The phishing campaign targeted users on WhatsApp, including an Iranian-British activist, and stole the credentials of a Lebanese cabinet minister and at least one journalist.

The New York Times has published new details about a purported cyberattack that unnamed US officials claim plunged parts of Venezuela into darkness in the lead-up to the capture of the country’s president, Nicolás Maduro.

Key among the new details is that the cyber operation was able to turn off electricity for most residents in the capital city of Caracas for only a few minutes, though in some neighborhoods close to the military base where Maduro was seized, the outage lasted for three days. The cyber-op also targeted Venezuelan military radar defenses. The paper said the US Cyber Command was involved.

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“Turning off the power in Caracas and interfering with radar allowed US military helicopters to move into the country undetected on their mission to capture Nicolás Maduro, the Venezuelan president who has now been brought to the United States to face drug charges,” the NYT reported.

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Cyberspace has become a central arena in cross-strait tensions, complementing military maneuvers, diplomatic isolation, and economic pressure.

The post China Launched 2.6M Daily Cyberattacks on Taiwan in 2025 appeared first on TechRepublic.

Cyberspace has become a central arena in cross-strait tensions, complementing military maneuvers, diplomatic isolation, and economic pressure.

The post China Launched 2.6M Daily Cyberattacks on Taiwan in 2025 appeared first on TechRepublic.

Industrial routers and other OT perimeter devices are absorbing the majority of cyberattacks targeting operational technology environments, according to new Forescout Vedere Labs research.

Analysing 90 days of real-world honeypot data, researchers found that 67% of malicious activity was directed at OT perimeter devices, such as industrial routers and firewalls, compared with 33% aimed at directly exposed OT assets like PLCs and HMIs.

The findings highlight the growing risk facing edge devices that sit between IT and OT networks.

Automated attacks dominate the OT perimeter

The research shows that OT environments are under constant, automated attack, with more than 60 million requests logged across 11 devices in just three months. Once high-volume SNMP fingerprinting traffic was removed, the remaining 3.5 million events revealed that industrial firewalls and routers were the most heavily targeted assets.

Attackers overwhelmingly relied on SSH and Telnet brute-force attempts, which accounted for 72% of perimeter attacks. Many of the credentials used were drawn from well-known default IoT password lists that have circulated for almost a decade, underlining the persistent risk posed by weak or unchanged credentials.

HTTP and HTTPS traffic made up a further 24% of attacks, including thousands of automated exploit attempts designed to force devices to download malware from external servers.

Emerging botnets raise concerns

Researchers identified several malware families actively targeting OT perimeter devices, including RondoDox, Redtail, and ShadowV2. Of these, RondoDox stood out as the most prevalent, responsible for 59% of observed malicious HTTP activity.

RondoDox is a relatively new botnet that has rapidly expanded its exploit arsenal to include more than 50 known vulnerabilities, many without assigned CVEs. While most current exploits focus on IT and IoT devices, researchers warn that the addition of industrial router vulnerabilities could quickly increase the risk to critical infrastructure operators.

ShadowV2, first observed only months ago, has already become the third most common botnet in the dataset, demonstrating how quickly new automated threats are emerging.

Chaya_005: a long-running reconnaissance campaign

One of the most significant findings was the discovery of a previously undocumented activity cluster, dubbed Chaya_005. Active for at least two years, Chaya_005 appears to focus on fingerprinting and capability testing of industrial edge devices, rather than immediate mass exploitation.

The campaign initially included a successful exploit against a legacy Sierra Wireless router, before evolving into a broader set of malformed exploit attempts against multiple vendors’ devices. Researchers believe the activity may be designed to identify which devices are vulnerable to specific command-execution techniques, potentially for future exploitation or monetisation.

Unlike typical botnets, Chaya_005 showed no evidence of indiscriminate scanning or follow-on attacks, suggesting a more deliberate and targeted reconnaissance effort.

Hacktivists and OT expand the threat surface

The research also highlights the growing interest of hacktivist groups in OT targets. In one incident, the pro-Russian group TwoNet compromised and defaced a water treatment HMI in Forescout’s adversary engagement environment.

While such attacks often rely on manual exploitation, the data shows that routers, PLCs, HMIs and even IP cameras are routinely targeted by automated scanners and botnets, blurring the traditional distinction between IT and OT threats.

Security teams urged to rethink IT/OT boundaries

Forescout warns that treating attacks as “IT-only” or “OT-only” is increasingly dangerous. Automated malware does not distinguish between environments, and compromised IT devices at the OT perimeter can serve as a stepping stone into critical systems.

To reduce risk, researchers recommend that organisations harden OT devices, eliminate weak credentials, avoid exposing industrial equipment directly to the internet, and implement OT-aware monitoring capable of detecting malicious behaviour specific to industrial protocols.

