Interview transcript:

Terry Gerton: You’ve recently laid out a mix of reforms and warnings and priorities for the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, which is still moving through Congress. What’s the overall message before we dig into the specifics that POGO wants to send about this year’s recommendations?

Greg Williams: Sure. I think we all welcome all of the extraordinary work that Congress has done this year to produce two different versions of NDAA bills that work very hard to overhaul military acquisition. Now that said, they place an enormous emphasis on deregulating military acquisition, with the Senate’s version repealing no fewer than 86 distinct statutes that govern military acquisition. Now, Congress has its own research arm to help inform for these decisions, and that’s the Government Accountability Office. Now the Government Accountability Office maintains a database of suggestions. And last I checked, there were 750 recommendations they had for how the Defense Department is run and exactly none of them recommend repealing any statutes having to do with military acquisition. Now I think the unavoidable question is if Congress doesn’t seem to be listening to the GAO, its own investigative body, well, who is it listening to? I think it’s only logical to wonder to what extent these changes are being pushed by the defense industry, perhaps at the expense of the interests of the taxpayer.

Terry Gerton: Are you seeing any specifics in the NDAA that relate back to those 750 GAO suggestions?

Greg Williams: Frustratingly few. Two that I’ll call out that I think are really important are passages in both the House and Senate versions that secure greater right to repair the military’s own equipment. Just imagine you’re far from home, you have a piece of equipment that you rely on, perhaps for your safety or in order to be able to complete your mission, and it breaks. Right now, there are rules, laws, contracts that often get in the way of military personnel fixing those things. This year’s NDAA, whether the Senate or the House versions prevail in this context, will dramatically increase the military’s right to repair its own equipment. And I think it’s really important that those passages survive conference. The other one that I think is particularly important in terms of acquisition law are some reforms to what’s called the Nunn-McCurdy Act, which stipulates that Congress needs to be informed if weapons development or procurement programs breach certain cost thresholds and requires that the Secretary of Defense or Secretary of War recertify those programs and provide updated timetables and budgets for their completion. So the passages that amend that provide Congress more say in the recertification of those programs and they make it easier to call out cost overages, especially in the case of large programs like naval shipbuilding, where if you look at the overall program, you may not have breached overall cost thresholds. But you’ve already built two or three ships and you can tell that they’re way over budget. What this passage allows you to do is to treat them as distinct subprograms and apply those thresholds to them individually.

Terry Gerton: Well, you’re right. There’s certainly a lot of coverage in the NDAA, both versions, around acquisition reform. One of the other pieces that POGO has really called out is the use of military force. First, you recommend that the authorizations for the use of military force from 1991 and 2002 tied to operations in Iraq be repealed. Why is it so important to take those off the books now?

Greg Williams: Well, those AUMFs have been used very pervasively to authorize all kinds of use of violence around the world that seem to have very little to do with the original intentions of those two AUMFs. And one of the ways Congress can clarify the use of its power to decide when and where we go to war is by not leaving things like that lying around to be potentially misinterpreted or reinterpreted by the executive branch.

Terry Gerton: I’m speaking with Greg Williams. He’s the director of the Center for Defense Information at the Project on Government Oversight. Greg, let’s follow up on this a little bit because there are conversations happening between the president and his team and Congress right now about operations in Venezuela. So how do those AUMFs relate to those kinds of current conversations?

Greg Williams: Well, I’m going to emphasize that there are operations against Venezuelan nationals and Venezuelan boats, and they’re being treated by the administration as being very distinct from potential operations that might take place in Venezuela. And in fact, the administration is arguing that they don’t need to comply with the War Powers Act in the context of the Venezuelan boats because we’re not deploying troops in harm’s way. As you may know, these boat strikes are believed to be largely conducted by unmanned aerial vehicles and so arguably, American troops are never in any danger as we execute these strikes. Now if we were to invade Venezuela or if we were to fly crewed aircraft over Venezuela or even close to Venezuela and engage in a shooting war with them, that would more clearly trigger the requirements of the War Powers Act, or at least that would not be subject to the exclusion that the Trump administration has called out in the context of those boats.

Terry Gerton: One of the other concerns that you raise about military deployments is border enforcement and the use of military forces in that function. What’s the concern there?

Greg Williams: Well, the overall concern is that what we’re seeing is a steady erosion of what we thought were bright lines, protecting both American citizens and others against being arbitrarily seized or killed. And whether we see those lines blurred outside our borders, as in the context of these boats or inside of our borders, it just makes us all a lot less safe. It’s much harder to count on not being swept up in some raid and potentially deported to a foreign country without any meaningful opportunity to defend our rights.

Terry Gerton: Well, military deployments and acquisition reform are really big topics. I want to pull you down to something a little more wonky and talk cost accounting standards because you’ve got a recommendation in here and there’s been a lot of conversation about moving DoD from cost accounting standards to GAAP, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Why was that important enough to raise in your memo?

Greg Williams: I think it represents a fundamental misunderstanding of how accounting in general works. And it undermines a very basic control that any customer organization wants to have over vendors that are submitting things like expense reports. So at a high level, I would describe the generally accepted accounting principles as a set of tools that are created by an industry consortium to protect shareholders in private organizations from misrepresentation of the value of the enterprise. Cost accounting standards are like the expense report guidelines that any consultant or anyone who’s ever worked as a customer for a big business has to comply with. And different customers have different standards. Some say you can’t have any alcohol at all with your dinner, some say you can have one drink. Some say if you’ve traveled less than 50 miles, you can’t submit any meal-related expenses. It represents an agreement between the customer and their vendor about what is and is not an acceptable expense. And it’s a very basic structure that any business person should recognize.

