When the swap finally happened, Putin greeted Krasikov on the tarmac with a public embrace, an extraordinary display of presidential affection for a convicted murderer. Days later, the Kremlin confirmed his FSB status, praised his “service,” and even highlighted his past role as a presidential bodyguard. Putin’s message to his security services—and to the world—could not have been clearer: if you kill for Putin’s regime, the regime will protect you. Killing for the regime has always been a mission for Russia’s intelligence services (RIS).

State-directed murder was long embedded in the mission and culture of the RIS and their predecessors. The practice predates the Soviet Union, reaching back to the Czarist Okhrana, which routinely hunted down dissidents when exile to Siberia failed to silence them. After the 1905 revolution, Czar Nicholas II unleashed a wave of retributive assassinations that set a precedent for the violence institutionalized by the Cheka and later the KGB. He became known as “Bloody Nicholas.” The state security “organs” (as they are still known in Russia) elevated assassination into a professional craft, giving rise to the notorious phrase in Russian: vishaya mera nakazaniya — the highest measure of punishment. The term still carries its original meaning and dreaded connotation: death at the order of the state, whether by trial or extrajudicial killing.

There were many examples both at home and abroad for Soviet citizens to be afraid. Stalin’s plot to kill his arch-rival and fellow revolutionary, Leon Trotsky, was decades in the making and ended with an ice pick to Trotsky’s head while he was in Mexico City. His assassin, Ramon Mercader, was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union when he was released from prison and arrived back in the USSR.

Secret institutes like the infamous “Poison Factory,” known in the KGB as Laboratory 1 or “kamera” (for “the cell”), were set up during the early years of the Cold War to study chemical and biological agents that could be used to murder quietly. Laboratory 1 specialized in refining special toxins, like the ricin pellet the KGB provided to their Bulgarian allies, and used in the infamous assassination of Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov on a London bridge in 1978.

Today is no different. Some assassinations are believed to be directly ordered by Putin in what the Russians call “direct action” (pryamoye deistviye, also known colloquially as mokroe delo, or wet work), while others are believed to be carried out with his implied approval. Poison factories continue to function inside of Russia. Today, the FSB uses a modern “kamera” which helped refine the nerve agent Novichok for use against the defector Sergei Skripal in the 2018 Salisbury UK attack. It was the same agent used against Russian Opposition leaders Alexei Navalny in a failed assassination attempt, prior to his death in a remote Russian prison, also likely wet work at the hands of the FSB.

Why does Putin let his Chekist assassins use such a well-known, state-only produced chemical weapon like Novichok to kill defectors or dissidents? The answer: because he wants the world to know the RIS were behind the attacks and that the tradition of the “highest measure” continues. Otherwise, he could certainly have his hitmen use a gun, ice pick, or other more deniable method. There is a track record now for decades, going back to the FSB defector Alexander Litvinenko and his death from polonium in the UK. The RIS will not hesitate to murder any intelligence or military defectors that the RIS can find and reach in the West. The lack of a formidable response from the UK and the U.S. to the Litvinenko poisoning only emboldened Putin and his henchmen (one of the assassins, Lugavoy, was praised so highly within Russia that he was eventually elected to the Russian duma).

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The Russian Record of Killing their Own: Disincentivizing Dissent

Putin and his RIS siloviki want all of their officers to know that the price for treason is death, and they don’t care what government may be offended or what international laws are broken. Otherwise, the incentive for those officers to betray Russia’s corrupt services and look to a better life for themselves and their families is too high. It matters not whether the execution is ordered by a secret court, or carried out on the street, the RIS consider it within their purview to decide how and when.

Two historical points illustrate this as practice within the RIS. For decades of the Cold War, and after, the rumor proliferated within the KGB and GRU that one or both of the first GRU spies to work for the United States, Pyotr Popov and Oleg Penkovskiy, were executed by being thrown into a furnace alive. Popov was uncovered and executed in 1960. Penkovskiy was arrested and executed in May 1963 after the vital role he played in providing intelligence to the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The practice during that time period, carried over from Stalin’s purges, was more likely a bullet to the back of the head up against a wall at the infamous Lubyanka prison. But the rumor, which was spread to the West by GRU defector Viktor Suvorov, was effective and garnered a lot of attention within the services; it still does. It was purposely spread, and taught, and continues to be, at the KGB Andropov Academy through the 1980s, now known as the modern SVR Foreign Service Academy (what they call the AVR). The same rumor is taught to officers at the GRU Military Diplomatic Academy. Defectors have confirmed for years that this rumor is whispered among classes at the academies, and as a warning against dissents—“you want to be thrown into a furnace alive, shut-up you idiot!” The very idea of being burned alive in a furnace is hard for young officers to forget.

There is another example from Cold War history that illustrates the same point. In 1985, the so-called “year of the spy,” while crypto-spy John Walker and his family ring were uncovered and arrested, CIA officer Ed Howard defected to Moscow, and many other espionage incidents took place. CIA traitor Rick Ames gave his “big dump” of classified holdings to the Soviets. Ames offered up roughly a dozen different U.S. cases to the Soviet services, including many penetrations of the KGB and GRU. Most of those assets were executed in short order, sending up a giant “CI flag” of counterintelligence warning to CIA/FBI and the entire U.S. intelligence community that something was amiss. A major mole hunt, which unfortunately took nine years, eventually led to Ames’ arrest. Ames himself commented after his arrest that he was astounded that the KGB/GRU had killed so many assets: why not keep them running as controlled cases, at least for a time, in order to protect him? It was an unprecedented, even reckless reaction.

Why did they do it?

The answer, as some senior Russian officers including former Line KR (kontrarazvedka or CI) Chief Viktor Cherkashin would later confirm (he wrote a book that was translated in the West) was that the Soviet services had no choice. The KGB and GRU had to take drastic steps to stop the flood of espionage and leaks in the Soviet services—too many traitors! An example had to be set.

Cherkashin would know since he ran both Ames and FBI spy Robert Hanssen when he served in the Washington D.C. Residency (station) of the KGB. Reportedly, the issue went to the highest ranks of the KGB/GRU and then on to the Central Committee of the Communist Party. For all their feared security prowess in the Soviet Union, the vaunted KGB had no idea that the CIA was running so many cases under their noses, literally, in Moscow and around the world. Since their own counterintelligence, the 2nd Chief Directorate of the KGB, had failed so miserably, the decision was made to execute them all (or nearly all, a previous few escaped death in the Gulag). There had to be a hard line drawn for the tens of thousands of other Soviet intelligence officers not to betray the regime - the highest measure would be the warning.

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Murder by Order or Murder to Impress the Boss?

The FSB is no less of a counterintelligence failure than their KGB predecessors. They cannot turn the tide against the U.S., our intelligence services, and those of our allies. Instead they arrest innocent civilians like those used to barter for the 2024 swap. That is why Putin likely continues to order death to all intelligence defectors. That is why he will greet a killer like Krasikov at the airport in Moscow in front of the cameras. But Putin’s RIS don’t just kill defectors and Chechen separatists. The RIS were almost certainly behind many political hits in Russia like Navalny, Boris Nemtsov and many others “falling out of windows” from Putin’s own government in recent years. Here it is important to recall that under President Yeltsin, Russia abolished the death penalty. So what were once judicial executions, ordered by the state, have become extra-judicial killings in the Putin era. But for the RIS, there is no distinction.

There have been many assaults and killings of journalists like Anna Politkovskaya. The question often arises—does Putin know about and order all of these murders? Perhaps, but there may be something else at play as well, an effort to impress “the boss.” This could also explain some of the more reckless acts of sabotage playing out in Europe at the hands of the RIS. Mafia families work in the same way - they surprise the boss with new income streams or take out a threat to the family with a hit, to earn one’s “button” and become a “made man.”

Indeed, the RIS function within mob-like cultures, fostered by patronage relationships, and corruption at every level. Officers are encouraged to pay bribes up the chain of command, and frauds of all kinds at every level infect their services. Putin has no doubt told aspiring leaders in the SVR, GRU and especially the FSB, his favorite service, to surprise him with new and inventive operations meant to hit back against the West, particularly regarding Ukraine. This has led to a cascading series of actions by the RIS, including sabotage, exploding parcels, and, yet again, like earlier in their history, attempted assassinations. The most brazen plot uncovered so far was the GRU plot that was unraveled in Germany in 2024 to assassinate the CEO of Rheinmetall, a leading provider of arms to Ukraine. GRU unit 29155 is likely behind that plot, just as they were behind the Skripal attack, and others.

The RIS attack dogs in Putin’s services are simply continuing a tradition of state-directed violence. Yet in the West, we often hesitate to assign blame, waiting for courtroom-quality evidence. But the evidence is already written across decades of Russian intelligence tradecraft, and reinforced by independent investigations.

Open-source teams like Bellingcat have repeatedly identified the GRU and FSB officers behind some of Moscow’s most feral operations - from the Skripal poisoning in Salisbury to the attempted assassination of Alexei Navalny. Still, conclusive proof of Kremlin authorization often appears only when an insider defects with hard intelligence. Those who contemplate such a step know they will be protected and given a new life in the West. They also know the stakes, however, if caught.

The absence of courtroom proof in every case of murder, poisoning, or a fall from a window should not silence the West. Putin’s record speaks for itself. His regime has presided over the killings of journalists, opposition figures, exiles abroad, and tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians. He operates as a modern bloody czar, no different in impulse from Nicholas II—ordering assassinations, reprisals, and revenge killings with impunity. And the pattern is escalating. It is only a matter of time before Russian intelligence pushes further, testing its reach against U.S. and allied targets. The warning signs are unmistakable. The question is no longer whether the threat exists, but what the West intends to do about it.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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A Russian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) fired from an underground silo on the country’s southern steppe Friday on a scheduled test to deliver a dummy warhead to a remote impact zone nearly 4,000 miles away. The missile didn’t even make it 4,000 feet.

Russia’s military has been silent on the accident, but the missile’s crash was seen and heard for miles around the Dombarovsky air base in Orenburg Oblast near the Russian-Kazakh border.

A video posted by the Russian blog site MilitaryRussia.ru on Telegram and widely shared on other social media platforms showed the missile veering off course immediately after launch before cartwheeling upside down, losing power, and then crashing a short distance from the launch site. The missile ejected a component before it hit the ground, perhaps as part of a payload salvage sequence, according to Pavel Podvig, a senior researcher at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in Geneva.

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OPINION — President Donald Trump’s 28-point peace plan is a humanitarian attempt to halt the killing and destruction in Ukraine, although Russia’s President Vladimir Putin may view the peace plan as an attempt to appease Russia. Since Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008, the U.S. and its NATO allies have not been able to deter an aggressive Russian Federation.

When Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, this was a clear signal, especially to NATO, that Russia was prepared to use force in the “near abroad” when their interests weren’t respected. The response from the U.S. and NATO was weak: no military support to Georgia or strong punitive actions against Russia

In 2014, Russia seized Crimea, with minimal consequences. The muted response in 2008 to Russia’s invasion of Georgia no doubt convinced the Kremlin that the U.S. and NATO would not risk a military confrontation with Russia. Although Russia was suspended from the G8 and the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning Russia’s annexation of Crimea, NATO’s military response – suspending all cooperation with Russia -- was weak:

The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021reinforced the Russian view that U.S. and NATO “red lines” were either not clear or not credible. Indeed, Russia viewed the withdrawal as a weakening of U.S. deterrence credibility.

On February 4, 2022, just weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Mr. Putin met with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Beijing Winter Olympics. The joint statement from their discussion was clear in stating a “no-limits” partnership and “no forbidden areas of cooperation” between Russia and China.

And prior to Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. publicly stated that they had credible intelligence of Russia’s plan to invade Ukraine. Unfortunately, however, even with this insight, the U.S. could not convince Mr. Putin an invasion of Ukraine would cross a red line and result in sanctions and other consequences for Russia. We failed to deter Russia from this bloody four-year war, with over 400,000 Ukrainian casualties and over one million Russian casualties.

The 28-point peace plan is being reviewed by the leadership in Ukraine and NATO and it’s possible the peace plan will be amended, to secure greater support from Ukraine and NATO.

What’s clear from Russia’s actions in Georgia, Crimea and Ukraine is that U.S. and NATO deterrence failed. A credible deterrence strategy would have made it clear to Russia that their aggressive military behavior would have resulted in significant consequences, to include biting sanctions, pariah status and a likely military response.

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China, North Korea and Iran, allies of Russia, are watching closely how the war in Ukraine ends. Indeed, their interest in what’s included in the peace plan and the consequences for Russia, given their invasion of a Ukraine that had security assurances from Russia – and the U.S. and United Kingdom – in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, which pledged to respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and existing borders.

Hopefully, none of Russia’s allies will view the Ukraine peace plan as license to foment trouble in their region. Clearly, China understands U.S. policy: A peaceful resolution of issues between China and Taiwan, in accord with the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. North Korea knows that the U.S. has extended deterrence commitments to our ally in South Korea and Iran should appreciate – - especially since the June 2025 bombing of their Fordow nuclear facility -- that Israel is a close ally of the U.S, with strong security commitments.

Deterrence credibility is important. That’s why the U.S. is providing Taiwan with about $387 million in defensive arms sales in 2024. And that’s why we have a Washington Declaration with South Korea, enhancing the nuclear deterrence alliance. Iran saw clearly, with the bombing of Fordow, how close our allied relationship is with Israel.

These allies of Russia would be making a grievous error if they try to exploit any peace agreement with Russia to end the war in Ukraine. And Mr. Putin would be advised to comply with any peace accord to end the Ukraine war and to refrain from any future attempt to violate the sovereignty of any of the 32 NATO members.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joseph DeTrani was first published in The Washington Times

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EXPERT OPINION – The recently leaked 28-point peace plan to end the war in Ukraine is nothing short of an appeasement that satisfies the maximalist demands of the aggressor in the conflict, Russian President Vladimir Putin. This is nothing short of the side on the verge of victory (eg, the free world) conceding to the side on the verge of defeat (Putin, the leader of the anti-west coalition). Sadly, it comes at a time when the situation on the battlefield is more or less a draw, both sides are effectively attacking energy infrastructure, and Russia’s economy is moving toward recession.

According to Russian data, third Quarter GDP growth in Russia was 0.6%. The expectation is that Q4 data will show the beginning of a recession. Sberbank has just decided to let 20% of their workforce go. Russia has for the first time, begun to sell gold reserves, presumably to make up for lost revenue from the recently imposed sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil. Russia’s wartime transition to a command economy is not sustainable with a declining workforce sapped by the loss of young men sacrificed in Ukraine and those who have voted with their feet by leaving Putin’s kleptocracy.

The key points of the 28-point plan amount to nothing less than surrender by Ukraine and make in vain the sacrifices made by their valiant soldiers and citizens in their three plus years of war of full-scale war since Russia’s deadly invasion.

The agreement will be remembered in history with the same ignominy of the Munich Agreement of 1938 and will have the same consequence of setting the stage for a larger war to come.

Perhaps most egregious in the terms of the draft agreement is the re-establishment of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine and the establishment of Russian as the official language. This indignity on top of the kidnapping of hundreds - if not thousands - of Ukrainian children to Russia and the forced conscription into the Russian army of men from Russian occupied territory. Then, of course, there is the massacre of innocent citizens by Russian soldiers in places like Bucha, all of which will go unaccounted for under the draft agreement. No judgement at Nuremberg for Russian war criminals.

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The plan U.S. officials have negotiated is nothing more than cultural genocide against the people of Ukraine. That the U.S. would be part of an agreement that almost certainly would result in the arrest, deportation and incarceration of a generation of brave Ukrainians who have bravely resisted Putin’s aggression is simply unthinkable.