The post Industrial routers bear the brunt of OT cyberattacks, new Forescout research finds appeared first on IT Security Guru.

Welcome back, my aspiring SCADA/ICS cyberwarriors!

SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems and the wider class of industrial control systems (ICS) run many parts of modern life, such as electricity, water, transport, factories. These systems were originally built to work in closed environments and not to be exposed to the public Internet. Over the last decade they have been connected more and more to corporate networks and remote services to improve efficiency and monitoring. That change has also made them reachable by the same attackers who target regular IT systems. When a SCADA system is hit by malware, sabotage, or human error, operators must restore service fast. At the same time investigators need trustworthy evidence to find out what happened and to support legal, regulatory, or insurance processes.

Forensics techniques from traditional IT are helpful, but they usually do not fit SCADA devices directly. Many field controllers run custom or minimal operating systems, lack detailed logs, and expose few of the standard interfaces that desktop forensics relies on. To address that gap, we are starting a focused, practical 3-day course on SCADA forensics. The course is designed to equip you with hands-on skills for collecting, preserving and analysing evidence from PLCs, RTUs, HMIs and engineering workstations.

Today we will explain how SCADA systems are built, what makes forensics in that space hard, and which practical approaches and tools investigators can use nowadays.

Background and SCADA Architecture

A SCADA environment usually has three main parts: the control center, the network that connects things, and the field devices.

The control center contains servers that run the supervisory applications, databases or historians that store measurement data, and operator screens (human-machine interfaces). These hosts look more like regular IT systems and are usually the easiest place to start a forensic investigation.

The network between control center and field devices is varied. It can include Ethernet, serial links, cellular radios, or specialized industrial buses. Protocols range from simple serial messages to industrial Ethernet and protocol stacks that are unique to vendors. That variety makes it harder to collect and interpret network traffic consistently.

Field devices sit at the edge. They include PLCs (programmable logic controllers), RTUs (remote terminal units), and other embedded controllers that handle sensors and actuators. Many of these devices run stripped-down or proprietary firmware, hold little storage, and are designed to operate continuously.

Understanding these layers helps set realistic expectations for what evidence is available and how to collect it without stopping critical operations.

Challenges in SCADA Forensics

SCADA forensics has specific challenges that change how an investigation is done.

First, some field devices are not built for forensics. They often lack detailed logs, have limited storage, and run proprietary software. That makes it hard to find recorded events or to run standard acquisition tools on the device.

Second, availability matters. Many SCADA devices must stay online to keep a plant, substation, or waterworks operating. Investigators cannot simply shut everything down to image drives. This requirement forces use of live-acquisition techniques that gather volatile data while systems keep running.

Third, timing and synchronization are difficult. Distributed devices often have different clocks and can drift. That makes correlating events across a wide system challenging unless timestamps are synchronized or corrected during analysis.

Finally, organizational and legal issues interfere. Companies often reluctant to share device details, firmware, or incident records because of safety, reputation, or legal concerns. That slows development of general-purpose tools and slows learning from real incidents.

All these challenges only increase the value of SCADA forensics specialists. Salary varies by location, experience, and roles, but can range from approximately $65,000 to over $120,000 per year.

Real-world attack chain

To understand why SCADA forensics matters, it helps to look at how real incidents unfold. The following examples show how a single compromise inside the corporate network can quickly spread into the operational side of a company. In both cases, the attack starts with the compromise of an HR employee’s workstation, which is a common low-privilege entry point. From there, the attacker begins basic domain reconnaissance, such as mapping users, groups, servers, and RDP access paths. 

Case 1

In the first path, the attacker discovers that the compromised account has the right to replicate directory data, similar to a DCSync privilege. That allows the extraction of domain administrator credentials. Once the attacker holds domain admin rights, they use Group Policy to push a task or service that creates a persistent connection to their command-and-control server. From that moment, they can access nearly every machine in the domain without resistance. With such reach, pivoting into the SCADA or engineering network becomes a matter of time. In one real scenario, this setup lasted only weeks before attackers gained full control and eventually destroyed the domain.

Case 2

The second path shows a different but equally dangerous route. After gathering domain information, the attacker finds that the HR account has RDP access to a BACKUP server, which stores local administrator hashes. They use these hashes to move laterally, discovering that most domain users also have RDP access through an RDG gateway that connects to multiple workstations. From there, they hop across endpoints, including those used by engineers. Once inside engineering workstations, the attacker maps out routes to the industrial control network and starts interacting with devices by changing configurations, altering setpoints, or pushing malicious logic into PLCs.

Both cases end with full access to SCADA and industrial equipment. The common causes are poor segmentation between IT and OT, excessive privileges, and weak monitoring.