Terry Gerton: How does that relate to DoD’s ability to pass an audit?

Greg Williams: I don’t think it is particularly related. As long as you follow whatever rules are articulated for you, you can pass an audit. I think use of cost accounting standards is more about making sure that the government gets a fair deal from its vendors when those vendors submit cost reports for reimbursement.

Terry Gerton: So POGO’s list is pretty specific in terms of things that you would hope Congress would consider. If they were to take up your list, what kinds of impact would you expect to see in terms of military readiness and operations?

Greg Williams: Well, I think it’s really interesting that over the last several weeks we’ve paid a lot of attention to the USS Gerald Ford Carrier Strike Group. There are two readiness issues that bear on it directly that have received some attention, I think, should probably receive more attention. One is that it was called out as a specific example of how service people are affected by the inability to repair their own equipment. And the example that was used was, I think, more than half of the ovens used to prepare meals for sailors embarked on the Ford were out of commission and had to wait an extended period of time for the vendor to repair them. Now that’s one thing when you know you can’t have muffins with your breakfast. But if similar principles apply to systems that allow the aircraft carrier to launch and recover aircraft or move weapons to the flight deck and things like that, just imagine being 6,000 miles away from the contractor who might repair those things and having one of them break and having to wait or redeploy back to the continental United States to have those things fixed. It’s just, I think, a fundamentally unreasonable expectation and puts our troops needlessly in danger.

The post POGO has new recommendations to improve the 2026 NDAA before it’s finalized first appeared on Federal News Network.

House and Senate negotiators are racing to finalize the 2026 defense policy bill by the end of the week, with all House and Senate Armed Services Committee disputes resolved and only a few Senate jurisdictional details still holding the legislation’s advancement to the House floor in early December.

“I think what they’re doing is, there’s been a couple of pencils-down time frames, but it sounds like it’ll be done by the end of the week. That’s what the focus is. Get it done by the end of the week, and then to be on the floor the beginning of the second week of December,” Rep. Rob Wittman, R-Va., a member of the House Armed Services Committee, told Federal News Network Tuesday. 

The one big place where things are still going through the process, Wittman said, is with the other committees of jurisdiction. They can either decide to waive jurisdiction or refine the language in ways that ensure the “Big Four” on HASC and SASC will agree to include it in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

“It really is a Senate issue because the Senate has the rules where they can add some things that are not allowed under House rules. That’s really where the issue is right now, I think all the HASC and SASC issues have been taken care of,” Wittman said. 

The Senate advanced its NDAA with broad bipartisan support in October, while the House version passed in September with mostly GOP support.

The two chambers were divided on topline funding — the Senate bill authorized nearly $925 billion for national defense, while the House version aligned with the White House’s $883 billion request. 

Both bills are heavily focused on acquisition reforms, and while the two chambers target many of the same areas, they differ in approach and specific reforms. 

“The House’s version really focused on achieving mission outcomes. It’s much more outcome-based. The Senate version was more about governance. How do we change the issues there of governance? Some of the things that we saw there that I think are really transformational is time frames,” Wittman said during the Defense One State of Defense Business Acquisition event on Tuesday. “The average acquisition process in the Pentagon is 800 days. This is going to change it to 90 to 120 days.”

Many of the acquisition reforms Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth recently rolled out as part of what he called a “war on Pentagon bureaucracy” mirror proposals in the House and Senate versions of the defense policy bill.

“Changing how we do modular open systems architecture — those things are going to be key, opening up the aperture even more, making it easier to use other transaction authorities, changing the [program executive officers] to [program acquisition executives], and then taking those billets that are now three-year billets and turning them into six-year billets,” Wittman said. “That’s actually a longer-term perspective for folks in those areas. I think this is the farthest-reaching effort in acquisition reform in the history of DoD. And a lot of what the House and Senate are doing is reflected in some of the things that the Pentagon is doing.” 

Hegseth’s move to replace the current program executive offices with a smaller number of portfolio acquisition executives — giving these new portfolio leaders broader authorities, including the ability to shift funds among programs — is also part of the Senate’s acquisition reform proposals.

When asked whether officers who used to serve three years as PEOs would want to serve six-year tours as PAEs, Wittman wagered they would as long as it doesn’t interfere with the promotion process.

“We’ve been clear that this does not interfere with the promotion process,” he said. “There’s nothing that prevents somebody that goes into a PAE position as a two-star to come out as a three-star, or, for that matter, even a four-star.” 

The change will also allow PAEs to take more risks in a culture that is deeply risk-averse. But it has to start with Congress, Whittman said. 

“We can’t lecture and say, ‘Take risks,’ and then the first time there’s a failure, we call somebody up on Capitol Hill and bang the table and holler and scream and go, ‘How did you do this? How could this happen?’ That behavior will stop in a heartbeat when somebody goes, ‘You know what? I watched them grill this PAE up on Capitol Hill. I’m not going to do that, so I’m not going to take any risks,’” Whittman said.

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