Mr. Trump, every member of your national security team should be required to watch episode nine of the brilliant HBO series Band of Brothers. The episode’s title is “Why We Fight” and the reasons for standing up to autocracy and evil portrayed in that episode are perfectly applicable to the situation today with the free world standing strong against the aggression of a malevolent dictator.

The Trump Administration’s desire to end the violence in Ukraine is commendable, but not at the price of setting the stage for the next war by giving victory to the aggressor. The men who reportedly negotiated the key points of the agreement have no experience dealing with Russia or Russians of the KGB ilk. The promises of “peace” offered by the Russian side are a chimera at best. Putin and the gang of thieves in his government know perfectly well how to manipulate representatives of the character of Steve Witkoff, President Trump’s real estate specialist now in charge of negotiating with Russia over Ukraine. Perhaps those negotiators are working with the idea of “Commander’s intent” that the President believes an agreement can be reached and counted upon with a counter-party like Putin. This is a serious misjudgment with serious consequences.

Those who have studied Putin for decades, understand clearly that he wants nothing but the destruction of the United States, our system of government and the set of ideals for which we stand. This is core to his beliefs. Putin and his security services will do everything they can to undermine the United States. One should not be surprised if the Russian services do not use every opportunity in the context of the Epstein revelations to attack every angle of the political spectrum in the U.S. that they can, including President Trump.

President Trump is now facing the most significant foreign and national security moment of his presidency. It appears the representatives he has chosen to negotiate with the Russian side have left him in a position to be remembered forever in history as the Chamberlain of the 21st century. Mr. Trump would do well to recognize that history does not remember Neville Chamberlain for any achievements in his political career in economic or domestic policy in Great Britain. He is remembered solely for Munich and "peace in our time". Mr. Trump is setting himself up to be remembered by history similarly. Sadly, it could also be the legacy of the country that was once the pillar of strength of the free world.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Russia’s intelligence services (RIS) have failed spectacularly in Ukraine: in planning, execution, and analysis, yet they will face no reckoning. Vladimir Putin cannot afford to hold the SVR, GRU, or FSB accountable because they are not merely instruments of the state; they are the pillars of his personal power. The RIS misled the Kremlin into believing Ukraine would fall in days, Europe would divide, and NATO would hesitate. Instead, they exposed the rot at the core of Russia’s national security system: corruption, internecine rivalry, and a profound detachment from reality. Understanding this dynamic matters for the West because it reveals not only how Russia fights its wars but how it fails, and how it will likely fight again.

As the war approaches its fourth year, the front lines have grown static, and speculation about an eventual end has returned. Certainly, the world hopes for peace and relief from the suffering that has defined Europe’s largest land conflict since 1945. Yet even when the drones stop flying, Ukraine’s struggle to rebuild will begin, and within the Russian government another kind of reckoning will unfold. The aggressor’s armed forces and intelligence services will take stock of losses and lessons learned. But unlike in the West, where failure invites inquiry and reform, Russia’s services are more likely to protect the system that failed them and pin any blame on each other.

Russian post-war accounting will not play out like we in the West might imagine. We are accustomed to commissions and legislative investigations after wars and major national security events, often resulting in harsh criticism for various agencies, and sweeping reforms. In Russia, however, Putin will largely give the RIS a pass.

To understand why, it is important to understand the roles the RIS played in the war and in the Russian government more broadly. The SVR (the Foreign Intelligence Service), the GRU (the Main Intelligence Directorate - military intelligence), and the FSB (the Federal Security Service), serve first and foremost as Putin’s Praetorian Guard. Their primary responsibility is securing his regime and hold on power. Moreover, Putin rose up through the RIS ranks in the KGB, and later held the post of FSB Director. His feelings toward the RIS are hardly objective. The reputations of Putin and the services are inextricably linked. Anything that significantly tarnishes the highly cultivated myth of RIS omnipotence inevitably damages his own hold on power.

If Putin and the “siloviki” (strongmen) who make up his inner circle try to call the RIS to account for their performance when the fighting stops, the one thing all three services will argue is that the war was an absolute success. Each will extoll their roles with little regard for the number of Russian lives lost and military assets squandered. Going back to Tsarist and Soviet times, casualties and human suffering were never a mark for a war’s success or failure in Russia. The RIS will focus on territory gained, Ukraine’s membership in NATO being halted (from their optic), and the alliance, they will claim, weakened. They will ignore the addition of two capable new members to the alliance (Finland and Sweden), the doubling of the length of NATO’s border with Russia, and the resuscitation of NATO’s military spending and defense industrial base. Facts will not stop the RIS from claiming success with Putin. But it is useful to further break down some of their likely claims, and actual performance, by service.

The SVR: “Speak up Sergey!”

Among the RIS, and especially relative to the FSB, Putin has never been particularly fond of the foreign intelligence service, the SVR. Its claims of success on Ukraine will likely not impress him or the other siloviki much. Recall Putin’s public dressing down of SVR Director Sergey Naryshkin on Russian TV in the days before the invasion for indecisiveness: “Come on Sergey, speak up, speak plainly!” But Sergey did not speak up, nor make much of a difference in the war.

Since they do not have troops or special ops elements in the war (their main Spec-Ops team, ZASLON, is used more for protection abroad), the SVR will likely try to boast of the success of its “active measures” operations. This is the traditional term the Russians have used for covert influence and disinformation activities intended to weaken, confuse, or disrupt their adversaries. Their modern term, however, is to refer to them as “measures of support” (MS). The SVR has an entire “Directorate MS” devoted to this line of operational work: using troll farms, social media, cyber operations, and recruited agents of influence to meddle in the internal politics, public opinion, and elite decision-making of its adversaries to Russia’s advantage. The Russians believe their active measures contributed to their successes in the Georgia invasion in 2008 and occupation of Crimea and parts of the Donbas in 2014. They believed they confused and stunted the West’s response and, to a degree, they were right.

But the SVR will have trouble claiming active measures succeeded in the current Ukraine war. They will perhaps try to sell Putin that the SVR sowed confusion at critical policy decision points when the U.S. and its European allies were not always in sync—hesitation in providing this or that weapons system, unity or lack thereof at times on sanctions, asset seizures, etc. Their efforts, however, did not materially alter Russia’s failure to achieve its war aims. If they were effective at all, it was only in the margins. There will be no dramatic accounting for the SVR but expect to see the SVR’s relative influence decline among the RIS, a continuation of trend since Putin’s rise to power.

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GRU: Plowed into the Grinder, and Re-Special Purposed

The GRU will likely point to the various sabotage acts, conducted in Europe after the invasion, some successful but most not, including exploding packages, industrial arson, cable cuts in the Baltic Sea, and assassinations, or attempts at them. These are the purview of the GRU and its various numbered units, such as Unit 29155, which was behind both the attempted assassination of GRU defector Sergey Skripal in the UK in 2018, and likely also the thwarted assassination plot against the CEO of Germany’s Rheinmetall in 2024. The Lithuanian government is convinced the GRU also was behind the crash of a DHL plane that same year. But these actions failed in their primary mission, to intimidate and deter Europe and NATO from assisting Ukraine. If anything, the actions have only emboldened members to continue support for Ukraine.

Another shocking GRU failure, one heavily criticized in Russia’s pro-war blogosphere but receiving less attention in the West, was its squandering of precious, highly trained Spetsnaz units on the Ukrainian battlefield. There are nine Spetsnaz, or “Special Purpose,” brigades under the GRU’s 14th Directorate (roughly analogous to Tier 1 elements in the U.S. SOCOM). Nearly all were heavily deployed in Ukraine, and all suffered extremely heavy casualties. The planned decapitation strike against the Ukrainian leadership in the first days of the war, spearheaded by Spetsnaz units, was a complete and costly failure (the failed seizure of Hostomel airport was part of this). Many Spetsnaz were also used foolishly in frontal assaults and to plug gaps in forward lines when Russian “kontraktniki” (paid soldiers, but often supplemented in frontline units with conscripts) failed. GRU Spetsnaz have a storied history and culture. It will be hard for them to recover the reputation for being “elite” without notable successes to point to in Ukraine. They failed to impact the direction of the war in any significant way.

As with the SVR, the GRU will likely avoid any dramatic negative consequences. There will probably be some modest reorganizations, just as there have been since the collapse of the USSR. In fact, the GRU is technically not even called the GRU any longer. It was formally redesignated the “GU” (Main Directorate), although many stubborn officers still refer to themselves as “GRU-chniki.” One reorganization has already occurred since the war began, the standup of something called the Department for Special Tasks (SSD). Its function and exact composition are still not fully known, but it appears to combine various Russian-termed “direct actions” (e.g., assassinations, sabotage) units, such as Unit 29155, into a unified structure. The SSD is broadly equivalent to the CIA’s Special Activities Center in terms of covert action, but dwarfs it in size (and the CIA is bound by law not to carry out assassinations). The GRU is a mammoth bureaucracy and it will likely only grow more after the war.

FSB: Failed, But Still Putin’s Favorite

Despite their many failures, there will be few significant negative consequences for the FSB, which Putin once ran. In many ways, though, the FSB’s shortcomings in Ukraine were the most egregious and consequential. The FSB was in charge of the war’s planning, particularly the hybrid dimensions, or what Russian doctrine refers to more broadly as “non-contact war.” The FSB's lead for the Ukraine invasion was its Fifth Service, which heads up both operational analysis and reporting to the President on the war. The FSB has organizational primacy for RIS operations in the “near abroad,” i.e., the states of the former USSR, including Ukraine. In the pre-war planning phase, the Fifth Service was wrong about everything: wrong about Ukrainian resilience, wrong about how quickly and substantially Europe and NATO would react, and wrong about the FSB and Russian Armed Forces’ capabilities on the ground.

FSB Spetsnaz units Alpha and Vympel all participated in the war, but like their GRU cousins, they have not distinguished themselves. Still they are still frequently lauded in the Russian press for “actions that cannot be disclosed.” The FSB also has the lead for cyber operations against Ukraine with its 16th Center, but those cyber-attacks have not materially altered the direction of the war in Russia’s favor. The battle over bytes was not won in any way by Russian FSB hackers, whose ranks were bolstered by Russian criminal groups hacking for the state and their coffers.

The FSB will likely be the RIS agency most affected by the war. But instead of accountability for failure, its power and influence will likely only grow. First, because of all the services, the FSB, in its secret police role, is the critical player in securing Putin’s rule. In the bureaucratic pecking order, the FSB sits at the very top and will remain there. FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov holds the military rank of full General, and he is treated as such by Russian military generals, despite never having served in the military. Second, if there is a formal investigation or after-action when the fighting stops, the FSB will lead it, just as it did in the investigations of the 2002 Nord-Ost theater terrorist attack, the 2004 school seizure in Beslan, and the more recent Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in 2024, each of which involved breathtaking intelligence and operational failures, but did not have significant negative repercussions for the FSB. The FSB pretends to clean up after it performs incompetently.

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In conclusion, the one thing the West can count on is that the Russian services will continue to relentlessly compete with and back-stab one another. There is no “intelligence community” in Russia remotely similar to the one we have in the United States. The rivalries within our community pale in comparison. This presents opportunities to recruit personnel from all the RIS services, many of whom will have lost colleagues in the war for a cause and for leaders whose competence an increasing number of them will come to doubt. This and the pervasive corruption in Russia are still strong incentives for espionage against those who have led Russia down this disastrous path.

The RIS will not prevent another war for Russia; if anything, they will foment one. Before they do, the US and our allies must understand these failures, but also, and critically, the Russian services’ likely self-evaluation and the lessons they themselves will draw, or fail to draw, from those lessons. When the current war ends, Putin may plan another intervention or aggression--in Europe, again in Ukraine, or elsewhere. Before he does, we need to be ready to counter the next iteration of the FSB, GRU, and SVR tactics to encourage and support war. We can better do so by studying their playbook and some of their attempted actions, and dramatic failures.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

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Yet the Russian army continues to engage in desperate efforts to regain limited territory to the west. British intelligence estimates that since the start of 2025 Russia has suffered 332,000 casualties, the highest loss rate since the invasion. Russia has made only marginal gains, which Putin trumpets as victories as he throws more men and equipment into the Ukraine meatgrinder.

Of course, Putin cannot afford to admit failure, but it nonetheless seems as if he actually believes his strategy is succeeding. Why?

The answer lies in the perverse incentives of Russian command and control (C2), which conceal the weaknesses of Russian FS. Russian C2 is concentrated in one civilian with no military training (Putin), and his small circle of advisers.

Putin’s leadership discourages innovation by field officers and welcomes blind obedience. Bad news from field officers of all ranks is punished with demotion or arrest. Good news is rewarded with promotion. As a result, field officers routinely lie about their failures in hopes of promotion and reassignment. There is almost no active search for information by headquarters to correct misinformation sent by field officers.

Russian force structures are notoriously corrupt—a corruption that is expected and tolerated, but also can be an excuse for punishment. Officers steal from their units by exaggerating the size of the unit and pocketing the unused pay. Hence, many Russian units are severely understaffed. Soldiers steal from their units by selling weapons, ammunition, and fuel, leaving their units under-equipped. The vast majority of battle-hardened soldiers are long gone, as are military trainers, who were all sent to the front lines. New Russian recruits are untrained and unaware of the risks they face.

Russia's C2 and FS Problems from the Start of the Invasion

A brief review makes it clear that C2 and FS problems have bedeviled the Russian invasion from the start of the 2022 invasion. Planning for the invasion ignored standard military doctrine, which emphasizes that successful invasions require sufficient scale, speed, and force. The considerable literature on the force differentials needed for an invasion, including Soviet doctrine, agrees on the classic rule that a frontal assault requires a 3:1 force ratio to compensate for the higher casualties suffered by the invaders.

Effective command and control are also essential for the success of an invasion. This includes accurate intelligence about enemy forces, freedom for field officers to improvise as needed, rapid field intelligence upward to inform tactics and strategy as the invasion proceeds, and quick top-down decisions in response to field intelligence.

The 2022 invasion violated all these requirements. In order to conceal its intentions and achieve an operational surprise, the planning of the invasion was limited to a very small group led by Putin. Not even Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, was included in this group. The Russian field commanders on the ground in Belarus for military exercises had no idea that they would be leading an invasion. The success of this secrecy came at a high cost: there was no opportunity for critiquing the invasion plan and no consideration of fall-back strategies.

Russian intelligence about the Ukraine’s response was based entirely on faulty assumptions that a high-speed invasion would demoralize the Ukrainian military, the Russian military would easily defeat the Ukrainian military on the battlefield, the top Ukrainian leaders would be quickly captured and executed, and that the vast majority of Ukrainians would either welcome the Russian invaders or remain passive.

The 3:1 force differential rule should have required an invasion of 590,000 Russian, given that the Russians knew the Ukrainian military had 196,600 active-duty personnel. Instead, the Russians planned an invasion of 190,000 personnel, actually smaller than the combined Ukrainian armed forces. Even worse, instead of massing its invasion force at one point to achieve a breakthrough, the Russians decided to attack on six different axes: from the Black Sea in the southeast, from Crimea in the south, from Donbas in the east, from Belgorod in the northeast (towards Kharkiv), from Kursk in the northeast (towards Kyiv), and from Gomel, Belarus, in the north (towards Kyiv).

All the Russian invasion routes faced unexpected problems, but the flaws in Russian C2 and FS can be illustrated by the fate of Russia’s most promising attack, coming from Gomel, Belarus, and aimed at Kyiv. This included an airborne assault on Antonov airport, in the Kyiv suburb of Hostumel. The Ukrainians had not expected an attack from Belarus and were unprepared for both the land invasion and the airborne assault.

Why did these attacks fail? Russian secrecy about the invasion had left the Russian ground forces in Belarus completely unprepared. They were informed of their roles in the invasion only 24 hours before the invasion. As a result, they lacked ammunition, fuel, food, and communications. They did not anticipate heavy fighting. Mud forced their armor to use the few roads, causing traffic jams. They encountered entire towns that were not on their maps, requiring them to stop and ask civilians where they were. Residents reported the Russian positions to Ukrainian authorities.