Frameworks and Methodologies

A practical framework for SCADA forensics has to preserve evidence and keep the process safe. The basic idea is to capture the most fragile, meaningful data first and leave more invasive actions for later or for offline testing.

Start with clear roles and priorities. You need to know who can order device changes, who will gather evidence, and who is responsible for restoring service. Communication between operations and security must be planned ahead of incidents.

As previously said, capture volatile and remote evidence first, then persistent local data. This includes memory contents, current register values, and anything stored only in RAM. Remote evidence includes network traffic, historian streams, and operator session logs. Persistent local data includes configuration files, firmware images, and file system contents. Capturing network traffic and historian data early preserves context without touching the device.

A common operational pattern is to use lightweight preservation agents or passive sensors that record traffic and key events in real time. These components should avoid any action that changes device behavior. Heavy analysis and pattern matching happen later on copies of captured data in a safe environment.

When device interaction is required, prefer read-only APIs, documented diagnostic ports, or vendor-supported tools. If hardware-level extraction is necessary, use controlled methods (for example JTAG reads, serial console captures, or bus sniffers) with clear test plans and safety checks. Keep detailed logs of every command and action taken during live acquisition so the evidence chain is traceable.

Automation helps, but only if it is conservative. Two-stage approaches are useful, where stage one performs simple, safe preservation and stage two runs deeper analyses offline. Any automated agent must be tested to ensure it never interferes with real-time control logic.

SCADA Network Forensics

Network captures are often the richest, least disruptive source of evidence. Packet captures and flow data show commands sent to controllers, operator actions, and any external systems that are connected to the control network.

Start by placing passive capture points in places that see control traffic without being in the critical data path, such as network mirrors or dedicated taps. Capture both raw packets and derived session logs as well as timestamps with a reliable time source.

Protocol awareness is essential. We will cover some of them in the next article. A lot more will be covered during the course. Industrial protocols like Modbus, DNP3, and vendor-specific protocols carry operational commands. Parsing these messages into readable audit records makes it much easier to spot abnormal commands, unauthorized writes to registers, or suspicious sequence patterns. Deterministic models, for example, state machines that describe allowed sequences of messages, help identify anomalies. But expect normal operations to be noisy and variable. Any model must be trained or tuned to the site’s own behavior to reduce false positives.

Network forensics also supports containment. If an anomaly is detected in real time, defenders can ramp up capture fidelity in critical segments and preserve extra context for later analysis. Because many incidents move from corporate IT into OT networks, collecting correlated data from both domains gives a bigger picture of the attacker’s path

Endpoint and Device Forensics

Field devices are the hardest but the most important forensic targets. The path to useful evidence often follows a tiered strategy, where you use non-invasive sources first, then proceed to live acquisition, and finally to hardware-level extraction only when necessary.

Non-invasive collection means pulling data from historians, backups, documented export functions, and vendor tools that allow read-only access. These sources often include configuration snapshots, logged process values, and operator commands.

Live acquisition captures runtime state without stopping the device. Where possible, use the device’s read-only interfaces or diagnostic links to get memory snapshots, register values, and program state. If a device provides a console or API that returns internal variables, collect those values along with timestamps and any available context.

If read-only or diagnostic interfaces are not available or do not contain the needed data, hardware extraction methods come next. This includes connecting to serial consoles, listening on fieldbuses, using JTAG or SWD to read memory, or intercepting firmware during upload processes. These operations require specialized hardware and procedures. It must be planned carefully to avoid accidental writes, timing interruptions, or safety hazards.

Interpreting raw dumps is often the bottleneck. Memory and storage can contain mixed content, such as configuration data, program code, encrypted blobs, and timestamps. But there are techniques that can help, including differential analysis (comparing multiple dumps from similar devices), data carving for detectable structures, and machine-assisted methods that separate low-entropy (likely structured) regions from high-entropy (likely encrypted) ones. Comparing captured firmware to a known baseline is a reliable way to detect tampering.

Where possible, create an offline test environment that emulates the device and process so investigators can replay traffic, exercise suspected malicious inputs, and validate hypotheses without touching production hardware.

SCADA Forensics Tooling

Right now the toolset is mixed. Investigators use standard forensic suites for control-center hosts, packet-capture and IDS tools extended with industrial protocol parsers for networks, and bespoke hardware tools or vendor utilities for field devices. Many useful tools exist, but most are specific to a vendor, a protocol, or a device family.

A practical roadmap for better tooling includes three points. First, create and adopt standardized formats for logging control-protocol events and for preserving packet captures with synchronized timestamps. Second, build non-disruptive acquisition primitives that work across device classes, ways to read key memory regions, configuration, and program images without stopping operation. Third, develop shared anonymized incident datasets that let researchers validate tools against realistic behaviors and edge cases.

