Welcome back, my aspiring cyberwarriors!
In our eventful time, the ability to communicate off-grid has become more valuable than ever. Whether you’re preparing for emergencies, exploring remote locations, or simply want a decentralized communication network that doesn’t rely on cellular towers or internet infrastructure, Meshtastic offers a powerful solution.
In this article, we will explore what Meshtastic is and what it has to offer.
Meshtastic is an open-source mesh networking platform that leverages LoRa (Long Range) radio technology to create decentralized communication networks. Unlike traditional communications that depend on cellular networks or WiFi, Meshtastic enables devices to communicate directly with each other over long distances, creating a self-healing network where messages hop from node to node until they reach their destination.
The platform is built around the concept of decentralization, meaning no central server or infrastructure is required. Each node operates independently while contributing to the network’s overall reach. With LoRa technology you can communicate over several kilometers. Some configurations have achieved ranges of 10-20km in open terrain.
The low power consumption design makes it excellent for battery-operated devices and for portable and remote deployments. Meshtastic works across various hardware platforms, including ESP32, Raspberry Pi, and dedicated LoRa boards, and the cost-effectiveness of the required hardware components means basic nodes can be built for under $50.
The primary purposes and use cases of these communication systems include supporting outdoor activities like hiking, camping, backpacking, and off-roading, allowing groups to stay in touch over long distances without relying on cellular towers. They are also essential in emergency and disaster response situations, providing communication during natural disasters, power outages, or other scenarios where cellular networks fail. These systems play a crucial role in search and rescue operations as well.
Additionally, they facilitate messaging in remote or restricted areas where connectivity is poor or internet access is limited. Community members and hobbyists use these systems to create local mesh networks for experimentation, conduct large-scale testing at events such as DEF CON, or establish backup communication systems for urban areas.
Ultimately, these universal communication systems enhance safety, build community connections, and ensure reliable communication in various challenging environments.
Meshtastic operates on hardware such as ESP32-based boards (e.g., Heltec, LilyGO T-Beam) or pre-built nodes equipped with LoRa modules. These devices are programmed with Meshtastic firmware and function on unlicensed ISM radio bands, making them legal in most regions without the need for a ham radio license, although using higher power may require one in certain areas.
Sending a Message: To send a message, connect a Meshtastic device (referred to as a “node”) to your phone via Bluetooth (or sometimes Wi-Fi/serial) using companion apps available for Android, iOS, web, or desktop. Type your message in the app, and it will be sent to your node.
Broadcasting: The node then broadcasts the encrypted message packet over the LoRa radio. It is important to note that LoRa is designed for low-bandwidth communication, making it suitable for short text messages but not for voice or video.
Meshing and Relaying: Nearby nodes that receive the packet check if it is new (nodes track received packets to avoid duplicates). If it is new, they will rebroadcast it after decrementing a “hop limit” (the default is around 3 hops to prevent infinite looping). This creates a flooding mesh that relays the message from node to node until it reaches the intended recipient(s) or the hop limit is exhausted.
Receiving: The destination node receives the packet, decrypts it using AES256 encryption with shared channel keys, and forwards it to the connected app or phone for display. Additionally, nodes can share location data to map group positions.
Many of us depend on LTE and 5G networks daily, so it’s important to compare them with Meshtastic.