The Ukrainians acted swiftly to confront the Russian assault from Gomel, which was approaching the outskirts of Kyiv. They committed most of their available special forces and special units of other security units, called up all their reserve units, and mobilized the cadets and staff of their military academies into new battalions, supported by two brigades of artillery and one mechanized brigade. Even so, the Russians had a 12:1 troop advantage on the Gomel axis. On 27 February, their advance units were able to capture the suburb of Bucha, just west of Kyiv.

However, the phone calls from residents from towns in the Russian path permitted Ukrainian artillery to target the Russian columns. The Ukrainian forces knew the territory well, giving them a huge tactical advantage, and they were able to assault the slow-moving Russian columns almost at will, causing panic, abandonment of equipment, and blockage of the roads. As the Russian columns stopped moving, their losses multiplied. The Russian advance units that had reached Bucha were short on fuel, ammunition, and manpower. They assumed defensive positions, waiting for reinforcements that never arrived.

In the battle for Antonov airport on the edge of Kyiv, the Russians used helicopters and elite airborne troops. These troops were to capture and execute the Ukrainian leadership. But the Ukrainians surrounded the airport with heavy armor, pounding the Russians. They were able to capture the airport, driving the Russians into the surrounding woods. While the Russians were able to recapture the airport after a couple of days, the Ukrainians had time to destroy the runways, making impossible the landing of reinforcements and preventing the Russians from capturing the Ukrainian leadership.

On March 16th the Ukrainian government announced a counteroffensive in the Kyiv region, and by the end of March, Russian ground forces were retreating north from the Bucha area. By April 2nd the entire Kyiv oblast was back in Ukrainian hands, including the area bordering Belarus.

What was the Russian response to this humiliating defeat? Those Russian generals who were not killed, were mostly cashiered or arrested, as were many of the colonels. The disaster resulted largely from Putin’s leadership, but the defeated units took the blame. This added to the incentive for officers to lie about failure and pretend achievement.

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The First Stalemate

The war has continued through various phases. The second phase, from early April through the end of August, 2022, was marked by active fighting along front lines, with heavy Russian losses, but was a relative stalemate in terms of territorial gains by either side.

The Second Ukrainian Offensive

The third phase began on September 6, 2022, when Ukrainian troops attacked the Kharkiv front near the Russian border. On September 9, Ukrainian mechanized units broke through. Ukrainian forces raced north and east. The cities of Kupiansk and Izium fell to the Ukrainians on 10 September. By the next day the Russian forces north of Kharkiv had retreated over the border, leaving all of the Kharkiv Oblast under Ukrainian control. Pressing on to the east, Ukrainian forces on 12 September crossed the Siverskyi Donets, and on 1 October the Ukrainians recaptured Lyman, a major railway hub, and took as prisoners an estimated 5,000 Russian troops.

As Russian forces rushed to the northeast front, Ukraine launched its counteroffensive in the Kherson region on October 2. By 9 October Ukrainian forces had retaken 1,170 square kilometers of territory, pressing on toward the Dnieper River and the city of Kherson. On 11 November, Kherson was occupied by the Ukrainians.

The Second Stalemate

The second period of stalemate dates from 12 November 2022 until the present. During this three-year period, the war has seen the introduction of drone warfare on a massive scale, first by Ukraine and then by Russia. As a result of the drone warfare, the entire conflict has changed in character. Drones have made assaults by armored vehicles so costly that the war has reverted to trench warfare reminiscent of World War I. Drones now account for two-thirds or more of front-line casualties in the war.

Ukraine’s government discarded Soviet-era regulations to provide tax breaks and profit incentives to independent Ukrainian drone producers, authorizing the Ukrainian military to contract with them. These independent companies have made good use of Ukraine’s large cadre of skilled aeronautical engineers and information technology specialists. About 200 of these companies are officially recognized to receive military contracts, and as many as 300 other groups manufacture drones and donate them directly to military units. However, financial resources remain a limiting factor.

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Russia has rapidly developed its own drone capacity. Moreover, Russia has the resources to outproduce Ukraine, even if its drones are less sophisticated. Russian drone production is limited less by finances than by the search for microchips, smuggled from the west or bought from China. Russia also has ballistic and airborne missile systems that are hard for Ukraine to bring down. Russia has been using massive barrages of drones and missiles to demoralize Ukraine. But this effort is counterproductive. Bombings anger enemy populations and stiffen resistance, as shown in WWII by the Blitz of London and Allied carpet bombings of Germany. Russian barrages may have strained Ukraine’s economy, but they have not lessened resistance.

While the drone/missile war is well known, Ukraine’s other defense industry growth is less known. Ukraine now produces more artillery shells than all of NATO’s 32 members and Europe. Since 2022, domestic production of armored personnel carriers has increased by 400 percent, artillery by 200 percent, ammunition by 150 percent, and anti-tank weapons by 100 percent. By 2025, a single Ukrainian factory was producing 20 Bohdana howitzers each month, similar in specifications to the French Caesar. Ukrainian defense companies deliver howitzers in 60 days for $2.5 million compared to a several-year wait and a cost of $4.3 million in the West.

Russia has had to develop a new tactical approach for the active fronts. Groups of two or three soldiers are forced (by firing squads) to run towards Ukrainian lines and if they live, conceal themselves to fight later. Specialized units such as snipers, artillery spotters, or drone operators try to identify and target the sources of firing at these individuals. Then larger assault units move forward to capture territory. However, these assault units are now poorly trained, and their equipment is obsolete armor or more often simply cars, vans, and motorcycles, often heavily camouflaged. Ukrainian spotter drones are waiting for these assaults, and once the Russian vehicles are in motion and supported by Russian artillery, Ukrainian drones blow up both the vehicles and the artillery. On a typical day in autumn 2025, the Russians were losing 1,000 soldiers, 10 armored units, 25 artillery barrels, and 100 vehicles. By offering increasingly high incentives, Russia was recruiting 30,000 soldiers a month, barely enough to cover losses.

Russian electronic warfare has improved dramatically, with a focus on disrupting Ukrainian drones. As a result, Ukrainian forces are now losing about 10,000 drones per month. Russian air defenses also have improved, reducing the ability of Ukrainian fighter jets to attack. Russian engineers have been effective in designing and building defensive trenchworks, minefields, and tank traps in areas they control.

However, Ukraine air defenses have also improved. Russian airplanes now must launch airborne missiles from Russian territory, with a considerable loss of accuracy. Russian ground to ground ballistic missiles are hard to bring down, but also lack accuracy.

Faced with the hardening of Russian front lines, Ukrainian forces are focused on inflicting high Russian casualties, rather than attacking themselves. The exception occurs when the Ukrainians decide to roll back a Russian salient to prevent it from being hardened. The massive Russian missile and drone attacks deep in Ukraine have required the Ukrainians to invest heavily in missile and drone defenses of all types, which have something like a 90% success rate. Nonetheless, Ukraine suffers considerable damage. This serves as a constant reminder to Ukrainians of what is at stake.

Conclusion

Putin’s war in Ukraine has provided him with a rationale for stifling dissent in Russia, redirecting vast resources to turn Russia’s economy to military production, sponsoring efforts to overturn governments that support Ukraine, and preparing for additional invasions that will re-establish the Russian empire and cement his legacy as a modern Stalin.

In spite of all this, Putin is still losing the war in Ukraine. That conflict is chewing up men and equipment at an unsustainable rate. Moreover, it has been a strategic disaster. The war strengthened Ukrainian nationalism. It energized the European members of NATO and caused Finland and Sweden to join NATO, which doubled the length of NATO’s frontier with Russia. It destroyed the myth of Russian military superiority. It ended Russian natural gas exports to the European Union, which had been carefully cultivated for decades. It led to the emigration of more than half a million of Russia’s best and brightest.

Most NATO countries are now rearming and expanding their militaries. The E.U. countries combined gross domestic income EU GDP of $19.4 trillion in 2024 added to the UK GDP of $3.6 trillion totaled over 23 trillion dollars, whereas the gross domestic income of the Russian Federation RF GDP in 2024 was 2.1 trillion. Over the long run, Russia cannot compete with Western Europe. Europe can afford to support Ukraine’s economy and war effort while European countries ramp up their defense industries and military infrastructure. Putin will eventually lose not only his Ukraine War, but also his dream of a new Russian empire.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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- John Steinbeck, East of Eden

Evil people don’t have songs. How is it, then, that the Russians have songs?

- Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols

OPINION -- The war that Russian President Vladimir Putin started in Ukraine may finally be turning in a direction that will result in Russia’s defeat as the strategic tide seems to be turning against Putin.

Russian casualties in Ukraine continue to mount as the Ukrainians are now effectively taking the war to the Russian Federation. Russia’s wartime economy is starting to show signs of strain, and evidence may be emerging that discontent with Putin leadership is starting to grow in some of Moscow’s elite circles.

One hopes that when he returns from his Asia trip, President Trump will turn his focus to the actions of his erstwhile friend Putin. This is a good time to soberly assess Russia and Putin’s current situation and the prospect that Russia might be on a path to losing the war they started.

In recent weeks, there have been a number of reported incidents of Russian drone and aircraft incursions over neighboring states, including the airspace of NATO members. In an escalation of nuclear saber rattling, Putin has tested a Burevestnik cruise missile, a Poseidon nuclear capable “super-torpedo” and conducted large-scale nuclear drills.

These are signs of weakness not strength and are certainly designed to intimidate leaders in the West—including President Trump—to reduce military and economic support to Ukraine. Putin’s strategy with regard to Trump again seems to have backfired with Trump announcing that the U.S. will resume nuclear testing after a pause of more than thirty years.

President Trump also made public the fact that the U.S. has nuclear capable submarines stationed off Russia’s coast. This is not the revelation of a strategic or military secret — just a reminder to Putin (and Russia’s elites) that the U.S. is a strategic nuclear power and Putin’s use of a nuclear weapon would result in the destruction of the Russian Federation and his kleptocracy.

Some Ukrainian leaders believe that there is a number of Russian casualties they can inflict that would bring about the collapse in the fighting effectiveness of the Russian army in Ukraine. While hard data on Russian casualties is difficult to gather, credible estimates put Russian combat deaths at over 200,000 and total casualties at over 1.1 million - many of those killed in 2025 as a result of Russia’s strategy of fighting a war of attrition using outmoded tactics to gain territory that can be measured in tens of kilometers.

Ukrainian leaders also believe that taking the war to the Russian people will have an impact on Moscow’s ability to sustain the invasion. Ukraine has done this effectively in recent months, even without Tomahawks.

Ukraine has used targeting data and weapons supplied by the West (Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missiles and ATACMs) to strike targets deep inside of Russia. These weapons combined with Ukrainian long-range drone capabilities (and ingenious operations such as SPIDER WEB) are taking the fight to the Russian Federation and making the war visible to the average Russian, despite efforts by Russian state-controlled media to push the false narrative that Russia is winning the war.

The economic impact of strikes against Russian energy infrastructure is beginning to be felt outside of Moscow as Russia diverts available energy from the regions to keep Moscow supplied. There are shortages and energy price hikes that the Kremlin can no longer conceal.

Russia’s economy is also suffering the impact of more effective and comprehensive sanctions on Russian energy production and sales. European purchases of Russian hydrocarbons are diminishing and the U.S. has levied new sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil and a number of their subsidiaries. This will have an impact on the network of oligarchs that support Putin. Inflation is also rising at an 8 percent increase year on year. There is scarcity of critical parts affecting the production of things like automobiles, aircraft and consumer appliances. It is only technology provided by China that keeps Russia’s defense industrial base functioning.

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Even this may be less sustainable in the long run if there is any truth to reports that Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping had productive conversations on ending the war. (I’m personally skeptical that Xi will do much to disappoint his partner and friend, Putin.)

There are also unconfirmed reports of growing discontent among Russian elites. A number of media sources now suggest that Mikhail Khordokovsky may be trying to organize a coup to remove Putin from power. It was only about 18 months ago that Yevgeniy Prigozhin launched a rebellion that saw his forces moving with surprising speed and success toward Moscow. Apparently in some circles in Russia, Putin is derisively referred to as the “moth.” And since Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022, an estimated one million Russians, mostly youth, have emigrated, creating a brain drain and, together with military casualties, exacerbating a labor shortage.

The situation is increasingly bleak. Finland and Sweden have joined NATO - turning the Baltic into a NATO lake. Ukrainian strikes have driven Russia’s Black Sea fleet from the eastern reaches of the Black Sea undermining Russian naval power. Europe is rearming and defense spending in NATO states is moving toward compliance with Treaty requirements or beyond. The alliance itself has been given new purpose.

Putin has destroyed any possibility of peaceful accommodation with Ukraine and in the process, has created a nation that will move inexorably toward a Western political and economic model. This is a strategic failure of Putin’s that cannot be undone.

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In other areas of the former Soviet Union, Russian influence continues to wane.

Azerbaijan and Armenia have agreed to a U.S.-brokered peace agreement. Kazakhstan is showing new political and economic independence. Putin’s ally Iran has suffered significant setbacks at the hands of U.S. ally Israel. Putin’s friend and supporter Bashar al Assad lost his hold on power in Syria and is in hiding in Moscow. The U.S. has led peace efforts in the Middle East as Moscow has been sidelined.

Now is the time for decisive action to end the conflict in Ukraine.

The action needs to take place on three levels: political, economic and military.

As discussed at the recent Cipher Brief Threat Conference in Sea Island, Georgia, the West has yet to meaningfully coalesce international political support behind Ukraine beyond gatherings of European and or NATO leaders. The U.S. should sponsor a global meeting of heads of states from around the world to decisively declare support for Ukraine, brand Russia and Putin as the aggressor in the conflict, and call for Russian withdrawal, payment of reparations for war damage and remand war criminals to justice. The simple message should be, “Mr. Putin, end this war!”

Secondly, the U.S. and the West need to increase further pressure on Russia’s economy to weaken Russia’s ability to prosecute the war.

And thirdly, military support to Ukraine needs to be increased, particularly in air defense technology and the delivery of systems that allow Ukraine to continue to take the war to the Russian Federation and make Russians feel the pain of the conflict. A concerted effort on these fronts will almost certainly lead to Putin’s demise and the end of the war.

Putin and his Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov constantly talk about the need to address the ”root causes” of the conflict. Quite simply, Putin is the root cause of the conflict and addressing his delusions of empire is the surest way to end it. That can’t come soon enough for the brave people of Ukraine and the world.

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For months, the U.S. president tried to play peacemaker, but Viktor Orban’s friend in Moscow ignored him – escalating missile strikes on Ukrainian cities and expanding hybrid warfare across Europe. Putin’s resolve to escalate only makes Trump look weak, and Trump does not tolerate looking weak. Now he appears to be bringing a stick to the negotiations. If Ukraine is indeed receiving Tomahawk missiles, things will only get worse for Putin. And for his friend in Budapest.

Orban appears to be sleepwalking into a crisis of his own making. His love affair with Putin has isolated him in Europe. His reliance on Russian oil threatens to result in an economic catastrophe if and when the oil stops flowing through Ukraine. His revanchist claims on Ukraine’s Zakarpattia Province has angered Kyiv, without winning Ukraine’s Hungarians to his side. And if he continues to provoke the drone superpower in Kyiv by violating Ukrainian airspace with Hungarian drones, he may one day find himself on the receiving end of a heavy stick.

How different things were in 1989, when more than 200,000 Hungarians gathered in Budapest’s Heroes’ Square for the reburial of Imre Nagy, the executed leader of the 1956 Revolution. The ceremony culminated in a bold seven-minute speech by a young Viktor Orban, who called for free elections and the withdrawal of Soviet troops still stationed in Hungary. It was that same Orban who during Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, condemned it as an “imperialistic action of pure power politics.” But by 2022, he was captured by Russian money.