In the meantime, it’s important to combine several approaches, such as maintaining high-quality network capture, work with vendors to understand diagnostic interfaces, prepare hardware tools and safe extraction procedures, while documenting everything. Establish and test standard operating procedures in advance so that when an incident happens the team acts quickly and consistently.

Conclusion

Attacks on critical infrastructure are rising, and SCADA forensics still trails IT forensics because field devices are often proprietary, have limited logging, and cannot be taken offline. We showed those gaps and gave practical actions. You will need to preserve network and historian data early, prefer read-only device collection, enforce strict IT/OT segmentation, reduce privileges, and rehearse incident response to protect those systems. In the next article, we will look at different protocols to give you a better idea of how everything works.

To support hands-on learning, our 3-day SCADA Forensics course starts in November that uses realistic ICS network topologies, breach simulations, and labs to teach how to reconstruct attack chains, identify IOCs, and analyze artifacts on PLCs, RTUs, engineering workstations and HMIs. 

During the course you will use common forensic tools to complete exercises and focus on safe, non-disruptive procedures you can apply in production environments. 

Learn more: https://hackersarise.thinkific.com/courses/scada-forensics

The post SCADA (ICS) Hacking and Security: An Introduction to SCADA Forensics first appeared on Hackers Arise.

Over the years, endpoint security has evolved from primitive antivirus software to more sophisticated next-generation platforms employing advanced technology and better endpoint detection and response.

Because of the increased threat that modern cyberattacks pose, experts are exploring more elegant ways of keeping data safe from threats.

Signature-Based Antivirus Software

Signature-based detection is the use of footprints to identify malware. All programs, applications, software and files have a digital footprint. Buried within their code, these digital footprints or signatures are unique to the respective property. With signature-based detection, traditional antivirus products can scan a computer for the footprints of known malware.

These malware footprints are stored in a database. Antivirus products essentially search for the footprints of known malware in the database. If they discover one, they’ll identify the malware, in which case they’ll either delete or quarantine it.

When new malware emerges and experts document it, antivirus vendors create and release a signature database update to detect and block the new threat. These updates increase the tool’s detection capabilities, and in some cases, vendors may release them multiple times per day.

With an average of 350,000 new malware instances registered daily, there are a lot of signature database updates to keep up with. While some antivirus vendors update their programs throughout the day, others release scheduled daily, weekly or monthly software updates to keep things simple for their users.

But convenience comes at the risk of real-time protection. When antivirus software is missing new malware signatures from its database, customers are unprotected against new or advanced threats.

Next-Generation Antivirus

While signature-based detection has been the default in traditional antivirus solutions for years, its drawbacks have prompted people to think about how to make antivirus more effective. Today’s next-generation anti-malware solutions use advanced technologies like behavior analysis, artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) to detect threats based on the attacker’s intention rather than looking for a match to a known signature.

Behavior analysis in threat prevention is similar, although admittedly more complex. Instead of only cross-checking files with a reference list of signatures, a next-generation antivirus platform can analyze malicious files’ actions (or intentions) and determine when something is suspicious. This approach is about 99% effective against new and advanced malware threats, compared to signature-based solutions’ average of 60% effectiveness.

Next-generation antivirus takes traditional antivirus software to a new level of endpoint security protection. It goes beyond known file-based malware signatures and heuristics because it’s a system-centric, cloud-based approach. It uses predictive analytics driven by ML and AI as well as threat intelligence to:

• Detect and prevent malware and fileless attacks
• Identify malicious behavior and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) from unknown sources
• Collect and analyze comprehensive endpoint data to determine root causes
• Respond to new and emerging threats that previously went undetected.

Countering Modern Attacks

Today’s attackers know precisely where to find gaps and weaknesses in an organization’s network perimeter security, and they penetrate these in ways that bypass traditional antivirus software. These attackers use highly developed tools to target vulnerabilities that leverage:

• Memory-based attacks
• PowerShell scripting language
• Remote logins
• Macro-based attacks.

To counter these attackers, next-generation antivirus focuses on events – files, processes, applications and network connections – to see how actions in each of these areas are related. Analysis of event streams can help identify malicious intent, behaviors and activities; once identified, the attacks can be blocked.

This approach is increasingly important today because enterprises are finding that attackers are targeting their specific networks. The attacks are multi-stage and personalized and pose a significantly higher risk; traditional antivirus solutions don’t have a chance of stopping them.

Explore IBM Security QRadar Solutions  

Endpoint Detection and Response

Endpoint detection and response (EDR) software flips that model, relying on behavioral analysis of what’s happening on the endpoint. For example, if a Word document spawns a PowerShell process and executes an unknown script, that’s concerning. The file will be flagged and quarantined until the validity of the process is confirmed. Not relying on signature-based detection enables the EDR platform to react better to new and advanced threats.

