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President Trump’s promise to cover CBD via Medicaid in limbo as hemp THC protections stall

✇MJBizDaily
By: Chris Roberts

Congressional leaders removed language delaying a ban on hemp THC from a spending bill released this week, complicating the picture for CBD treatments promised by President Trump.

President Trump’s promise to cover CBD via Medicaid in limbo as hemp THC protections stall is a post from: MJBizDaily: Financial, Legal & Cannabusiness news for cannabis entrepreneurs

Report: Hemp THC ban may be unenforceable

✇MJBizDaily
By: Chris Roberts

Hemp THC products will become illegal under federal law in November 2026 thanks to the spending bill President Donald Trump signed last month. What’s still not known is which authorities will enforce the ban – or whether they’ll enforce the hemp ban at all, a new Congressional Research Service (CRS) report notes. In fact, both […]

Report: Hemp THC ban may be unenforceable is a post from: MJBizDaily: Financial, Legal & Cannabusiness news for cannabis entrepreneurs

A Fragile Truce at the Durand Line: Will the Afghanistan–Pakistan Ceasefire Last?

✇The Cipher Brief
By: Ethan Masucol

OPINION — One of the most enduring security issues in South Asia has been rekindled by the recent border conflicts between the Taliban-led Afghanistan and Pakistan military regimes. Diplomatic efforts by Qatar and Turkey have resulted in a tenuous ceasefire after days of fierce fighting that claimed scores of lives on both sides, offering a little respite from the rising violence. However, talks for a lasting peace have since collapsed. The crisis reveals long-standing structural tensions along one of the most volatile frontiers in the world that have their roots in militant activity, historical enmity, and disputed sovereignty.

Escalation and Triggers of Conflict

Intense fighting broke out along several stretches of the 2,600-kilometer Afghanistan-Pakistan Durand line in early October 2025, especially close to Spin Boldak–Chaman and the Kurram tribal areas. Each side accused the other of starting the conflict. The Taliban-led government denounced Pakistan's retaliatory bombings as a violation of national sovereignty, while Pakistan asserted that militants connected to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) were conducting cross-Durand line attacks from Afghan territory. According to reports, Pakistani air raids in the provinces of Kandahar and Paktika killed dozens of civilians. Taliban members retaliated by attacking a number of Pakistani military installations, with the opposing side suffering heavy losses. Afghan traders are losing millions of dollars every day as a result of the conflict's rapid disruption of humanitarian and commercial routes, which led to the closure of important Durand line crossings.

This breakdown was not the first. Pakistan has long accused the Afghan Taliban of harbouring the TTP, a group committed to destroying Pakistan's government but philosophically linked with Kabul's leadership. The Taliban have refuted these claims, stating that Afghanistan forbids the use of its territory against other countries. However, the Durand Line, from the colonial era, continues to function as a political and geographic fault line, trapping both sides in a never-ending blame game.

The Doha-Istanbul Ceasefire Agreement

An emergency ceasefire agreement was reached on October 19, 2025, following nearly a week of fighting, thanks to intensive mediation by Qatar and Turkey. Both parties committed to immediately stopping offensive operations, prohibiting cross-Durand line attacks, and setting up systems for ensuring compliance under the agreement. To address implementation and verification procedures, a follow-up meeting was planned for October 25 in Istanbul. The deal was heralded as a diplomatic victory, particularly since Turkey and Qatar, who both have comparatively open lines of communication with the Taliban leadership, were instrumental in facilitating communication between two regimes which do not trust one another.

Khawaja Muhammad Asif, the defence minister for the Pakistani military dictatorship, underlined that Islamabad would evaluate the truce based on the Taliban's capacity to control the TTP. "This agreement will be broken by anything coming from Afghanistan," he cautioned. The Taliban's stated position that Afghanistan "will not allow its soil to be used against any country" was reaffirmed by Zabihullah Mujahid, the regime's spokesperson. Although these declarations show official dedication, they conceal more profound disparities in ability and perspective. The Taliban government sees the threat as a matter of border integrity and sovereignty, whereas Pakistan primarily sees it through the prism of counterterrorism. It will take more than diplomatic words to bridge different viewpoints.