| Aspect | Meshtastic (LoRa Mesh) | LTE (4G) | 5G |
|---|---|---|---|
| Technology | LoRa radio (915 MHz ISM band in US, license-free) | Cellular (various bands, e.g., 700–2600 MHz) | Cellular (sub-6 GHz + mmWave high bands) |
| Infrastructure | Decentralized mesh: User-deployed nodes relay messages | Centralized: Carrier-owned cell towers | Centralized: Dense cell towers + small cells |
| Coverage/Range | 5–20+ km per hop (line-of-sight, terrain-dependent); extends via mesh | Nationwide/global where towers exist; indoor/outdoor | Similar to LTE but denser for high speeds; mmWave short-range |
| Data Speed | Very low: ~0.5–20 kbps (text-only, short messages) | 5–100 Mbps typical (up to 300 Mbps peak) | 100 Mbps–1+ Gbps typical (up to 10–20 Gbps theoretical) |
| Latency | Seconds to minutes (mesh hopping) | 20–50 ms | 1–10 ms (ultra-low for real-time apps) |
| Data Types | Text messages, GPS positions, basic telemetry | Voice, video, high-speed internet, apps | All LTE + AR/VR, IoT, autonomous vehicles |
| Power Consumption | Very low: Weeks/months on battery/solar | Moderate: Drains phone battery quickly | Higher (especially mmWave); improved efficiency in newer devices |
| Cost | Low one-time (devices + optional solar); no subscriptions | Monthly plan + device | Higher plans; premium for full speeds |
| Reliability in Outages | Excellent: Works off-grid, no single point of failure | Fails without power/towers (e.g., disasters) | Same as LTE; more vulnerable to congestion |
| Limitations | Text-only, slow, needs multiple nodes for range | Requires signal/subscription | Limited high-speed coverage; higher battery drain |
These technologies serve different purposes: Meshtastic for resilient, infrastructure-independent communication in remote or emergency scenarios, versus LTE/5G for high-speed, everyday mobile internet and voice.
Meshtastic is a free and user-friendly tool that enables you to send messages without relying on the internet or mobile networks. It connects small, specialized devices to form a network, allowing communication over long distances. This makes it ideal for outdoor adventures, emergencies, or communication in remote areas.
Stay tuned as we continue to explore off-grid communication and simulate the mesh network using minimal hardware equipment in future articles.
A popular phone call/voicemail scam (i.e., vishing) involves someone calling you, claiming to be law enforcement with a warrant for your arrest, and then offers you an opportunity to avoid arrest by paying the “fine.”
Known since 2014, the Cloud Atlas group targets countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Infections occur via phishing emails containing a malicious document that exploits an old vulnerability in the Microsoft Office Equation Editor process (CVE-2018-0802) to download and execute malicious code. In this report, we describe the infection chain and tools that the group used in the first half of 2025, with particular focus on previously undescribed implants.
Additional information about this threat, including indicators of compromise, is available to customers of the Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting Service. Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com.
The starting point is typically a phishing email with a malicious DOC(X) attachment. When the document is opened, a malicious template is downloaded from a remote server. The document has the form of an RTF file containing an exploit for the formula editor, which downloads and executes an HTML Application (HTA) file.
Fpaylo
Malicious template with the exploit loaded by Word when opening the document
We were unable to obtain the actual RTF template with the exploit. We assume that after a successful infection of the victim, the link to this file becomes inaccessible. In the given example, the malicious RTF file containing the exploit was downloaded from the URL hxxps://securemodem[.]com?tzak.html_anacid.
Template files, like HTA files, are located on servers controlled by the group, and their downloading is limited both in time and by the IP addresses of the victims. The malicious HTA file extracts and creates several VBS files on disk that are parts of the VBShower backdoor. VBShower then downloads and installs other backdoors: PowerShower, VBCloud, and CloudAtlas.
This infection chain largely follows the one previously seen in Cloud Atlas’ 2024 attacks. The currently employed chain is presented below:
Malware execution flow
Several implants remain the same, with insignificant changes in file names, and so on. You can find more details in our previous article on the following implants:
In this research, we’ll focus on new and updated components.
Compared to the previous version, the backdoor runs additional downloaded VB scripts in the current context, regardless of the size. A previous modification of this script checked the size of the payload, and if it exceeded 1 MB, instead of executing it in the current context, the backdoor wrote it to disk and used the wscript utility to launch it.
The script collects information about running processes, including their creation time, caption, and command line. The collected information is encrypted and sent to the C2 server by the parent script (VBShower::Backdoor) via the v_buff variable.
