windows): $1,600-$2,200 USD
  • Standalone RAT or Keylogger: $500 USD each

Intelligence suggests bundle discounts are available for customers purchasing multiple services.

Conclusion

Despite repeated Telegram account bans and channel removals throughout 2025, CyberVolk has reestablished its operations and expanded its service offerings.

However, storing master encryption keys in plaintext is a significant design blunder that undermines the ransomware’s effectiveness, allowing victims to recover files without acceding to the threat actor’s ransom demand.

Nevertheless, defenders should see CyberVolk’s adoption of Telegram-based automation as a reflection of broader trends among politically-motivated threat actors. These groups continue to lower barriers for ransomware deployment while operating on platforms that provide convenient infrastructure for criminal services.

The SentinelOne Singularity Endpoint Platform currently detects and prevents malicious behaviors and artifacts associated with CyberVolk Ransomware attacks.

Indicators of Compromise

CyberVolk (VolkLocker 2025) Linux
0948e75c94046f0893844e3b891556ea48188608

CyberVolk (VolkLocker 2025) Windows
dcd859e5b14657b733dfb0c22272b82623466321

Bitcoin Address
bc1qujgdzl0v82gh9pvmg3ftgnknl336ku26nnp0vy (CyberVolk)

Telegram Bot Token
8368663132:AAHBfe3xYPtg1IMynKhQy1BRzuF5UZRZspw (CyberVolk)

Beyond Cargo Audit: Securing Your Rust Crates in Container Images

11 December 2025 at 08:00

Container image scanning has come a long way over the years, but it still comes with its own set of, often unique, challenges. One of these being the difficulty in analyzing images for vulnerabilities when they contain a Rust payload. If you’re a big Rust user, you may have found that some software composition analysis […]

The post Beyond Cargo Audit: Securing Your Rust Crates in Container Images appeared first on Anchore.

The post Beyond Cargo Audit: Securing Your Rust Crates in Container Images appeared first on Security Boulevard.

SHADOW-VOID-042 Targets Multiple Industries with Void Rabisu-like Tactics

In November, a targeted spear-phishing campaign was observed using Trend Micro-themed lures against various industries, but this was quickly detected and thwarted by the Trend Vision Oneβ„’ platform.

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