Whether Orban harbors imperial ambitions or simply covets the totalitarian control exerted by a corrupt Kremlin, Hungary has become a bastion of Chinese and Russian influence in the heart of Europe and has actively supported Putin’s war and provoked Kyiv.

In May 2025, Ukraine’s Security Service exposed a suspected Hungarian military intelligence network, marking the first time an EU state had been caught spying against Kyiv.

Then in September 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that reconnaissance drones likely belonging to Hungary had violated Ukraine’s airspace, the first such reported breach. Kyiv accused the aircraft of scouting Ukraine’s industrial capacity along the border.

Orban even shrugged off the violation while speaking on a talk show, saying that Hungarian drones “either crossed or not” into Ukraine’s skies, before adding that “Ukraine is not a sovereign country” and Hungary was not its enemy, so there was no problem. This reckless attitude is reflected within his own government. In a leaked 2023 recording, Defense Minister Kristóf Szalay-Bobrovniczky spoke of “breaking with the peace mentality” and entering “phase zero of the path to war.” This was the kind of language you’d expect from Moscow, not from the capital of a NATO ally.

That arrogance carries risks. In August 2025, Ukraine struck the Druzhba oil pipeline, cutting flows of Russian crude to Hungary and Slovakia – the only EU states still addicted to Moscow’s energy. Kyiv had little reason to spare countries that blocked aid in Brussels, and the strike showed that Hungary’s dependence on Russian pipelines is a vulnerability Ukraine can easily exploit. That Hungary signed a deal with France’s Engie to buy liquefied natural gas changes nothing, since Orban says he has no plans to stop importing gas and oil from Russia.

What’s the point of Orban’s provocations? Does he really believe that Russia is winning a war that’s cost it over 1 million casualties? Does he truly believe that Hungary can reestablish the borders it had during the Habsburg Empire and help Russia dismantle Ukraine? Does he not see that he’s compelling the EU and NATO to adopt measures that will ultimately isolate Hungary and negate its baneful influence?

A rational politician in a small, landlocked country that’s benefited inordinately from its neighbors’ largesse would certainly sing a different tune. Instead, Orban is, like Putin, driving his country toward disaster.

It’s possible that the erstwhile Hungarian patriot has become a Hungarian imperialist who models himself on Moscow’s dictator. More likely, Orban and his legitimacy are trapped in the revisionist ideology that helped him consolidate power. According to him and his propaganda apparatus, Hungary was victimized in both world wars, whereas the reality is that it happened to ally with the wrong side, thereby bringing its troubles upon itself.

That narrative, and Orban’s dictatorial pretensions, appear to have outlived their purpose. His opponent, Peter Magyar, leads Orban by around 10 percentage points and is likely to win the parliamentary elections in April 2026. Investors are already betting that a change of government would unlock as much as €18 billion in frozen EU aid, roughly a tenth of Hungary’s GDP, fueling a rally in the Hungarian forint.

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Orban would be wise to change course and return to being the man who inspired thousands in 1989. He should stop pushing the Ukrainians, if only because that makes him look ridiculous. As Szabolcs Panyi, a Hungarian investigative journalist, has said, “Hungary’s army is wholly unprepared for any type of conflict with anyone. Ukraine’s army is so superior that it’s completely unrealistic that Orban would engage in direct fighting.”

Orban also declared that Hungary was “not afraid” to shoot down Russian drones if they violated his country’s airspace. Perhaps what he truly fears is cutting off the payments from Moscow that keep him loyal. In any case, Budapest would be the weak link in any European “drone wall,” should it soon be built. Still, the Russians seem to have been launching drones from ships, which would weaken any future drone wall.

As to the EU and NATO, Orban should realize that it makes no sense to bite, again and again, the hand that feeds you. Alas, Orban still has a long way to go. On October 1, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz reportedly clashed with Orban at an EU summit in Copenhagen after the Hungarian leader disrupted talks on the bloc’s security strategy and aid for Ukraine.

His hostility has only sharpened since. On October 6, Orban accused Zelensky of using “moral blackmail” to push Ukraine’s EU bid, claiming Hungary had “no moral obligation” to support it.

Unless a miracle happens, Orban will lose and be thrown out of office. Hungary could then become what it was in 1956 and 1989: a beacon of hope for democracy and human rights.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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The wars in Ukraine and Gaza must stop. Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a sovereign nation with 1994 security assurances from Russia, has killed or maimed tens of thousands of combatants and civilians. Efforts by President Donald Trump to end this war have failed, with an emboldened Vladimir Putin escalating hostilities in Ukraine, while probing the credibility of NATO, flying drones into Poland and Romania and recently violating Estonia’s airspace. This is the Putin who lamented the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and vowed to recreate the Russian Empire. And that’s what he’s doing. Georgia and Crimea in 2008 and 2014 was a prelude to his invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The Baltic states - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – are next, on Putin’s quest to recreate the Russian Empire.

It's obvious what Putin is doing. He got away with Georgia and Crimea and Putin is confident he’ll prevail in Ukraine with minimal consequences. So, what could the UN do to sanction Russia for its violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty? Indeed, there should be an outcry from the UN demanding that Mr. Putin halt his invasion of Ukraine and enter negotiations with Kyiv.

Iran’s continued refusal to permit UN nuclear inspections and refusal to resume nuclear talks with the U.S. resulted in the reimposition — on September 28 — of sanctions lifted in 2015. So, given that Iran has not changed its attitude and in fact has become more defiant, “snap back” sanctions ban nuclear enrichment, establish an arms embargo and ban tests and transfers of ballistic missiles. It’s clear that Iran wants the option to acquire nuclear weapons capability. A nuclear-armed Iran will be an existential threat to Israel -- an adversary Iran wants to annihilate – and the region.

But for Iran it’s more than acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism, working with its proxies – Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis -- to destabilize and terrorize the region. On September 17, the Department of State also designated three Iraqi militia groups aligned with Iran as terrorist organizations. These terrorist groups have attacked the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and bases hosting U.S. and Canadian forces.

Indeed, the human rights situation in Iran is equally dismal. The 2009 presidential election protests and the 2022 killing of Mahsa Amini by the so-called morality police for incorrectly wearing her head scarf sparked national protests that were brutally suppressed by the ruling theocracy. Nationwide arrests and executions were conducted by a weak and corrupt theocracy that was threatened by the public and its outcry for justice and liberty.

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Ensuring that food and water are available to the people of Gaza is a priority objective, as is ending this bloody war. The onslaught in Gaza was caused by Hamas’s October 7 attacks that killed approximately 1,200 people, mostly civilians, and the abduction of 251 hostages. This was the bloodiest day for Israel since its independence on May 14, 1948. Indeed, Hamas is a terrorist organization closely affiliated with Iran, which provides Hamas with the weaponry and support needed for its acts of terrorism.

The situation in the South China Sea could escalate quickly between China and the Philippines. The irony is that a 2016 ruling by a UN-backed arbitration tribunal invalidated China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea, ruling overwhelmingly with the Philippines. The ruling was deemed final and binding, although China has rejected the ruling and continues to defy it.

These are just some of the national security issues the UN should openly discuss and attempt to resolve. The wars and turmoil in Myanmar, Sudan, Yemen, Haiti and Libya also require immediate UN attention. This is the mission of the UN.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Joseph Detrani was first published in The Washington Times.

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“Dictators,” Churchill observed, “ride to and fro on tigers from which they dare not dismount.” “And,” he added, “the tigers are getting hungry.”

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE / OPINION -- Churchill penned those words when mankind was on the precipice of what would be the most devastating conflict in human history. The men who took it over the edge - Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini and a leadership in Japan that would increasingly take on the characteristics of a military dictatorship under men such as General Hideki Tojo - were driven by ambition; animus for their enemies, real, imagined and contrived; and a will to use any means at their disposal to ensure their countries assumed what they saw as their rightful places in the world.

The leaders of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan took their countries into war because of conditions they had fomented. Cynically exploiting political radicalization, economic pressures, and societal fervor stoked by authoritarian leadership and militarist-nationalist ideology, they dismantled democratic institutions – thus removing the brakes on both repression and aggression - and promulgated pervasive propaganda that created a climate where war appeared both inevitable and justified.

Once at war, they desperately clung to their illusions of national greatness and delusions of personal grandeur as their countrymen were killed, their nations devastated and their militaries defeated. In the end; with Hitler’s suicide in a dank bunker; the bodies of Mussolini and his mistress hanging in a Milan square; and Tojo’s drop through a trapdoor with a hangman’s noose around his neck; the tigers feasted.

The nature of the relationship among the Axis powers of the Second World War is worth considering within the context of the recent meeting of the leaders of the ‘Axis of Autocracies’ in Beijing. The extension by Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping of invitations to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit and a massive military parade celebrating the end of the Second World War to Russian President Vladimir Putin, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian was in keeping with Xi’s intent to send a signal of unity in opposition to the so-called ‘rules-based’ international order dominated by the U.S. Further, the Chinese leader will have seen the presence of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Turkish President Recep Erdogan among some twenty invitees to the Beijing festivities – coming, as they did, amid trade tensions with Washington and with the 2027 deadline he has set for his military to be ready to act against Taiwan nearing - as evidence his message is finding broader resonance.

"Global governance,” Xi said, “has reached a new crossroads." The new order he envisions would, the Chinese leader said in comments clearly directed at the U.S., “take a clear stand against hegemonism and power politics, and practice true multilateralism."

What he did not say, and did not need to say, was that his country and party would be at the center of a realignment of global power that would bear little similarity to the current world order for which the Chinese leader has nothing but contempt.

As China has long demonstrated, it has no regard for adherence to norms of behavior that the failed U.S. policy of engagement was intended to promote. Indeed, its aggressive and expansionist policies vis-à-vis its neighbors; its disregarding of treaty obligations in the case of Hong Kong; its resort to influence operations to suborn foreign governments and international institutions; its exploitation of Belt and Road initiative projects that turn recipients into debtor nations; its use of espionage means to steal the intellectual property and national wealth from rival nations, their businesses and industries; and its brutal repression of political opponents and ethnic minorities demonstrate that Beijing neither recognizes nor accepts any international rules of conduct.

While North Korea and Iran play lesser, supporting roles in this Axis, the relationship with between Russia and China is central to Xi’s desire to put together a global system of strategic and economic ties that supersedes the post-war, U.S.-dominated world order.

Xi’s message clearly resonated with Putin. Addressing his Chinese counterpart as “dear friend,” the Russian President said that Moscow’s ties with Beijing are “at an unprecedentedly high level.” Citing Soviet assistance to China during the war, going on that: “We were always together then, we remain together now.” Putin’s avowals of what he would have termed ‘fraternal friendship’ in his earlier life notwithstanding, Russia likely sees its reliance on Beijing for support as being driven by the necessities of the Ukraine war and surely does not envision long-term dependence on China.

However, what Putin also surely understands - if Xi did not make the point explicitly clear to him in conversations between the two - is that the state of the Ukraine war is a significant factor in the timing and nature of Chinese planning for ‘reunification’ of Taiwan with the mainland insofar as it serves to distract and diffuse any Western – read U.S. – response to such an undertaking.

Consequently, there is every incentive for Beijing to ensure there is no resolution of that war prior to any move it makes against Taiwan. In such an instance, the U.S. would find itself having to contend with China backed by Russia should it choose to counter a move by Xi to seize the island. It is, of course, unclear what form Beijing-Moscow war-time cooperation would take. But ties between Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan might be instructive in this regard.

As is the case with relations between Moscow and Beijing today, the connection between the two most powerful Axis powers was rooted in a desire to undo the existing – then Anglo-American and now U.S. led - world order. Germany and Japan fought their war as ostensible allies. But it was a strangely distant union. They were bound together more by de facto strategic interdependence than by formal alliance. The two countries did sign a series of compacts. Chief among these were 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact (according to which both parties agreed to work against the Soviet-directed ‘Comintern’, or Communist International), and the Tripartite Pact of 1940, establishing an “Axis” alliance which also included Italy.

There were also several supporting economic and military cooperation agreements, the most significant of which was the "No Separate Peace” agreement of 11 December 1941. Signed following U.S. entry into the war, it formalized joint prosecution of the war against the U.S. and Britain by the Axis, pledging that the signatories would not seek a separate peace without mutual consent.

These arrangements were integral to the wartime calculations of Germany and Japan. But none of them formally bound either country to come to the aid of the other in event of war. Moreover, their ability and willingness to develop and implement a joint strategy for waging the war was hampered by geographical distance, divergent interests, and occasionally conflicting operational priorities.

There is, for instance, no evidence that the timing of Tokyo’s December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor was coordinated with Berlin. The attack’s timing was primarily dictated by Japan’s urgent need to break U.S.-led embargoes and secure critical resources, rather than a calculated move to exploit any German "distraction" of the Allies.

But Germany’s war in Europe did create opportunity for Japan in the Asia-Pacific by significantly weakening the Western colonial presence in the region, indirectly making a Japanese attack more viable and thus influencing Tokyo’s risk calculus.

With major Western powers preoccupied—Britain fully engaged in Europe and North Africa, and the U.S. focused on supporting Britain and preparing for possible conflict—Japanese leaders judged that the Western colonial powers in Asia (Britain, the Netherlands, and France) were vulnerable to rapid Japanese offensives. That assessment enhanced Japan’s confidence in the success of those operations but was not the determining factor in their timing.

Moreover, Hitler’s declaration of war on the U.S. after Pearl Harbor puzzled Allied leaders and historians since given America’s massive industrial potential; his own experience in the First World War when entry of America into the war tipped the balance against Germany; and the fact that Tokyo did not join the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union, a non-decision that allowed Stalin to shift reserves from Siberia to confront the German army threatening Moscow.

It appears the German dictator declared war on the U.S. - even though the declaration removed any remaining obstacles to full American involvement against him in Europe - primarily because he thought war with America inevitable, wanted to unleash his U-Boats on ships carrying Lend-Lease material to Britain, and sought to present the Axis as a united front. He also saw the U.S. as a decadent, racially mixed nation and underestimated its capacity to quickly gear up for war, believing Germany could defeat the Allies before significant American power could be brought to bear. His decision proved a crucial strategic blunder as it unified America’s population and industries behind a total war effort that was ultimately decisive.

The February 2022 promulgation of a “Partnership Without Limits” by Xi and Putin on the margins of the Winter Olympics not only signaled a warming of relations between their countries. It also implied at least tacit Chinese backing for the Russian invasion of Ukraine that occurred just a few days later.

As was the case with the Axis powers, that announcement was presaged by other agreements between Beijing and Moscow. The establishment of formal diplomatic ties after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the 2001 signing of a ‘Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation’ set the stage for strategic, economic, and security collaboration between the two countries. Over the following years, they resolved border disputes, held joint military exercises, expanded energy trade, and cooperated within such international organizations as the SCO.

While ties between Russia and China on economic, diplomatic and military matters have deepened, the relationship – as was the case with the Axis - is marked more by a joint desire to challenge the U.S. than by deep mutual affinity. Despite declarations in the 2022 joint statement that the friendship between the two countries “has no limits” and that there are “no forbidden areas of cooperation,” Putin is no doubt well aware that Xi has other motives in supporting Russia.

Not least among them are using the Ukraine war to draw down Western military stockpiles and taking advantage of Moscow’s relative loss of influence in Central Asia. And Russia remains deeply wary of Chinese strategic intentions and intelligence activities. Notably, recently leaked Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) documents indicate Moscow’s growing concern over Chinese espionage targeting Russian military, scientific, and geopolitical assets. The FSB has labeled China as an "enemy" and initiated counterintelligence programs designed to counter aggressive Chinese recruitment of Russian scientists, officials, and businessmen—especially those with access to sensitive state institutions.