VBShower::Payload (1)
The script is used to install the VBCloud implant. First, it downloads a ZIP archive from the hardcoded URL and unpacks it into the %Public% directory. Then, it creates a scheduler task named “MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask” to run the following command line:
wscript.exe /B %Public%\Libraries\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.vbs
It renames the unzipped file %Public%\Libraries\v.log to %Public%\Libraries\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.vbs, iterates through the files in the %Public%\Libraries directory, and collects information about the filenames and sizes. The data, in the form of a buffer, is collected in the v_buff variable. The malware gets information about the task by executing the following command line:
cmd.exe /c schtasks /query /v /fo CSV /tn MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask
The specified command line is executed, with the output redirected to the TMP file. Both the TMP file and the content of the v_buff variable will be sent to the C2 server by the parent script (VBShower::Backdoor).
Here is an example of the information present in the v_buff variable:
Libraries: desktop.ini-175| MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.vbs-2299| RecordedTV.library-ms-999| upgrade.mds-32840| v.log-2299|
The file MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.vbs is a launcher for VBCloud, which reads the encrypted body of the backdoor from the file upgrade.mds, decrypts it, and executes it.
VBShower::Payload (2) used to install VBCloud
Almost the same script is used to install the CloudAtlas backdoor on an infected system. The script only downloads and unpacks the ZIP archive to "%LOCALAPPDATA%", and sends information about the contents of the directories "%LOCALAPPDATA%\vlc\plugins\access" and "%LOCALAPPDATA%\vlc" as output.
In this case, the file renaming operation is not applied, and there is no code for creating a scheduler task.
Here is an example of information to be sent to the C2 server:
vlc: a.xml-969608| b.xml-592960| d.xml-2680200| e.xml-185224|| access: c.xml-5951488|
In fact, a.xml, d.xml, and e.xml are the executable file and libraries, respectively, of VLC Media Player. The c.xml file is a malicious library used in a DLL hijacking attack, where VLC acts as a loader, and the b.xml file is an encrypted body of the CloudAtlas backdoor, read from disk by the malicious library, decrypted, and executed.
VBShower::Payload (2) used to install CloudAtlas
This script is the next component for installing CloudAtlas. It is downloaded by VBShower from the C2 server as a separate file and executed after the VBShower::Payload (2) script. The script renames the XML files unpacked by VBShower::Payload (2) from the archive to the corresponding executables and libraries, and also renames the file containing the encrypted backdoor body.
These files are copied by VBShower::Payload (3) to the following paths:
| File | Path |
| a.xml | %LOCALAPPDATA%\vlc\vlc.exe |
| b.xml | %LOCALAPPDATA%\vlc\chambranle |
| c.xml | %LOCALAPPDATA%\vlc\plugins\access\libvlc_plugin.dll |
| d.xml | %LOCALAPPDATA%\vlc\libvlccore.dll |
| e.xml | %LOCALAPPDATA%\vlc\libvlc.dll |
Additionally, VBShower::Payload (3) creates a scheduler task to execute the command line: "%LOCALAPPDATA%\vlc\vlc.exe". The script then iterates through the files in the "%LOCALAPPDATA%\vlc" and "%LOCALAPPDATA%\vlc\plugins\access" directories, collecting information about filenames and sizes. The data, in the form of a buffer, is collected in the v_buff variable. The script also retrieves information about the task by executing the following command line, with the output redirected to a TMP file:
cmd.exe /c schtasks /query /v /fo CSV /tn MicrosoftVLCTaskMachine
Both the TMP file and the content of the v_buff variable will be sent to the C2 server by the parent script (VBShower::Backdoor).
VBShower::Payload (3) used to install CloudAtlas
This script was previously described as VBShower::Payload (1).
This script is used to check access to various cloud services and executed before installing VBCloud or CloudAtlas. It consistently accesses the URLs of cloud services, and the received HTTP responses are saved to the v_buff variable for subsequent sending to the C2 server. A truncated example of the information sent to the C2 server:
GET-https://webdav.yandex.ru| 200| <!DOCTYPE html><html lang="ru" dir="ltr" class="desktop"><head><base href="...
VBShower::Payload (5)
This script was previously described as VBShower::Payload (2).
This is a small script for checking the accessibility of PowerShower’s C2 from an infected system.