Istanbul Talks

The follow-up talks in Istanbul — intended to turn the Doha truce into an enforceable framework—ended without a resolution after four days of negotiations. Reporting from multiple outlets indicates that mediators could not bridge the gap over concrete action against TTP networks allegedly operating from Taliban controlled soil and over how to verify any commitments. Pakistani regime’s officials briefed that Kabul was unwilling to accept binding steps to rein in or relocate the TTP; Afghan sources countered that the Taliban does not command or control the TTP and rejects responsibility for cross-Durand line attacks.

On the eve of, and during, the Istanbul round, Pakistan’s defence minister publicly warned that failure would risk “open war,” underscoring how narrow the window is for diplomacy if violence resumes along the frontier. While he acknowledged the ceasefire had broadly held for several days, he framed the talks’ success as contingent on Kabul’s verifiable curbs on the TTP. Reports say talks in Istanbul have restarted in another attempt for a deal.

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Key unresolved issues

First, TTP-focused measures: Islamabad sought explicit commitments (dismantling safe havens, detentions/relocations, or handovers of wanted militants), while Kabul insists it won’t allow Afghan territory to be used against neighbours but resists operations that might trigger internal backlash or fracture ties with sympathetic factions. No binding text on TTP was agreed.

Second, a verification and incident-prevention mechanism: negotiators discussed joint hotlines, third-party monitoring, or liaison teams stationed in cross-Durand line hubs to investigate incidents in real time. Talks stalled over scope, authority, and who would adjudicate disputes.

Third, the Durand Line: Pakistan has fenced large stretches and wants coordinated patrols and recognized crossing protocols; the Taliban does not formally recognize the Durand Line as an international boundary, making technical fixes politically sensitive. This gap persisted in Istanbul.

Fourth, trade and crossings: business lobbies on both sides pushed for a timetable to reopen Spin Boldak–Chaman and other checkpoints for normal commerce and humanitarian flows, but negotiators did not finalize sequencing (security steps first vs. parallel reopening).

Fifth, refugees and returns: Islamabad raised concerns around undocumented Afghans and cross-Durand line facilitation; Kabul pressed for humanitarian safeguards. No durable arrangement was announced.

Obstacles to Durable Peace

The structural issues threatening Afghanistan-Pakistan ties are still mostly unaddressed in spite of the truce. First, the ceasefire does not include militant organisations like the TTP. Their independence severely restricts the enforceability of the agreement. According to analysts, the Taliban are reluctant to use force to fight the TTP because of ethnic and ideological ties that make internal Afghan politics more difficult.

Second, monitoring is quite challenging because of the porous nature of the Durand-line. Pakistan has unilaterally fenced off significant portions of the Durand Line, whereas Afghanistan does not formally recognise it as an international border. Recurrent conflicts are exacerbated by this lack of mutual recognition, especially when it comes to security patrols and cross-Durand line trading.

Third, there is still an imbalance of interests. Attacks by militants coming from Afghanistan are the problem for Pakistan. Pakistan's repeated airstrikes and backing of anti-Taliban groups are the source of Kabul's resentment. Joint security coordination is hampered by these conflicting narratives.

Fourth, pressure from within both governments is increasing. While the Taliban in Afghanistan must strike a compromise between meeting external demands and preserving their credibility among nationalist and tribal factions, public annoyance in Pakistan has increased due to an increase in attacks on security forces. Internal resentment could result from any impression of giving in.

Last but not least, the economic aspect introduces another level of complication. Afghanistan relies significantly on cross-border trade through Pakistan for imports and transit to global markets. Significant financial losses and humanitarian difficulties have resulted from the bridge closures. Unless trade flows restart fully, the truce will have limited practical effects.

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The Strategic and Regional Implications

There are wider ramifications for South and Central Asia from the crisis and the resulting truce.

Stability and militancy in the region: Should the truce fail, transnational militant networks, such as IS-K and al-Qaida elements, may gain more confidence. Resuming hostilities might destabilise the entire region, as these organisations flourish in uncontrolled border areas.

Taliban governance: The truce also serves as a litmus test for the Taliban's ability to govern. Global opinions of its legitimacy as a ruling power will be influenced by its capacity to maintain territorial control, interact diplomatically, and quell militant groups.