Like the (successful) intelligence operations mounted by Stalin’s Soviet Union against its erstwhile Western allies during World War Two, Chinese intelligence has intensified its attempts to gain insight into Russia’s military operations in Ukraine and its knowledge of Western combat systems.

The FSB has documented Chinese front organizations—including corporate and academic groups—seeking access to information on Russian technological advancements, as well as covert Chinese activities in the Arctic and Russia’s Far East. Moscow has responded by restricting the access of foreign researchers, monitoring users of Chinese platforms like WeChat, and increasing face-to-face warnings to vulnerable officials. These security concerns underscore the reality of the relationship: while Russia and China publicly coordinate on economic and military fronts, deep mutual suspicion and competing strategic ambitions complicate their alliance.

In spurring his country towards war, Hitler exploited economic instability, the national humiliation of the Versailles Treaty, fears of internal enemies in the form of Jews and communists, and a desire to restore German national power by re-building the military and expanding the country to develop a totalitarian, militarized, racially pure state under a supreme leader able to act decisively in his quest to dominate Europe.

The German dictator seized on an opportunity to play on what he rightly perceived as weakness on the part of his potential adversaries to fulfill his dark version of his country’s national destiny. Likewise, the leaders of Imperial Japan exerted enormous influence over the country’s domestic and foreign policy, seizing an opportunity to press for an expansionist war to address economic pressures and resource scarcity. Often acting independently of - and sometimes overruling - civilian authorities, the militarists used propaganda, suppression of political dissent and racialist exhortations to national destiny to justify expansionary war as the only viable path to Japanese strength and salvation, as well as their own power.

Similarly, both Xi and Putin are driven by imperatives; in their cases – assuming their revealing conversation about organ harvesting and eternal life was just aspirational – in the form of actuarial calendars. The former has committed to resolving the Taiwan issue during his time as Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary. And the latter undertook the Ukraine invasion as part of an effort to restore Russian power and influence world-wide, but particularly in the former Soviet “the near abroad,” while at the helm in the Kremlin. Both are building up their militaries – Putin out of immediate necessity and Xi to actualize expansionist aspirations - while stoking nationalism to at once garner support for those endeavors and to defray potential domestic threats to their rule.

Although Xi maintains a strong grip on power as China’s paramount leader, internal tensions are rising due to the absence of a succession mechanism, demographic decline and, most importantly, increased public discontent engendered by weak economic growth, prolonged real estate market weakness, record youth unemployment, deflationary pressures, and ballooning government debt.

He faces also elite dissatisfaction fueled by his reluctance to initiate necessary market reforms. Party insiders are said to be concerned over the sustainability of the state-led model and its impact on global competitiveness, as well as the political risk of widespread public dissatisfaction in an environment where social mobility appears impossible and wealth gaps are evident.

In response, the Chinese leader has used surveillance, purges, ideological education, and anti-Western messaging to silence dissent. This approach has made him over-reliant on what the Soviets called ‘the instruments of state repression.”

Even though overt dissent is suppressed, the risk of future instability is rising beneath the surface. Unrest could rapidly appear if economic or political crises dramatically worsen. To avoid the fate of those who ruled the Soviet Union, Xi’s approach over the coming years may be shaped by the need to adapt by opening the economy to some degree to vent off steam while trying. Confronted with such circumstances, he could well be tempted to further ramp up repression while whipping up nationalist fervor around the Taiwan issue. Although adopting such a course might obscure economic difficulties and bolster his authority, it could also increase the risk of reckless foreign policy steps.

The potential for, and the possible consequences of, a rash move by Xi are increasing. China is engaged in intensifying competition that is generating friction with the U.S., especially around Taiwan, the South China Sea and the race to dominate the emerging realm of AI. Regional tensions are likewise intensifying as China’s increasingly aggressive stance has prompted growing concern and coalition-building by Japan, India, Australia and the U.S.

Pushback to China’s exploitive Belt and Road Initiative in the form of growing recipient-country debt and local resentment are complicating Beijing's ambitions and increasing its frustration.

Finally, Beijing has been impacted by American economic decoupling and sanctions. Export restrictions, technological bans, and tariffs imposed by the U.S. are beginning to bite, challenging China’s drive to seize global leadership in AI, semiconductors, and green technology.

Putin, playing on nationalist sentiment over claimed repression of ethnic Russians in Ukraine and a desire to reassert Moscow’s dominion over that nation, plunged his country into a regional war that could – like the Japanese assault on China in the 1930’s – be a prelude to a larger conflict.

The Russian leader faces mounting internal pressures as the war he unleashed grinds into its fourth year. His invasion has devolved into a slogging match that has cost his country immense amounts of blood and treasure for relatively little recompense.

Although the Kremlin has retained control through coercion, propaganda, and material incentives, challenges are surfacing from multiple directions. The costs in blood and treasure of waging a seemingly endless war are straining the economy, rising inflation, and reducing living standards. Importantly, frustration within elite circles is rising due to the costs and duration of a war waged for insufficient territorial gains.

Moreover, Russia is struggling with the spiraling costs and military overstretch of its commitment in Ukraine, which has limited its ability to project power elsewhere. The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and Armenia’s distancing from Russia after the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have weakened Russia’s network of regional allies. Its position in Belarus and in other former Soviet states is increasingly precarious, with popular uprisings and anti-Russian sentiment rising. This, coupled with sustained Western sanctions and relative international isolation, has resulted in reduced Russian influence on the world stage.

The Kremlin continues to call its Ukraine invasion a "special military operation" rather than issuing a formal declaration of war due to fears of backlash. It has, to date, successfully isolated most of society from the war’s worst impact, suppressed dissent, and delayed difficult political choices. The Kremlin portrays all of this as the consequences of a U.S.-led proxy war targeting the Russian nation and its people. But internal pressures from war fatigue, economic strain, and elite tensions are quietly growing. And the longer the war persists without a decisive victory or settlement, the risk of cracks—in the form of elite disaffection and public unrest —will continue to rise.

Finally, like his Chinese counterpart, Putin could be tempted to engage in more external adventurism to divert attention away from the internal pressure building within his country.

Their mutual antipathy for the U.S. aside, another thing the two modern-day dictators have in common is that both are taking steps to prepare their militaries and people for possible large-scale conflict by intensifying military reforms, working to enhance readiness and developing more advanced weapons systems. Having already put his economy on a war footing, Putin is doing this both to enable operations in Ukraine and to prepare for a possible wider war.

Xi, for his part, has embarked on military modernization and shows of force such as the massive parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II to undergird his strategic messaging regarding his intent to “reunify” Taiwan with the mainland and to ready their militaries for active operations to that end if needed. Finally, China and Russia have engaged in a series of joint military exercises, including recent and upcoming naval drills in the Sea of Japan and Pacific emphasizing anti-submarine warfare, missile defense, and combined arms tactics to counter the U.S. and its allies.

Those exercises may signal something more than theater in terms of cooperation between the two militaries. But they have not shown that ties between the two countries have progressed to the point that they are prepared to implement a joint plan for waging war against the U.S.

Like their Axis forbearers, their strategic interests are likely too disparate to allow for anything more than strategic coordination in broad terms between them. This does not mean the U.S. and its allies would find it easy to confront both adversaries at once. Nazi Germany and Japan did not fight jointly, but Allied victory came at huge cost, nonetheless.

At this stage, the key question is whether, when and how Putin intends to end his assault on Ukraine. At present, the Kremlin is publicly evincing no willingness to end this war absent the achievement of at least his minimalist demands: no NATO membership for Ukraine and occupation of the four Russian-annexed regions of that country (in addition to Crimea).

If Ukraine does not cede control over those territories, it appears Putin intends to pursue a fight and negotiate strategy until his goals are achieved. However the war ends, the U.S. will then have to decide if it is prepared to try to engage Russia with an eye towards creating a rift between it and China.

With the latter on a course that appears to be inexorably leading to a confrontation with the U.S. over Taiwan, and Washington clearly preferring not to have to simultaneously deal with two adversaries on different fronts, the questions of whether, how and how soon the war in Ukraine can be ended, and what tack the Russian leader will take thereafter are of great significance to U.S. national security.

In the years since Churchill wrote about the dangers for and from dictators in riding a tiger, others have used the same analogy. Jefferson Starship even wrote a song about it. Science fiction writer Robert A. Heinlein cautioned all who would try it that “the first principle in riding a tiger is to hold on tight to its ears.” But it was John F. Kennedy who most succinctly addressed the perils past leaders courted by engaging in the practice. “Those who foolishly sought power by riding the back of the tiger,” he cautioned, “ended up inside.” One wonders how tight a grip the dictators in Beijing and Moscow have on the big cats they sit astride.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

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Cipher Brief exclusive: Former six-time CIA station chief Ralph Goff details the status of the frontlines in Ukraine and where Kyiv needs the most help from its allies.

EXPERT Q&A — The Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace this week underscores how far Russia is from the negotiating table and agreeing to a just, sustainable peace in Ukraine. Ralph Goff, a former six-time CIA station chief, got an on-the-ground account of this reality in Ukraine, telling The Cipher Brief about the meat-grinder tactics of Russia, and how Ukraine is relying on technology to defend against this.

Cipher Brief CEO and Publisher Suzanne Kelly spoke with Goff live from Ukraine, for insights into how Ukraine is faring with the battlefield reality of today, and why increased Western support is desperately needed. Our conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

The Cipher Brief: The Russian drone incursion into Poland activated NATO, with the EU responding as well. What’s your take on this through an intelligence filter?

Goff: The flight of anywhere between 19 and 23 Russian drones over Poland - which the Russians claim either didn't happen, or was some sort of mistake, or the Ukrainians jammed their drones so they wandered over Polish airspace, yada-yada-yada. Excuse after excuse - It was a test. This is Vladimir Putin testing the waters after the Alaska Summit, after the last two weeks of back and forth with the European allies about where to go from here in efforts to get Russia to the negotiating table. This is absolutely vintage Vladimir Putin who - like any two-year-old child - is testing his parents' forbearance.

In this one, at least in my opinion, he may have made a big mistake. This is a violation of NATO airspace so Article 5 applies. The Poles have already invoked Article 4, which isn't much but it does mean that NATO allies gather and discuss the issue. [Ed note: Right after our interview with Goff, NATO announced Operation Eastern Sentry].

But at the same time, Putin's made a mistake because he's given NATO a gift. He's also given a gift to the Trump administration where they can react by establishing a no-fly zone over all of Ukraine or maybe a no-fly zone over the approaches to Poland, including into the airspace of Belarus by saying, "Hey, because these drones are a threat to airspace, we're taking them out before they even get here." So we'll see. I think this is a real acid test of the will of the NATO allies and the will of the Trump administration to show Vladimir Putin that he can't always have his way.

The Cipher Brief: You've been traveling with a small group of folks to some of the areas along the front lines in Ukraine. What does ground truth look like there?

Goff: What it looks like is the Russians are making slow gains, but they're advancing slower than the Western powers advanced during World War I. So it’s nothing to brag about, but it is a steady advance and it's something that the Ukrainians are having a problem dealing with.

The challenge to the Ukrainians - because they lack the manpower - is to kind of protect their manpower, try to save lives and try to husband their resources in terms of manpower. Whereas the Russians are just throwing men into it. I mean, one of the most horrifying things I heard all week was from a commander out in one of the battalions who said they are capturing Russian soldiers who, from the time they left their house - to the time they were in Ukrainian captivity - was just 12 days. Twelve days from the time they left home to the time they were captured.

The Cipher Brief: So there's no training anymore. There's no training or organization, really?

Goff: There's no training. They're basically giving them uniforms, sticking them on a bus or a train, sending them out to the front, giving them a weapon and sending them out to fight. 12 days. However, technology is making a difference.

Unfortunately, the ratio of casualties which was always very highly in favor of the Ukrainians, is beginning to shift. The Russians are making adjustments. Putin is reckless, but he's not stupid. So, we're seeing a situation where the Russian casualty rate is diminishing a bit and the Ukrainian casualty rate is staying the same, but it's still a net loss for Kyiv. Ukraine just doesn’t have the manpower to match Russia.

One of the areas where they're having problems is in what we call the ‘mid-range’, anywhere from 40 to 70 miles from the front lines. The Russians are dominating that space right now. They're able to bring their forces in, distribute them for their assaults and trickle down, and the Ukrainians just haven't had the means to strike them in that zone to break these formations up before they get closer to the front, where the Russians will send 50 guys knowing that in the end, maybe only two of them will be alive. But if those two guys have advanced 50 meters, that's a gain.

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The Cipher Brief: The Cipher Brief was there with you just a couple of months ago in May and there was a lot of talk then about how there was a ‘no-man buffer zone’ that had formed along the front because of this ubiquitous use of drone technology. No one could actually go into that space without being targeted and killed by drones. Can you give us a sense of what day-to-day life is like on the front lines right now?

Goff: The day that we visited at battalion headquarters on the front, it was pretty quiet. We were watching 40 or 50 drone feeds at any given time, and there wasn't much going on there, but that said, there are times when the front becomes active. And yes, it is a death zone, but again, the difference now is that the Russians are willing to take casualties, so they will send men into that death zone, whereas the Ukrainians are forced to respond.

Let's say you have five Ukrainians in a position they successfully defend, and they hold off the Russians. Let's say they kill 10 or 20 Russians. But if they lose two guys, they're down to three. The next assault of 50 guys eventually comes and it just wears them out. So it is a numbers game. And the Putin administration, for some bizarre reason, continues to be able to recruit and mobilize. Mostly it's economic because they're recruiting soldiers from the poorest regions of the former Soviet Union, now the Russian Federation. These guys are being offered recruitment bonuses and money that is millions of rubles, which is thousands of U.S. dollars in comparison, but it's money they never would have dreamed of having. Then a couple of days later, they're either dead or in Ukrainian captivity. It's bizarre.

The Cipher Brief: You've spent a lot of time in that region professionally, and of course you're a retired senior CIA officer so you've got a lot of knowledge about what happens in these areas. If you were writing a report back today, what would you say are the top opportunities and challenges for the Ukrainian troops who are fighting along the front right now?

Goff: The top opportunities are that, if you're fighting guys who 12 days ago were sitting at home and you've been fighting a war for two or three years, you have a huge advantage in terms of your experience and your abilities, so they have that.

The challenge though, is keeping those guys alive. So for us in the West, for the United States, for NATO, I think the key here is to provide weapons, ammunition, and a non-ending supply. It can't be like last year when the bill before Congress to supporting Ukraine was frozen for months. Finally, it passed, but at the last moment, literally, and Ukrainians were hanging on by their fingertips then. Literally, it was like the cavalry coming over the hill to protect against the last charge of the enemy. So we can't allow that to happen again. We've got to enable the Ukrainians to be properly equipped and properly armed, and that includes helping them solve the problem of the mid-range distance with the types of weapons that can strike out 40, 50, 60, 70 miles from the front.

The Cipher Brief: The criticism has always been that the U.S. has given Ukraine just enough not to lose, but never enough to win. Is there anything in the places that you visited or from the leaders that you talked to that surprised you?

Goff: No real surprises other than it's just surprising that their morale is still so high. You go to these frontline units and their morale is high. There is no one sitting around morosely. And then you go to cities like one we visited on the Black Sea, it was a lovely place, and people were on the beach. It's a little weird at first to see people hanging out on the beach like a normal beach day, but then you think, "Hey, look, this is their daily reality," right? We're marking the anniversary of 9/11 in Ukraine where one could argue that every day is 9/11.

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OPINION — Following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Vladimir Putin expected a swift victory from his “special military operation.” Instead, it is Kyiv now conducting special air campaigns against Russia’s oil and gas industry. Ordinary Russians are beginning to feel the war’s costs more directly and the pressure on the Kremlin is growing.