VBShower::Payload (7)
This script is used to install PowerShower, another backdoor known to be employed by Cloud Atlas. The script does so by performing the following steps in sequence:
"HKCU\Console\%SystemRoot%_System32_WindowsPowerShell_v1.0_powershell.exe"::"WindowPosition"::5122 "HKCU\UConsole\taskeng.exe"::"WindowPosition"::538126692
powershell.exe -ep bypass -w 01 %APPDATA%\Adobe\AdobeMon.ps1
Login"%APPDATA%\Adobe\p.txt". Then, renames the file "p.txt" to "AdobeMon.ps1"."%APPDATA%\Adobe". Gets information about the task by executing the following command line, with the output redirected to a TMP file:cmd.exe /c schtasks /query /v /fo LIST /tn MicrosoftAdobeUpdateTaskMachine
VBShower::Payload (8) used to install PowerShower
The decrypted PowerShell script is disguised as one of the standard modules, but at the end of the script, there is a command to launch the PowerShell interpreter with another script encoded in Base64.
Content of AdobeMon.ps1 (PowerShower)
This is a small script for collecting information about the system proxy settings.
VBShower::Payload (9)
On an infected system, VBCloud is represented by two files: a VB script (VBCloud::Launcher) and an encrypted main body (VBCloud::Backdoor). In the described case, the launcher is located in the file MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.vbs, and the payload — in upgrade.mds.
The launcher script reads the contents of the upgrade.mds file, decodes characters delimited with “%H”, uses the RC4 stream encryption algorithm with a key built into the script to decrypt it, and transfers control to the decrypted content. It is worth noting that the implementation of RC4 uses PRGA (pseudo-random generation algorithm), which is quite rare, since most malware implementations of this algorithm skip this step.
VBCloud::Launcher
The backdoor performs several actions in a loop to eventually download and execute additional malicious scripts, as described in the previous research.
Unlike VBShower, which uses a global variable to save its output or a temporary file to be sent to the C2 server, each VBCloud payload communicates with the C2 server independently. One of the most commonly used payloads for the VBCloud backdoor is FileGrabber. The script exfiltrates files and documents from the target system as described before.
The FileGrabber payload has the following limitations when scanning for files:
Part of VBCloud::Payload (FileGrabber)
As mentioned above, PowerShower is installed via one of the VBShower payloads. This script launches the PowerShell interpreter with another script encoded in Base64. Running in an infinite loop, it attempts to access the C2 server to retrieve an additional payload, which is a PowerShell script twice encoded with Base64. This payload is executed in the context of the backdoor, and the execution result is sent to the C2 server via an HTTP POST request.
Decoded PowerShower script
In previous versions of PowerShower, the payload created a sapp.xtx temporary file to save its output, which was sent to the C2 server by the main body of the backdoor. No intermediate files are created anymore, and the result of execution is returned to the backdoor by a normal call to the "return" operator.
This script was previously described as PowerShower::Payload (2). This payload is unique to each victim.
This script is used for grabbing files with metadata from a network share.
PowerShower::Payload (2)
As described above, the CloudAtlas backdoor is installed via VBShower from a downloaded archive delivered through a DLL hijacking attack. The legitimate VLC application acts as a loader, accompanied by a malicious library that reads the encrypted payload from the file and transfers control to it. The malicious DLL is located at "%LOCALAPPDATA%\vlc\plugins\access", while the file with the encrypted payload is located at "%LOCALAPPDATA%\vlc\".
When the malicious DLL gains control, it first extracts another DLL from itself, places it in the memory of the current process, and transfers control to it. The unpacked DLL uses a byte-by-byte XOR operation to decrypt the block with the loader configuration. The encrypted config immediately follows the key. The config specifies the name of the event that is created to prevent a duplicate payload launch. The config also contains the name of the file where the encrypted payload is located — "chambranle" in this case — and the decryption key itself.
Encrypted and decrypted loader configuration
The library reads the contents of the "chambranle" file with the payload, uses the key from the decrypted config and the IV located at the very end of the "chambranle" file to decrypt it with AES-256-CBC. The decrypted file is another DLL with its size and SHA-1 hash embedded at the end, added to verify that the DLL is decrypted correctly. The DLL decrypted from "chambranle" is the main body of the CloudAtlas backdoor, and control is transferred to it via one of the exported functions, specifically the one with ordinal 2.