Some of the ways EDR thwarts advanced threats include the following:

• EDR provides real-time monitoring and detection of threats that may not be easily recognized by standard antivirus
• EDR detects unknown threats based on a behavior that isn’t normal
• Data collection and analysis determine threat patterns and alert organizations to threats
• Forensic capabilities can determine what happened during a security event
• EDR can isolate and quarantine suspicious or infected items. It often uses sandboxing to ensure a file’s safety without disrupting the user’s system.
• EDR can include automated remediation and removal of specific threats.

EDR agent software is deployed to endpoints within an organization and begins recording activity on these endpoints. These agents are like security cameras focused on the processes and events running on the devices.

EDR platforms have several approaches to detecting threats. Some detect locally on the endpoint via ML, some forward all recorded data to an on-premises control server for analysis, some upload the recorded data to a cloud resource for detection and inspection and others use a hybrid approach.

Detections by EDR platforms are based on several tools, including AI, threat intelligence, behavioral analysis and indicators of compromise (IOCs). These tools also offer a range of responses, such as actions that trigger alerts, isolate the machine from the network, roll back to a known good state, delete or terminate threats and generate forensic evidence files.

Managed Detection and Response

Managed detection and response (MDR) is not a technology, but a form of managed service, sometimes delivered by a managed security service provider. MDR provides value to organizations with limited resources or the expertise to continuously monitor potential attack surfaces. Specific security goals and outcomes define these services. MDR providers offer various cybersecurity tools, such as endpoint detection, security information and event management (SIEM), network traffic analysis (NTA), user and entity behavior analytics (UEBA), asset discovery, vulnerability management, intrusion detection and cloud security.

Gartner estimates that by 2025, 50% of organizations will use MDR services. There are several reasons to support this prediction:

• The widening talent shortage and skills gap: Many cybersecurity leaders confirm that they cannot use security technologies to their full advantage due to a global talent crunch.
• Cybersecurity teams are understaffed and overworked: Budget cuts, layoffs and resource diversion have left IT departments with many challenges.
• Widespread alert fatigue: Security analysts are becoming less productive due to “alert fatigue” from too many notifications and false positives from security applications. This results in distraction, ignored alerts, increased stress and fear of missing incidents. Many alerts are never addressed when, ideally, they should be studied and acted upon.

The technology behind an MDR service can include an array of options. This is an important thing to understand when evaluating MDR providers. The technology stack behind the service determines the scope of attacks they have access to detect.

Cybersecurity is about “defense-in-depth” — having multiple layers of protection to counter the numerous possible attack vectors. Various technologies provide complete visibility, detection and response capabilities. Some of the technologies offered by MDR services include:

• SIEM
• NTA
• Endpoint protection platform
• Intrusion detection system.

Extended Detection and Response

Extended detection and response (XDR) is the next phase in the evolution of EDR. XDR provides detection and protection across various environments, including networks and network components, cloud infrastructure and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS).

Features of XDR include:

• Visibility into all network layers, including the entire application stack
• Advanced detection, including automated correlation and ML processes capable of detecting events often missed by SIEM solutions
• Intelligent alert suppression filters out the noise that typically reduces the productivity of cybersecurity staff.

Benefits of XDR include:

• Improved analysis to help organizations collect the correct data and transform that data with contextual information
• Identify hidden threats with the help of advanced behavior models powered by ML algorithms
• Identify and correlate threats across various application stacks and network layers
• Minimize fatigue by providing prioritized and precise alerts for investigation
• Provide forensic capabilities needed to integrate multiple signals. This helps teams to construct the big picture of an attack and complete investigations promptly with high confidence in their findings.

XDR is gaining in popularity. XDR provides a single platform that can ingest endpoint agent data, network-level information and, in many cases, device logs. This data is correlated, and detections occur from one or many sources of telemetry.

XDR streamlines the functions of the analysts’ role by allowing them to view detections and respond from a single console. The single-pane-of-glass approach offers faster time to value, a shortened learning curve and quicker response times since the analysts no longer need to pivot between windows. Another advantage of XDR is its ability to piece multiple sources of telemetry together to achieve a big-picture view of detections. These tools are able to see what occurs not only on the endpoints but also between the endpoints.

The Future of Antivirus Software

Security is constantly evolving, and future threats may become much more dangerous than we are observing now. We cannot ignore these recent changes in the threat landscape. Rather, we need to understand them and stop these increasingly destructive attacks.

The post The Evolution of Antivirus Software to Face Modern Threats appeared first on Security Intelligence.