Realignments in diplomacy: The participation of Qatar and Turkey demonstrates how regional diplomacy is changing. Both nations have established themselves as go-betweens that can interact with the Taliban government without granting official recognition. Their mediation highlights a changing power dynamic in South Asia, where non-Western actors are having a greater impact on resolving disputes.

Economic and humanitarian impact: The conflict's humanitarian effects go beyond its security implications. Food and medical supplies have been disrupted by the closing of the Cross-Durand line, and the situation for displaced people on both sides of the frontier is getting worse. Maintaining peace will depend on reopening trade channels and making sure help is delivered.

The Road Ahead

The establishment of cooperative verification systems, a quantifiable decline in militant attacks, and the resumption of trade are important markers to keep an eye on. If any party breaks the agreement, the area can quickly revert to hostilities. It will be a careful balancing act for Pakistan to keep pressure on the Taliban without inciting escalation. The ability of the Taliban to control militant organisations while maintaining internal unity and sovereignty will be put to the test in Afghanistan. Supporting monitoring, communication, and de-escalation procedures is essential for regional partners, especially Qatar and Turkey, to continue their mediation efforts beyond symbolic diplomacy. As of October 28, the Istanbul process has adjourned without a deal, leaving these markers unmet and the ceasefire’s durability uncertain until verifiable steps are negotiated.

In the end, the ceasefire between Afghanistan and Pakistan serves as an example of the potential and vulnerability of regional diplomacy in a post-Western security context. In addition to bilateral discussions, broad regional collaboration tackling the interconnected problems of militancy, Durand-line governance, and economic interdependence will be necessary for a lasting peace. The willingness of both regimes to turn promises into tangible, verifiable action will determine whether this armistice develops into long-lasting stability or just serves as another brief break in a lengthy history of antagonism.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

Afghanistan Is Becoming India and Pakistan’s Proxy Battlefield—Again

✇The Cipher Brief
By: Ethan Masucol
OPINION — On Oct. 15, 2025, Islamabad and Kabul announced a 48-hour ceasefire after days of shelling and cross-border clashes around Spin Boldak/Chaman and in Kurram. That same week New Delhi hosted Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, the highest-profile Taliban visit to India since 2021. These two parallel events are not accidental. They are the visible symptoms of a strategic pattern that has, for decades, made Afghanistan an arena for India–Pakistan competition. If left unchecked, that competition will once again turn Afghan territory, institutions, and people into collateral damage.

The recent clashes underscore a simple truth: kinetic escalation along a porous frontier is a multiplier. Airstrikes, artillery duels, and intermittent border closures do not remain local nuisances. They force displacement, interrupt trade and humanitarian access, and create openings for transnational violent actors to regroup and expand. At the same time, high-level diplomatic gestures, like India’s reception of a Taliban foreign minister—help normalize engagement without demanding verifiable commitments from Kabul on terrorism, human rights, or governance. The result is a dangerous two-track dynamic: escalation on the ground and normalization in the capitals.

A brief history of the rivalry on Afghan soil

Pakistan’s footprint in Afghanistan is old and deep. From the anti-Soviet jihad to the 1990s civil war, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) cultivated proxies, trained fighters in madrassas and camps, and hosted Taliban decision-making bodies in Quetta, Peshawar, and Miramshah. By the time I led Signals Intelligence at NDS, the material flows, explosives, trainers, and fighters—were a familiar pattern. As U.S. forces drew down after 2014, Islamabad’s public posture shifted; in private and in some diplomatic forums, Pakistan presented the Taliban as a political reality to be accommodated. That accommodation was always transactional, however, and it produced deep leverage inside Afghanistan—from provincial commanders to elements inside Kabul.

India’s engagement followed a different logic but with equally transactional ends. Delhi invested heavily in infrastructure, education and development—roads, power projects, scholarships that sent Afghans to Indian universities. Those investments built goodwill and administrative capacity. But India also positioned itself as a counterweight to Pakistan. New Delhi’s network of consulates, including two on Pakistan’s border, provided both soft-power reach and strategic insight. My colleagues and I at NDS were aware that New Delhi’s intelligence service (RAW) cultivated contacts in border provinces and maintained links that could be used against Pakistan. At the time the Afghan republic rationalized these partnerships: the enemy of our enemy was a useful ally. That pragmatic logic blinded us to a harsher reality—India’s support for Afghan institutions was, ultimately, calibrated to New Delhi’s competitive needs, not an unconditional commitment to the Republic’s survival.