Since late 2023, Ukraine has unleashed a drone offensive, targeting Russian oil refineries. By 2024, the Biden administration was upset at the impact Ukraine was beginning to have, as the US was sensitive to changes in oil prices.

But for Russia, oil and gas revenues help fund its ongoing war against Ukraine. Russia’s reliance on massive recruitment bonuses to sustain its war effort in Ukraine is straining its economy, driving up wages and inflation as the military competes with civilian industries for labor. According to a June survey by the independent Russian pollster Levada Center, 58% of Russians named rising prices as their top concern.

Drones have formed the backbone of Ukraine's defense, but now, they are increasingly used on the offensive against Russia. Over time, drone strikes became more effective. By 2025, Ukraine had built an extensive fleet of long-range drones and put them to use, targeting Russian oil, hitting Moscow where it hurts most. Kyiv believes these to be “kinetic sanctions,” since the West has been hesitant to target Russian oil for years. And for Putin, fuel prices are politically dangerous.

Since early August, Ukraine has carried out more than a dozen strikes on Russian oil refineries, knocking out as much as 20% of refining capacity – over 1 million barrels a day. According to The Economist, the attacks have forced rationing, sent wholesale petrol prices up by more than 50%, and pushed Russia to suspend gasoline exports. The attacks have continued into September.

The result is that Russians are stuck in long lines waiting for fuel. Some cities reportedly don’t have any fuel supplies left. Local government budgets are in freefall. All of Russia’s major oil companies have reported profit declines in 2025, with industry-wide earnings cut in half.

The shortages now dominate the headlines of Russian newspapers. By early September, Putin himself was forced to admit that Russia is facing a gas shortage. The result is growing social pressure within the country. One Russian war blogger wrote, “We've been half-dead here for months, digging mud in the trenches, under drones every day, counting bullets, while back home, oil refineries are burning down in batches.”

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The Kremlin’s official narrative has been that damage to refineries came from falling debris after drones were shot down. Yet at the same time, Russian authorities broadcast loudspeaker warnings urging citizens not to record footage of Ukrainian drones – an implicit admission that direct hits were occurring and to not broadcast the success of Kyiv’s efforts.

Things will continue to get worse for Russia. Ukrainian defense company Fire Point has recently unveiled two new ballistic missiles, the FP-7 and FP-9, with ranges of 200 km and 855 km respectively, as part of Kyiv’s push to strike deeper into Russian territory. Kyiv has also been deploying AI drone swarms. With time, this technology will be extended to long-range drones.

While these strikes alone may not determine the outcome of the war, they are shaping its trajectory. Ukraine has shown it can bring the fight deep into Russia’s economic heartland, weakening the very revenues that sustain Moscow’s military machine.

Putin would be wise to remember the lessons of Tsar Nicholas II during World War I: when the frontlines dragged on and domestic shortages mounted, social pressure at home proved as dangerous as the enemy abroad.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

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OPINION — “The reason why I still remain pessimistic is that everything that [Russian President Vladimir] Putin says is he still wants those four territories…Eastern Ukraine. He hasn't achieved that yet. And he wants Ukraine to be at least subjugated to Russia, because he doesn't think that Ukraine's an independent country or independent nation. Ukrainians are just Russians with accents. That's his view. I've heard him talk about it personally. I've been in the room when he talks that way. And maximally he wants to bring it all into Russia. So, tragically, I think the only way he negotiates seriously is when he's stopped on the battlefield and his armies cannot march further west.”

That was Michael McFaul, President Obama’s Ambassador to Russia (2012-to-2014), speaking with Katie Couric August 18, on YouTube. McFaul, a Russian expert, is today a professor at Stanford University and Director of its Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

In the 53-minute conversation, McFaul provided a background to the Ukraine war, shared his views on the relations between Putin and President Trump, and talked about the possible future when it comes to the NATO and European Union nations and the United States.

Early in their conversation, McFaul provided an interesting background to the past and current fighting which has been taking place in eastern Ukraine, adjacent to Russia.

“So there are four regions that most of the fighting has been taking place,” McFaul said, “In each of those four regions [they] are partially occupied by the Russians today.”

Two of the four regions, Donetsk and Luhansk, together form what’s called the Donbas. Russia holds all of Luhansk and 75 percent of Donetsk. The other two regions are Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, where Russia has about 70 percent of the land.

McFaul said, “Two years ago Putin held a big ceremony where he said these new four regions are now part of the Russian Federation in addition to Crimea, which he annexed back in 2014…So five regions of Russia, five states if you will of the Ukrainian country Putin has already, you know, annexed.”

“On paper,” McFaul continued, Putin “had a big ceremony, there's parades, and the Kremlin and they say he had all these fictitious leaders from these places saying you're now part of Russia, right, but de facto on the ground in reality he doesn't control any of those places 100%.”

McFaul explained the “Donbas is rich in minerals. It's the industrial base of the country. So I think it's like eight or nine percent of the [Ukraine] population…but it's more like 15 percent of

the GDP [gross national product] of the entire country. So it would be a tremendous loss to Ukraine. That is true. Also, half parts of it have been occupied de facto by Russian surrogates

since 2014. So another important thing to realize is that once that happened, many hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians left that territory. They're living all over the place. I have friends from those regions that are living in Germany, living here in the United States, and living in parts, other parts of Ukraine.”

McFaul tied the Donbas to what happened when Trump met with Putin in Alaska on August 15, saying, “We never really got a good readout from what happened in Alaska, but to the best of our understanding, what Putin asked for in Alaska, pretty audacious. He said, Donbas, that's two of those regions, right? That's up in the northwest corner, northeast corner. He said, Mr. President, convince Zelensky to leave Donbas. Remember Ukrainian soldiers and Ukrainians now hold parts of Donbas as we speak…It's Ukrainian held territory and Putin says you got to convince Zelensky to give me those two regions and in return I will stop fighting in those other two regions that I just mentioned. Right? Kherson and Zaporizhzhia…So that's his deal.”

McFaul went on, “That's his offer. And the Ukrainians, you know, I talked to many Ukrainians afterwards. I mean, this is nonsense from them. The idea that they would give up territory that hasn't even been conquered is just a non-starter. But that's what Putin asked for.”

McFaul also set out what he thought the Ukrainians might settle for, while making clear Zelensky had never said it directly.

“I think,” McFaul said, “the part [of Ukraine] that was occupied since 2014 [Crimea, small sections of the Donbas] is a part that Ukrainian people and President Zelensky could live with giving up. Again, I want to stress, they're not going to recognize it as part of Russia, but they could recognize that they will only seek reunification through peaceful means. That's the language...That means that in reality it would be under Russia, you know, as long as Putin's in power.”

McFaul added, “But they're only going to do that if they have some guarantee from the West that by doing that they get something in return for their security. And so when you hear this phrase ‘land for peace,’ the Ukrainians keep saying, well, yeah, you guys keep asking us for land, but you never say what the peace part is. And that is what the conversation [Trump with Zelensky with European leaders] at the White House today [August 21] is, I think, principally focused on.”

Before talking about the Trump/Putin relationship, McFaul gave some interesting personal background about the Russian President.

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“I can tell you Putin is an effective interlocutor,” McFaul said, “He is an effective speaker. He will go on and on about Russian history. He'll spin it in his own way. And if you don't know, you know, what happened in the 15th century, and even I don't, you know, so most presidents don't, it's hard to follow. In one meeting with Obama, he [Putin] went on for 58 minutes in the beginning of the meeting before President Obama even had the chance to speak. So that's the way he rolls. I just fear that Trump accepted his, you know, perverse notion of history.”

I saw an example of this side of Putin four years ago, before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when a friend suggested I read a 10-page essay published by the Russian President on July 12, 2021, entitled, On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians. It can still be accessed on Putin’s website.

Putin began it by writing, “During the recent Direct Line [a TV question-and-answer session with Putin] when I was asked about Russian-Ukrainian relations, I said that Russians and Ukrainians were one people – a single whole. These words were not driven by some short-term considerations or prompted by the current political context. It is what I have said on numerous occasions and what I firmly believe. I therefore feel it necessary to explain my position in detail and share my assessments of today's situation.”

Putin continues to push that idea, as he did on August 16 in his joint press conference with Trump in Alaska, when he described Ukrainians as “a brotherly people, no matter how strange it may sound in today’s circumstances. We share the same roots, and the current situation is tragic and deeply painful to us. Therefore, our country is sincerely interested in ending this.”

At one point in their conversation, Couric asked McFaul, “Do you think that Donald Trump is being played by Putin?”

McFaul answered: “Honestly, I think he [Putin] thinks of Trump as being just a really weak leader and with a little bit of praise and a little bit of, you know, repeating things that are false

that Trump wants to hear, he can win him over…So in Alaska, Putin said, ‘I would have never invaded Ukraine had you been president.’ And that's exactly what Trump wanted to hear.”

McFaul went on, “And then behind closed doors, as we learned later in his conversation with Sean Hannity, Putin went on and on about how the 2020 elections was stolen because of mail-in ballots, because of mail-in voting, right?”

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I studied the Fox Hannity August 15 interview where Trump spoke of “one of the most interesting things” Putin had told him, which was, “Your [the U.S. 2020] election was rigged because of mail-in voting.” Trump then continued. “He [Putin] said mail-in voting, every election. He [Putin] said, no country has mail-in voting. It’s impossible to have mail-in voting and have honest elections.”

McFaul’s response to Trump’s description to Hannity of that portion of his exchange with Putin reflected what other Americans commentators have said.

“I just listened to the President [Trump] talk about that [Putin’s view of the 2020 election],” McFaul said, “and I just can't believe that he [Trump] would be so gullible. Honestly, I guess I should get used to it by now. But what an absurd thing for him [Putin] to claim…How does Putin know that that happened [in the 2020 election]? And no credible American organization, no investigative journalists have uncovered that. But somehow mysteriously the president of Russia knows that it was stolen because there was mail-in voting. And yet the President [Trump] just repeated that and that's how Putin has won him over.”

Three days later, on August 18, Trump messaged on Truth Social: “I am going to lead a movement to get rid of MAIL-IN BALLOTS…We are now the only Country in the World that uses Mail-In Voting. All others gave it up because of the MASSIVE VOTER FRAUD ENCOUNTERED.”

In fact, as reported by Politifact, a Sweden-based organization, Supporting Democracy Worldwide, in an October 2024 report found that at least 20 countries other than the U.S. allow some form of mail-in voting, including Austria, Australia, Japan, India, Canada, Ireland, Greece, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

Towards the end of the interview, McFaul said there were two major things he hoped for.

“One,” he said was “the security guarantee that we've been talking about where European soldiers are deployed on Ukrainian territory to help keep the peace. Peacekeepers, you

know, tripwire. I don't really like that word tripwire, but where they're there to just keep that border, right?... And you go up to the border and you see all the soldiers there and you see the barbed wire that keeps the peace.”

The second thing McFaul hoped for involved “about $300 billion dollars of Russian central bank assets and other Russian assets that are in our banks. They were correctly, brilliantly frozen by the G7…back in 2022,” after Putin invaded Ukraine.

McFaul said, “The next move, those assets have to be given to Ukraine. Americans don't want to pay for reconstruction. Europeans don't want to pay for it. That's money is sitting right there.” It would be used, McFaul said, as “part of a sweetener” for Zelensky because “he's got to have something else to give the Ukrainian people” to keep fighting against the Russians.

McFaul’s closing point is worth remembering.

Referring to the NATO allies at the White House with Zelensky, McFaul said it should “remind everybody that Moscow, neither the Soviets or the Russians, have never attacked a NATO

country. So NATO expansion has helped to keep the peace especially in places like the Baltic states. But also NATO has never attacked the Soviet Union or Russia. And so we shouldn't buy into this argument that it's a threat to Russia. It's not a threat to Russia…We have to think about NATO as an alliance that preserves the peace rather than causes conflict.”

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OPINION — By now, much of the world has increasingly started to truly understand just how far Russia’s Vladimir Putin is from Ukraine and the West when it comes to wanting peace. The world has watched in horror as Putin’s military savages Ukraine’s cities, homes, schools, and hospitals. Every day brings new footage of children pulled from rubble, of civilians killed in missile strikes, of infrastructure bombed not for strategic value, but for the sole purpose of breaking Ukraine’s will. And yet—amid this brutality—some in the West continue to push for Ukrainian restraint, for a stop to the fighting on Russia’s terms, and for concessions that reward invasion with territory and more. Are we really going to let parts of Ukraine be gobbled up and crushed while lecturing its people about compromise?

Enough. It’s time to shift from timid appeasement to strategic dominance. That means helping Ukraine win.

Let’s be clear: helping Ukraine win does not mean rolling into Moscow. It means driving Russian forces out of Ukraine’s sovereign territory, restoring borders, and crushing the Kremlin’s ability to wage aggressive war. It means showing the world—especially Russia and China—that democracies won’t fold when authoritarian powers try to redraw maps by force.

Today, Russia’s forces are grinding forward in eastern Ukraine. They’re threatening key cities like Pokrovsk, gaining psychological momentum and physical ground. Their industrial war machine, now increasingly operating at scale, churns out killer drones and missiles with near impunity. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s defenders are struggling to hold the line, their supplies thin and their populations and cities vulnerable.

This must stop. The West has the tools to shift the war’s balance and, thereby, also re-position the terms of negotiations.

And this should appeal to the U.S. president who likes negotiating from a position of strength--with real teeth--that sets up an actual negotiated deal versus an endless series of meetings, threats, and peace plans, all while Ukraine bleeds and Putin makes gains at home and in Ukraine. And while China's Xi watches.

And here's a vital point: just talking about these measures shifts the strategic landscape, which occurred when the U.S. president said he was displeased with Putin and was going to enact secondary sanctions on Russia’s oil sales several weeks ago.

If the West shows that it’s truly serious, then even before the first missile flies or sanction bites, the pressure changes. Negotiations would no longer be about what Ukraine must give up, but what Russia must stop doing if it wants to survive economically and militarily. That’s how we change the West's and Ukraine's negotiating strength.

Marching Orders

Let’s start with the $300 billion in frozen Russian assets sitting in Western coffers. Right now, we allow the interest from that money to support Ukraine. That’s a timid half-measure. Instead, seize the principal—yes, all of it—over time for Ukraine’s war fighting, even greater arms industrialization, including for Western weapons manufacturers and suppliers to Ukraine, and eventual reconstruction. Ukraine should not have to beg for bullets while Putin builds still more drones and bombs, even if it is with money from his dwindling reserves and oil sales.

Second, flood Ukraine with advanced air defense systems—Patriots, IRIS-Ts, SAMP/Ts—and establish partnerships with Western defense manufacturers to scale up weapons production on European and U.S. soil in a substantial and even more rapid way. Some efforts have started; now it’s time to turbocharge them. Protect Ukraine’s people, skies, cities, and infrastructure with urgency—not over years, but in months or less.

Third, end the restrictions that prevent Ukraine from striking targets inside Russia. Right now, many of Moscow’s war factories, command and control facilities, logistics hubs, and more operate untouched—safe in the knowledge that Western-supplied weapons can’t reach them. That’s a strategic gift to the Kremlin. Let Ukraine hit back. Let Russia feel the ramifications of its monstrous violence and aggression.

Germany, for example, has long-range Taurus cruise missiles—precisely the type of weapons Ukraine needs to take out heavily defended targets inside Russian-occupied territory as well as Russian supply lines, command and control locations, and key choke points, such as bridges. Berlin has offered to help Ukraine develop long-range capability, but won’t supply the Taurus directly due to fears it could be used on Russian soil. Enough. Send the missiles. Give Ukraine the range, precision, and firepower to make continued Russian brutality and escalation come at a steep cost.