On September 19, 2022, an 18-year-old cyberattacker known as “teapotuberhacker” (aka TeaPot) allegedly breached the Slack messages of game developer Rockstar Games. Using this access, they pilfered over 90 videos of the upcoming Grand Theft Auto VI game. They then posted those videos on the fan website GTAForums.com. Gamers got an unsanctioned sneak peek of game footage, characters, plot points and other critical details. It was a game developer’s worst nightmare.

In addition, the malicious actor claimed responsibility for a similar security breach affecting ride-sharing company Uber just a week prior. According to reports, they infiltrated the company’s Slack by tricking an employee into granting them access. Then, they spammed the employees with multi-factor authentication (MFA) push notifications until they gained access to internal systems, where they could browse the source code.

Incidents like the Rockstar and Uber hacks should serve as a warning to all CISOs. Proper security must consider the role info-hungry actors and audiences can play when dealing with sensitive information and intellectual property.

Stephanie Carruthers, Chief People Hacker for the X‑Force Red team at IBM Security, broke down how the incident at Uber happened and what helps prevent these types of attacks.

“But We Have MFA”

First, Carruthers believes one potential and even likely scenario is the person targeted at Uber may have been a contractor. The hacker likely purchased stolen credentials belonging to this contractor on the dark web — as an initial step in their social engineering campaign. The attacker likely then used those credentials to log into one of Uber’s systems. However, Uber had multi-factor authentication (MFA) in place, and the attacker was asked to validate their identity multiple times.

According to reports, “TeaPot” contacted the target victim directly with a phone call, pretended to be IT, and asked them to approve the MFA requests. Once they did, the attacker logged in and could access different systems, including Slack and other sensitive areas.

“The key lesson here is that just because you have measures like MFA in place, it doesn’t mean you’re secure or that attacks can’t happen to you,” Carruthers said. “For a very long time, a lot of organizations were saying, ‘Oh, we have MFA, so we’re not worried.’ That’s not a good mindset, as demonstrated in this specific case.”

As part of her role with X-Force, Carruthers conducts social engineering assessments for organizations. She has been doing MFA bypass techniques for clients for several years. “That mindset of having a false sense of security is one of the things I think organizations still aren’t grasping because they think they have the tools in place so that it can’t happen to them.”

Social Engineering Tests Can Help Prevent These Types of Attacks

According to Carruthers, social engineering tests fall into two buckets: remote and onsite. She and her team look at phishing, voice phishing and smishing for remote tests. The onsite piece involves the X-Force team showing up in person and essentially breaking and entering a client’s network. During the testing, the X-Force teams attempt to coerce employees into giving them information that would allow them to breach systems — and take note of those who try to stop them and those who do not.

The team’s remote test focuses on an increasingly popular method: layering the methods together almost like an attack chain. Instead of only conducting a phishing campaign, this adds another step to the mix.

“What we’ll do, just like you saw in this Uber attack, is follow up on the phish with phone calls,” Carruthers said. “Targets will tell us the phish sounded suspicious but then thank us for calling because we have a friendly voice. And they’ll actually comply with what that phishing email requested. But it’s interesting to see attackers starting to layer on social engineering approaches rather than just hoping one of their phishing emails work.”

She explained that the team’s odds of success go up threefold when following up with a phone call. According to IBM’s 2022 X-Force Threat Intelligence Index, the click rate for the average targeted phishing campaign was 17.8%. Targeted phishing campaigns that added phone calls (vishing, or voice phishing) were three times more effective, netting a click from 53.2% of victims.

What Is OSINT — and How It Helps Attackers Succeed

For bad actors, the more intelligence they have on their target, the better. Attackers typically gather intelligence by scraping data readily available from public sources, called open source intelligence (OSINT). Thanks to social media and publicly-documented online activities, attackers can easily profile an organization or employee.

Carruthers says she’s spending more time today doing OSINT than ever before. “Actively getting info on a company is so important because that gives us all of the bits and pieces to build that campaign that’s going to be realistic to our targets,” she said. “We often look for people who have access to more sensitive information, and I wouldn’t be surprised if that person (in the Uber hack) was picked because of the access they had.”

For Carruthers, it’s critical to understand what information is out there about employees and organizations. “That digital footprint could be leveraged against them,” she said. “I can’t tell you how many times clients come back to us saying they couldn’t believe we found all these things. A little piece of information that seems harmless could be the cherry on top of our campaign that makes it look much more realistic.”

Tangible Hack Prevention Strategies

While multi-factor authentication can be bypassed, it is still a critical security tool. However, Carruthers suggests that organizations consider deploying a physical device like a Fido2 token. This option shouldn’t be too difficult to manage for small to medium-sized businesses.

“Next, I recommend using password managers with long, complex master passwords so they can’t be guessed or cracked or anything like that,” she said. “Those are some of the best practices for applications like Slack.”