Main routine that processes the payload file
When the main body of the backdoor gains control, the first thing it does is decrypt its own configuration. Decryption is done in a similar way, using AES-256-CBC. The key for AES-256 is located before the configuration, and the IV is located right after it. The most useful information in the configuration file includes the URL of the cloud service, paths to directories for receiving payloads and unloading results, and credentials for the cloud service.
Encrypted and decrypted CloudAtlas backdoor config
Immediately after decrypting the configuration, the backdoor starts interacting with the C2 server, which is a cloud service, via WebDAV. First, the backdoor uses the MKCOL HTTP method to create two directories: one ("/guessed/intershop/Euskalduns/") will regularly receive a beacon in the form of an encrypted file containing information about the system, time, user name, current command line, and volume information. The other directory ("/cancrenate/speciesists/") is used to retrieve payloads. The beacon file and payload files are AES-256-CBC encrypted with the key that was used for backdoor configuration decryption.
HTTP requests of the CloudAtlas backdoor
The backdoor uses the HTTP PROPFIND method to retrieve the list of files. Each of these files will be subsequently downloaded, deleted from the cloud service, decrypted, and executed.
HTTP requests from the CloudAtlas backdoor
The payload consists of data with a binary block containing a command number and arguments at the beginning, followed by an executable plugin in the form of a DLL. The structure of the arguments depends on the type of command. After the plugin is loaded into memory and configured, the backdoor calls the exported function with ordinal 1, passing several arguments: a pointer to the backdoor function that implements sending files to the cloud service, a pointer to the decrypted backdoor configuration, and a pointer to the binary block with the command and arguments from the beginning of the payload.
Plugin setup and execution routine
Before calling the plugin function, the backdoor saves the path to the current directory and restores it after the function is executed. Additionally, after execution, the plugin is removed from memory.
FileGrabber is the most commonly used plugin. As the name suggests, it is designed to steal files from an infected system. Depending on the command block transmitted, it is capable of:
For each detected file, a series of rules are generated based on the conditions passed within the command block, including:
Resource scanning
If all conditions match, the file is sent to the C2 server, along with its metadata, including attributes, creation time, last access time, last modification time, size, full path to the file, and SHA-1 of the file contents. Additionally, if a special flag is set in one of the rule fields, the file will be deleted after a copy is sent to the C2 server. There is also a limit on the total amount of data sent, and if this limit is exceeded, scanning of the resource stops.
Generating data for sending to C2
This is a general-purpose plugin, which parses the transferred block, splits it into commands, and executes them. Each command has its own ID, ranging from 0 to 6. The list of commands is presented below.
"%APPDATA%\ntsystmp.vbs". The path to launch the file dropped on the remote system is passed to the launched VB script as an argument.
Content of the dropped VBS
This plugin is used to steal cookies and credentials from browsers. This is an extended version of the Common Plugin, which is used for more specific purposes. It can also drop, launch, and delete files, but its primary function is to drop files belonging to the “Chrome App-Bound Encryption Decryption” open-source project onto the disk, and run the utility to steal cookies and passwords from Chromium-based browsers. After launching the utility, several files ("cookies.txt" and "passwords.txt") containing the extracted browser data are created on disk. The plugin then reads JSON data from the selected files, parses the data, and sends the extracted information to the C2 server.
Part of the function for parsing JSON and sending the extracted data to C2
This plugin is used to collect information about the infected system. The list of commands is presented below.
net group "Exchange servers" /domain Ipconfig arp -a
As mentioned in one of our previous reports, Cloud Atlas uses a custom Python script named get_browser_pass.py to extract saved credentials from browsers on infected systems. If the Python interpreter is not present on the victim’s machine, the group delivers an archive that includes both the script and a bundled Python interpreter to ensure execution.
During one of the latest incidents we investigated, we once again observed traces of this tool in action, specifically the presence of the file "C:\ProgramData\py\pytest.dll".