Two anecdotes illustrate the corrosive effect of external rivalry on Afghan sovereignty. First, while intercepting communications as head of Signals Intelligence I once heard General Dostum pleading on the phone with Pakistan’s ambassador—an exchange that revealed how quickly even vocal opponents could seek patronage. Second, a private meeting with the RAW station chief in Kabul—held months before the Republic collapsed—left me with a hollow certainty: Indian intelligence was preparing contingency plans for the Republic’s fall rather than mobilizing to prevent it. Those were not betrayals born of malice but of strategic realism: both Delhi and Islamabad were optimizing for their own survival and leverage.

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Why this rivalry matters now

Three features make the current moment particularly risky.

First, even when attacks originate with state-adjacent actors inside Afghanistan, their effects are interstate: whether Islamabad acknowledges strikes in Kandahar or Taliban-aligned groups carry out violence, the result is cross-border harm — civilians killed, infrastructure damaged, and humanitarian access disrupted.

Second, diplomatic gestures without conditionality distort incentives. India’s public reset—receiving a Taliban foreign minister—grants political space to a movement whose internal policies remain deeply repressive. If major regional powers normalize ties without demanding verifiable changes, they risk entrenching a governance model that enables radicalization and denies basic rights, particularly for women and minorities.

Third, Afghans pay the price. External competition saps Afghan agency. Political elites are incentivized to cultivate foreign patrons rather than build domestic coalitions. Former security personnel, civil servants and vulnerable communities are either abandoned or become leverage for outside actors. The human cost—displacement, loss of livelihoods, shrinking civic space—is the clearest metric of failure.

A three-part policy approach: sovereignty, de-escalation, and conditional engagement

If Washington and its partners are serious about stability in South and Central Asia, they should adopt a compact focused on three priorities.

Prevent Afghanistan from becoming the battlefield. The U.S. should lead a regional security initiative—narrow in scope but backed by monitoring and consequence mechanisms—bringing together India, Pakistan, Iran, China, and key Central Asian states. The initiative would pledge non-use of Afghan territory for hostile proxy activity, create impartial border monitoring mechanisms, and establish rapid-response channels to defuse incidents before they spiral.

Push India and Pakistan back to bilateral dialogue. The most durable way to remove Afghan soil from the rivalry is to reduce the rivalry itself. Washington should use calibrated incentives and diplomatic leverage to get Delhi and Islamabad into issue-specific talks—starting with confidence-building measures on border management, refugee handling, counter-narcotics cooperation, and a hotline for counterterrorism incidents. These are pragmatic, tradeable commitments that build reciprocity without demanding grand concessions.

Condition engagement with Kabul on verifiable benchmarks. Engagement with the de facto authorities will continue for humanitarian and security reasons—but it must not reward predation. Bilateral ties should be tied to transparent, public benchmarks: demonstrable counter-terrorism cooperation, protections for civilian populations (especially women and minorities), and steps to prevent Afghan soil from being used by transnational violent actors. Parallel support must be scaled for civil society, independent media, and the Afghan diaspora—networks that preserve the political capital needed for a future inclusive order.

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Realism with consequences

Some will argue that Delhi’s and Islamabad’s actions are driven by existential fears and that external pressure has limited purchase. That is true. But realism also recognizes that incentives, reputational costs, and monitoring can alter strategic calculations. The goal is not to force idealism but to make proxy strategies less profitable—politically, economically and reputationally—than cooperation.

Conclusion

The recent ceasefire and high-profile diplomatic activity are warnings more than signals of resolution. Afghanistan’s sovereignty must not be treated as negotiable currency in a broader regional rivalry. If the international community fails to act, Afghans will continue to suffer as their country becomes the chessboard for others’ strategies. The path forward is straightforward, if politically difficult: prevent kinetic escalation, push India and Pakistan toward practical dialogue, and condition engagement with Kabul on measurable protections for Afghan people. For the sake of Afghanistan—and for regional security—that is the responsible, pragmatic choice.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

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