Of course, no hacking prevention strategies that address social engineering would be complete without security awareness. Carruthers advises organizations to be aware of attacks out in the wild and be ready to address them. “Companies need to actually go through and review what’s included in their current training, and whether it’s addressing the realistic attacks happening today against their organization,” she said.

For example, the training may teach employees not to give their passwords to anyone over the phone. But when an attacker calls, they may not ask for your password. Instead, they may ask you to log in to a website that they control. Organizations will want to ensure their training is always fresh and interactive and that employees stay engaged.

The final piece of advice from Carruthers is for companies to refrain from relying too heavily on security tools. “It’s so easy to say that you can purchase a certain security tool and that you’ll never have to worry about being phished again,” she said.

The key takeaways here are:

• Incorporate physical devices into MFA. This builds a significant roadblock for attackers.
• Try to minimize your digital footprint. Avoid oversharing in public forums like social media.
• Use password managers. This way, employees only need to remember one password.
• Bolster security awareness programs with particular focus on social engineering threats. Far too often, security awareness misses this key element.
• Don’t rely too heavily on security tools. They can only take your security posture so far.

Finally, it’s important to reiterate what Carruthers and the X-Force team continue to prove with their social engineering tests: a false sense of security is counterproductive to preventing attacks. A more effective strategy combines quality security practices with awareness, adaptability and vigilance.

Learn more about X-Force Red penetration testing services here. To schedule a no-cost consult with X-Force, click here.

The post An IBM Hacker Breaks Down High-Profile Attacks appeared first on Security Intelligence.

It’s no secret that cyberattacks in the U.S. are increasing in frequency and sophistication. Since cyber crime impacts millions of businesses and individuals, many look to the government to see what it’s doing to anticipate, prevent and deal with these crimes.

To gain perspective on what’s happening in this area, the U.S. government’s budget and spending plans for cyber is a great place to start. This article will explore how much the government is spending, where that money is going and how its budget compares to previous years.

How Much is the U.S. Spending on Cybersecurity, and Where is the Money Going?

In June 2022, the U.S. announced new spending bills for the fiscal year 2023, including an allocation of $15.6 billion for cybersecurity. The majority of the money — $11.2 billion — will be appropriated for the Department of Defense (DoD), and $2.9 billion will go to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).

The money going to the DoD will be used in a variety of ways. For example, Paul Nakasone, commander of the U.S. Cyber Command, has discussed plans to grow five Cyber Mission Force teams. Approximately 133 of these already exist and focus on carrying out defensive cyber operations.

How Involved is the Private Sector in the Allocation of Funds?

Clearly, the majority of funds in the new budget will go to government agencies. However, the government also plans to invest in the private sector and has discussed the importance of strengthening relationships with companies and private organizations.

One key area here is information sharing; after all, cybersecurity is a team sport. However, the government has faced criticism in the past for expecting detailed data from companies while failing to provide adequate information on their end. Recently, government agencies have spoken more about working towards more open and two-sided information sharing, but only time will tell how successful that strategy will be.

U.S. lawmakers have asked the defense secretary to work more closely with CISA and the private organizations within it, especially in areas related to Russian and Chinese activity. CISA has also received $417 million more in funding than was initially requested by the White House.

How do Current Federal Investments in Cyber Compare to Previous Years?

Compared to the previous few years, investment in cybersecurity is gradually increasing. 2021 saw $8.64 billion in spending, followed by a slight increase in 2022.

It’s a positive trend that signals the government is taking the issue seriously. But are state and local governments keeping up?

How is Cyber Investment Changing at the Local and State Levels?

The data shows that the government is also investing in cybersecurity in non-financial capacities at the local and state level. In 2021, for instance, state legislative sessions saw more than 285 pieces of cybersecurity-related legislation introduced, and in 2022 that number increased to 300.

In addition, President Biden introduced the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act in 2021, which allocated $1 billion in grants to bolster cybersecurity at the local, state, tribal and territorial levels. The government will distribute this amount over four years until 2025.

It adds up to a promising development for local and state governments, who are finally gaining the resources to protect their communities more effectively. Plus, it demonstrates a growing understanding of the importance of cybersecurity at the federal level and, hopefully, a more informed approach in the future.

Promising Signs for the Future

While cybersecurity funding is one truly positive sign, there are more reasons to be hopeful — such as the appointment of the USA’s first-ever National Cyber Director, Chris Inglis.

Looking to the future, the U.S. will need to constantly readjust its cyber defense posture and adapt to this ever-changing landscape, especially as cyber crime becomes not only more common but also more challenging and complex. It costs money to do that effectively, so the government must prioritize cyber funding for the foreseeable future.