The pytest.dll library is called from within get_browser_pass.py and used to extract credentials from Yandex Browser. The data is then saved locally to a file named y3.txt.
According to our telemetry, the identified targets of the malicious activities described here are located in Russia and Belarus, with observed activity dating back to the beginning of 2025. The industries being targeted are diverse, encompassing organizations in the telecommunications sector, construction, government entities, and plants.
For more than ten years, the group has carried on its activities and expanded its arsenal. Now the attackers have four implants at their disposal (PowerShower, VBShower, VBCloud, CloudAtlas), each of them a full-fledged backdoor. Most of the functionality in the backdoors is duplicated, but some payloads provide various exclusive capabilities. The use of cloud services to manage backdoors is a distinctive feature of the group, and it has proven itself in various attacks.
Note: The indicators in this section are valid at the time of publication.
0D309C25A835BAF3B0C392AC87504D9E протокол (08.05.2025).doc
D34AAEB811787B52EC45122EC10AEB08 HTA
4F7C5088BCDF388C49F9CAAD2CCCDCC5 StandaloneUpdate_2020-04-13_090638_8815-145.log:StandaloneUpdate_2020-04-13_090638_8815-145cfcf.vbs
24BFDFFA096D3938AB6E626E418572B1 StandaloneUpdate_2020-04-13_090638_8815-145.log:StandaloneUpdate_2020-04-13_090638_8815-145.vbs
5C93AF19EF930352A251B5E1B2AC2519 StandaloneUpdate_2020-04-13_090638_8815-145.log:StandaloneUpdate_2020-04-13_090638_8815-145.dat (encrypted)
0E13FA3F06607B1392A3C3CAA8092C98 VBShower::Payload(1)
BC80C582D21AC9E98CBCA2F0637D8993 VBShower::Payload(2)
EBD6DA3B4D452BD146500EBC6FC49AAE VBShower::Payload(2)
12F1F060DF0C1916E6D5D154AF925426 VBShower::Payload(3)
E8C21CA9A5B721F5B0AB7C87294A2D72 VBShower::Payload(4)
2D03F1646971FB7921E31B647586D3FB VBShower::Payload(5)
7A85873661B50EA914E12F0523527CFA VBShower::Payload(6)
F31CE101CBE25ACDE328A8C326B9444A VBShower::Payload(7)
E2F3E5BF7EFBA58A9C371E2064DFD0BB VBShower::Payload(8)
67156D9D0784245AF0CAE297FC458AAC VBShower::Payload(9)
116E5132E30273DA7108F23A622646FE VBCloud::Launcher
1C7387D957C5381E11D1E6EDC0F3F353 upgrade.mds
E9F60941A7CED1A91643AF9D8B92A36D VBCloud::Payload(FileGrabber)
718B9E688AF49C2E1984CF6472B23805 PowerShower
A913EF515F5DC8224FCFFA33027EB0DD PowerShower::Payload(2)
F56DAD18A308B64247D0C3360DDB1727 PowerShower::Payload(2)
62170C67523C8F5009E3658F5858E8BF libvnc_plugin.dll
BAA59BB050A12DBDF981193D88079232 chambranle (encrypted)
097D18D92C2167D2F4E94F04C5A12D33 system.dll
B0100C43BD9B024C6367B38ABDF5C0D2 system_check.exe
7727AAE4A0840C7DC037634BED6A6D74 pytest.dll
billet-ru[.]net
mskreg[.]net
flashsupport[.]org
solid-logit[.]com
cityru-travel[.]org
transferpolicy[.]org
information-model[.]net
securemodem[.]com
roskomnadz[.]com
processmanagerpro[.]net
luxoftinfo[.]com
marketru[.]net
rzhd[.]org
gimnazija[.]org
technoguides[.]org
multipackage[.]net
rostvgroup[.]com
russiatimes[.]info
updatechecker[.]org
rosatomgroup[.]com
telehraf[.]com
statusupport[.]org
perfectfinder[.]net
A critical race condition vulnerability has been discovered in the Linux kernel’s Rust Binder module, potentially causing system crashes and memory corruption. Assigned CVE-2025-68260, this issue affects the kernel’s inter-process communication mechanism and requires immediate attention from system administrators and kernel maintainers. The Vulnerability The vulnerability exists in the Rust Binder component’s death_list handling mechanism. […]
The post New Linux Kernel Rust Vulnerability Triggers System Crashes appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.