Fourth, oil—Putin’s lifeblood. Russia’s war machine runs on fossil fuel revenue. The West’s oil price cap has been riddled with loopholes and weak enforcement from the start. It’s time to fix that. Impose debilitating secondary sanctions and tariffs on every country that buys Russian oil in large quantities or above the price cap—without exception. No more free passes for China, India (against which Washington has imposed additional tariffs beginning later this month), NATO member Turkey, or any others, including European nations. Slash the price cap. Reduce the volume that can be sold. Make every barrel of oil that Moscow sells return even less with which it can kill Ukrainians.

And fifth, harshly go after Russia's economy across the board. As Ukraine’s Presidential Office Head, Andriy Yermak, recently argued in The Washington Post, the West must disconnect Gazprombank from SWIFT, and cut off Russia’s access to the international financial system if it really wants to change the ballgame. Also, target Rosatom, Roscosmos, and every other state agency enabling Russia’s war economy. Squeeze them out of global markets. Shut down dual-use technology transfers, and prosecute those enabling Russian logistics and cyber operations, including crypto infrastructure providers.

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Teaching All Authoritarians a Lesson

Predictably, Russia will forcefully lash out. There will be even more aggression against Ukraine, and nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction saber-rattling, as well as increased "gray zone" attacks, cyber strikes and campaigns, information operations and propaganda, and much more.

Putin thrives on fear. But if we give in to it now, such as with one-sided territorial and other concessions on Putin's terms, we will pay much, much more later—in Ukraine, in Taiwan, in other parts of Europe, including the Baltics, and beyond.

The lesson to dictators must be this: war, rape, child abductions, torture, and genocidal conquest will not be tolerated. There will be powerful, punishing consequences and you will lose.

It’s time to stop hiding behind “avoiding escalation.” Russia escalated years ago when it invaded Ukraine not once but twice. It continues to escalate daily with every missile strike on civilians, every drone attack on power stations and other infrastructure, every load of kidnapped children taken to be “re-educated” and adopted in Russia.

We must make Putin pay the costs--gargantuan costs--that come with carrying out a war and brutality, thereby compelling him and his supporters to reel back and suffer, and causing other authoritarians and dictators considering a similar path to see their dreadful fate too.

History does not reward those who counsel surrender and accept an ill-conceived and dangerous precedent in the face of evil (e.g., Neville Chamberlain). It remembers those who fought back—and those who helped them win. Ukraine still has the will to fight. What it needs is for the West to match that will and action. Fight, fight, fight, as the U.S. president likes to say — and help Ukraine win.

This is the moment. No appeasement. No more half-measures. No more fear.

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OPINION / EXPERT PERSPECTIVE – As we reach a temporary ceasefire in diplomatic progress aimed at ending the war in Ukraine - a war that has cost the lives of more than a million people and has caused billions of dollars in damage – there is still a path we haven’t yet taken. One of maximum pressure. As of now, no agreement has been reached, no breakthrough achieved, no path forward identified, but the events of the past couple of weeks have made a few things crystal clear.

The first is that Russian President Vladimir Putin has no intention of ending the war he started on anything other than his own terms, which have not changed since the war began. Putin wants to occupy all of Ukraine and if that is not achievable through force alone, he will do his bet to turn the remainder of Ukraine into the 21st Century version of Vichy France.

Whatever contrary messaging Trump’s hopelessly overmatched envoy Steve Witkoff may have delivered, there can no longer be any doubt in the President’s mind of Putin’s intentions.

As Russia continues to bomb Ukrainian civilian targets throughout the period of negotiations including before and after the summit in Anchorage, Alaska, President Trump must now see clearly Putin’s love of brutality and his belief that he can win this war militarily.

It should also be clear to President Trump that his administration made a tactical and perhaps strategic blunder by granting Putin a meeting on U.S. soil with no concessions by the Russian side agreed to in advance. The U.S. move allowed Putin to end his diplomatic isolation, get a photo opportunity on U.S. soil for his constituents at home and seemingly disregard his history as an indicted war criminal.

In Putin’s mind, the summit was a meeting of equals and it was represented as such in the Russian press. This, despite Russia being a superpower only in that it possesses a vast arsenal of nuclear weapons. The U.S. is a superpower economically, militarily, and culturally. These are the reasons why Anchorage was a big win for Putin and an embarrassment for the U.S. But we can still fix this.

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The White House meeting that followed the Trump-Putin talks, was an impressive display of allied solidarity that included Ukraine and senior European leaders. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky showed that he had learned some lessons from his previous visit to the Oval Office, this time, frequently and effusively praising President Trump and thanking him for the support the U.S. has provided since Russia’s full-scale invasion began.

Other NATO allies have clearly studied the playbook that Putin uses when manipulating Trump, managing to charm the U.S. president as they did during the NATO summit in the Netherlands earlier this summer. One hopes that President Zelensky and the other leaders effectively explained to President Trump the impossibility of Ukraine being able to accept Putin’s territorial demands, which aren’t only illegal under the Ukraine’s constitution but in Donetsk, they would mean abandoning carefully prepared defensive positions and the abandonment of over 200,000 Ukrainians to Russian occupation. For many, that would be a death sentence or rapid deportation to Russia’s gulags.

So far, the U.S. President has tried using flattery and accommodation bordering on appeasement to get Putin to end this war. It has not worked. He humiliated the Ukrainian President in the Oval Office to get him to do something he could not do—agree to what terms that to many, signify a surrender. The U.S. has cut off military and intelligence support to Ukraine. Still the Ukrainians fought on.

There is still time for the U.S. to act in a meaningful way.

The U.S. President has threatened Russia with “crushing” sanctions. But Putin played “rope-a-dope” and instead got a summit and postponement of sanctions for his efforts. President Trump has now set another deadline. The time for deadlines is over. It is time for action. The only path that has not been tried (but has only been threatened) is to put maximum pressure on Putin and the Russian Federation.

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Here’s how we get there: first, the President should immediately authorize the advancement of pending legislation in the U.S. Congress on sanctions on Russia and purchasers of Russian hydrocarbon products.

Second, the President should use his authority to advance the sale or “lend lease” of military support for Ukraine.

Third, the U.S. should remove any restrictions on Ukrainian use of weapons systems already provided or already committed to help Ukraine defend itself. Let Ukraine take the war to the Russian Federation and make it visible to the people of Russia what is happening. If Putin doesn’t like it, let him end the war and withdraw from Ukrainian territory.

And fourth, the U.S. should restore maximum diplomatic isolation of Russia and publicly call out Russia as the aggressor in this conflict.

In this context, the success President Trump had ending the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict should be leveraged to reduce Russian influence in the Republic of Georgia, long a bastion of pro-U.S. sentiment but recently put under a cloud of Russian interference.

Let the loss of influence in the Caucasus be added to the list of Putin’s strategic failures. Put it on the list right next to Finland and Sweden joining NATO.

Sanctions alone won’t influence Putin, but sanctions, renewed military and financial support for Ukraine, renewed diplomatic isolation, and strategic leverage on Russia’s periphery might.

The path ahead should be clear to the U.S. President, who must now know that he can’t trust Putin. The Russian president is the enemy of the U.S. in every fiber of his being and it’s time for him to pay the price of his folly.

Disclaimer: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

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OPINION / EXPERT PERSPECTIVE – The Russian state media's triumphant coverage of Vladimir Putin's August 15 meeting with Donald Trump in Alaska tells a familiar story: the great leader Putin has once again outmaneuvered the West, broken his international isolation, and secured recognition as an equal on the world stage. The reality, however, tells a different story entirely.

While Putin's propagandists work overtime to spin the Alaska meeting as a diplomatic victory, the facts reveal a Russian president who traveled thousands of kilometers only to return home empty-handed, his war machine no closer to achieving its objectives in Ukraine than it was before the meeting.

Thanks to what appears to be U.S. planning documents accidentally left on a hotel printer as reported by National Public Radio, we have a clearer picture of what Putin may have hoped to achieve in Alaska, and what he spectacularly failed to secure. The original itinerary included an expanded working lunch with senior U.S. economic officials, including Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Commerce Secretary Steve Lutnik. Their presence would have signaled American willingness to discuss sanctions relief and expanded trade, the economic lifeline Putin desperately needs as his war economy strains under international pressure.

Instead, Putin found himself in abbreviated meetings with a U.S. president who refused to offer any meaningful concessions without concrete steps toward ending the war in Ukraine. No private tête-à-tête, no economic discussions, no promises of sanctions relief - just the same message the Kremlin has been hearing from the West for over three years now: end the war, then we can talk.

The contrast between Putin's return journey and Trump's is particularly telling. While Trump spent his flight consulting with European allies and announced that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky would visit the White House just days later, Putin's "diplomatic triumph" consisted of a factory visit in provincial Magadan, and a phone call with his Belarusian vassal Alexander Lukashenko. For a man who once commanded attention on the global stage, this is a remarkably diminished itinerary.

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The Kremlin's attempts to highlight increased U.S.-Russia trade since Trump's return to office only underscore Putin's weak position. These modest increases pale in comparison to the massive economic damage inflicted by three years of sanctions and international isolation.

Russia's economy remains fundamentally distorted by military spending, its demographic crisis deepened by mobilization and emigration, and its technological sector crippled by export restrictions.

What Putin received in Alaska was not recognition of Russian strength, but a final diplomatic opportunity that he appears to have squandered through his continued insistence on maximalist demands in Ukraine. Trump's willingness to meet, despite significant domestic political risks, represented exactly the kind of face-saving diplomatic opening that a more pragmatic Russian leader might have seized upon to begin extracting his country from an increasingly costly quagmire.

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Instead, Putin's intransigence has left him more isolated than ever. His remaining international partners -China, India, Turkey, and the UAE - continue to engage with Moscow primarily for their own economic interests, not out of respect for Russian power or Putin's leadership. But even these relationships are increasingly transactional, with partners carefully avoiding actions that might trigger secondary sanctions.

The most damaging aspect of Putin's missed opportunity in Alaska is not what he failed to achieve internationally, but what his empty-handed return signals domestically.

Three years into a "special military operation" that was supposed to last days, the Russian president has little to show his population beyond mounting casualties, economic hardship, and diplomatic isolation. His inability to secure meaningful concessions from the United States, even from a president theoretically more sympathetic to Russian concerns, exposes the fundamental weakness of his position.

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Putin's war has not made Russia stronger or more respected; it has made the country a pariah state dependent on increasingly costly relationships with authoritarian regimes. His Alaska journey, rather than marking Russia's return to great power status, instead highlights how far the country has fallen from its post-Soviet aspirations to rejoin the community of civilized nations.

The tragedy is that Putin's stubbornness is prolonging a war that is devastating not just Ukraine, but Russia itself. Every day the conflict continues, more Russian families lose sons and fathers, the economy becomes more distorted by military spending, and the country's international isolation deepens. The diplomatic window that Trump opened in Alaska may not remain open indefinitely, and Putin's next opportunity for a face-saving exit may come at an even steeper price.

For ordinary Russians watching state television celebrations of their president's "diplomatic victory," the question should be simple: if Putin won so decisively in Alaska, why is the war still grinding on, why are sanctions still crushing the economy, and why is Russia more isolated than ever? The answer, unfortunately, is that there was no victory at all - only another missed opportunity for a leader increasingly disconnected from both international realities and his own people's interests.

Disclaimer: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

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OPINION -- I am a pessimist when it comes to the Russia-Ukraine situation. Talks at the White House this week between President Trump, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders did nothing to improve my outlook. From my perspective, the meetings felt naive and short-sighted. While I am hopeful for peace, I have spoken to a lot of Ukrainians - and foreigners fighting in Ukraine - who have no intention to stop fighting. And our leaders, eager for a quick resolution, aren't recognizing the challenges on the horizon.

Russia must achieve something that Putin can sell to the populace as “total victory”, or risk angering the Russian people. As the Russian author, Eduard Topol, pointed out on August 11, there is precedent in Russia for a violent overthrow in the aftermath of wars: the return of Russian troops from Europe after the victory over France led to the anti-tsarist uprising in 1825; Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War led to the 1905 Revolution; the desertion of a million Russian soldiers from the Russo-German front during World War I forced Emperor Nicholas II to abdicate and resulted in the February Revolution of 1917; the peace signed by Lenin with Germany allowed the Bolsheviks to execute the entire royal family; the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in February 1989 marked the beginning of the USSR’s collapse.

While regime change is probably Putin's central concern, even if a ceasefire occurs on favorable terms (for Russia) what will Russia do with more than a million Russian soldiers, many of whom are former prisoners, returning from the Ukrainian front with post-traumatic trauma and other behavioral issues? The effect will be devastating for Russian society, which has little or no mechanisms for dealing with a crisis on this scale.

The same is true for Ukraine. If a ceasefire happens, there are no guarantees that former Ukrainian soldiers, disenfranchised with the terms of a ceasefire and unwilling to give up “a single inch” of Ukraine to Russia, will not fire their massive stockpiles of one-way attack drones into Russia in a “flight of the valkyries” style assault. The effect would be yielding the “high-ground” to Putin by painting Russia as the victim of unwarranted aggression and violation of the ceasefire.

Couple that with the fact that Ukraine will have to reduce or dismantle their military completely without significant infusions of international capital. If Russia has the high ground and they are being attacked, their invasion of Ukraine will appear justified.

Without a standing army and with Putin portrayed as a victim in the eyes of the international community, our administration will be unlikely to send military aid.

The best case scenario, in my opinion, is pressing for something that looks like a Russian defeat. There is a chance that Putin will be replaced by someone worse. But if so, China will be decisively engaged in crisis management, stymieing their (likely advanced) plans for an invasion of Taiwan. We will also have set a new precedent for what happens when a major power invades their neighbors.

This is a case study for the benefits of early and powerful intervention.

If we had gone all-in when Russia invaded we wouldn't be staring at an existential crisis, and the world would not be contending with the dangers of emboldened (and well-trained) cartels armed with autonomous killer robots threatening global infrastructure.

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OPINION — Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an illegal and brutal war of aggression. Moscow is solely responsible for unleashing this conflict, and the world is right to recoil from the idea of rewarding Vladimir Putin for his crimes. Ukraine’s defense has been courageous and principled, and global support for its sovereignty is both moral and necessary. Yet even with this moral clarity, after more than three years of war, it is time to face several painful but unavoidable truths. Chief among them: Ukraine is slowly losing this war. Many media descriptions of the war in Ukraine as a stalemate do not reflect battlefield reality. The incremental but continual gains the Russians are achieving in the face of courageous Ukrainian resistance are obvious to anyone closely following events on the ground. The question is, if peace is not achieved now on the best terms possible, will those terms – from Kiev’s point of view – be any better 3-6 months from now? Absent a dramatic shift such as a coup in Moscow or direct NATO – read US – intervention in the war, the answer to that question is surely no.

Putin considers this to be an existential conflict. From the outset, he has made clear that NATO membership for Ukraine is anathema to Moscow. Further, the 2023 annexation of four oblasts (Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Luhansk) in addition to Crimea clearly indicates Russia’s minimalist war aims. Sanctions, even secondary sanctions, are unlikely to change him from this course in the near term. Absent an agreement that does not meet those war aims, he is likely to continue the war at least through 2025, by the end of which, the ‘Stavka’ or Russian General Staff, has told him they will have achieved those objectives. Whether those objectives are, in fact, achievable is open to question. What is beyond question, however, is that the Ukrainian military position is slowly eroding. As Putin’s unwillingness to agree to a ceasefire indicates, he believes he has the military initiative and intends to pursue a fight-and-negotiate strategy in order to keep pressure on Ukraine during any talks. Much like Stalin, who prolonged 1944-45 negotiations with the Western Allies over the fate of Poland long enough for Red Army advances to render those discussions moot, Putin is prepared to continue waging war to achieve his goals absent Ukrainian territorial concessions in the Donbas.