Of course, individual organizations will need to take responsibility for their own security, too.

IBM can help — with solutions like the Security QRadar XDR, you get a suite of tools and powerful features to help you defend your organization against attacks and keep your teams focused on what’s important. Find out more here.

The post How Much is the U.S. Investing in Cyber (And is it Enough)? appeared first on Security Intelligence.

Ransomware attacks, fueled by COVID-19 pandemic turbulence, have become a major money earner for cybercriminals, with the number of attacks rising in 2020. These file-encrypting attacks have continued largely unabated this year, too. In the last few months alone we’ve witnessed the attack on Colonial Pipeline that forced the company to shut down its systems […]

Japanese multinational conglomerate Fujifilm has been forced to shut down parts of its global network after falling victim to a suspected ransomware attack. The company, which is best known for its digital imaging products but also produces high-tech medical kit, including devices for rapid processing of COVID-19 tests, confirmed that its Tokyo headquarters was hit […]

Cygilant, a threat detection cybersecurity company, has confirmed a ransomware attack.

Christina Lattuca, Cygilant’s chief financial officer, said in a statement that the company was “aware of a ransomware attack impacting a portion of Cygilant’s technology environment.”

“Our Cyber Defense and Response Center team took immediate and decisive action to stop the progression of the attack. We are working closely with third-party forensic investigators and law enforcement to understand the full nature and impact of the attack. Cygilant is committed to the ongoing security of our network and to continuously strengthening all aspects of our security program,” the statement said.

Cygilant is believed to be the latest victim of NetWalker, a ransomware-as-a-service group, which lets threat groups rent access to its infrastructure to launch their own attacks, according to Brett Callow, a ransomware expert and threat analyst at security firm Emsisoft.

The file-encrypting malware itself not only scrambles a victim’s files but also exfiltrates the data to the hacker’s servers. The hackers typically threaten to publish the victim’s files if the ransom isn’t paid.

A site on the dark web associated with the NetWalker ransomware group posted screenshots of internal network files and directories believed to be associated with Cygilant.

Cygilant did not say if it paid the ransom. But at the time of writing, the dark web listing with Cygilant’s data had disappeared.

“Groups permanently delist companies when they’ve paid or, in some cases, temporarily delist them once they’ve agreed to come to the negotiating table,” said Callow. “NetWalker has temporarily delisted pending negotiations in at least one other case.”

Cyber threat startup Cygilant hit by ransomware by Zack Whittaker originally published on TechCrunch

Companies are beginning to realize that the location of their employees and the devices they use are not as important as they used to be. The work culture will be more about what you do and not where you do it. In 2023, a hybrid world begins to develop where the barriers of the digital and real world will disappear. With flexibility being a priority for businesses and ordinary users, they face the challenge of user security and privacy as they easily change their location with multiple devices and networks and use different communication platforms. One of the most important trends that will dominate in 2023 is political or social attacks and state-sponsored cyberattacks. Political attacks can quickly damage businesses, industries, and economies, as well as cause unrest in a region.

The cloud platform and the Zero Trust method are the perfect combination to increase the security of access to every user and device, regardless of their local location. In 2023, this cybersecurity method will be actively implemented.

Clive Harby said in 2006 that this data is the new oil, but it is now routinely shared by vendors, customers and businesses. Zero Trust’s main goal is to protect this strategic asset from falling into the wrong hands.

As the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning evolve, we’re seeing new cybersecurity solutions emerge more often and help identify and respond to threats in real time. Such technologies will help organizations find and avoid attacks. Many expect technology to facilitate faster and more accurate responses to possible threats as the threat landscape evolves.

The emergence of quantum-type computers also indicates that the vulnerability of traditional forms of encryption is increasing. As a result, researchers have developed new quantum-resistant forms of security that can protect advanced computing systems. These new technologies will be crucial to securing sensitive information and methods over the coming years.

Companies, too, are beginning to view blockchain as something more than cryptocurrency. Blockchain is expected to be used to create new, innovative solutions to protect cyberspace. For example, blockchain systems can provide more secure verification of a user’s identity, and blockchain-based data stores can help protect against data leakage.

As the threat continues to grow, government and regulators are setting requirements for organizations to create appropriate cyber defenses. In 2023, expect an increased focus on cybersecurity regulation and compliance and the implementation of new requirements and guidelines to help organizations protect their system data.

As more and more devices connect to the Internet, IoT devices are becoming a serious problem. As a result, new technology is being developed to protect IoT devices from manipulation. This will be especially important in healthcare, where the security of medical devices is important.

In 2023, cyber threats will emerge in a new world, and many companies will actively use the latest technology to provide cyber protection. As a result, it is safe to assume that this trend and development will play an important role in strengthening information security in general.