Amazon has uncovered a North Korean imposter posing as a U.S.-based systems administrator. The discovery was made not through traditional background checks but by analyzing the subtle timing of the worker’s typing. According to a report from Bloomberg, Amazon security specialists flagged the employee due to suspicious “keystroke input lag.” For a genuine remote worker in […]
The post Amazon Identified North Korean IT Worker by Tracking Keystroke Activity appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.
Evalian’s Security Operations Centre has uncovered an active, sophisticated phishing campaign targeting HubSpot customers, combining business email compromise (BEC) tactics with website compromise to distribute a credential-stealing malware to unsuspecting users. The multi-layered attack demonstrates how modern threat actors are evolving their techniques to bypass traditional email security controls. The phishing campaign employs a deceptive […]
The post Targeted Phishing Attack Strikes HubSpot Users appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.
Microsoft has released an out-of-band security update to address a significant vulnerability in Message Queuing (MSMQ) functionality that impacts Windows 10 systems running IIS web servers and enterprise environments. The flaw, discovered and documented in the December 9, 2025 update (KB5071546), affects Windows 10 version 22H2 and version 21H2. The Vulnerability The MSMQ bug causes […]
The post Microsoft Patches MSMQ Flaw That Affects IIS Web Servers appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.
Roundcube, the widely used open-source webmail software, has officially released critical security updates to address two significant vulnerabilities in its 1.6 and 1.5 LTS (Long-Term Support) versions. These flaws could allow attackers to execute malicious scripts or expose sensitive information, posing a risk to organizations and individuals relying on the platform for email communication. The […]
The post Roundcube Flaws Let Attackers Execute Malicious Scripts appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.
WatchGuard has issued an urgent warning regarding a critical zero-day vulnerability in its Firebox firewall appliances that is currently being exploited in the wild. The flaw, tracked as CVE-2025-14733, allows remote attackers to seize control of affected devices without needing any authentication. Technical Details and Impact The vulnerability is an Out-of-Bounds Write flaw located in the iked process, which handles […]
The post WatchGuard Zero-Day Actively Exploited to Seize Control of Firewalls appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.
North Korean cybercriminals shattered previous records in 2025, stealing at least $2.02 billion in cryptocurrency through a sophisticated campaign that represents the most successful year ever for state-sponsored digital theft despite fewer confirmed attacks. This unprecedented haul marks a 51% increase year-over-year. It brings the regime’s cumulative cryptocurrency theft to a staggering $6.75 billion, cementing […]
The post North Korean Hackers Set Record with $2 Billion Crypto Heist in 2025 appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.
The notorious Clop ransomware group has launched a new data extortion campaign targeting internet-facing Gladinet CentreStack file servers, exploiting an unknown vulnerability to steal sensitive corporate information. Incident responders from the Curated Intelligence community first identified this campaign, which marks the latest in a series of Clop attacks targeting enterprise file transfer and storage solutions. […]
The post Clop Ransomware Group Targets Gladinet CentreStack Servers to Exfiltrate Data appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.
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The University of Sydney has alerted its community to a significant cybersecurity breach involving the unauthorized access of a code library. The incident, confirmed by university officials on December 18, 2025, has exposed the personal information of thousands of current and former staff members, as well as a smaller group of students and alumni. University […]
The post University of Sydney Suffers Cyberattack, Student and Staff Data Exposed appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.
OpenAI has officially released GPT-5.2-Codex, marking a significant leap forward in AI-driven software engineering and defensive cybersecurity. Described as the most advanced “agentic” coding model to date, this new iteration is optimized to handle complex, long-horizon tasks, making it a powerful tool for developers and security researchers alike. Unlike previous models that excelled at short code […]
The post OpenAI’s GPT-5.2 Codex Boosts Agentic Coding and Cyber Vulnerability Detection appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.