A second truth, one that follows from the first, is that the Russians have changed their strategy to enable them to sustain their war effort for some indefinite, but lengthy, timeframe to come. Moscow has long-since put the country on a war-footing. It is now capable of manufacturing much of what it needs to continue the war domestically. And that which it cannot produce at home, it has proven adept at getting either in whole (e.g. Iranian Shaheed drones and North Korean 152 mm artillery shells) or in part (e.g. Chinese electronic components) from its allies. Admittedly, western equipment supplied to Ukraine is generally more capable than that being employed by the Russians. But equipment that is available to the Russians does not have to be better than that which the West has put into Ukrainian hands. It has only to be good enough to allow Moscow to wage war effectively.

It is also evident that Moscow’s military approach to the war has shifted over time as dictated by circumstances in a manner that allows its forces to wage the war more effectively and at relatively lesser cost in human and materiel terms. The ill-considered coup-de-main strategy adopted by the Kremlin at the outset of the war and the brutal massed armors and human-wave “meat” assaults that followed have given way to operations emphasizing more limited incursions by smaller infantry or light mobile forces into weak points along the increasingly stretched Ukrainian front lines. These tactics are, not surprisingly, reminiscent of those employed by the Red Army on a grander scale against the Germans in the period between the 1943 Battle of Kursk and Operation ‘Bagration’ the following year.

At that time, the Soviets launched a series of limited offensive operations intended both to seize territory and to induce the Germans into almost inevitable counterattacks. This gave the Red Army the opportunity to use their greatest advantage – heavy firepower – against the elite Army and Waffen-SS armored ‘fire brigades’ dispatched to restore or, at minimum, stabilize the front lines. The consequent attrition of its mobile reserves left the Wehrmacht unable to respond effectively to the ‘Bagration’ offensive which resulted in the crushing of the German Army Group Center thereby setting the stage for the Red Army’s victorious drive to Berlin. The Germans lost control of the situation in much the same way in which Ernest Hemingway described his path to bankruptcy: ‘First gradually and then suddenly’. Given the comparative disparity in manpower, the longer the war in Ukraine goes on, the greater the risk that Kiev could find itself in a similar situation.

A third hard truth is that given all that has come before and the ruthless nature of the man in the Kremlin, there can be no peace arrangement that absolutely ensures Russia will not resume hostilities at some point in the future. What does, however, appear overstated is the Russian capacity to mount a successful attack on a NATO member. Given Moscow’s inability to conquer Ukraine, a country with about a quarter of Russia’s population and a tenth of its GDP, its prospects for military success against NATO – particularly with the recent commitment by alliance members to significantly increase their defense spending and the unity they have displayed of late in supporting President Trump’s Ukraine peace initiative – would appear remote.

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It is likely evident to Putin himself that his military is not prepared to take on NATO. His continuing aspirations regarding Ukraine are, however, quite another matter. This means that the fact and form of the “security guarantees’ for Ukraine now being discussed are of critical import if a lasting peace is to be achieved. The Russians have repeatedly said they will not agree to the presence of NATO – which they consider a de facto enemy – on Ukrainian territory. It is less clear whether they would accede to the presence in Ukraine of forces from NATO countries under some other arrangement - perhaps as a ‘coalition of the willing’ - as part of a final peace settlement. This might seem a distinction without a difference in that Moscow would know that any resumption of operations in Ukraine bringing the Russian military into contact with western forces would – even with the US only acting as a ‘back-up’ by providing intelligence, logistical and, perhaps, air support - likely draw the same response from the West as would be the case with NATO forces.

But the fact that western forces would be deployed under something other than a NATO structure could make such an arrangement acceptable to Putin if it resulted in an agreement that makes it possible for him to point to territorial gains as a victory that justifies the exorbitant price his country has paid in blood and treasure for it. What is a virtual certainty, however, is that any acquiescence by Moscow to such an arrangement will – in keeping with usual Russian negotiating tactics - only come about at the last minute, that is after they have wrung every possible concession out of their opposite numbers. In this case, this would be following, or concurrent with, Ukrainian agreement on territorial concessions.

Finally, it must be borne in mind that US objectives in the Ukraine negotiations are not limited to concluding a peace agreement between Kiev and Moscow. As was the case throughout the Cold War, a post-Ukraine US objective must be to create and exploit fissures between Moscow and Beijing. Given the damage Russia has wrought in Ukraine, some will find even consideration of such a shift in approach abhorrent. However, the US does not want to find itself confronting a Russia allied to China if, or more likely when, the looming war with the latter comes to pass. Further, Washington must move with some alacrity in doing so given Xi Jinping’s oft-stated 2027 deadline for his military to be prepared to act against Taiwan.

It has long been evident that this war would end in either a negotiated settlement or a frozen conflict. That moment has arrived. It is now up to Ukraine to determine whether it is willing to enter an inherently uncertain peace arrangement in exchange for the ceding of territory it has sacrificed so much to defend. This is a terrible and unjust choice for Ukrainians to have to make. But it is sometimes necessary to amputate a limb to save a life.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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CIPHER BRIEF REPORTING -- President Donald Trump said Monday that he is moving forward with plans to arrange a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in what is being seen as the next crucial step toward bringing an end to Russia’s war in Ukraine.

A meeting at the White House on Monday with President Zelensky and senior European leaders provided a strong show of solidarity, and a striking visual contrast to President Trump’s one-on-one meeting on Friday with President Putin in Alaska, which ended earlier than scheduled and without any public announcements of progress.

On Monday as the White House welcomed Zelensky, along with French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and Finnish President Alexander Stubb, European Union President Ursula von der Leyen and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, the images signaled a much stronger show of unity among those calling for an end to the killing and a sign that the ball is landing squarely in Putin’s court.

"This looks to me like the beginning of negotiations,” Ambassador Kurt Volker who served as U.S. Special Envoy for Ukraine negotiations from 2017-2019, and as Ambassador to NATO from 2008-2009, told The Cipher Brief. “Putin set out his maximalist position. Now, Ukraine and the European leaders are setting out a much more modest and realistic one and calling for a trilateral meeting to discuss.”

Even though a scheduled press conference between Presidents Trump and Putin was cancelled after the two leaders met on Friday, White House Special Envoy Steve Witkoff characterized the meeting to CNN as a win, saying that the ball had moved forward on convincing Russia to agree to “Article 5-like protections”, describing the guarantees as “game changing.”

Article 5 under the NATO charter, provides for collective defense, meaning an attack against one NATO member can trigger a response by any NATO member - something that has been a non-starter for the Russian president since Moscow’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The idea of a U.S.-supported Article 5-type measure is something that the Trump administration has said will largely be shouldered by the Europeans – with U.S. support – and it signals a lot more pressure on the Russian President to concede on some of his most adamant demands to date.

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“Putin is under a lot of pressure,” former senior CIA Officer Glenn Corn told The Cipher Brief. “He's under stress. He understands that he doesn't have the cards.”

Even though the Russian President was not present during talks with Zelensky and European leaders, President Trump made a point to pause talks in order to call the Russian leader, according to European sources. A follow-up meeting between Putin and Zelensky would signal a strong win for President Trump. Not so much for President Putin.

“Putin is unlikely to accept such a meeting if his pre-conditions are not met,” Ambassador Volker told The Cipher Brief. “So, this is just positioning. The real issue will be what happens to Russian supply lines, increasingly targeted by Ukraine, and the Russian economy, which is faltering. I still expect Putin to go along with a ceasefire in place by the end of the year."

In addition to future security guarantees, another key issue on the table is that of land and just how much Ukrainian territory might be ceded to Russia as part of a deal to end the killing.

“Russia is chiefly looking to legitimize territorial gains obtained by force and Ukraine is looking for security guarantees if they are ever to agree to give up territory,” said former 6-time CIA station chief Ralph Goff in an exclusive Cipher Brief interview. “While the Ukrainians will hardly be ready to cede any territory without a Russian boot on it, Zelensky can likely give up territory but only if Russia accepts the Article 5-type" security guarantees.”

While an unpopular realization in Kyiv, some three and a half years into this war, Ukraine lacks the manpower to retake territory that’s been lost to Russia.

“Indeed, they are not able to prevent continuing incremental gains by the Russians albeit at huge cost to the Russians,” said Goff. “Thus, Zelensky can tell his countrymen "Look if you won't allow me to cede territory already lost to the Russians then I need to draft your teenagers to try and get it back."

Some experts, who have long advocated for more – not less – U.S. involvement in helping Ukraine are concerned about just how much land Kyiv will be forced to give up and how that may signal a win for Putin.

“The U.S. and our Allies have not actually even tried to help Ukraine win this war,” said retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges (Ret.), who served as NATO Senior Mentor for Logistics. “We never declared it as an objective or created or implemented policies that would make it so – we’ve barely touched Russia’s ability to export oil and gas and we’ve not touched frozen Russian assets, nor moved all of the military resources needed to help them win.”

Still, there is hope that the solidarity seen at the White House on Monday will be enough to pressure Putin to a deal.

“We shouldn't forget that Monday’s meeting didn't happen without White House concurrence,” said Corn. “They were guests of the United States Government and of the President of the United States. So, Europe, the U.S. and NATO seem unified in a way that we haven't seen in a while.”

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EXPERT Q&A – After Friday’s meeting in Alaska between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, former CIA senior officer and 6-time station chief Ralph Goff breaks down how each leader worked to “case officer” the other and ultimately, who walked away with a strategic advantage, despite no deal being reached. (Our transcript has been lightly edited for length and clarity.)

The Cipher Brief: What was your general assessment of the pros and cons of the meeting between the two leaders in Alaska?

Goff: The summit wasn't the disaster that some feared it would be in Europe or in Kyiv - the capitals where people were waiting anxiously to see what happened. Nothing was really given away (in terms of territory), but it wasn't a success either because we didn't hear details of a follow-on meeting. Remember that President Trump was keen to have a follow-up meeting with President Putin and President Zelensky and himself.

I think in terms of winners and losers, I think on this one, Putin came out slightly ahead. For instance, there was no mention of any intensification of harsher sanctions being imposed on Russia, which is something that Putin, I'm sure, was desperate to avoid.

President Trump mentioned seeking a comprehensive peace agreement as opposed to an immediate ceasefire followed by talks, which is what the Europeans have been pushing for and Kyiv as well. They want an immediate ceasefire and then to engage in talks without any agreements yet in place. Putin is seeking peace talks while he continues to eat away at territory in Ukraine and continues to bomb their cities. As for that, it's maybe not a green light for further aggression, but he definitely didn’t get a red light.

I think also there was a lot of bad imagery. Having a red carpet there to welcome the Russian president – I get that it’s protocol - but I think things like a red carpet could have been skipped by the U.S. side. It gives Putin a boost with his domestic constituency. He was invited to the United States, so that will play well back home and may not play well in other capitals. There was a lot of criticism about Putin's status as a war criminal and he still gets to travel to the U.S.? I mean, that's kind of an empty argument but nonetheless, it is an argument that has traction in some capitals.

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The Cipher Brief: There's a lot of concern about how the president is perceiving Putin – whether it’s as a friend or as someone who brutally launched this war in Ukraine. As someone with has experience in understanding how to manipulate other people to get them to do what you want them to do - which was basically your job at CIA – do you see those elements at play or is this just a bunch of talk by critics of President Trump?

Goff: There is some of that and Putin is a former KGB case officer and he is trying to use some of those skills. I don't think he's a very gifted case officer. I don't think he was actually really successful in the KGB. He was best known to be an obscure colonel somewhere in East Germany, but he is trying to manipulate the president. I think he's failing. And I think what we're seeing is Donald Trump trying to be a case officer as well. He's using flattery and he's controlling Putin and trying to get this guy to a deal right so he's not going to [verbally] bludgeon his way toward a deal although he does do that when Putin's not around. President Trump does have a habit of talking tough when he's with European allies or at some of his press conferences here in the United States - so there's a bit of case officering going on - on both sides and I would say that neither one of them is really being successful because it's pretty transparent on both sides.

The Cipher Brief: With Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky planning to meet with the President at the White House, what would be the best case scenario in your mind?

Goff: The best-case scenario, and this is based on the realities of the conflict itself, is to freeze in place. Russia keeps the territories wherever there is a Russian boot. Putin seems to be aiming to have the geographical boundaries of territories which are not in Russian control at present and that's something that Zelensky cannot agree to as that would be political suicide for him. And the Ukrainians fought and died to hold the lines where they're at so giving up territory that you fought over without having to is a nonstarter, I think, for them. But, you know, in the end, there is going to be a high cost of territory for Ukraine. That's just the reality. And they know that.

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The Cipher Brief: The Cipher Brief has been fortunate enough to travel with you on several trips to Ukraine over the past few years. And there has been a sense that Ukrainians are ready for this war to end for more than a year now. When you combine that with the sanctions that President Trump is threatening, how desperate do you think the situation is on the Russian side to end this war?

Goff: The situation is not desperate enough to force an agreement by the Russians. It's not there yet, but the potential does exist, and the president has some tools at his disposal. He can intensify sanctions, he can continue to press India on the secondary oil market - that's having an effect – and when you look at recent political developments outside of Ukraine, like the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace deal that the president worked out, that's a problem for Russia. That's the beginning of the loss of the Caucasus.

So, cracks are beginning to appear in the so-called near abroad of Russia and meanwhile you you have new NATO members Finland and Sweden and in Finland in particular, President Alexander Stubb has gotten buddy buddy with Donald Trump. They call each other almost daily and they seem to have a real friendship. So, the president has a number of people who are whispering in his ear who understand the Russians and can guide him to some sort of political framework that is agreeable or acceptable to the Europeans and the Finns.

And prior to the summit, President Trump reached out to Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko, Putin’s ally. That was a smart move. That can't have gone over well with Putin. Lukashenko is a stalwart ally, but he's several times during the past decade, he has tried to creep out from underneath the Russian thumb. And so, you know, this is another pressure point that President Trump can use to kind of guide Russia down the path that is desired by Europe and the West.

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The Cipher Brief: When you're looking at overall U.S. strategy right now, it sounds like you're seeing the bits and pieces of this come together in different ways.

Goff: Yes. I mean, there’s a lot going on and the media tend to shine a spotlight on just one spot. Meanwhile, there's stuff going on in the shadows outside that spotlight. And I think that's what we're seeing here.

Look, in the end, there is a lot to be said in favor of trying to get some sort of normalization of relationships between the United States and Russia. Putin's a horrible person. He's committed many crimes, whether it's the invasion of Ukraine or the murder of political opponents or the jailing of political opponents who then die in jail. He’s committed a host of crimes. And he may be an unsavory character, but he's the leader of a nuclear state that represents an existential threat to the United States. So, there is logic behind trying to force a better relationship between Russia and the United States. I give President Trump credit for trying to find a new way to deal with Russia.

The Cipher Brief: What are the key things you're going to be looking for on Monday as President Zelensky meets with President Trump that are going to indicate some kind of progress toward an actual end to this war?

Goff: The things to look for are when the president has his conversations with the European allies and has his conversation with President Zelensky, we want to see signs that there's a consensus there of where to go next and not arguing like we've seen in the past. So, I think a good sign for the West would be consensus.

And from the Russian side, they can do a lot here. They can tone down their attacks on civilian infrastructure and civilian targets in Ukraine. They're not going to stop fighting in the East and they’re not going to stop fighting on the front. That will continue. But they could throw President Trump a bone here and declare some sort of moratorium on strikes against civilian or infrastructure targets.

That’s a long shot, but it's something that if we saw it, that would be hugely positive. I just don't think we're going to see it. In the meantime, there's improved prospects for the Ukrainians too. There are a lot of rumors that they are developing a ballistic missile capability of their own and that would allow them to strike deeper into Russian territory at more strategic targets as opposed to just utilizing drone strikes. So, there's still stuff yet to come in this war that could have an impact.

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